

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

Liana Davis,	*	
Plaintiff,	*	
	*	
v.	*	Case No. 2:25-cv-220
	*	
Christopher Coopri-der, et al.	*	
Defendants.	*	

STATUS REPORT AND SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO COMPEL

Defendant Coopri-der submits his Status Report and Supplement to his Motion to Compel filed on March 27, 2026.

1. Before and during this litigation Plaintiff Liana Davis (“Davis”) has engaged in destruction of evidence, blackmail, and manipulation of evidence. Her actions are serious and show a pattern of disregard of the Court processes and her overwhelming self-interest.

2. On March 21, 2025, Davis deleted all the text message dated prior to March 21, 2025 between Christopher Coopri-der (“Coopri-der”) and herself from Coopri-der’s phone. She did this in order to conceal her drinking, affair and pregnancy from the family court in Corpus Christi, Texas where her divorce was filed. Exhibit 7-24 filed with the Answer on September 3, 2025, is a transcript of the conversation between Davis and Coopri-der in real time as she was destroying evidence:

Liana (10:51) Okay. (10:52) Where am I? (10:54) Delete me. (10:55) Delete it. (10:55) Delete the whole thing, the whole thread.
Liana (10:58) Swipe. (11:01) I don't exist. (11:02) Delete it. (11:03) Delete the whole thing.
Liana (14:45) January 14. (14:47) Okay. (14:48) Keep going. (14:49) We're gonna take it back to the ninth.
Chris (14:51) Of January?
Liana (14:52) Yeah. (14:53) I think that's where I first sent you anything compromising.

Liana (21:50) You wiped your phone clean. (21:51) Do you have another phone on you? (21:53) I I know that, Chris, I know this sounds bizarre. (21:56) Like, this is I'm trying to save my liking. (21:58) I'm trying to save everything, like, control.
Liana (22:01) Just I'm trying to stop the bleed. (22:02) Like, stop the bleed.

Liana (32:22) Like, nothing. (32:25) You're about to fuck that up. (32:28) You're wonderful. (32:29) I like you a lot. (32:32) I had to wipe you out wipe myself out of your phone.

Liana (32:34) I'm gonna wipe you out of all my devices. (32:36) I have you like, evidence of you in at least two devices because, again, what, like, those screen oh my god. (32:42) Put it in the head. (32:43) The screenshots I sent you, this is round one. (32:45) They're gonna dig deeper.

Liana (36:35) I don't know. (36:35) See, this is where, like, I'm limited by my knowledge of the legal system because I don't know if they make you, like, call Verizon and get that stuff because anyone could delete anything. (36:47) Right? (36:47) Yeah. (36:47) Might make me do that.


Liana (36:49) Right? (36:49) So even if I even if I delete it, it's not gone. (36:54) I mean, nothing's ever gone. (36:55) It can be retrieved. (36:57) So I'm shitting myself a little over that.

The full Audio Recording of Destruction of Evidence was lodged with the Court on September 3, 2025 as Exhibit 7-23 and is embedded here.



CR000001 Exhibit A
Destruction of Evide


3. On January 23, 2025 Davis audio recorded having sex with Christopher Cooprider without his knowledge or permission. Exhibit 7-25 to the Answer. She later attempted to blackmail Cooprider by threatening to post the audio recording on Facebook. This audio recording has not been produced by Davis in discovery.



4. Davis has avoided providing communications with the witnesses listed in RFP 2 and other requests. Only after being given a Court ordered deadline -- which she believed did not actually require her to produce the documents, merely extract them -- on March 25, 2026 at 3:00 pm, Davis provided a spreadsheet of her text messages. The imbedded images and videos were stripped from the spreadsheet. Counsel for Plaintiff requested the complete text messages with images.

5. Counsel for Plaintiff learned through produced text message that Davis has been using and app on her phone called "Decipher" since November 2024. This is the app that is required by the Texas Family law Courts to preserve and lift complete text messages for Court purposes. Text from Davis to Samuelson November 4, 2024:

11/4/2024 9:24 PM
iPhone (14122957136)



11/5/2024 10:02 PM

iPhone (14122957136)

I'm so sorry to hear that! I'm trying to figure out the text downloading program that the lawyer sent me with minimal direction.

