

1 CHAD A. READLER
 Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division
 2 NICOLA T. HANNA
 United States Attorney
 3 DOROTHY A. SCHOUTEN
 Chief, Civil Division
 4 DAVID K. BARRETT
 Chief, Civil Fraud Section
 5 DAVID M. HARRIS
 Deputy Chief, Civil Fraud Section
 6 JOHN E. LEE (CBN 128696)
 Assistant United States Attorneys
 7 300 N. Los Angeles Street, Room 7516
 Los Angeles, California 90012
 8 Tel: (213) 894-3995; Fax: (213) 894-7819
 Email: john.lee2@usdoj.gov
 9 MICHAEL D. GRANSTON
 DANIEL R. ANDERSON
 10 EDWARD CROOKE
 JUSTIN DRAYCOTT
 11 PAUL G. FREEBORNE
 JESSICA KRIEG
 12 PAUL PERKINS
 CAROL L. WALLACK
 13 Attorneys, Civil Division
 United States Department of Justice
 14 P.O. Box 261, Ben Franklin Station
 Washington, D.C. 20044
 15 Tel: (202) 307-0486; Fax: (202) 307-3852
 Email: carol.wallack@usdoj.gov
 16 JAMES P. KENNEDY, JR.
 United States Attorney
 17 KATHLEEN ANN LYNCH
 Assistant United States Attorney (Admitted PHV)
 18 138 Delaware Avenue
 Buffalo, New York 14201
 19 Tel: (716) 843-5830; Fax: (716) 551-3052
 Email: kathleen.lynch@usdoj.gov
 20 Attorneys for the United States of America

21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

22 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

23 WESTERN DIVISION

24 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *ex*
rel. BENJAMIN POEHLING,

25 Plaintiffs,

26 v.

27 UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC. *et al.*,

28 Defendants.

No. CV 16-08697 MWF (SSx)

AMENDED JOINT RULE 26(f)
 REPORT

DATE: April 9, 2018

TIME: 11 a.m.

COURTROOM: 5A

The Parties submit this amended Joint Report to the Court regarding the Rule 26(f) conference that counsel for the Parties conducted by telephone on December 8, 2017. At the Rule 26(f) conference, the Parties discussed the topics set forth in Rule 26(f), along with the topics set forth in the Court's February 28, 2018 Order Setting Scheduling Conference. The Parties then submitted a Joint Report on December 22, 2017 (Dkt. No. 191), which this Report updates and supersedes. The Parties' respective positions regarding each topic are set forth in detail below.

A. Statement of the Case

United States and Relator's Position: This is a civil fraud action under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, as well as for restitution and common law damages, for monies unlawfully obtained and retained by Defendant UnitedHealth Group, Inc. and various of its direct and indirect subsidiaries ("Defendants") involved in Parts C and D of the Medicare Program.¹ Pursuant to its First Claim for Relief set forth in its First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), filed on November 17, 2017 (Dkt. No. 171), the United States alleges that Defendants violated 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G), known as the "reverse false claims" provision, by knowingly (as "knowingly" is defined by 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)) concealing or knowingly and improperly avoiding their obligations to repay significant sums of money to the Medicare Program.² Specifically, for over a decade, Defendants have been knowingly concealing and knowingly and improperly avoiding their contractual and regulatory obligations to repay risk adjustment payments to which they were not entitled from the Medicare Program. In particular, Defendants failed

¹ On February 12, 2018, this Court issued an Order granting Defendants' motion to dismiss the United States' Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for Relief under the False Claims Act but denying the motion as to the United States' First, Fifth, and Sixth Claims for Reliefs. (Dkt. No. 212) Accordingly, this statement about the case focuses on the First, Fifth, and Sixth Claims for Relief.

² On May 16, 2017, Plaintiff-Relator Benjamin Poehling filed his Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 117) against Defendants. He is not pursuing any claims beyond those asserted by the United States.

1 to comply with their well-established contractual and regulatory obligations to
2 delete, withdraw, retract, or correct invalid diagnoses submitted by them to the
3 Medicare Program for risk adjustment payments based on the health status of
4 beneficiaries in their Medicare Advantage plans or to otherwise return to the
5 Medicare Program the overpayments based on the invalid diagnoses. On
6 information and belief, Defendants continue to engage in this unlawful conduct.

7 Pursuant to its Fifth Claim for Relief, the United States alleges that, based on
8 the same wrongful conduct, Defendants have been unjustly enriched by receiving
9 risk adjustment payments to which they were not entitled and must make
10 restitution. Pursuant to the Sixth Claim for Relief, the United States seeks to
11 recover the overpayments because they were paid by the United States based on
12 the mistaken belief that Defendants' diagnosis data was valid.

13 The United States' claims relate in part to Defendants' very large national
14 Chart Review Program, which they have conducted annually since 2005. The
15 United States alleges that Defendants systematically ignored the negative results of
16 their chart reviews, *i.e.*, results showing that diagnoses submitted by them for risk
17 adjustment payments were not supported by their beneficiaries' medical records,
18 and failed to comply with their obligations to delete the unsubstantiated diagnoses.
19 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in *United States ex rel.*
20 *Swoben v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co.*, 848 F.3d 1161, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2016),
21 held that this type of conduct – turning a blind eye to information about
22 unsupported diagnoses – constitutes reckless disregard and deliberate ignorance
23 toward the truth or falsity of the data submitted to the Medicare Program. On
24 information and belief, Defendants have continued to ignore the negative results of
25 their Chart Review Program and, thus, have continued to avoid repaying the
26 Medicare Program overpayments based on invalid diagnoses. The United States
27 seeks to recover all overpayments due to Defendants' violation of the FCA.

28

1 In addition, the United States' claims relate to Defendants' disregard of
2 information from their Risk Adjustment Coding Compliance Review ("RACCR")
3 Program about invalid diagnoses reported to them by their financially-incentivized
4 capitated and gainsharing providers. The United States alleges that Defendants
5 knew that these providers had a financial incentive to report invalid diagnoses to
6 increase risk adjustment payments and, based on the results of the RACCR
7 Program, that the providers actually or likely over-reported diagnoses, but
8 Defendants nonetheless continued to submit diagnoses from these providers and
9 knowingly and improperly avoided repaying Medicare for risk adjustment
10 payments based on invalid diagnoses from these providers.

11 UnitedHealth's Position: This case arises from the United States' and
12 Relator's effort to change the rules governing obligations of Medicare Advantage
13 ("MA") plans to verify data submitted by third-party healthcare providers. The
14 United States claims that UnitedHealth was obligated to undertake efforts to verify
15 diagnostic data from third-party healthcare providers that the government itself
16 does not undertake with respect to beneficiaries it insures under traditional
17 Medicare. UnitedHealth believes that the United States is seeking to impose
18 obligations that simply did not, and do not, exist. UnitedHealth submitted bids to
19 care for a population of beneficiaries based on a set of statutory and regulatory
20 rules administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS").
21 Those rules include CMS's risk adjustment methodology, which already reduces
22 the amount that UnitedHealth and other MA plans receive in a way that builds in
23 and reflects the existence of unsupported diagnosis codes. In addition, CMS
24 applies a statutory coding intensity adjustor, reducing payments to MA plans, to
25 account for Chart Review activities and other differences in coding patterns
26 between MA plans and CMS FFS data. UnitedHealth has not been overpaid,
27 unjustly enriched, or paid by mistake under those rules; to the contrary, requiring
28

UnitedHealth to delete unsupported diagnosis codes would result in UnitedHealth being *underpaid*.

Furthermore, UnitedHealth was transparent with CMS about the extent to which it was reviewing diagnosis codes submitted to it by providers, and CMS officials confirmed it was not required to do so-called “two-way looks” to double-check provider submissions. This suit is a misguided attempt to second guess that CMS guidance and oversight of the MA program, pursuing a windfall for the United States and Relator by forcing UnitedHealth to suffer a loss for playing by the rules CMS originally set up more than a decade after the fact. UnitedHealth has therefore asserted counterclaims for (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Fraudulent Inducement; (4) Negligent Misrepresentation; and (5) Promissory Estoppel.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

United States and Relator’s Position: This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345, & 1367(a) and 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a)-(b). The Court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 over Defendants’ counterclaims.

UnitedHealth’s Position: As to the counterclaims, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, as well as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13. To the extent jurisdiction is proper under the Complaint, it is also proper under the counterclaims, which arise out of the same transactions and occurrences alleged in the Complaint.

C. Legal Issues

United States and Relator’s Position: Many, if not most, of the key legal issues presented by this case have already been decided by the Ninth Circuit in its opinion in *Swoben*, including that (1) Defendants were not entitled to risk adjustment payments for diagnoses unsubstantiated by their beneficiaries’ medical

1 records, 848 F.3d at 1168 (“Each diagnosis code submitted must be supported by a
2 properly documented medical record”) (citations omitted); (2) Defendants were
3 obligated to exercise due diligence to ensure the validity of the diagnosis data they
4 submitted for risk adjustment payments and to take affirmative steps to address
5 errors in the diagnosis data they submitted for such payments, *id.* at 1174 (“The
6 defendants’ contention that they were under no obligation to take affirmative steps
7 to address errors . . . ignores § 422.503, which since 2005 has required Medicare
8 Advantage organizations to have effective compliance programs in place,
9 including ‘procedures for internal monitoring and auditing’ and for ‘ensuring
10 prompt response to detected offenses’”) (citing 42 C.F.R. § 422.503(b)(4)(vi),
11 (vi)(F), (vi)(G) (2005)); (3) Defendants were obligated to withdraw diagnoses
12 unsupported by their beneficiaries’ medical records, *id.* at 1185 n. 8 (“[I]f a
13 Medicare Advantage organization relied on medical record X to justify submitting
14 a particular diagnosis code to CMS initially, and the retrospective reviewer
15 concludes X does not support that diagnosis, then the code should be withdrawn”);
16 and (4) Defendants acted with actual knowledge that the diagnoses they submitted
17 were false when they withheld known errors from CMS and acted with reckless
18 disregard and deliberate ignorance about the falsity of the data submitted to CMS
19 when they turned a blind eye to the errors and did not withdraw them, *id.* at 1175-
20 76. The Court also rejected Defendants’ argument that, because CMS does not
21 verify diagnoses submitted under different parts of the Medicare Program (which
22 pay providers based on services rendered, not diagnoses submitted), Defendants
23 are entitled to risk adjustment payments based on diagnoses unsubstantiated by
24 their beneficiaries’ medical records. 848 F.3d at 1179 (rejecting this so-called
25 “actuarial equivalence” argument for “multiple reasons”).

26 In addition, in its February 12, 2018 opinion on Defendants’ Motion to
27 Dismiss (“MTD”) (Dkt. No. 212), this Court held that the United States’ FAC
28 adequately and “extensively alleges how central the diagnostic data is to the risk

1 adjustment payments CMS makes to Defendants” and “that the Government’s
2 FAC contains enough factual allegations of the effect of the submission of invalid
3 diagnosis codes on the Government’s risk adjustment payments, and on
4 Defendants’ retention of risk adjustment payment to which they are not entitled, to
5 satisfy the *Escobar* [materiality] standard.” Order on MTD at 19-20. This Court
6 further held that, with respect to the Government’s claims based on the second part
7 of the reverse false claims provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G), “[t]he
8 Government has adequately pled facts showing that the Defendants have
9 knowingly avoided obligations to repay CMS by failing to delete invalid diagnosis
10 codes, and that such failure was material” and that “the issue here is . . . the
11 specific invalid diagnosis codes that Defendants submitted and failed to delete
12 despite information available to them.” *Id.* at 20-21. Accordingly, both the Ninth
13 Circuit and this Court have recognized the direct link between the invalid
14 diagnoses submitted by Defendants and the risk adjusted payments by Medicare.
15 *Swoben*, 848 F.3d at 1167-68 (“diagnoses codes contribute to an enrollee’s risk
16 score, which is used to adjust a base payment rate”); Order on MTD at 15 (“not
17 only do various contractual and regulatory materials require Defendants to submit
18 accurate diagnostic data, but that data is central to the calculation of the amount of
19 money CMS pays to Defendants”). Moreover, the Government believes that,
20 consistent with the Ninth Circuit in *Swoben*, this Court has recognized that
21 Defendants had a legal obligation to repay CMS by deleting invalid diagnosis
22 codes, including diagnoses unsubstantiated by the beneficiaries’ medical records.
23 *Id.*

