

RAÚL R. LABRADOR
ATTORNEY GENERAL

JAMES E. M. CRAIG, ISB #6365
Chief, Civil Litigation and
Constitutional Defense

BRIAN V. CHURCH, ISB #9391
Lead Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Facsimile: (208) 854-8073
james.craig@ag.idaho.gov
brian.church@ag.idaho.gov

Attorneys for Defendant

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO**

MAYDAY HEALTH,

Plaintiff,

v.

RAÚL R. LABRADOR, Attorney General of
Idaho, in his official capacity,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:26-cv-00334-AKB

**OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Mayday Health, says it wanted to avoid a “needless dispute” with the Idaho Attorney General. Yet it has created one by filing this lawsuit.

Pre-enforcement actions, like Plaintiff’s, presume that there is some sort of threatened or imminent controversy between the two sides. And thus for purposes of demonstrating the injury component of standing the federal courts examine three elements. First, a plaintiff must show that it intends “to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest”; second, that the intended future conduct is arguably proscribed by the challenged statute; and third, “the threat of future enforcement . . . is substantial.” *Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus*, 573 U.S. 149, 161–64 (2014); *accord Peace Ranch, LLC v. Bonta*, 93 F.4th 482, 487–90 (9th Cir. 2024).

That does not describe this case. There is no imminent controversy between Plaintiff and the Attorney General. Plaintiff has not made a clear showing (as it must do on a preliminary injunction motion) that “threatened enforcement [is] sufficiently imminent,” i.e., that “there exists a credible threat of prosecution [under a statute].” *Driehaus*, 573 U.S. at 159 (cleaned up). Plaintiff relies on a three-year-old void and withdrawn letter—that was voided and withdrawn three years ago—written to a state representative, and then relies on the fact that the Attorney General would not advise whether “neither the AG, nor anyone else, will penalize Mayday or any third party for [Mayday’s billboard] display.” Dkt. 1 Ex. 6; *see also* Dkt. 4-1 at 11–14. But those do not show a credible threat of prosecution here.

The Attorney General has made no statement against, threat toward, or commenced any kind of action against Plaintiff. The withdrawn letter caused confusion, was “mischaracterized as law enforcement guidance,” and its “analysis is void”, and not just void but “void in its entirety” and “does not represent the views of the Attorney General on any question of Idaho law.” Decl. of Counsel Ex. 1. To be clear, the original letter was not some type of guidance document and was

incomplete, in that it did not analyze or address the First Amendment or other concepts, which led to subsequent confusion. That letter was withdrawn three years before Plaintiff contracted with the Nampa billboard company. *Id.*; Dkt. 4-1 at 5.

Additionally, Plaintiff's attempts to drag the Attorney General into this suit and manufacture a dispute should not be rewarded. When Plaintiff said it "want[ed] to be sure that neither the AG, nor anyone else, will penalize Mayday or any third party for [the billboard]", it was asking for advice on the legality of its billboard, and asking the Attorney General to bind other governmental agencies over which he has no control, including the U.S. Department of Justice, other federal law enforcement agencies, and county and city prosecuting attorneys. Such legal advice should come from its own attorneys. And that is why the Attorney General told Plaintiff's attorney that "[t]he Attorney General does not provide legal advice to private parties"—he cannot bind any other governmental agency. These facts do not demonstrate a credible threat of prosecution.

Given that the Attorney General has no "bone to pick" with Plaintiff, he should not be forced in this litigation to take a position. Nor frankly should the Court be involved in this litigation. The Court's jurisdiction is premised on actionable cases and controversies under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, not hypothetical jurisdiction resulting in hypothetical judgments, or advisory opinions, something "disapproved by [the Supreme] Court from the beginning." *Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't*, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998) (citing *Muskrat v. United States*, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911); *Hayburn's Case*, 2 Dall. 409 (1792)). Accordingly, the Court should deny the motion for preliminary injunction pending before it.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary’ equitable remedy that is ‘never awarded as of right.’” *Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney*, 602 U.S. 339, 345–46 (2024) (quoting *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)). The movant bears the burden to “make a clear showing that ‘[1] he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.’” *Id.* at 346 (quoting *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 20). When the nonmovant is the State, the last two factors merge. *Baird v. Bonta*, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023).