6. Davis used Decipher to produce the texts to and from witness Jackie Samuelson on March 25, 2026. The Decipher header was cut off the production, but the format is that of Decipher.

7. On the minute the Motion to Compel was due (3:00 PM), Plaintiff's counsel provided the complete text messages.

8. On **March 27, 2026** (two days post Court deadline) after realizing that Davis had used Decipher and likely knew how to obtain complete texts with images, counsel for Plaintiff was provided with this information and this link

<https://deciphertools.com/decipher-textmessage.html>

9. Decipher is easy to use, and Davis could have used this tool at any time in the past six months with ease and very limited time involvement. According to Davis, she only started to use the Decipher on March 25, 2026, the day of the Court ordered deadline.

10. Notably, in her motion, she tells the Court "I have been reluctant to produce all of my text messages with Mr. Coopriider and with Ms. Samuelson because some of the non-responsive texts contain material that I would rather not disclose unless required to."

11. On Friday, March 27, 2026 Davis admitted through counsel that she destroyed her text messages with Yvonne Yokopovich. This case involves a malicious prosecution

claim, and the communications with Ms. Yokopovich are relevant. Ms. Yokopovich communicated with Davis throughout the pregnancy at issue and she and her husband urged Davis to threaten Coopriider with paternity, child support and premeditated murder. Ms. Yokopovich communicated with Davis during the time frame of the miscarriage until April 7, 2025. Ms. Yokopovich and her husband conducted investigations into Coopriider's flight schedules and incorrectly determined that he did not have a flight -- when he did. Mr. and Ms. Yokopovich's erroneous investigation was turned over to the police.

12. Davis reported Coopriider to Corpus Christi Police for murder charges on April 5, 2025. The date that Davis initiated criminal proceedings is the date that triggered a duty to retain all evidence.

13. Sometime during the night of March 30, 2026 Davis "found" through a search for a very limited selection of text messages with Yvonne Yokopovich for the dates April 1, 2025 to April 7, 2025. She claimed that "she just discovered" that Decipher can retrieve deleted messages.

14. At **3:14 am of March 30, 2026**, a limited number of texts from April 1, 2025 – April 7, 2025 between Yokopovich and Davis were produced. It is believed that the communications between Ms. Yokopovich and Davis extend beyond the limited search and texts provided. When this discrepancy was pointed out to Davis, she was offended. No further texts have been produced.

15. Jackie Samuelson, Davis's neighbor was interviewed by Corpus Christi police who noted: "The witness was very concerned and feels the victim's claims are false. She wanted to mention to me as well that the victim has asked to lie under oath for her

and has made the offender delete text.” Law enforcement has documented that Davis asked Samuelson to lie. Consistent with this in Exhibit 24 Davis states:

Liana (54:05) Jackie and I are meeting tomorrow, and I'm gonna drill her on what we are and are not going to say because she has this isn't hyped up. (54:12) She has literally been contacted, like, by the amicus attorney. (54:15) It it played a very small factor in custody decisions that were made because there was a morning, fun fact, where I had to flee to her house in the dark because Devin was going off on me. (54:29) And even though the kids were here asleep, I had to make a an agonizing decision. (54:34) Okay.

16. Given Davis’s pattern and practice of destroying evidence and bullying witnesses to lie, all of her responses to requests for production are circumspect, and Davis cannot be trusted to produce electronically stored evidence responsive to discovery.

17. RPD No 2. Requests:

2. ALL COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and the following individuals between November 1, 2024 and the present:

- (a) Ami Amoroso;
- (b) CHRIS COOPRIDER;
- (c) Devan Davis;
- (d) Melisa Madrigal;
- (e) Your present or past boyfriend named “Marshall”;
- (f) Casey Pyle;
- (g) Jackie Samuelson;
- (h) Kyle Yakopovich;
- (i) Yvonne Yakopovich; and
- (j) Anna Ziarko;

concerning YOU, YOUR pregnancy(ies), the termination thereof – whether real or suspected, and/or CHRIS COOPRIDER.

18. Davis has delayed these proceedings for six months claiming sickness, work load, and issues in her divorce case. Even her attorney was unable to secure timely cooperation. He called her “every day” for months to get her to provide the responses. Defense counsel gave Davis grace and provided contacts for tech support. All this while, Davis knew exactly how to produce the requested text messages. She simply does not want to comply with her obligations.