24 Very recently, on March 23, 2018, Defendants filed an Answer to the FAC.
25 The Answer includes 21 enumerated affirmative defenses, some of which raise
26 new legal and factual issues. For example, Defendants contend that the wrongful
27 conduct alleged in the FAC was the fault of third parties (affirmative defense 19)
28 and that they are “not vicariously liable for the acts alleged in the” FAC

1 (affirmative defense 5), although Defendants also contend that they made a
2 voluntary disclosure to the Department of Justice of their wrongful conduct
3 pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (affirmative defense 21) and, thus, if they are
4 liable, their liability is limited to only double (not treble) damages. Defendants
5 also contend that the Government failed to mitigate damages (affirmative defense
6 6) although Defendants, in 2012, represented to the Department of Justice that they
7 were developing a program to delete unsubstantiated diagnoses and would do so
8 (FAC ¶ 190) and despite the fact that Defendants never informed CMS about the
9 specific unsubstantiated diagnoses that they failed to delete. *See* Order on MTD at
10 21 (“[G]eneralized knowledge does not amount to actual knowledge of specific
11 invalid diagnoses. Without such actual knowledge, CMS could not know how it
12 should change the risk adjustment payments.”) Other new issues raised by
13 Defendants’ affirmative defenses include, but are not limited to, that the “services
14 and products reimbursed by the United States under Medicare were worth what the
15 government paid” (affirmative defense 15), the Court does not possess subject
16 matter jurisdiction because the Relator is not an “original source” (affirmative
17 defense 16), and the Government’s claims against one or more Defendants are
18 improperly joined with its claims against other Defendants and must be severed
19 (affirmative defense 17). Plaintiffs are currently evaluating all 21 affirmative
20 defenses and presently anticipates moving to strike some of them under Rule
21 12(f)(2). Plaintiffs will need to conduct discovery relating to at least some of
22 Defendants’ affirmative defenses (depending on which remain), which may add
23 significantly to the amount of discovery that they need to conduct in this action.
24 For example, one of Defendants’ affirmative defenses is that “[t]he services and
25 products reimbursed by the United States under Medicare were worth what the
26 government paid” (affirmative defense 15). If the Court does not strike this
27 defense, then Plaintiffs would have to conduct extensive discovery about the
28

1 services and products that Defendants provided and whether they were worth what
2 the Government paid.

3 Moreover, on March 23, 2018, Defendants filed five counterclaims against
4 the Government. Defendants' counterclaims appear to be based in large part on
5 their meritless "actuarial equivalence" argument. Defendants seek to avoid their
6 legal obligations to delete diagnoses unsubstantiated by their chart reviews and to
7 retain payments for the invalid diagnoses. This is based on their legally erroneous
8 and entirely unreasonable interpretation of the terms "actuarial equivalence" and
9 "same methodology" in that part of the Medicare Statute relating to payments to
10 Medicare Advantage organizations ("MAOs"). There is nothing in the Medicare
11 Statute, including the use of those terms in the Statute, which entitles Defendants
12 to risk adjustment payments based on invalid diagnosis data. Defendants were
13 never entitled to payments based on invalid data and had longstanding contractual
14 and regulatory obligations to delete invalid diagnoses submitted by them for such
15 payments. Their attempt to avoid their obligations and keep substantial sums (at
16 least over one billion dollars for just four years) of Medicare funds and taxpayer
17 dollars to which they were never entitled should be summarily rejected by this
18 Court.

19 Plaintiffs believe that an early ruling by the Court on this "actuarial
20 equivalence" legal issue will streamline discovery and resolution of this case.
21 Alternatively, if Defendants are not asserting their "actuarial equivalence"
22 argument in this case as they appear to represent in their statement of the legal
23 issues (below), then they should stipulate that they are not asserting this argument
24 here and withdraw their numerous and burdensome document requests relating to
25 this issue.

26 The counterclaims also appear to be based on Defendants' contention that, in
27 2014, CMS purportedly misled them to believe that they could ignore the negative
28 results of their chart reviews – the results showing the diagnoses that were

1 unsubstantiated by the beneficiaries' charts – and avoid their obligation to delete
 2 the invalid diagnoses. The Ninth Circuit, in *Swoben*, already rejected this
 3 argument. It explained that, although CMS decided in 2014 not to finalize the
 4 proposed rule prohibiting MAOs from designing chart reviews to only identify
 5 diagnoses for additional payments, CMS made clear that MAOs remained
 6 responsible for ensuring the validity of their data to avoid receiving or retaining
 7 overpayments. 848 F.3d at 1169-70. The Ninth Circuit further explained that, in
 8 2014, CMS finalized a regulation that had the same effect as the proposed
 9 regulation because it required the return of overpayments resulting from the
 10 submission of diagnoses that are unsupported by the beneficiaries' medical
 11 records. *Id.* at 1185 n.4.³ Furthermore, according to Defendants' own senior
 12 executives, in 2014, CMS told them that they could not ignore information about
 13 invalid diagnoses from their reviews of medical records and that CMS could not
 14 advise Defendants about their compliance with laws regarding their overpayment
 15 obligations. (FAC ¶ 226 & 228-29).

16 The Government presently anticipates moving to dismiss the counterclaims.
 17 Among other deficiencies with these counterclaims, it appears that Defendants'
 18 alleged damages are anticipatory, contingent, and unripe in that they are premised
 19 on this Court issuing a judgment requiring Defendants to repay the overpayments
 20 due to their failure to delete invalid diagnosis data. The primary intent of

22 ³ The regulation that CMS finalized in 2014 is often referred to as the
 23 Overpayment Rule, 42 C.F.R. § 422.326. It is the regulation that Defendants
 24 challenge in their Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") case. That regulation
 25 was issued pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"),
 26 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(d), which requires MAOs to report and return overpayments
 27 no later than 60 days after their identification of the overpayments; otherwise, their
 28 late overpayments become "obligations" under the FCA and the MAOs are subject
 to liability under the reverse false claims provision of the FCA even if they
 returned the overpayments after 60 days. The resolution of the APA case will not
 resolve this FCA case. *See UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Price*, 2017 WL 2623783,
 at 2-3 (D.D.C. June 14, 2017). This case does not involve the Overpayment Rule
 because Defendants were not just late in returning the overpayments; they never
 returned the overpayments. Nonetheless, in this case, Defendants are demanding
 the production of documents relating to the Overpayment Rule.

1 Defendants' meritless counterclaims appears to be to divert the Government's
 2 resources from focusing on its document production and other efforts in this
 3 matter.

4 Pursuant to Rule 12(a)(2), the Government's response to the counterclaims
 5 is due within 60 days after service of the counterclaims on the United States
 6 Attorney, to and including May 22, 2018. The Government and Relator also seek
 7 the same 60 days to move to strike some or all of the affirmative defenses.

8 Plaintiffs recently sent Defendants a proposed stipulation that Plaintiffs will file
 9 their motions to dismiss and to strike by May 22, 2018; Defendants may file their
 10 oppositions by June 11, 2018; Plaintiffs may file their replies by June 25, 2018;
 11 and the motions shall be heard on July 9, 2018. If Defendants do not agree to this
 12 stipulation, Plaintiffs will file an application with this Court seeking this relief.

13 In addition to issues identified elsewhere in this Report, including Section
 14 M, Plaintiffs anticipate that other legal issues may arise as discovery continues.

15 UnitedHealth's Position: This case centers on a dispute about the reciprocal
 16 contractual, regulatory, and statutory obligations of MA plans and CMS in the MA
 17 program. As the Parties, as well as this Court, have previously recognized, the
 18 "central" issues in the dispute are currently being litigated in an Administrative
 19 Procedures Act suit in the District of Columbia. See Order Denying Motion to
 20 Transfer at 4, ECF No. 154 (noting the government's agreement that "'identical
 21 arguments' . . . are 'central' to the cases"); see also *UnitedhealthCare Ins. Co. v.*
 22 *Hargan*, No. CV-16-RMC (D.D.C.).⁴ Those issues include whether MA plans are
 23 required to attempt to delete all unsupported diagnosis codes submitted to them by
 24 providers, even though the model CMS uses to determine payment amounts is
 25 based in part on unsupported codes that CMS itself collects in the Medicare Part A
 26 and B programs. CMS has acknowledged in the APA suit that it knowingly uses

27 ⁴ Upon the resignation of former Secretary of Health and Human Services Thomas
 28 Price, UnitedHealth's APA action was automatically re-captioned with the name of
 Acting Secretary Eric Hargan.

1 unsupported diagnosis codes to estimate its expected costs for Medicare patients
2 whose care it pays for directly under Medicare Parts A and B. UnitedHealth has
3 argued that CMS' choice has direct implications for the types of risk adjustment
4 data it collects from MA plans. Specifically, Congress has required CMS to use
5 the "same methodology" to determine payment amounts in the MA program, 42
6 U.S.C. § 1395w-23(b)(4), and has directed CMS to "ensure actuarial equivalence"
7 between the two programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23(a)(1)(C)(i). In light of those
8 statutory requirements, UnitedHealth believes that CMS cannot require MA plans
9 to use a different approach to the diagnosis codes they submit than the one CMS
10 itself uses, such as by requiring MA plans to delete all unsupported codes, unless
11 CMS also provides a means of adjusting for the different methodologies.

12 UnitedHealth and the United States have already fully briefed cross-motions
13 for summary judgment in the APA case addressing those issues. UnitedHealth
14 believes it would be inappropriate, inefficient, and a waste of judicial resources to
15 attempt to litigate those same issues here while they are already pending before the
16 APA court. If the APA court upholds the validity of the regulation there based on
17 a rejection of UnitedHealth's arguments described above, UnitedHealth will not
18 seek to re-litigate the regulation's validity here. If the APA court finds the
19 regulation *invalid*, then at that point the Parties will be able to address the
20 implications of such a decision for the United States' claims here. The extent to
21 which the "actuarial equivalence" and "same methodology" requirements will need
22 to be addressed by this Court, and the timing of any such consideration by this
23 Court, thus depends on the outcome in the APA case. UnitedHealth remains
24 willing to discuss those issues with the United States in an attempt to avoid
25 unnecessary and inefficient briefing on the United States' contemplated motion for
26 partial summary judgment on this issue (and has been open to such discussions
27 since the United States first raised the prospect of a motion for partial summary
28 judgment on this issue in November 2017).

1 Depending on how the APA case is resolved, there may also be other FCA-
2 and fact-specific issues to resolve in this case, including:

3 (i) Whether a physician's subjective clinical judgment regarding
4 diagnostic coding may give rise to a false claim under the FCA;

5 (ii) Whether any regulatory or contractual violations UnitedHealth did
6 commit were committed "knowingly," in light of the regulatory landscape and the
7 government's knowledge and approval of UnitedHealth's chart review processes;

8 (iii) Whether any alleged noncompliance was material to payment under
9 the FCA or the United States' unjust enrichment or payment by mistake claims;

10 (iv) Whether the acts of UnitedHealth resulted in damages actionable
11 under the FCA or claims of unjust enrichment and payment by mistake; and

12 (v) Whether the United States can sustain claims for unjust enrichment
13 and payment by mistake when valid contracts between the parties existed.

14 The United States has taken the position here, as it did on remand in
15 *Swoben*, that the Ninth Circuit's *Swoben* decision resolves many of these questions
16 in the United States' favor. That is incorrect. The Ninth Circuit's decision arose
17 following a dismissal on Rule 8 and 9(b) grounds, and resolved only the narrow set
18 of issues that were actually at issue there. Specifically, the Parties there disputed
19 the extent of detail that Rule 9(b) requires at the pleading stage in a case like this
20 one, and also the extent of the verification obligations imposed by the "best
21 knowledge, information, and belief" standard contained in the contractual
22 attestation. *See Swoben*, 848 F.3d 1178-79. The Ninth Circuit expressly *declined*
23 to address whether the United States' allegations stated a claim under the reverse
24 false claims provision. *Id.* at 1172 n.6. Accordingly, *Swoben* is of minimal
25 guidance now that this Court has dismissed the United States' attestation-based
26 claims (Dkt. 212), and the only FCA claim remaining is based on a theory that was
27 not addressed by the Ninth Circuit.

28

1 In addition, contrary to the United States’ contention, in granting in part
2 UnitedHealth’s motion to dismiss on February 12, 2018 (Dkt. 212), the Court did
3 not “recognize[] that [UnitedHealth] had a legal obligation to repay CMS by
4 deleting invalid diagnosis codes”—the Court merely held that, at this stage (where
5 factual allegations must be accepted as true), the FAC contained sufficient
6 allegations to plead materiality under the United States’ remaining causes of
7 action. (Order on MTD at 20-21.)