In a lawsuit, a plaintiff must present a case or controversy. “Federal courts can only review statutes and executive actions when necessary to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by official violation of law.” *Murthy v. Missouri*, 144 S. Ct. 1972, 1985 (2024) (cleaned up). One requirement is that a plaintiff establish its standing, which requires a showing that it “has suffered, or will suffer, an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” *Id.* at 1986 (cleaned up). Where a plaintiff brings a pre-enforcement challenge, (1) it must allege “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest”; (2) the intended future conduct “must be arguably prescribed by the challenged statute”; and (3) “the threat of future enforcement must be substantial.” *Peace Ranch, LLC v. Bonta*, 93 F. 4th 482, 487 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing or quoting *Driehaus*, 134 S. Ct. at 162–64) (cleaned up).

The plaintiff “must support each element of standing with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” *Murthy*, 144 S. Ct. at 1986 (citation omitted) (cleaned up). And at the preliminary injunction stage, the plaintiff must make a “clear showing that [it] is likely to establish each element of standing.” *Id.* (cleaned up). In this case, Plaintiff has not made the clear showing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. In April 2026, Plaintiff says it planned a billboard campaign.

According to Plaintiff, this case is about a mobile billboard that Plaintiff wants to have driven around Nampa. Plaintiff says that on April 7, 2026, it contracted with a vendor to display the mobile (vehicular) billboard advertising its website, which would drive around Nampa. Dkt. 1 ¶ 24. But ten days later, on April 17, 2026, its executive director “reluctantly instructed the billboard operator to stand down, surrendering Mayday’s payment.” *Id.* ¶ 28. According to Plaintiff, it would like to run the billboard in Nampa and publish certain unspecified media in Idaho. *Id.* ¶ 30.

II. Plaintiff wanted the Attorney General to provide it legal advice about what the Attorney General or others would do about the billboard campaign.

The day after it entered the contract with the billboard vendor, Plaintiff wrote a letter to the Attorney General on April 8, 2026. Dkt. 1 ¶ 26. That letter asked the Attorney General to confirm “it will take no action against Mayday, the billboard operator Mayday has contracted with, or any other third parties under any state law... either to prevent Mayday from displaying its billboard, or to penalize Mayday, the billboard operator, or any other third party for enabling or causing its display.” Dkt. 1 Ex. 3 at 27 (blue number). The letter closed with a paragraph referring to a recent lawsuit that involved a temporary injunction, saying “[w]e would expect the same result here.” *Id.*

Then, on April 17, 2026, Mayday’s counsel emailed three Deputy Attorneys General (including the Chief of Civil Litigation) about the letter, and subsequently called and left voice messages for them. *Id.* ¶ 27 & Exs. 4, 5. Ten days later, on April 27, 2026, Plaintiff’s attorney contacted the Chief of Civil Litigation by email. *Id.* ¶ 29. Plaintiff wanted advice on whether the “AG” and “anyone else” would “penalize Mayday or any third party” for the billboard display. Dkt. 1 Ex. 6. On the same day as the email, the Chief of Civil Litigation responded by email and said, “Hi

Wendy, The Attorney General does not provide legal advice to private parties. Thanks, Jim [signature].” *Id.*¹

III. Three years prior, the Attorney General had written a letter to a representative, which he withdrew, declared the letter and its analysis void, and made that withdrawal public.

None of the communications from Mayday’s attorneys to the Attorney General reference a 2023 letter to a representative. Dkt. 1. Exs. 3 (April 8 letter), 4 (April 17 email), Ex. 6 (April 27 emails). (Nor do they reference a statutory provision.) But Mayday’s complaint does. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 22–23 & Ex. 2. In that 2023 letter, dated March 27, 2023, to Representative Crane, the Attorney General responded to some questions from the representative. *Id.* Ex. 2. The March 2023 letter referenced or summarily discussed Idaho Code §§ 18-604(1), 18-603, 18-607, and 18-622. *Id.* After a lawsuit was initiated about this March 2023 letter, the letter was withdrawn and voided, as was its analysis. In an April 7, 2023 letter, the Attorney General explained that the prior letter had been mischaracterized as law enforcement guidance; recognized the confusion the letter was causing; but also recognized it was not properly requested. Counsel Decl. Ex. 1. The April 2023 letter was clear: the March 2023 letter was withdrawn, the March 2023 letter’s analysis is void, the March 2023 letter “is void in its entirety,” and “[i]t does not represent the views of the Attorney General on any question of law.” *Id.* Plaintiff acknowledges the March 2023 letter was withdrawn. Dkt. 1 ¶ 22.