19. Given Davis's flagrant self-interest and pattern of destruction of evidence, Coopriider requests that the Court appoint a forensic computer specialist to create a mirror image of her cell phone and computer so that the evidence can be preserved and specific searches approved by the Court can be executed. Coopriider suggests the following providers:

- a. <https://www.lawandforensics.com/digital-forensics-services/>
- b. <https://computerforensicsresources.com/computer-forensic-houston-tx/>
- c. <https://tecinquiries.com/about>
- d. <https://www.expertinstitute.com/experts/george-w-vasiliou-cco-ccpa-492674/>

20. Davis's pattern of defiance and spoliation justifies this drastic discovery order. In determining whether a motion to compel a forensic exam of a party's phone should be granted, the court will evaluate whether the exam "will reveal information that is relevant to the claims and defenses in the case and whether such an examination is proportional to the needs of the case given the cell phone owner's compelling privacy interest in the contents of his or her cell phone." The otherwise expansive scope of discoverable evidence is tempered by the party's privacy interest in the device. Pable v. Chicago Transit Authority, No. 19, 2021 WL 4789023, *2 (N.D. Ill. April 2, 2021). For that reason, "the inquiring party must present at least some reliable information that the opposing party's representations are misleading or substantively inaccurate." Id. See also, Liederbach v. NYU Langone Hospitals, No. 24-CV-00742 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2025) ("forensic examinations of computers and cell phones are generally considered a drastic discovery measure because of their intrusive nature." Such examinations may be permitted only if "there is reason to believe that a litigant has tampered with the device

or hidden relevant materials” or engaged in other improper conduct.) Tingle v. Hebert, No. CV 15-626-JWD-EWD, 2018 WL 1726667 at *5 (M.D. La. Apr. 10, 2018) (“Further, the utility of the examination must be clearly defined and specified: ‘[M]ere skepticism that an opposing party has not produced all relevant information’ and ‘a mere desire to check that the opposition has been forthright in its discovery responses’ do not suffice to ‘warrant drastic discovery measures like an exhaustive computer forensic examination.’”) See also “*Be Smart: Mobile Devices and Forensic Imaging*” a summary of relevant cases attached as Exhibit A for the Court’s convenience.

21. Coopriders has shown good cause and provided ample evidence that Davis has withheld, destroyed, or tampered with evidence and that a less intrusive method such as manual production of text messages has proven insufficient. Unreliable production, spoliation, witness tampering and failed prior discovery are all before the Court.

FOR these reasons, Coopriders respectfully requests that the Court appoint a forensics expert to create a mirror image of Davis’s cell phone so that future proper and limited searches can be effectuated and this case move forward. Coopriders further respectfully requests that the Court enter orders to compel discovery, to remedy the evidence destroyed, and to award fees and costs as this Court deems appropriate.

April 7, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

BETH KLEIN, PC

By: /s/ Beth A. Klein

Beth A. Klein

BETH KLEIN, P.C.

Colorado Bar No. 17477

S.D. Tex. I.D. No. 3934133

beth@bethklein.com

350 Market Street, Suite 310

Basalt, Colorado 81621

Telephone: (303) 448-8884

WATTS LAW FIRM LLP
Texas State Bar No. 20981820
Federal Bar ID # 12419
mikal@wattslp.com
811 Barton Springs #725
Austin, Texas 78704
Telephone: (512) 479-0500
Facsimile: (512) 479-0501
ATTORNEY-IN-CHARGE

ATTORNEYS FOR
CHRISTOPHER COOPRIDER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on April 7, 2026 I SERVED the foregoing via ECF on all counsel of record.

/s/ Beth A. Klein
Beth A. Klein

Be Smart: Mobile Devices and Forensic Imaging

Scott J. Etish

The Legal Intelligencer, March 22, 2016

Even before the adoption of the original e-discovery-related amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in December 2006, litigants regularly sought forensic copies—or images—of computer hard drives in the discovery process, particularly when there was a risk of loss of evidence. In the early days of e-discovery, the decisional law on the right to and scope of such (then) extraordinary discovery primarily focused on requests for imaging of computer or portable hard drives.