8 The United States also fundamentally misconstrues UnitedHealth’s
9 counterclaims and affirmative defenses. UnitedHealth’s counterclaims and
10 affirmative defenses do not rely on the actuarial equivalence issues being
11 separately litigated in the APA case. Rather, UnitedHealth’s counterclaims are
12 based on the fact that CMS failed to issue any rule or otherwise make clear any
13 requirement to perform two-way looks, affirmatively represented to UnitedHealth
14 that two-way looks were not required, knew that UnitedHealth understood it was
15 not under an obligation to perform two-way looks and relied on that understanding
16 in calculating its bids and entering into MA contracts with CMS, and continued to
17 enter into and pay UnitedHealth under such contracts. Yet the United States, years
18 after the fact, seeks to alter the fundamental assumptions built into UnitedHealth’s
19 bids, and thus, their contracts with CMS. The United States’ conduct under these
20 circumstances gives rise to UnitedHealth’s valid assertion of counterclaims
21 consisting of breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
22 dealing, fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation, and promissory
23 estoppel. UnitedHealth is prepared to litigate any motions to dismiss and/or strike
24 its counterclaims and affirmative defenses.

25 **D. Parties, Evidence, etc.**

26 **1. Parties**

27 The Parties are Plaintiff United States of America, Relator Benjamin
28 Poehling, and Defendants UnitedHealth Group Incorporated, United HealthCare

Services, Inc., UnitedHealthcare, Inc., Ovations, Inc., Optum, Inc., and OptumInsight, Inc., as well as the numerous Medicare Advantage Organizations identified in paragraph 26 of the FAC. The full list of Defendants' parents and subsidiaries is available in UnitedHealth's Corporate Disclosure Statement, Dkt. No. 129, and UnitedHealth's Notice of Interested Parties, Dkt. 130.

2. Percipient Witnesses

United States and Relator's Position: Plaintiffs, at this early stage of the litigation and subject to the factual record developed during discovery, identify the following potential percipient witnesses in this case: The individuals identified in Plaintiffs' Initial Disclosures (served on Defendants on December 22, 2017) as individuals likely to have discoverable information that the Government and Relator may use to support their claims; Relator Benjamin Poehling; the current and former executives and employees of Defendants identified in paragraph 42 of the FAC; the individuals identified and/or described in the Declaration of Carol Wallack in Support of the United States' Opposition to United's Motion to Transfer, Dkt. No. 138-1; the current and former employees of the incentivized providers listed in Exhibits 14 and 15 of the FAC; the chart reviewers and diagnosis coders who reviewed charts and coded diagnoses as part of Defendants' Chart Review, Claims Verification, and RACCR Programs; certain current and former employees of CMS and its contractors, including Palmetto and ARDX; and certain current and former participants in a managed care industry group called the Industry Collaboration Effort ("ICE").

UnitedHealth's Position: In addition to the witnesses identified by the United States and the individuals identified in UnitedHealth's Initial Disclosures (served on the United States on December 22, 2017) as those likely to have discoverable information that UnitedHealth may use to support its claims and defenses, UnitedHealth anticipates, subject to the factual record developed during discovery, that the following may be key witnesses in this action: (1) Marilyn

1 Tavenner, the former Administrator of CMS; (2) Jonathan Blum, the former
 2 Principal Deputy Administrator and Director of CMS; (3) Sean Cavanaugh, the
 3 former Deputy Administrator and Director of CMS; (4) Cheri Rice, the Acting
 4 Deputy Director of the Center for Medicare at CMS; (5) Jeffrey Grant, the former
 5 Division Director, Capitated Payment; (6) Dan Farmer, the former Special
 6 Assistant at CMS; (7) Julia Gorner, Director, Division of Capitated Plan Audits at
 7 CMS; (8) Cynthia Tudor, Deputy Center Director, Parts C and D at CMS; (9)
 8 Lateefah Hughes, the former Acting Deputy Group Director of Payment Policy and
 9 Financial Management at CMS; (10) Tom Hutchinson, the former Director of the
 10 Medicare Plan Payment Group at CMS; (11) Sean Creighton, the former Deputy
 11 Group Director of Payment Policy and Financial Management at CMS; (12)
 12 Jennifer Harlow, the Acting Director and Deputy Director of Medicare Plan
 13 Payment Group, Division of Payment Systems at CMS; (13) Jonathan Smith, the
 14 Director of the Medicare Plan Payment Group, Division of Retiree Drug Subsidy at
 15 CMS; (14) current and former government officials who (a) devised the MA risk
 16 adjustment methodology; (b) reviewed UnitedHealth's annual MA plan bids
 17 setting forth its proposed capitated payment amounts; (c) established CMS'
 18 average cost and risk calculations within specific geographic regions; (d)
 19 developed the methodology CMS uses for its own audits of MA plans; and (e) set
 20 forth diagnosis coding and medical documentation criteria used by the government
 21 itself in auditing health plans; and (15) UnitedHealth employees who will testify to
 22 the fact that they believed, and still believe, that UnitedHealth was paid properly
 23 and never submitted false statements or claims and did not knowingly and
 24 improperly retain any overpayments or avoid or decrease any obligations.

25 **3. Key Documents**

26 United States and Relator's Position: Plaintiffs, at this early stage of the
 27 litigation and subject to the factual record developed during discovery, identify the
 28 following potential key categories of documents in this case: The documents and

1 electronically stored information (“ESI”) identified in Plaintiffs’ Initial Disclosures
2 as documents and ESI that the Government and Relator may use to support their
3 claims; the documents referenced in the FAC; documents relating to Defendants’
4 Chart Review, Claims Verification, and RACCR Programs; documents relating to
5 Defendants’ knowledge (as that term is defined by the FCA) about inaccurate or
6 untruthful diagnoses submitted by providers, including diagnoses unsubstantiated
7 by the providers’ medical records; documents relating to Defendants’ obligation to
8 submit accurate and truthful risk adjustment data to Medicare for risk adjustment
9 payments, including the obligation to submit diagnoses substantiated by
10 beneficiaries’ medical records; documents relating to Defendants’ obligation to
11 retract, withdraw, or delete inaccurate or untruthful risk adjustment data submitted
12 to Medicare, including the obligation to retract, withdraw, or delete diagnoses
13 unsubstantiated by beneficiaries’ medical records; documents relating to
14 Defendants’ submission of inaccurate or untruthful risk adjustment data to
15 Medicare; documents relating to Defendants’ failure to retract, withdraw, or delete
16 inaccurate or untruthful risk adjustment data; documents relating to Defendants’
17 contracts and other agreements with CMS and their attestations; medical records
18 from the RACCR “financially incentivized” providers relating to the beneficiaries
19 whose diagnoses are at issue; documents regarding liability accruals and reserves
20 that one or more of the Defendants took relating to their Chart Review, Claims
21 Verification, and RACCR Programs; documents relating to Defendants’
22 communications with CMS about the above-mentioned issues; and documents
23 related to damages.

24 UnitedHealth’s Position: UnitedHealth anticipates, subject to the factual
25 record developed during discovery, that the key categories of documents in this
26 action include: (1) the documents and electronically stored information (“ESI”)
27 identified in UnitedHealth’s Initial Disclosures as documents and ESI that
28 UnitedHealth may use to support its claims and defenses; (2) documents

demonstrating that UnitedHealth was transparent with the government about its claims verification program; (3) documents demonstrating that there was no statutory or regulatory requirement for MA plans to “look both ways”; (4) documents demonstrating that UnitedHealth did not knowingly retain any alleged overpayments; and (5) documents demonstrating that the allegedly fraudulent conduct was not material to payment.

E. Damages

United States and Relator’s Position: At this time, Plaintiffs’ damages calculations for both its Chart Review and RACCR damages analyses do not involve sampling or extrapolation. Rather, at this time, Plaintiffs intend to identify the specific diagnoses that Defendants failed to delete. In addition, Defendants’ contention below that the FCA damages in this case should be reduced by an undefined “benefit” conferred by them to the Medicare Program is unfounded. There was no benefit to the Medicare Program from Defendants’ receipt and retention of payments based on invalid data.

Furthermore, contrary to Defendants assertion below, Plaintiffs do not seek Defendants’ assistance in determining their damages theories. However, Plaintiffs do seek and have a right to obtain the data and related information in Defendants’ possession that Plaintiffs need to calculate all of the damages to the Medicare Program.

Chart Review Damages: In this action, the Government seeks to recover its damages for the 2009 payment year and all subsequent years during which Defendants knowingly avoided their obligation to delete diagnoses invalidated by their own chart reviews. To date, the Government has data to determine its damages for payment years 2011 to 2014. Assuming that the Court will schedule this action for trial for early 2020, the Government will limit its damages claim for purpose of that trial to five additional payment years: 2009, 2010, and 2015 to

1 2017.⁵ Accordingly, the Government is now seeking to obtain from Defendants
2 the data for those additional payment years. Based on experience from the
3 investigation, as recounted below, it will take Defendants a significant amount of
4 time to produce the data for the other five years and, thus, for the Government to
5 perform the damages analyses.

6 In the investigation of this matter, Defendants produced data and other
7 information for the Government to assess its damages for four of the years at issue,
8 the 2011 to 2014 payment years. The Government requested this data from
9 Defendants in July 2015. It took Defendants one year, until July 2016, to produce
10 the data for all four years. In addition, after July 2016, Defendants continued to
11 provide supplement data and information necessary to perform the damages
12 analysis. According to a December 2, 2016 letter from Defendants to the
13 Government, for those four years, Defendants' initial production included 47 files
14 containing 828 million rows of data and totaling 150 GB of data and subsequent
15 productions included 60 supplemental and replacement files totaling an additional
16 150 GB of data. This was not surprising as Defendants have conducted millions of
17 chart reviews. (FAC ¶ 169)

18 As alleged in paragraph 237 of the FAC, the Government determined that,
19 for 2011 to 2014, Defendants failed to repay the Medicare Program at least \$1.1
20 billion by failing to look both ways and delete diagnoses invalidated by their Chart
21 Review Program. These damages are based on (1) a comparison of the results of
22 Defendants' chart reviews for those four years with the diagnoses they submitted
23 for payment for those years in order to identify the unsubstantiated diagnoses that
24 should have been deleted, as alleged in paragraph 235 of the FAC, and (2) a
25 computation of the overpayments made to Defendants based on those invalid
26 diagnoses.

27 ⁵ To the extent that Defendants are continuing to ignore the negative results of their
28 current chart reviews and failing to delete the invalid diagnoses, the Government
reserves its right to recover the damages for payment years after 2017.

1 On October 5, 2017, the United States served Defendants with its First
2 Request for Production of Documents, which includes specific requests for the
3 chart review and other data required to conduct the damages analyses for the 2009,
4 2010, and 2015 to 2017 payment years. To date, Defendants have not produced
5 any of the requested data. In a letter dated March 7, 2018, Defendants stated that
6 they anticipate producing data for 2015 to 2017 payment years by April 27, 2018,
7 but that they reserve their right to modify what years are included and the data that
8 Defendants will produce for the 2016 and 2017 payment years will not be
9 complete. Defendants have not stated when they will produce the data for the 2009
10 and 2010 payment years.

11 Defendants are refusing to provide complete chart review and other data for
12 the later payment years and to comply with Rule 26(e)'s requirement that
13 discovery responses be supplemented or corrected if they are incomplete or
14 incorrect. In a recent letter, Defendants state that they will not produce any chart
15 review and other data necessary to assess damages after January 31, 2018.
16 However, for the 2016 payment year, pursuant to a deadline set by CMS,
17 Defendants (and other MAOs) are allowed to submit diagnoses to the Medicare
18 Program until August 2, 2018. Thus, for that year, Defendants currently may be
19 performing chart reviews in order to submit additional diagnoses to increase
20 payments and they may continue to perform chart reviews and submit those
21 additional diagnoses until August 2, 2018. Similarly, for the 2017 payment year,
22 Defendants (and other MAOs) are allowed to submit diagnoses until September 14,
23 2018. Thus, for that year, Defendants also currently may be performing chart
24 reviews in order to submit additional diagnoses to increase payments and they may
25 continue to perform chart review and submit the additional codes until September
26 14, 2018. Accordingly, in order to obtain complete and accurate data to assess
27 damages for payment years 2016 and 2017, Defendants must provide the
28 Government with (i) the results of and other information about any chart reviews

1 relating to those years that were performed after January 31, 2018 and (ii) any
2 supplemental or corrected data relating to the beneficiaries whose charts were
3 reviewed for those years (for example, supplemental data would include any
4 additional diagnoses submitted by providers for those beneficiaries for those
5 years). Because Defendants have refused to do this, the Government will move to
6 compel the production of complete and accurate data for the 2016 and 2017
7 payment years.