¹ Mayday misrepresents this communication in paragraph 3 of its complaint. There it says “the Attorney General’s representatives informed Mayday’s counsel that his office would not give ‘legal advice’ or disavow its claimed authority to punish Mayday if it chose to go forward with its planned campaign.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 3.

The “Attorney General’s representative[]” did not “inform[] Mayday’s counsel that his office would not ... disavow its claimed authority to punish Mayday if it chose to go forward with its planned campaign.” The email, attached to the complaint, itself demonstrates there was no comment on or a reference to “disavowal” and no comment on or reference to “claimed authority to punish Mayday if it chose to go forward with its planned campaign” by either side. Respectfully, if this case goes forward, Plaintiff should amend its complaint to fix this blatant misrepresentation.

IV. Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit.

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on May 29, 2026. Dkt. 1. On the same day it filed the pending motion for a preliminary injunction. Dkt. 4. The preliminary injunction seeks to enjoin the Attorney General “from taking any action under any law—including Idaho Code §§ 18-603, 18-607, 18-622, 18-623, and 48-601—to penalize or threaten to penalize Mayday for displaying its mobile billboard in Idaho or for publishing its website to Idahoans.” Dkt. 4 at 2. After serving the Attorney General with the motion for a preliminary injunction on June 8, 2026, the parties stipulated to, and the Court adopted, a procedure whereby the Attorney General would first respond to the preliminary injunction. Dkts. 15, 16. The Attorney General now does so, opposing the motion for a preliminary injunction.

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success or irreparable injury.

A. There is no substantial threat of enforcement.

When a party brings a pre-enforcement challenge, as Plaintiff has done, it must satisfy the *Driehaus* factors as to its alleged injury. At the preliminary injunction stage, it must make a clear showing (1) of “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest”; (2) that the intended future conduct “must be arguably prescribed by the challenged statute”; and (3) that “the threat of future enforcement must be substantial.” *Peace Ranch*, 93 F. 4th at 487 (citing or quoting *Driehaus*) (cleaned up). The last factor refers to a “credible threat of prosecution.” *Driehaus*, 573 U.S. at 159 (quoting *Babbitt v. Farm Workers*, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). Plaintiff has not made that showing here.

In its complaint, Plaintiff asserts there is a credible threat of enforcement based on the interpretation of Idaho Code §§ 18-603, 18-607, 18-622, and 48-601 of the Attorney General, and “because the Attorney General has refused to disavow punishing Mayday ... despite repeated specific

requests.” Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 31–32. (Idaho Code § 18-623 is not referenced in paragraph 31, and neither it nor Idaho Code § 48-601 is referenced in the March 2023 letter that Plaintiff is purportedly concerned about.)

But simply because there is a three-year-old, void (and withdrawn) letter is insufficient to support standing. And simply because the Attorney General refuses to provide legal advice to Plaintiff is also insufficient by itself, or combined with the void letter, to justify standing. All that Plaintiff has here is a series of statutes, with no threat or even attempt at enforcement against Plaintiff by the Attorney General. The Attorney General has done nothing as it pertains to Mayday, except to tell Mayday that the Attorney General does not provide legal advice to private parties. Under these circumstances, that is insufficient.² There is no substantial threat of enforcement.

Plaintiff makes much of the void (and withdrawn) letter, which was voided three years before Plaintiff contacted the billboard company. The March 27, 2023 letter to a state representative summarily addressed Idaho Code §§ 18-604(1), 18-603, 18-607, and 18-622. It did not mention Plaintiff; it was not targeted at Plaintiff; and it did not address entities who (as Plaintiff describes itself) are information clearinghouses. That letter was also withdrawn as of April 7, 2023.

And so, the fact that the March 2023 letter had been withdrawn and voided as of April 7, 2023, was known to Plaintiff. But contrary to Plaintiff’s limited characterization, this was not just

² The Attorney General is cognizant of the Ninth Circuit’s recent decisions that appear to hold that the mere existence of “a new law whose history of enforcement is negligible or nonexistent” with either “a general warning of enforcement” or a “failure to disavow enforcement[.]” are sufficient. *E.g., Imperial Sovereign Court of Mont. v. Knudsen*, 170 F.4th 820, 835 (9th Cir. 2026) (cleaned up). That does not apply here because the laws at issue here are not new.

Regardless, the recent panel decisions are hard to square with *Driehaus* and with the en banc court’s statement in *Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n*, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) that neither the mere existence of a statute nor a general threat of enforcement is sufficient. Whether the subsequent panels that distinguished that statement have done so properly is not before this Court. *E.g., Cal Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman*, 328 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Norita v. N. Mariana Islands*, 331 F.3d 690, 696 (9th Cir. 2003).

a withdrawal letter for procedural reasons. *See* Dkt. 1 ¶ 23. The analysis was very much noted to be void and the earlier letter did not represent the views of the Attorney General. The March 2023 letter could not inform Plaintiff of the Attorney General’s view regarding the statutes cited, or their applicability to Plaintiff, or even any comment on an entity like Mayday, when the April 2023 letter made clear that the March 2023 letter did not represent the Attorney General’s views.

The conclusion here that the void March 2023 letter (in conjunction with the April 2023 letter) does not support a “credible threat of prosecution” is not in conflict with the earlier *Planned Parenthood* ruling. *See Planned Parenthood Great Nw. v. Labrador*, 122 F.4th 825 (9th Cir. 2024). In that case, the Ninth Circuit examined whether there was pre-enforcement standing on the basis of the March 2023 letter and as to the physician plaintiffs—recall, standing generally is based upon the facts as they exist as the time of the lawsuit (though disavowal can occur later), which was filed before April 7. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 569 n.4 (1992). The court there noted the March 2023 letter was specific to “Idaho health care professionals who perform the specific act of referring patients to abortion providers across state lines.” *Planned Parenthood*, 122 F.4th at 838 (cleaned up). It further said that the Attorney General had not disavowed the interpretation of § 18-622 (or an alternative interpretation), and concluded that that a county prosecutor could rely on the letter’s interpretation. *Id.* Thus, the court concluded that the physician plaintiffs had reasonably viewed the March 2023 letter as communicating a specific warning or threat. *Id.* at 839.

Here, though, three years prior to Plaintiff reaching out to a vendor, the March 2023 letter had already been withdrawn by the April 2023 letter, declared void in its entirety, and declared not to contain views of the Attorney General. Plus, Plaintiff was neither mentioned, nor referenced, nor targeted by either of the letters. County prosecutors could not rely on the March 2023 letter

anymore either, because the letter and its analysis are void and do not represent the views of the Attorney General. Thus, Plaintiff's situation and its awareness of the March 2023 and April 2023 letters, make this situation different than the *Planned Parenthood* case.

Plaintiff also makes much of the fact that the Attorney General refused to provide legal advice. In the first letter it references, it says it wanted the Attorney General's office to advise that the office would not take action against Plaintiff and "and any other third parties under any state law." Dkt. 1 at 27 (blue number); *see also id.* at 30 (blue number). Plaintiff also references a call log of its counsel, including some calls which its counsel attempted to conceal the identity of the caller.³ *Id.* at 33 (blue number). And Plaintiff sent an email in late April 2026 requesting the Attorney General to opine on whether "the AG, []or anyone else, will penalize Mayday or any third party for this display." *Id.* at 35 (blue number). But all of these communications were nothing more than an attempt to draw an opinion on hypothetical circumstances, involving unknown third parties, over which there was no credible threat of prosecution. The Attorney General, as the Chief of Civil Litigation informed Plaintiff's counsel, "does not provide legal advice to private parties." Thus, Plaintiff needed to ask its counsel what it could and couldn't do consistent with the First Amendment and Idaho law. The Attorney General's refusal to provide private legal advice does not demonstrate a credible threat of enforcement by him against Plaintiff or these unknown third parties.

In its brief supporting the motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff refers to the Attorney General making "unrenounced threats" against it but never identifies specifically what those "threats" were or how they were directed at Plaintiff. Dkt. 4-1 at 11–14. Plaintiff also says that the

³ Dialing *67 before a number attempts to block the caller ID from displaying the caller's phone number on the recipient's phone.