8 In addition, since at least 2014, Defendants have submitted diagnoses
9 through two separate systems to CMS, the Risk Adjustment Processing System
10 (RAPS) and the Encounter Data Processing System (EDPS). Defendants have two
11 separate databases that they use to report into each system. Defendants' database
12 that submits diagnoses to RAPS is called IRADS. It includes data about all of the
13 beneficiaries in Defendants' MA Plans, including the beneficiaries whose charts
14 were reviewed in Defendants' Chart Review Program. This data includes, among
15 many other things, the dates of services of the medical encounters that the
16 beneficiaries had with providers, information identifying the providers, and the
17 diagnoses submitted by the providers. Defendants' database that submits
18 diagnoses to EDPS includes additional information about the beneficiaries, the
19 providers, and the beneficiaries' health status. That additional data is likely to be
20 very useful in assessing damages.

21 In its October 2017 Document Request, the Government requested data from
22 both of Defendants' databases, IRADS and the database that submits to EDPS, in
23 order to ensure that it has complete and accurate data to perform its damages
24 analyses. So far, Defendants have not agreed to provide the data from their
25 database that submits to EDPS. Accordingly, the Government will move to
26 compel its production.

27 After the requested documents and data are produced, the Government will
28 conduct the damages analyses for the 2009, 2010, 2015 to 2017 payment years.

1 The Government will present its damages pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) relating to the
2 disclosure of expert testimony.

3 For the Government to even attempt to make its initial damages expert
4 disclosures by June 28, 2019 (the date proposed by Plaintiffs for initial expert
5 disclosures), Defendants need to complete their production of the chart review and
6 other data necessary to compute damages by September of 2018. In order for their
7 productions to be deemed complete, Defendants must provide all information
8 necessary for the Government to understand and interpret the data that they
9 produce. It is the Government's understanding that Defendants will insist that the
10 Government obtain this explanatory information through formal discovery
11 (interrogatories and depositions). Obtaining this information through formal
12 discovery will significantly add to the time and effort necessary for the
13 Government to make its initial damages expert disclosures.

14 RACCR Damages: Defendants themselves estimated the amount of the
15 overpayments they would have to return to the United States as a result of the
16 RACCR Program in the tens of millions of dollars per year during the time period
17 before they started phasing out the program. In December 2017, Plaintiffs served
18 Defendants with interrogatories to obtain the information necessary to conduct the
19 first phase of their determination of these overpayments. The interrogatories seek
20 information necessary to identify which financially-incentivized (capitated and
21 gainsharing) providers coded excessive numbers of diagnoses (more than three
22 times the average rate), including those providers who were included in the
23 RACCR Program and failed Defendants' sample validation test. The
24 interrogatories also seek information about the diagnoses that these providers
25 coded at these excessively high rates and the beneficiaries for whom they coded
26 these diagnoses. Defendants have not yet provided all of the information requested
27 by the interrogatories. After Defendants complete their provision of this
28 information (and assuming the information that Defendants provide is sufficient),

1 Plaintiffs plan to conduct the second phase of their overpayment analysis, which
2 will require obtaining medical records from the outlier providers and conducting
3 medical record reviews to determine the invalid diagnoses that Defendants should
4 have deleted. Defendants have not stated when they will complete their responses
5 to these interrogatories.

6 Defendants' Alleged Damages: Based on Defendants' counterclaims, it
7 appears that their purported damages are contingent entirely on their paying
8 damages to the Government in this action. Accordingly, at this time, Plaintiffs do
9 not believe that there will be a need to conduct separate damages analyses
10 pertaining to Defendants' counterclaims. However, because Defendants have
11 failed to provide any description of their purported damages or even a description
12 of their theory of damages either in their pleading setting forth their counterclaims
13 or in this report, Plaintiffs do not know whether their belief is correct. If it is
14 incorrect, Plaintiffs will need additional time to conduct fact and expert witness
15 discovery relating to Defendants' damages. Pursuant to Rule 26(e)(1)(B), the
16 Court should order Defendants to supplement their Rule 26(a)(1)(A) initial
17 disclosures to describe their damages as well as to list the witnesses and documents
18 supporting their counterclaims.

19 UnitedHealth's Position: UnitedHealth denies that it owes any damages
20 alleged in the FAC. UnitedHealth will have an alternate theory as to how damages
21 should be calculated if liability is established in light of the contracts and
22 reimbursement methodology and the FCA measure of damages, which take into
23 account the benefit already conferred on the government. UnitedHealth anticipates
24 challenging the propriety of sampling and extrapolation and asserting that a fee-
25 for-service adjustor must be applied to account for unsupported codes in the
26 diagnostic data of fee-for-service beneficiaries.

27

28

1 At this point in the litigation, UnitedHealth does not have sufficient
2 information to estimate damages associated with its counterclaims against the
3 United States regarding its obligations under the MA program.

4 UnitedHealth notes that the United States and Relator's position above on
5 Damages details discovery-related issues instead of setting forth "[t]he realistic
6 range of provable damages," as required by the Court's Order Setting Scheduling
7 Conference. UnitedHealth addresses the United States' mischaracterization of
8 these discovery issues below in the proper section, Status of Discovery (Section I).
9 The notion that the United States needs significantly more time to conduct routine
10 discovery in a case it brought—despite the advantages of a multi-year
11 investigation, detailed responses to dozens of complex (and sometimes improper
12 and nonsensical) interrogatories, more than 20 Civil Investigative Demand oral
13 examinations, over 630,000 documents produced by UnitedHealth during the
14 investigation and in *Swoben*, 6 document productions totaling nearly 66,000
15 documents already in this litigation, and 5 spreadsheets of over 125,000 lines of
16 data produced by UnitedHealth in response to the United States' First Set of
17 Written Interrogatories to Defendants—rings hollow.

18 The United States chose to bring this lawsuit, and it cannot now complain
19 about conducting routine discovery to which UnitedHealth is entitled and that
20 UnitedHealth needs to defend itself. The United States effectively is seeking
21 UnitedHealth's assistance in not only determining what their theory of damages is,
22 but also in determining whether there are any damages (there are not). This is
23 wholly improper and does not justify the United States delaying discovery or
24 failing to meet its discovery obligations.

25 **F. Insurance**

26 Coverage is available to UnitedHealth for certain claims in the FAC under
27 UnitedHealth's insurance policies, and UnitedHealth has agreed to make certain
28 documents relating to those policies available to Plaintiffs.

G. Motions

The United States and Relator's Position: As explained in Section C (Legal Issues), the Government presently anticipates filing a motion to dismiss Defendants' counterclaims. In addition, the Government and the Relator presently anticipate filing a separate motion to strike certain of Defendants' affirmative defenses. As explained in Sections E (Damages) and I (Status of Discovery), Defendants refuse to produce certain very relevant documents and Plaintiffs presently anticipate moving to compel the production of these documents.

In addition, the Government reserves the right to seek leave to (i) add any Medicare Advantage Organizations (or Part D Sponsors) directly or indirectly owned, affiliated with, or controlled by UnitedHealth Group that should be included in the list of such organizations set forth in paragraph 26 of the FAC; and, (ii) if necessary to recover its damages, to add any other entities affiliated with UnitedHealth Group that owned, controlled, or managed the Medicare Advantage Organizations. Information that has recently come to Plaintiffs attention indicates that some Medicare Advantage Organizations (or Part D Sponsors) directly or indirectly owned, affiliated with, or controlled by UnitedHealth Group may not have been expressly named in the FAC or may have been identified incorrectly. As needed, Plaintiffs will seek to stipulate with Defendants to amend the FAC to address these types of issues.

In addition to the motions identified in Section M, Plaintiffs anticipate considering additional motions as issues arise throughout the litigation. Plaintiffs may also file motions to exclude certain documents as evidence for use both in supporting summary judgment motions and at trial.

UnitedHealth's Position: UnitedHealth has engaged in good-faith discussions and negotiations on all issues raised by the United States during the course of discovery either to resolve or narrow any areas of disagreement between the Parties. Those discussions and negotiations are ongoing, and UnitedHealth is

1 committed to working with the United States to avoid or limit the necessity for
 2 seeking intervention from the Court.

3 In addition, UnitedHealth reserves the right to seek leave to amend its
 4 counterclaims to add or substitute any Medicare Advantage Organizations (or Part
 5 D sponsors) that may subsequently be added or substituted by the United States in
 6 its FAC.

7 Both Parties reserve the right to file non-dispositive pretrial motions,
 8 including but not limited to motions related to discovery disputes, motions *in*
 9 *limine*, and motions to exclude experts. Dispositive motions are addressed below.

10 **H. Manual for Complex Litigation**

11 The Parties do not believe the Manual for Complex Litigation should be
 12 utilized in this case.

13 **I. Status of Discovery**

14 *The United States and Relator's Statement:*

15 In July 2017, the Court provided that “the Parties may engage in written
 16 discovery (document requests and interrogatories) and may do so before a Rule
 17 26(f) conference.” (Dkt. No. 133) Defendants have served the Government with
 18 two sets of document requests and the Relator with one set of document requests.
 19 The Government has also served Defendants with two sets of document requests.
 20 The Government has also served Defendants with several interrogatories to which
 21 Defendants are responding by producing documents.

22 *Government's Production of Documents:* The Government fully appreciates
 23 that Defendants have a right to obtain documents and other information relevant to
 24 the claims and defenses that are appropriately a part of this case. The Government
 25 has been and will continue to be fully cooperative with Defendants in that regard.

26 The Government has been working cooperatively with Defendants in
 27 responding to their 97 separate document requests (the total number in both sets),
 28 which cover a very wide range of documents on many subject matters. The

1 Government spent many hours working with Defendants in the drafting of
2 mutually-agreeable proposed protective orders relating to the treatment of
3 confidential documents and other information and relating to the non-waiver of
4 privilege and protected documents. These protective orders were entered by the
5 Court on January 16, 2018. (Dkt. Nos. 197 & 198) In addition, on a regular basis
6 over the last six months, the Government has been in contact with Defendants
7 about their document collection and production activities through emails, letters,
8 telephone calls, and meetings. The Government spent many hours providing
9 Defendants with an extensive amount of information about its document collection
10 efforts and document review protocols and discussing these efforts and protocols
11 with Defendants' counsel. The Government identified its numerous document
12 custodians and multi-access email accounts from which it has collected documents,
13 and the Parties have agreed to provide titles and dates of employment for each of
14 their document custodians. The Government also identified the search terms used
15 to collect potentially responsive documents in the custodians' electronic files. In
16 addition, the Government provided Defendants with detailed information about its
17 Technology Assisted Review methodology being used to identify the responsive
18 documents in its enormous collection of electronic documents.

19 The Government also has spent many hours responding to Defendants'
20 requests that it expand its efforts to locate and collect documents, revise its search
21 terms for collecting electronic documents, and revise its Technology Assisted
22 Review methodology. The Government has complied with many of these requests.
23 The Government has also compromised and tried to minimize the burden of
24 discovery disputes needed to be resolved by the Court by agreeing to produce
25 documents relating to various issues that are irrelevant to this case, including, for
26 example, documents relating to CMS' methodology for conducting administrative
27 audits and the calculation of the statutory coding intensity adjustment that applies
28

1 to all MAOs. (However, the Government may still file one or more motions as
2 necessary to limit or prevent such wasteful discovery.)

3 The Government has also agreed to produce documents and privilege logs
4 on a rolling basis. In addition, it has agreed to prioritize the production of various
5 documents at Defendants' request so long as it is given reasonable notice and
6 Defendants' also agree to requests by the Government to prioritize the production
7 of certain documents such as the production of the data necessary to perform the
8 Government's damages analyses.

9 In response to Defendants' document requests, the United States has so far
10 collected over four terabytes of data, constituting over five million documents,
11 from more than 150 custodians at CMS and other parts of the Department of
12 Health and Human Services ("HHS"). The United States is still in the process of
13 collecting documents in response to Defendants' requests that it expand the search
14 terms that it is using to collect potentially responsive documents and expects to
15 collect a substantial amount of additional documents within the next several
16 months. In response to other requests made by Defendants, the United States is
17 also continuing to identify additional document custodians, including custodians at
18 the Office of the Secretary of HHS.