Attorney General “refused repeated requests to disavow enforcing Idaho Code §§ 18-603, 18-607, 18-622, and 48-601 against Mayday’s protected expression,” but none of these statutes are cited by Plaintiff in its communications to the Attorney General. *Compare* Dkt. 4-1 at 11, *with* Dkt. 1, Exs. 3, 4, 6.

Plaintiff also cites the earlier *Planned Parenthood* case, Dkt. 4-1 at 11, but for the reasons discussed above this situation is different. And Plaintiff cites a decision concerning plaintiffs challenging an abortion trafficking statute, Idaho Code § 18-623. Dkt. 4-1 at 10–11 (citing *Matsumoto v. Labrador*, 122 F.4th 787, 798–99 (9th Cir. 2024)). But in *Matsumoto* the court relied on the newness of the law, and that the Attorney General affirmed his authority to prosecute violations of Idaho Code § 18-623 if the local prosecutor refused to, the Attorney General took the position that the statute was constitutional, and Idaho had not attempted to prevent county attorneys from enforcing the statute. *Matsumoto*, 122 F.4th at 797–98. The situation is *dissimilar* here where these are not new laws, and the Attorney General has had no communication with Plaintiff, other than to tell Plaintiff’s counsel that the Attorney General does not provide legal advice to private parties.

For these reasons, the Court should conclude there is no clear showing of a substantial threat of enforcement, and thus neither a likelihood of success on the merits nor irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction.⁴

⁴ Related to the lack of an Article III injury are the lack of traceability and redressability. There are other prosecutor authorities who act independent of the Attorney General, including federal prosecutors, county prosecutors, and city attorneys. Moreover, under the federal Comstock Act, related provisions create criminal offenses for using “the mails” to ship “any drug ... for producing abortion” or using express companies or common carriers to ship “any drug ... designed, adapted, or intended for producing abortion[s].” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462(c). Thus, injuries purportedly from these enforcement authorities, or the separate laws that would impact mailing abortifacients, would not be traceable to the Attorney General or redressable by him.

II. The Attorney General would be harmed by an unnecessary injunction.

Here, an injunction is *unnecessary* for the reasons described above. An injunction purporting to enjoin the Attorney General from applying “any state law” is overbroad, but it would also work harm on the State where there has been no showing of a need for such an injunction. “[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.” *Maryland v. King*, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, J., in chambers) (citation omitted) (cleaned up).

Moreover, the third and fourth preliminary injunction factors also suggest that an unnecessary injunction should not be entered. These factors focus on the balance of equities and the public interest. As above, an unnecessary injunction against the Attorney General’s “enforcement” would harm the state by enjoining one of its officials from properly effectuating Idaho’s laws if there ever were a need to properly enforce them. This would not be in the public interest, and the balance of equities would favor not harming the State. Moreover, Idaho has spoken through its duly enacted statutes regulating abortion, and an injunction against those would not be in the public interest, nor would be in the balance of equities.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

DATED: June 29, 2026

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

/s/ Brian V. Church
BRIAN V. CHURCH
Lead Deputy Attorney General

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT on June 29, 2026, the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing to the following persons:

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
Los Angeles, California

Adam S. Sieff
adamsieff@dwt.com

Farrah C. Vazquez
farrahvazquez@dwt.com

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
Seattle, Washington

Ambika Kumar
ambikakumar@dwt.com

Nicole Saad Bembridge
nicolesaadbembridge@dwt.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
Washington, DC

Chelsea T. Kelly
chelseakelly@dwt.com

Laura R. Handman
laurahandman@dwt.com

Azeezat Adeleke
azeezatadeleke@dwt.com

LEGAL VOICE
Seattle, Washington

Wendy S. Heipt
wheipt@legalvoice.org

LEGAL VOICE
Boise, Idaho

Kelly O'Neill
koneill@legalvoice.org

/s/ Brian V. Church
BRIAN V. CHURCH

RAÚL R. LABRADOR
ATTORNEY GENERAL

JAMES E. M. CRAIG, ISB #6365
Chief, Civil Litigation and
Constitutional Defense

BRIAN V. CHURCH, ISB #9391
Lead Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
Facsimile: (208) 854-8073
james.craig@ag.idaho.gov
brian.church@ag.idaho.gov

Attorneys for Defendant

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO**

MAYDAY HEALTH,

Plaintiff,

v.

RAÚL R. LABRADOR, Attorney General of
Idaho, in his official capacity,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:26-cv-00334-AKB

DECLARATION OF COUNSEL

I, BRIAN V. CHURCH, declare as follows:

1. I am a Lead Deputy Attorney General for the Idaho Office of the Attorney General in the Civil Litigation and Constitutional Defense Division. I am an attorney of record for Defendant. I previously served as an attorney of record in *Planned Parenthood Great Northwest v. Labrador*, No. 1:23-cv-00142-BLW.

2. Attached as **Exhibit 1** is a copy of the April 7, 2023 letter to Representative Brent Crane from the Attorney General withdrawing and voiding the March 27, 2023 letter directed to Representative Crane. The document was previously submitted in the *Planned Parenthood* litigation as Dkt. 42-4, and filed on April 14, 2023.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED: June 29, 2026

STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

/s/ Brian V. Church
BRIAN V. CHURCH
Lead Deputy Attorney General

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
Los Angeles, California

Adam S. Sieff
adamsieff@dwt.com

Farrah C. Vazquez
farrahvazquez@dwt.com

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
Seattle, Washington

Ambika Kumar
ambikakumar@dwt.com

Nicole Saad Bembridge
nicolesaadbembridge@dwt.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP
Washington, DC

Chelsea T. Kelly
chelseakelly@dwt.com

Laura R. Handman
laurahandman@dwt.com

Azeezat Adeleke
azeezatadeleke@dwt.com

LEGAL VOICE
Seattle, Washington

Wendy S. Heipt
wheipt@legalvoice.org

LEGAL VOICE
Boise, Idaho

Kelly O'Neill
koneill@legalvoice.org

/s/ Brian V. Church
BRIAN V. CHURCH



STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RAÚL R. LABRADOR

April 7, 2023

Representative Brent Crane
Idaho House of Representatives
Idaho State Capitol
700 W. Jefferson Street, Rm. EW46
Boise, ID 83702
NON-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

Re: Withdrawal of March 27 Letter

Representative Crane:

On March 27, 2023, I provided you with a letter analysis of several questions prepared by my Associate Attorney General. Since then, the letter analysis has been mischaracterized as law enforcement guidance sent out publicly to local prosecutors and others. It was not a guidance document, nor was it ever published by the Office of the Attorney General.

Due to subsequent events in the legislative process and my determination that your request was not one I was required to provide under Idaho law, that analysis is now void. Accordingly, I hereby withdraw it.

First, the March 27 analysis is now moot because it relates to a law that has been significantly altered by intervening legislation. The day after I issued the analysis, the Legislature introduced HB374 to amend Idaho's laws concerning the legal definition and proscription of abortion that my analysis summarily addressed. That legislation passed on March 31, 2023, and was enacted upon the Governor's signature on April 6, 2023. The amendment of the existing statute by HB374 vitiates the "question of law" upon which you asked me to opine, rendering the letter void. Idaho Code § 67-1401(6).

Second and troublingly, further examination of your request suggests it was not an authorized request for an Attorney General's Opinion as contemplated by Idaho Code § 67-1401(6). You were not asking for an opinion related to your duties as a legislator but were merely acting as a pass-through "requestor." State law

authorizes the Attorney General to render an opinion when requested by, inter alia, “any senator or representative,” *id.*, on questions of law related to their respective offices. As a result, the letter is withdrawn, and the resulting analysis is void.

Indeed, the subsequent use of the analysis illustrates the problems that arise when the Attorney General Opinion process is misused. Immediately after I transmitted this attorney-client letter to you, it was publicly posted by a nongovernmental third party who requested it in service of a political fundraising plea. This is precisely why I have sought to reform the opinion process and simply stick to a textualist reading of Idaho Code § 67-1401(6).

Again, for these reasons the March 27, 2023 letter is void in its entirety. It does not represent the views of the Attorney General on any question of Idaho law.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Raúl R. Labrador". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Raúl" being the most prominent part.

RAÚL R. LABRADOR
Attorney General