19 The United States must review all of the documents that it has collected and
20 will collect over the next several months. It must review these documents for
21 responsiveness, confidentiality (for example, for patient identifiable data and
22 information relating to other insurance companies which participate in the
23 Medicare Advantage Program), and privilege. To expedite the task of reviewing
24 and producing responsive, non-privileged documents, the United States is utilizing
25 targeted searches, Technology Assisted Review, and manual review. Even
26 utilizing these methods, however, the task of identifying responsive, non-
27 privileged documents and determining which of those are confidential is enormous.
28 The Government currently estimates that there are at least 500,000 documents that

1 its attorneys must manually review for privilege and this does not include the
2 manual, eyes-on privilege review that will need to be conducted for documents that
3 the Government has not yet collected. Contrary to Defendants' assertion below,
4 Relator's counsel cannot perform this privilege review of Government documents.
5 Government attorneys must exclusively perform this review. Furthermore,
6 contrary to Defendants' assertion below, the Government is not inappropriately
7 relying on the deliberative process privilege or applying the privilege too broadly.
8 *See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.*, 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975) (privilege protects
9 documents that "reflect[] advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
10 comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
11 formulated"); *Hongsermeier v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 621 F.3d 890,
12 904 (9th Cir. 2010) (privilege protects documents that are "predecisional" and
13 "deliberative").

14 The Government's initial goal was to make rolling productions of
15 documents on a regular basis throughout 2018 and to substantially complete its
16 production by the end of 2018. This goal was premised on the hope that
17 Defendants would agree to withdraw at least some of its requests for irrelevant
18 documents, but they have not. In addition, this goal was premised on the hope that
19 the Court would agree with the Government's proposal that fact witness
20 depositions by both Parties commence after both Parties substantially complete
21 their document productions. However, over the last several months, Defendants
22 diverted the Government's resources because of their insistence that they conduct
23 expedited depositions of certain Government witnesses. This was exacerbated by a
24 change in Defendants' position in insisting that the Government also produce
25 documents relating to these witnesses on an expedited basis even though neither
26 Defendants' deposition notice nor subpoena relating to these witnesses had
27 requested such documents. In order to accommodate the noticed depositions of
28 two senior Government witnesses (including a former Administrator of CMS),

1 which went forward notwithstanding the Government's objection that they were
2 premature, the Government had to interrupt its document collection and review
3 efforts in response to Defendants' 97 document requests (sets one and two) in
4 order to prioritize the collection, review and production of documents relating to
5 these two deponents. This has impeded the Government's document review and
6 production efforts.

7 Furthermore, the Government's resources are now being diverted by
8 responding to Defendants' counterclaims and affirmative defenses. Government
9 counsel is now focused on preparing motions to dismiss the counterclaims and
10 strike some of the affirmative defenses.

11 To date, the Government has produced approximately 10,000 documents.
12 The tasks of identifying responsive documents and conducting manual, "eyes-on"
13 privilege and confidentiality reviews have consumed and will continue to consume
14 significant Government's resources until these reviews are completed. The
15 Government proposes that phased discovery, with fact witness depositions
16 commencing in November 2018, would significantly facilitate its completion of the
17 production of documents. If Defendants continue to expedite the depositions of
18 Government witnesses, the Government's resources will be diverted to defending
19 those depositions and producing attendant documents and, thus, discovery will
20 proceed in a piecemeal fashion. This diversion will be in addition to the diversion
21 caused by moving to dismiss Defendants' counterclaims and strike their
22 affirmative defenses. This diversion will further delay the Government's
23 completion of its production of documents.

24 It should not be surprising to Defendants that it would require significant
25 time for the Government to produce documents in response to their numerous and
26 broad requests. In the investigation, the approximately 600,000 documents
27 produced by Defendants were produced over a 4 year time period, from December
28 2012 to December 2016. Furthermore, the Government also believes that

1 Defendants will not substantially complete their document production in this action
2 until at least the end of 2018.

3 Relator's Production of Documents: Relator has served his responses and
4 objections to Defendants' document requests and is in the process of making a
5 relatively small production of non-privileged, relevant documents. Following his
6 departure from UnitedHealth in 2012, Relator gave UnitedHealth all non-
7 privileged documents in his possession generated in the course of and directly
8 related to his work at UnitedHealth (that is, UnitedHealth's documents).
9 Moreover, pursuant to agreements between UnitedHealth and Relator, he destroyed
10 all such UnitedHealth documents in his possession other than his performance
11 reviews.

12 Defendants' Production of Documents: Plaintiffs presently anticipate
13 moving to compel Defendants' production of various documents that they have
14 refused to produce. As explained in Section E (Damages), this includes chart
15 review and other data that is necessary to assess damages for payment years 2016
16 and 2017. As another example, this includes documents from the electronic and
17 hard copy files of Steve Hemsley, the Chief Executive Officer of UnitedHealth
18 Group from 2006 to 2017, and Janis Leafgren, Mr. Hemsley's Administrative
19 Assistant, who (for instance) sent and received emails on behalf of Mr. Hemsley.
20 On March 27, 2018, Defendants sent the Government a letter stating that it needs
21 some undefined amount of additional time to decide whether it will produce
22 documents from these relevant custodians' files. However, Mr. Hemsley engaged
23 in activities relevant to this case. Among other things, Mr. Hemsley chaired
24 Defendants' Risk Adjustment Advisory Board (FAC ¶ 42); the executives who
25 managed Defendants' Medicare Advantage Plans regularly reported to Mr.
26 Hemsley with respect to risk adjustment payment-related issues (*id.*); according to
27 a 2011 documents produced by Defendants, Mr. Hemsley was "significantly
28 involved in the oversight and management of" Defendants' "Medicare business"

(*id.*); and, Mr. Hemsley was aware of risk adjustment payment compliance issues (*id.* at ¶¶ 154 & 188). Moreover, Mr. Hemsley was intimately involved in the decision to terminate Defendants’ Claims Verification Program and revert to ignoring the negative results of Defendants’ chart reviews and failing to delete the diagnoses invalidated by those reviews. Mr. Hemsley is the one who directed Messrs. Renfro, Johnson, Nelson, and Schumacher and Ms. Erickson to speak with CMS about Defendants’ termination of their Claims Verification Program. (FAC ¶¶ 224-26, 230-31, & 234) Defendants have provided no valid justification for not searching these custodians’ files.

Plaintiffs also anticipate that they may challenge many of Defendants’ privilege assertions, including privilege assertions pertaining to the rendering of non-legal advice, the attendance of Defendants’ attorneys at business meetings to shield those meetings from discovery, and the participation of Defendants’ attorneys in non-legal communications to shield those communications from discovery.

UnitedHealth’s statement:

UnitedHealth’s statement on the collection and production of documents:

The United States opted to bring this lawsuit, yet it now balks at the notion of meeting its discovery obligations and allowing UnitedHealth to pursue discovery to which UnitedHealth is entitled so that it may properly and effectively defend itself. The United States complains about its resources being “diverted” by other standard litigation matters—such as defending depositions and responding to counterclaims and affirmative defenses—and attempts to justify its failure to meet its original document production deadline because of these “diverted resources.” Despite the advantage of conducting a multi-year investigation related to this matter, the United States curiously now appears to claim that it lacks the resources to properly litigate this matter and to meet its discovery deadlines. The notion that Plaintiffs—which currently have thirteen government attorneys and twenty active

1 attorneys for Relator (including twelve partners)—lack the resources to conduct
2 routine discovery in a timely manner is absurd.

3 Prior to filing the FAC, DOJ investigated this matter for more than five
4 years. During that time, UnitedHealth produced over 600,000 documents,
5 compiled detailed responses to dozens of complex interrogatories, and produced
6 more than twenty witnesses for Civil Investigative Demand oral examinations. In
7 *United States ex rel. Swoben v. Secure Horizons*, Case No. CV-09-5013 JFW
8 (JEMx), UnitedHealth produced over 34,000 documents, which are also responsive
9 in this case. The United States, in contrast, made two small productions totaling
10 less than 600 documents, the majority of which were publically available and re-
11 produced from another action.

12 In response to the United States' Complaint in this case, UnitedHealth has
13 been collecting documents from 118 custodians and 7 email distribution lists and
14 has collected approximately 70 million documents to date. In addition to the more
15 than 634,000 documents produced during the investigation and the *Swoben*
16 litigation, UnitedHealth has produced over 65,845 documents in this litigation. On
17 January 29, 2018, UnitedHealth produced 5 spreadsheets of over 125,000 lines of
18 data requested by the United States in its First Set of Written Interrogatories to
19 Defendants. UnitedHealth has also produced two privilege logs thus far—in
20 addition to the more than ten it produced during the investigation—and intends to
21 continue producing privilege logs on a monthly basis.

22 In contrast, the United States failed to produce a single document until late
23 February 2018—and only did so at the direction of Magistrate Judge Segal after
24 initially refusing to comply with its discovery obligations related to the depositions
25 of Marilyn Tavenner and Jeffrey Grant. The United States' first two productions
26 consisted of 893 documents total. Although the United States' deadline for its first
27 Technology Assisted Review production was the week of March 19, it failed to
28 make its production until March 28, when it produced approximately 9,500

1 documents—approximately one-sixth of the number of documents produced by
2 UnitedHealth in this litigation alone. UnitedHealth also notes that Relator has yet
3 to produce a single document in this matter, despite UnitedHealth serving
4 document requests on Relator on January 19, 2018.

5 UnitedHealth has already agreed that the United States need not log certain
6 categories of likely privileged documents (such as communications with the
7 Department of Justice or the Office of General Counsel), so the United States’
8 assertion that it will have to review over 500,000 documents (and counting) for
9 privilege is not primarily tied to attorney-client or work product privilege concerns.
10 Rather, it is the product of the United States’ inappropriately broad view of the
11 qualified deliberative process privilege, as demonstrated by the United States’ first
12 privilege log that it produced on March 30, 2018. The United States has asserted
13 deliberative process privilege over every single document on that log for which
14 CMS is a custodian—approximately eighty percent of the entire log. This
15 specious, over-expansive view is nothing more than a strategic attempt to yet again
16 deprive UnitedHealth of key information that UnitedHealth needs to defend itself
17 in a lawsuit that the United States chose to bring. For example, the United States
18 brazenly attempts to assert deliberative process privilege over documents the
19 government itself produced previously in response to a FOIA request. In response
20 to that request, these documents were produced partially redacted, suggesting they
21 had already undergone review by the relevant government agency outside of this
22 litigation and deemed appropriate for public disclosure.

23 UnitedHealth has also provided the United States with information regarding
24 its document collection efforts and document review protocols and will continue to
25 work cooperatively with the United States on discovery. UnitedHealth engaged in
26 good-faith negotiations with the United States and exchanged detailed information
27 about its Technology Assisted Review protocol, and the Parties have now agreed
28 on respective Technology Assisted Review protocols. While UnitedHealth

1 proposed that the Parties exchange additional information, including custodians'
2 job titles and employment history, regarding custodians on December 20, 2017, the
3 United States was not prepared to do so.

4 UnitedHealth's statement regarding data productions: The United States'
5 Damages section (Section E, above) is replete with inaccuracies and misleading
6 statements, and it is highly inappropriate for a Rule 26(f) Joint Report. To avoid
7 any prejudice resulting from the United States' tactics, UnitedHealth will briefly
8 respond to set the record straight, but UnitedHealth does not believe this Joint
9 Report is the proper vehicle to respond to each and every one of the United States'
10 assertions.

11 UnitedHealth has been working diligently and devoting substantial
12 resources—in addition to the overlapping resources it is expending to respond to
13 other document requests and interrogatories, deposing witnesses, moving to
14 dismiss the FAC, answering the United States' 364-paragraph FAC, and
15 developing its counterclaims, among other things—to collect and produce data
16 responsive to various requests by the United States. UnitedHealth agreed to the
17 United States' request that UnitedHealth prioritize dates of service years 2014
18 through 2016 and will be making a significant production on April 27, 2018, the
19 government's unilaterally imposed deadline. Per the United States' request,
20 UnitedHealth also agreed to produce the requested data for dates of service years
21 2008 and 2009 after April 27, 2018. UnitedHealth has been transparent with the
22 United States about its data productions, and the United States' claim otherwise is
23 preposterous. The United States appears to be dictating how much time
24 UnitedHealth is going to require to produce responsive data to its extremely broad
25 data requests, but UnitedHealth clearly is better positioned to make that
26 determination. Accordingly, UnitedHealth has in good-faith proposed a discovery
27 schedule that not only meets the United States' unilaterally imposed April 27, 2018
28

1 deadline but also gives UnitedHealth sufficient time to satisfy its discovery
2 obligations.

3 **J. Discovery Plan**

4 **1. Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures – Rule 26(f)(3)(A)**

5 The Parties made their initial disclosures on December 22, 2017.

6 United States and Relator's Position: In their initial disclosures, Plaintiffs
7 provided Defendants with the results of their estimation of damages for the four
8 payment years (2011 to 2014) for their violations of the FCA relating to their chart
9 reviews. These results are also described in paragraphs 235 and 237 of the FAC.
10 At this time, Plaintiffs claim a work product privilege with respect to the analyses
11 underlying this damages estimate. In accordance with Rule 26(a)(2), the United
12 States and Relator will make their expert damages disclosures at the time set forth
13 in the Schedule entered by the Court.

14 As previously explained, Defendants have not produced documents and data
15 required to compute damages due to their one-way chart reviews for payment years
16 2009, 2010, 2015, 2016, and 2017.⁶ In addition, Defendants have agreed to
17 provide certain information responsive to the Government's interrogatories
18 concerning Defendants' RACCR program, but have not yet done so. Once
19 Defendants have completed their provision of information responsive to the
20 Government's interrogatories, Plaintiffs will use that information to propound
21 subpoenas to third-party providers who participated in Defendants' RACCR
22 program, to enable Plaintiffs to obtain and review medical records in the
23 possession of those third-party providers.

24 The United States proposes that it will comply with the requirements
25 imposed by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) when it makes its damages expert witness(es)
26 disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B). The United States needs sufficient time

27 ⁶ If Defendants' unlawful one-way Chart Review Program has continued past
28 payment year 2017, the United States reserves its right to recover the additional
damages.

(approximately nine months) to perform all the work, including, but not limited to, the document review and data analyses, necessary in order to compute damages and make its damages expert witness(es) disclosures after Defendants complete their production of the required documents and data (assuming that the Defendants also cooperate in producing the data in a usable format).

UnitedHealth's Position: The United States' discussion in this section is once again largely unnecessary and inappropriate in a Joint Report. The Parties exchanged initial disclosures on December 22, 2017 and will revise or supplement as required as the matter moves forward.

UnitedHealth continued to work diligently and to devote substantial resources to collect and produce data sought by the United States, and UnitedHealth will be making a significant production of data on April 27, 2018. Again, the notion that the United States needs significantly more time to conduct routine discovery and develop its damages theory and analysis is baseless. The United States chose to file this lawsuit after the benefit of a multi-year investigation, detailed responses to dozens of complex interrogatories, numerous Civil Investigative Demand oral examinations, and UnitedHealth's production of hundreds of thousands of documents. The United States must now engage in timely discovery and cannot continue to delay meeting its obligations.

2. Subjects and Timing of Discovery – Rule 26(f)(3)(B)

The Parties' positions as to the specific dates for Non-Expert and Expert Discovery Cut-Off are set forth below and in Exhibit A. The Parties' positions as to the subjects on which discovery may be needed, and whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to or focused on particular issues, are as follows:

United States and Relator's Position: Certain key issues in this case are purely legal issues because the underlying facts are undisputed and most of those legal issues have already been decided by the Ninth Circuit in *Swoben*. Discovery

1 is therefore unnecessary to resolve these legal issues. In particular, the
2 “materiality” of Defendants’ submission of false risk adjustment data is a purely
3 legal issue as are Defendants’ legal obligations to delete unsubstantiated diagnoses.
4 In addition, Defendants’ “actuarial equivalence” argument (if Defendants are
5 making it in this case) raises a purely legal issue about the meaning of that term as
6 used in Part C of Medicare Statute. Accordingly, discovery relating to the
7 “materiality” issue, Defendants’ contractual and regulatory obligations to delete
8 invalid diagnoses, and the “actuarial equivalence” issue should be precluded or, at
9 a minimum, limited by the Court pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1).

10 Plaintiffs believe that discovery, including third party discovery, should
11 focus on the results of Defendants’ medical record reviews conducted as part of
12 their Chart Review, Claims Verification, and RACCR Programs; Defendants’
13 knowledge (as that term is defined by the FCA) about inaccurate or untruthful
14 diagnoses submitted by providers, including diagnoses unsubstantiated by the
15 providers’ medical records; Defendants’ knowledge (as that term is defined by the
16 FCA) about their obligation to submit accurate and truthful risk adjustment data to
17 Medicare for risk adjustment payments, including the obligation to submit
18 diagnoses substantiated by beneficiaries’ medical records; Defendants’ knowledge
19 (as that term is defined by the FCA) about their obligation to retract, withdraw, or
20 delete inaccurate or untruthful risk adjustment data submitted to Medicare,
21 including the obligation to retract, withdraw, or delete diagnoses unsubstantiated
22 by beneficiaries’ medical records; Defendants’ submission of inaccurate or
23 untruthful risk adjustment data to Medicare; Defendants’ processes and procedures
24 for submitting risk adjustment data to CMS and for withdrawing, retracting, or
25 deleting such data; Defendants’ failure to retract, withdraw, or delete inaccurate or
26 untruthful risk adjustment data; Defendants’ communications with CMS about the
27 above-mentioned issues; Defendants’ contractual and financial relationship with
28 their “incentivized” capitated and gainsharing providers; the unsubstantiated and

1 invalid diagnoses that incentivized providers reported to Defendants and
2 Defendants submitted to CMS for risk adjustment payments; any affirmative
3 defenses that remain after the government and relator's motion to strike; and
4 damages.

5 Plaintiffs propose that discovery proceed in phases and we describe these
6 phases in detail below. Both Rules 16(c)(2)(F) and 26(d)(3) and the Court's
7 February 28, 2018 Order Setting Scheduling Conference contemplate the use of
8 phased discovery. Phased discovery is particularly appropriate in very large and
9 complex cases such as this.

10 Plaintiffs believe that this approach is warranted to ensure that this very
11 large case be conducted in the manner most efficient for the Court, the Parties,
12 third parties, and witnesses. Plaintiffs also strongly believe that fact witness
13 depositions should begin after (i) the Court resolves the Government's motion to
14 dismiss Defendants' counterclaims, the Plaintiffs' motion to strike Defendants'
15 affirmative defenses, and the motion for partial summary judgment on Defendants'
16 "actuarial equivalence" argument (unless Defendants stipulate that they are not
17 making this argument in this case); (ii) the Parties produce substantially all
18 relevant documents to each other relating to the fact witnesses; and (iii) privilege
19 issues and issues relating to the appropriate scope of discovery are resolved.
20 Otherwise, there is a significant risk that (i) significant time will be spent deposing
21 witnesses about issues relating to counterclaims that are later dismissed on legal
22 grounds by the Court and/or defenses that the Court strikes or disposes of on the
23 Government's motion for partial summary judgment; (ii) the Parties will seek to
24 depose the same witnesses multiple times because, subsequent to their depositions,
25 additional documents relating to the witnesses (or the topics on which they were
26 deposed) were collected and produced; and (iii) the Court will be unnecessarily
27 burdened with multiple motions for protective orders and motions to compel. By
28 making this request for phased discovery, the Government does not seek to prevent

1 Defendants from obtaining any needed and relevant evidence, as Defendants may
2 pursue all reasonable discovery efforts they desire. The Government simply seeks
3 to ensure that discovery is conducted in the most efficient manner possible as
4 appropriate for litigation of this magnitude.

5 In addition, Defendants' proposal that non-expert discovery be cut-off on
6 January 28, 2019 is not realistic and is extremely prejudicial to Plaintiffs. This
7 deadline will force Plaintiffs to take depositions of fact witnesses before
8 Defendants produce documents relevant to their depositions. It will also force the
9 Government to focus on defending depositions rather than completing its
10 document production. In addition, this January 28, 2019 deadline will not provide
11 the Government with sufficient time to analyze the chart review and other data that
12 Defendants produce in order for the Government to assess damages and to obtain
13 the additional information it needs to understand and interpret the data. As
14 previously stated, the Government will need to obtain this information by deposing
15 fact witnesses and serving interrogatories on Defendants. This deadline also will
16 not provide Plaintiffs with sufficient time to determine the overpayments due to the
17 incentivized providers' invalid diagnoses, which, as previously stated, requires that
18 Plaintiffs subpoena medical records and other documents from these providers and
19 then review the medical records.

20 Furthermore, Defendants' argument that Magistrate Judge Segal already
21 decided that phased discovery should not occur in this case is incorrect. Magistrate
22 Judge Segal allowed Defendants to conduct the depositions of only two
23 Government witnesses over the Government's objection that the depositions were
24 premature. Defendants represented to Magistrate Judge Segal that they would not
25 re-depose those witnesses a second time in this matter. Magistrate Judge Segal did
26 not hold a Rule 16(b) Scheduling Conference or consider the phased discovery
27 plan set forth by Plaintiffs below.

28

1 Phase One:

- 2 • The Parties should focus on the completion of production of documents; the
3 resolution of objections to the production of documents based on relevancy,
4 burden, etc.; and the resolution of privileges being asserted to withhold the
5 production of documents. It is likely that the Court's intervention may be
6 required to resolve objections and privilege issues and, thus, that the Parties
7 will need to brief these issues. Resolution of these objections and privilege
8 issues before fact witness depositions will streamline such depositions and
9 ensure that they are conducted appropriately.
- 10 • By April 30, 2018, Defendants must disclose in writing whether they will
11 rely on an advice of counsel, and/or good faith reliance defense, and
12 describe their defense(s) in sufficient detail to permit Plaintiffs to conduct
13 relevant discovery. Disclosure of this information under the proposed
14 deadline will permit Plaintiffs to seek additional discovery on these issues
15 during phase one, including documents over which Defendants waive
16 privilege, as applicable, through assertion of the defense(s).
- 17 • By September 30, 2018, Defendants must complete their production of
18 documents and data responsive to the one-way chart review damages-related
19 discovery requests that have been served. After the production of the data,
20 Defendants should work cooperatively with Plaintiffs to explain and answer
21 questions concerning the data produced, including explaining the format and
22 source of the data, and any abbreviations. The Court's imposition of this
23 intermediate deadline on Defendants ensures that Plaintiffs will have
24 sufficient time to review Defendants' production of documents and data
25 needed to compute damages, to clarify or resolve any issues, to take
26 depositions of fact witnesses knowledgeable about such documents and data,
27 to propound and receive answers to interrogatories about such documents
28 and data, and to prepare the required disclosures of damages expert

1 witness(es) before opening expert reports are due.

- 2 • The Parties may take discovery relating to the preservation, collection, and
3 production of documents, including the Defendants' production of data
4 requested by Plaintiffs in order to compute damages.
- 5 • The Parties may serve subpoenas on third parties in order to obtain
6 documents from them. Plaintiffs have already done so. For example,
7 Defendants objected to producing documents and data about the results of
8 their chart reviews on the ground that the results were in the possession of
9 third-parties. Consequently, Plaintiffs served third party subpoenas on three
10 companies that Defendants employed to review medical records as part of its
11 Chart Review Program in order to obtain the results of these reviews. But
12 then, two of the companies responded that Defendants directed them to
13 provide the documents and data to Defendants and the companies have not
14 yet produced the chart review results to Plaintiffs. In addition, Plaintiffs will
15 seek medical records from incentivized providers who were outliers (i.e.,
16 diagnosed certain medical conditions at unusually high rates) and whose
17 diagnoses had high invalidation rates based on the results of Defendants'
18 RACCR reviews. Plaintiffs have sought information (through
19 interrogatories) from Defendants identifying the beneficiaries whom those
20 incentivized providers diagnosed with those conditions in order to serve the
21 providers with subpoenas for those beneficiaries' medical records, and
22 Defendants have agreed to provide certain information responsive to those
23 interrogatories. Until Defendants complete their provision of information
24 necessary to identify these beneficiaries, Plaintiffs cannot serve the
25 providers with the subpoenas requesting their medical records. Review of
26 those medical records will enable the Plaintiffs to identify the
27 unsubstantiated diagnoses that Defendants submitted to the Medicare
28 Program but deliberately ignored or recklessly disregarded.

- 1 • The Parties may also propound interrogatories on each other. Plaintiffs
2 propose that each side may, without seeking leave of Court, serve up to 30
3 interrogatories relating to the Government's claims in this action. Plaintiffs
4 further state that they will seek the Court's permission to serve additional
5 interrogatories relating to Defendants' counterclaims that are not dismissed
6 and the affirmative defenses that remain after the Court rules on their
7 motions.
- 8 • The Parties may also serve requests for admissions, which number should
9 not be limited.
- 10 • Plaintiffs anticipate that Phase I will be the principal phase for written and
11 document discovery, although the Parties will not be precluded, prior to the
12 close of fact discovery, from submitting additional discovery requests to
13 address discrete issues that arise or become clear later in the litigation, or to
14 establish the authenticity and admissibility of documentary evidence if those
15 evidentiary issues cannot be resolved cooperatively.

16 Phase Two:

- 17 • During this phase, the Parties should focus on conducting fact witness
18 depositions. Plaintiffs estimate that, with respect to their claims (not
19 Defendants counterclaims or affirmative defenses), they will need at least
20 100 hours for depositions of fact witnesses and at least an additional 14
21 hours for depositions of corporate entities conducted pursuant to Rule
22 30(b)(6) (such depositions and topics may be the subject of more than one
23 notice) and propose that this phase of discovery start November 1, 2018 and
24 end by May 31, 2019. This estimate of the number of hours for and the time
25 it will take for fact witness depositions is based on the assumptions that (i)
26 Defendants will work informally and cooperatively with Plaintiffs to provide
27 the information necessary for Plaintiffs to understand Defendants' data
28 relating to damages (otherwise additional time would be needed to depose

1 fact witnesses knowledgeable about the data; and (ii) there are no major
2 issues concerning the authenticity and admissibility of documents (which
3 would also require additional time to depose fact witnesses). This estimate
4 also does not include fact witness depositions relating to Defendants'
5 counterclaims or affirmative defenses. In addition, if Defendants fail to
6 work informally and cooperatively with Plaintiffs to provide the information
7 necessary for Plaintiffs to understand and interpret the chart review and
8 other data Defendants provide to determine damages, Plaintiffs seek an
9 additional 25 hours for depositions of witnesses who can provide this
10 information.

- 11 • Plaintiffs agree that the customary limitations regarding the duration of
12 depositions (seven hours) should remain, and that no individual will be
13 deposed more than once without a showing of good cause and leave of court.
14 However, Plaintiffs believe that, on the whole, fact witness depositions
15 should be limited by the number of total hours and not by the number of
16 witnesses. Plaintiffs need to depose many fact witnesses, but we believe that
17 many of them can be deposed in less than a full day. Defendants' request
18 that the Court limit the number of fact witness depositions to ten deponents
19 (with the Parties having the option to stipulate to more) is unreasonable.
20 The Government's use of the testimony it took during the investigation is
21 limited to impeachment and Defendants are currently producing additional
22 documents relating to those deponents. Accordingly, Plaintiffs must re-
23 depose many of those fact witnesses in this litigation. Furthermore, there are
24 many important fact witnesses that the Government did not depose during
25 the investigation. Defendants' proposed ten-deponent limit is also
26 undermined by the Parties' estimate that each of them will call numerous
27 witnesses at trial.

1 Phase Three:

- 2 • By June 28, 2019, approximately four weeks after the close of fact witness
3 depositions, the Parties should make expert testimony disclosures pursuant
4 to Rule 26(a)(2) addressing issues on which they bear the burden of proof.
5 At this time, Plaintiffs anticipate that their disclosures will include experts
6 on risk adjustment under Parts C and D of the Medicare Program; experts on
7 diagnosis coding; and damages experts. However, because the Court has not
8 yet had the opportunity to rule on various issues, Plaintiffs' disclosures may
9 include other types of experts. Because of this uncertainty, it is also difficult
10 to estimate the amount of time needed to conduct expert discovery, but
11 Plaintiffs' current estimate is that responsive expert reports would be due by
12 July 31, 2019, approximately four weeks after the opening expert reports,
13 and expert depositions would be completed by September 30, 2019,
14 approximately a month before summary judgment briefing. Accordingly, at
15 this time, Plaintiffs estimate that expert discovery can be completed by
16 September 30, 2019. Expert depositions should also be limited to 7 hours
17 for each expert. In addition, as previously stated, Plaintiffs' ability to make
18 their initial damages expert disclosures will depend on Defendants' timely
19 production of the requested documents and data.

20 UnitedHealth's Position: The staged discovery process proposed by the
21 United States appears intended to prevent UnitedHealth from obtaining the
22 evidence it believes necessary to defend this case: the proposed restrictions and
23 controls on discovery advocated by the United States will frustrate UnitedHealth
24 from securing relevant and necessary evidence promptly. In this case, the United
25 States already possesses a vast amount of documentary and testimonial information
26 it obtained from UnitedHealth and other sources. UnitedHealth anticipates needing
27 extensive discovery from the United States in order to prepare its defenses and
28 counterclaims, including discovery relating to: the manner in which risk

1 adjustment factors are calculated; CMS' knowledge of UnitedHealth's and other
2 MA Plans' chart reviews and its awareness of industry-wide diagnostic coding
3 error rates and data verification practices during the relevant time period; any
4 attempts by the United States to calculate a Medicare fee-for-service error rate;
5 information concerning what those error rates are and their impact on payment
6 calculations; the United States' analysis of the assumptions and disclosures
7 contained in UnitedHealth's bids; the meaning of the "reasonable diligence"
8 standard; the decision not to finalize the medical record review rule; meetings and
9 communications between UnitedHealth and CMS regarding its obligations to
10 perform a "two-way-look" in light of this proposed rule; and the May 2014
11 overpayment rule. UnitedHealth will also seek discovery, including third-party
12 discovery, to identify what information, if any, Relator possesses, how Relator
13 obtained that information, and the source of that information. UnitedHealth
14 expressly reserves the right to conduct discovery on additional subjects and from
15 additional persons or entities as necessary and appropriate, and to make
16 appropriate objections to discovery requests.

17 UnitedHealth does not believe that phasing of discovery is necessary or
18 appropriate in this case and respectfully submits that it is an improper attempt by
19 the United States to impede UnitedHealth's efforts to defend itself. Rather than
20 lead to a more efficient discovery process, the United States' proposal would
21 prejudice UnitedHealth, and lead to both protracted discovery and increased costs.
22 For example, if UnitedHealth is unable to depose certain witnesses at the outset, it
23 will suffer delay in its attempt to effectively outline the scope of necessary
24 documents and other materials it may need.

25 Moreover, phased discovery would further delay UnitedHealth's access to
26 key fact witnesses and prejudice its ability to mount an effective defense in this
27 action. As noted above, for over five years, UnitedHealth has produced over
28 600,000 documents, compiled detailed responses to dozens of complex

1 interrogatories, and produced more than twenty witnesses for Civil Investigative
2 Demand oral examinations. While document productions are ongoing,
3 UnitedHealth requires the ability to take testimony of a number of current and
4 former government executives to effectively begin the defense of this action and to
5 identify potential other sources of documents and relevant information. However,
6 by the United States' proposal, UnitedHealth would be precluded from doing so for
7 another *seven months*. Such an imbalance in the Parties' access to witnesses is
8 antithetical to the spirit and purpose of the discovery rules, which advocate for
9 liberal and expeditious discovery and mutual knowledge of all relevant facts. For
10 similar reasons, Judge Segal noted during the Parties' informal discovery
11 conference on November 20, 2017, that there is no such rule in the Federal Rules
12 that says a party is entitled to complete written discovery or to resolve written
13 discovery prior to the beginning of depositions. And, indeed, the Federal Rules of
14 Civil Procedure do not contemplate the proposed phasing of discovery the United
15 States advocates. During the Parties' informal discovery conference on February
16 8, 2018, Judge Segal again noted that delayed or phased discovery is not "built-in"
17 in federal court and, when it is permitted, it is usually "with both parties'
18 agreement about the usefulness of phasing." See February 8, 2018 Telephonic
19 Conf. Tr. 25:16-20. Otherwise, if one side is able to dictate the phasing of
20 discovery, it "can be used as a strategy point in a case" and gamesmanship. See *id.*
21 25:21-23.

22 The United States' suggestion that depositions should only begin after the
23 Court resolves its forthcoming motion to dismiss UnitedHealth's counterclaims,
24 motion to strike UnitedHealth's affirmative defenses, and motion for partial
25 summary judgment is similarly unjustified. The United States in essence seeks a
26 stay of depositions during the pendency of the motions, which is not provided for
27 in the Federal Rules—otherwise, a case could be pending for months before
28 significant progress in the litigation is made. Similarly, the United States'

1 conclusory and generalized assertion that there will be privilege issues does not
2 justify postponing the commencement of depositions. Privilege issues exist in
3 most cases, yet most cases do not stall the commencement of depositions for close
4 to a year and a half after a complaint is filed, particularly where one side has
5 already had access to more than twenty witnesses. The propriety of a privilege
6 assertion cannot be addressed in a vacuum; it is typically best addressed in the
7 context of a specific question and the assertion of privilege in response. The
8 ordinary course is to resolve questions about the assertion of privilege in the
9 specific contexts in which they arise, so that the Court has a specific topic to
10 address.

11 UnitedHealth has only recently been afforded the opportunity to conduct
12 affirmative discovery to defend itself from the United States' baseless claims.
13 UnitedHealth is entitled to continue the process of reaching symmetry in the
14 discovery of factual information through depositions. During the December 18,
15 2017 telephonic conference before Judge Segal regarding The United States'
16 Motion for a Protective Order, Judge Segal stated that the United States had not
17 made a showing of undue burden or good cause sufficient to prevent UnitedHealth
18 from proceeding with depositions as laid out in the Federal Rules of Civil
19 Procedure. Judge Segal also stated that a pending motion for partial summary
20 judgment generally does not justify postponing depositions and that would be "the
21 exception and not the common practice." See December 18, 2017 Telephonic
22 Conf. Tr. 14:11-16. During the Parties' informal discovery conference on
23 February 8, 2018, Judge Segal again stated that UnitedHealth "ha[s] a right to
24 notice depositions" and reiterated that she likely would not enter a protective order
25 because there is "nothing in the rules that would justify it here." See February 8,
26 2018 Telephonic Conf. Tr. 26:23-27:1. Consistent with Judge Segal's admonition
27 that "given the complexity of this case . . . [it is not] inappropriate for a defendant
28 to be moving quickly to try and gather information and prepare its defenses"

1 UnitedHealth should be permitted to continue deposing government witnesses. See
2 *id.* 27:8-10.

3 Phased discovery would also introduce significant disputes regarding
4 whether certain discovery should or should not have been conducted during a
5 particular phase – disputes for which there is no case law or guidance in the
6 Federal Rules. Moreover, UnitedHealth does not agree to disclose whether it will
7 rely on any specific defense by any date unilaterally imposed by the United States.
8 Such a deadline is not mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

9 Finally, the United States’ proposed imposition of a unilateral deadline on
10 UnitedHealth to complete production of documents responsive to damages-related
11 discovery requests by September 2018 is unreasonable and inequitable, particularly
12 in light of the fact that the United States has only just begun to produce documents
13 in this matter. UnitedHealth is willing to work cooperatively with the United
14 States to engage in mutual exchanges of information and to comply with its
15 obligations under the Federal Rules.

16 **3. Electronically Stored Information – Rule 26(f)(3)(C)**

17 The Parties are aware of their duties regarding the preservation of
18 discoverable information. The Parties have taken reasonable measures to comply
19 with those duties as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local
20 Rules. The Parties have met and conferred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
21 Procedure 26(f), and each represented that steps have been taken to preserve
22 evidence relevant to this litigation. The Parties have agreed to a protocol for the
23 exchange of Electronically Stored Information.

24 **4. Privilege Issues – Rule 26(f)(3)(D)**

25 The Parties negotiated a protective order governing non-waiver of privilege
26 and protected material. Magistrate Judge Segal entered the order on January 16,
27 2018. (Dkt. No. 198)

28

1 **5. Changes to Federal and Local Rules – Rule 26(f)(3)(E)**

2 United States and Relator's Position: The changes that we propose are set
3 forth in our proposed discovery plan set forth in Section J.2 above.

4 UnitedHealth's Position: UnitedHealth reiterates that phased discovery is
5 inappropriate in this case. Exhibit A, and Subsections K and L below, address
6 UnitedHealth's position on the timing of discovery and proposed discovery
7 deadlines. UnitedHealth disagrees with the United States' hour-based calculation
8 of depositions. UnitedHealth's position is that each side will likely need more than
9 the 10 depositions permitted by the Federal Rules without leave, and that the
10 Parties should meet-and-confer as the need for additional depositions matures.
11 UnitedHealth agrees with the United States' proposal of 30 interrogatories by the
12 United States and Relator jointly and 30 interrogatories by UnitedHealth.

13 **6. Other Orders – Rule 26(f)(3)(F)**

14 United States and Relator's Position: As discussed above, Plaintiffs request
15 that the Court issue an order, pursuant to Rule 16(b)(3)(B)(i) and 16(c)(2)(F),
16 modifying the timing of initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) relating to
17 damages. The Government also provided Defendants with a proposed stipulation
18 and order relating to the scope of expert disclosures and discovery in order to
19 streamline that part of the case. The Government hopes that Defendants will agree
20 to this.

21 Pursuant to Rule 16(b)(3)(B)(ii), Plaintiffs also request that the Court limit
22 the scope of discovery to only factual issues and preclude discovery relating to
23 purely legal issues, including materiality, Defendants' legal obligations to delete
24 invalid diagnoses, and actuarial equivalence. In addition, pursuant to Rule
25 16(c)(2)(C), Plaintiffs believe it may benefit the case to make rulings in advance
26 on the authenticity and admissibility of certain evidence. This would include
27 evidence that may be relied upon for summary judgment motions as well as trial.
28

Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the Parties be permitted to file motions relating to authenticity and admissibility of documents at any time.

UnitedHealth's Position: UnitedHealth objects to the limiting of discovery pursuant to Rule 16(b)(3)(B)(ii). UnitedHealth believes that CMS would not have acted differently or sought repayment from UnitedHealth had it learned that UnitedHealth allegedly retained overpayments and is entitled to discovery on this topic, including discovery of facts which are relevant to UnitedHealth's ability to establish this and other defenses, including the views of CMS employees about the ambiguous regulatory requirements here at issue, which is relevant to scienter.

K. Discovery Cut-Off

United States and Relator's Position:

Plaintiffs propose that the non-expert discovery cut-off date be May 31, 2019.

UnitedHealth's Position:

UnitedHealth proposes that the non-expert discovery cut-off date be January 28, 2019.

L. Expert Discovery

The Parties agree to disclose expert witnesses consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules, and any order entered by this Court. Plaintiffs' position with respect to the timing of expert witness disclosures (June 28, 2019 for initial disclosures and July 31, 2019 for rebuttal disclosures) and the expert discovery cut-off date (September 30, 2019) are set forth in Section J.2 above (its discovery plan) and Exhibit A.

UnitedHealth proposes the following dates for expert witness disclosures and expert discovery cut-off under Rule 26(a)(2).

Expert Disclosure – Initial	February 25, 2019
Expert Disclosure – Rebuttal	March 25, 2019
Completion of Expert Discovery	April 22, 2019

1 **M. Dispositive Motions**

2 The United States and Relator's Statement: The United States presently
3 anticipates filing a motion to dismiss Defendants' counterclaims and the United
4 States and Relator presently anticipate filing a motion to strike some of
5 Defendants' affirmative defenses. The United States also intends to file a motion
6 for partial summary judgment on Defendants' "actuarial equivalence" argument
7 (unless Defendants stipulate that they are not asserting it in this case) because it
8 presents a purely legal issue which can be adjudicated at this time and should be
9 adjudicated at this time to avoid wasteful discovery. The United States may file
10 other motions, including motions for summary judgment or partial summary
11 judgment, on other issues concerning liability, damages, and issues raised in
12 Defendants' Answer to the FAC. Plaintiffs may also file motions *in limine*
13 because certain issues or defenses may be determined earlier on by such motions,
14 especially with respect to the authenticity and/or admissibility of certain
15 documents created by Defendants for purposes of litigation.

16 Plaintiffs propose that the last date to hear summary judgment motions be
17 November 4, 2019.

18 UnitedHealth's Statement: UnitedHealth will oppose the United States'
19 motion to dismiss and motion to strike. As noted above in Section C,
20 UnitedHealth and the United States have already fully briefed cross-motions for
21 summary judgment in the APA case addressing "actuarial equivalence" and it
22 would be inappropriate, inefficient, and a waste of judicial resources to attempt to
23 litigate those same issues here. In addition, as noted above in Section J, the United
24 States has only recently begun to produce documents in this case. Accordingly, the
25 filing of any summary judgment motion is drastically premature at this point in the
26 litigation. UnitedHealth anticipates filing motions or cross motions for summary
27 judgment, at the appropriate time and after the Parties have had the opportunity to
28 conduct meaningful discovery.

1 UnitedHealth proposes the last date to hear summary judgment motions be
2 May 20, 2019.

3 **N. Settlement/Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)**

4 *The United States' Statement:* In October 2016, pursuant to a request made
5 by Defendants, the United States made a presentation to Defendants about their
6 liability under the False Claims Act. After this presentation, Defendants' counsel
7 notified the United States that it was not interested in discussing a settlement of
8 this matter.

9 *UnitedHealth's Position:* In October 2016, the United States made a
10 presentation concerning this case in which it refused even to acknowledge
11 UnitedHealth's myriad defenses and asserted no formal settlement demand;
12 accordingly, UnitedHealth did not make any settlement offer either. Based on the
13 one-sided presentation the United States made in October 2016 and other
14 discussions, UnitedHealth respectfully believes that settlement discussions are
15 unlikely to be productive at this time.

16 A Notice to the Parties of Court-Directed ADR Program was entered on
17 November 22, 2016, when this action was transferred to this Court. Dkt. No. 54.
18 Pursuant to Local Rule 16-15.2, the Parties are filing concurrently a Request:
19 ADR Procedure Selection. The Parties have agreed on ADR Procedure No. 3
20 (private dispute resolution).

21 **O. Trial Estimate**

22 *The United States and Relator's Position:* Plaintiffs estimate that their
23 presentation of their claims at trial will take approximately 10-15 days and include
24 approximately 25-30 witnesses (including experts), depending on whether the
25 Court agrees that certain key issues are purely legal issues, the Court's resolution
26 of dispositive motions, the Court's resolution of evidentiary issues prior to trial, the
27 Parties' stipulation to the authenticity and admissibility of documents, and the
28 Parties' admission of undisputable facts. Plaintiffs estimate that Defendants'

1 presentation of their defenses should take an equal or less number of days.

2 Accordingly, Plaintiffs have estimated a total of 20-30 days.

3 If the Court does not dismiss all of Defendants' counterclaims prior to trial,
4 Plaintiffs request that any trial relating to any of those claims be severed and
5 separate from the trial of their claims against Defendants, especially considering
6 their apparent contingent nature. At this time, Plaintiffs do not have an estimate
7 for the duration of a trial relating to the counterclaims.

8 UnitedHealth's Position: UnitedHealth estimates that the trial will take 24
9 to 32 days, including presentations by both sides. UnitedHealth anticipates calling
10 25-30 witnesses at trial, including experts.

11 UnitedHealth opposes the United States' request to sever or bifurcate
12 UnitedHealth's counterclaims at trial. The United States fails to provide any
13 substantive basis for its premature request to sever and bifurcate.

14 The Parties reserve their rights to modify these estimates as the case
15 progresses and to ask for additional time for rebuttal witnesses.

16 **P. Trial Counsel**

17 United States: Edward Crooke, Carol Wallack, Justin Draycott, Paul
18 Freeborne, John Lee, Jessica Krieg, and Paul Perkins from the U.S. Department of
19 Justice.

20 Relator: Eric R. Havian, Jessica T. Moore, Henry C. Su, from Constantine
21 Cannon; William Christopher Carmody, Arun Subramanian, from Susman
22 Godfrey; and Stephen S. Hasegawa from Phillips & Cohen.

23 Defendants: David J. Schindler, Daniel Meron, Kathryn H. Ruemmler, and
24 Abid R. Qureshi.

25 **Q. Independent Expert or Master**

26 At this time, the Parties do not anticipate a need for an independent expert or
27 master.

28

R. Timetable

The Parties' completed Schedule of Pretrial and Trial Dates is attached as Exhibit A.

S. Other Issues

At this time, the Parties do not have other issues.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: April 2, 2018

CHAD A. READLER
Acting Assistant Attorney General
NICOLA T. HANNA
United States Attorney
DOROTHY A. SCHOUTEN
Chief, Civil Division
DAVID K. BARRETT
Chief, Civil Fraud Section
DAVID M. HARRIS
Deputy Chief, Civil Fraud Section
Assistant United States Attorneys

MICHAEL D. GRANSTON
DANIEL R. ANDERSON
EDWARD CROOKE
JUSTIN DRAYCOTT
PAUL G. FREEBORNE
JESSICA KRIEG
PAUL PERKINS
CAROL L. WALLACK
Attorneys, Civil Division
United States Department of Justice

JAMES P. KENNEDY, JR.
United States Attorney
KATHLEEN ANN LYNCH
Assistant United States Attorney

/s/ John E. Lee

JOHN E. LEE
Assistant United States Attorney

Attorneys for the United States of America

1 Dated: April 2, 2018

ERIC R. HAVIAN
HARRY LITMAN
JESSICA T. MOORE
HENRY C. SU
Constantine Cannon LLP
STEPHEN HASEGAWA
Phillips & Cohen LLP
WILLIAM CHRISTOPHER CARMODY
ARUN SUBRAMANIAN
MATTHEW R. BERRY
JOHN P. LAHAD
MENG XI
Susman Godfrey LLP

8 /S/ Jessica Moore
JESSICA MOORE

Attorneys for Relator Benjamin Poehling

11 Dated: April 2, 2018

DAVID J. SCHINDLER
DANIEL MERON
KATHRYN H. RUEMMLER
ABID R. QURESHI
Latham & Watkins LLP

14 /S/ David J. Schindler
DAVID J. SCHINDLER

Attorneys for Defendants UnitedHealth
Group, Inc.; United Healthcare Services,
Inc.; United Healthcare, Inc.;
UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company;
UHIC Holdings, Inc.; Ovations, Inc.;
Optum, Inc.; and OptumInsight, Inc.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Attestation

I hereby attest that the other signatories listed, on whose behalf the filing is submitted, concur in the filing's content and have authorized the filing.

Dated: April 2, 2018

/S/ John E. Lee
JOHN E. LEE
Assistant United States Attorney

JUDGE MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD
SCHEDULE OF PRETRIAL AND TRIAL DATES WORKSHEET

Case No.	16-08697			
Case Name	United States ex rel. Poehling v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc. et al.			
Matter		**Plaintiff(s) Date mo / day	Defendant(s)' Date mo / day / year	Court Order
[X] Jury Trial or [] Court Trial (Tuesday at 8:30 a.m.) Duration Estimate: _____ Days		2/18/2020; duration estimate = 20-30 days	8/27/2019; duration estimate = 24-32 days	
Final Pretrial Conference [LR 16] and Hearing on Motions <i>In Limine</i> (Monday at 11:00 a.m. -- <u>three (3) weeks</u> before trial date) Motions <i>In Limine</i> must be filed <u>three (3) weeks</u> before this date; oppositions are due <u>two (2) weeks</u> before this date; no reply briefs.		1/27/2020	8/5/2019	
Event	Weeks Before Trial	Plaintiff(s)' Date mo / day / year	Defendant(s)' Date mo / day / year	Court Order
Last Date to Hear Motion to Amend Pleadings / Add Parties		10/29/2018	10/29/2018	
Non-Expert Discovery Cut-Off (at least 4 weeks before last date to hear motions)	18	5/31/2019	1/28/2019	
Expert Disclosure (Initial)		6/28/2019	2/25/2019	
Expert Disclosure (Rebuttal)		7/31/2019	3/25/2019	
Expert Discovery Cut-Off	14 *	9/30/2019	4/22/2019	
Last Date to Hear Motions (Monday at 10:00 a.m.)	14	11/4/2019	5/20/2019	
Last Date to Conduct Settlement Conference	12	12/26/2019	6/3/2019	
<u>For Jury Trial</u> i File Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and Law, LR 16-4 i File Exhibit and Witness Lists, LR 16-5.6 i File Status Report Regarding Settlement i File Motions <i>In Limine</i>	6	1/6/2020	7/15/2019	
<u>For Jury Trial</u> i Lodge Pretrial Conference Order, LR 16-7 i File Agreed Set of Jury Instructions and Verdict Forms i File Statement Regarding Disputed Instructions, Verdicts, etc. i File Oppositions to Motions <i>In Limine</i>	5	1/13/2020	7/22/2019	
<u>For Court Trial</u> i Lodge Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, LR 52, and Summaries of Direct Testimony	3			

* The parties may choose to cut off expert discovery prior to MSJ briefing.

** If the Court dismisses Defendants' counterclaims, Plaintiffs may revise their proposed dates and estimated trial duration.

ADR [LR 16-15] Selection:

☐ Attorney Settlement Officer Panel

☒ Private Mediation

☐ Magistrate Judge (with Court approval)

EXHIBIT A