However, with the explosion in the use of mobile devices, and their extension of the trail of relevant electronically stored information (ESI), there has been an increase in requests for imaging of mobile devices, and legal opinions that address these requests. This trend promises to continue considering the vast array of information available on smartphones, tablets and other portable devices, which now includes email; text and voicemail messages; call history; browser (Internet search) history; photographs; video and voice recording; GPS data; cellular and Wi-Fi location history; and maps and navigation history, according to "The Big Data Collection Problem of Little Mobile Devices," by Michael Arnold & Dennis R. Kiker.

This vast array of available data, combined with the proliferation of corporate "bring your own device" (BYOD) practices and policies, will make device imaging a common practice. This article discusses recent court decisions addressing requests for forensic imaging of an adversary's mobile device.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 permits a party "to inspect, copy, test, or sample any designated documents or electronically stored information."

The official Comment to Rule 34 and case law since the 2006 Federal Amendments make it clear that forensic imaging, while much more common in recent years, is still typically considered an extraordinary request that will generally be permitted only in exceptional circumstances. The recent amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), which became effective Dec. 1, 2015, will likely not make it any easier to secure an order requiring the

Be Smart: Mobile Devices and Forensic Imaging
Scott J. Etish, *The Legal Intelligencer*

imaging of a party's electronic device. Pursuant to the pre-amendment rule, "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." However, under the new rule:

"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit."

The "subject matter" and "reasonably calculated" openers—two clauses often misinterpreted or misapplied by practitioners to open the floodgates on discovery—have also been removed. Combined with the central change of explicitly incorporating the concept of proportionality, these revisions to Rule 26 will likely make it even more difficult to secure an order requiring the imaging of an adversary's mobile device.

Cases Involving Requests to Image Adversary's Electronic Devices

Courts will generally not require a party to turn over a mobile device for a forensic inspection or imaging in the absence of exceptional circumstances. As expected, many of the cases addressing requests for forensic imaging of mobile devices draw heavily upon earlier cases involving forensic imaging of a party's hard drive. While the burden is high, parties are more likely to be successful in seeking to image an adversary's electronic device when they are able to demonstrate that they have been unable to obtain the information through traditional discovery methods (i.e., a party has failed to fulfill its discovery obligations by intentionally or negligently deleting relevant ESI), as held in *Genworth Financial Wealth Management v. McMullan*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53145 (D. Conn. June 1, 2010).

In *Genworth*, the plaintiff presented evidence that one defendant used his personal computer and personal email address to download, access and transmit the plaintiff's proprietary information. The defendant further admitted that he spoliated evidence when he discarded his computer even after counsel instructed the defendant not to do so. Accordingly, the plaintiff was able to demonstrate that a forensic imaging of the defendant's electronic devices was required because of the defendant's spoliation.

Be Smart: Mobile Devices and Forensic Imaging
Scott J. Etish, *The Legal Intelligencer*

Courts have also not hesitated to sanction parties in situations involving a party's failure to preserve relevant ESI from mobile devices such as text messages, as in *Calderon v. Corporacion Puertorriquena De La Salud*, 992 F. Supp. 2d 48, 50 (D.P.R. 2014), and in *Christou v. Beatport*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9034, at *37-39 (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2013). Recent decisions also demonstrate that courts will be more inclined to order a party to turn over an electronic device for forensic imaging when the operation and/or content of a computer, mobile device and/or computer system is directly related to a cause of action, as in *Ameriwood Industries v. Liberman*, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93380, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006).

There are very few situations in which a litigant should not be specific when seeking relief from the court, and this is certainly true when seeking access to an adversary's mobile device. Litigants should describe in detail the relevance of the electronic evidence being sought, as in *Freres v. Xyngular*, 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 44116 at *14 (D. Utah Mar. 31, 2014), and in *Bailey v. Scoutware*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37197, at *17-18 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014).

For instance, in *Bailey*, a whistleblower and breach of contract action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant terminated and breached its contract with him after discovering he had filed a suit against his former employer, Fast Model. In discovery, the parties disputed the discoverability of several text messages between a Fast Model employee and the plaintiff's co-worker/mentor at Scoutware. These text messages allegedly occurred shortly after the plaintiff's deposition in the case against Fast Model after Fast Model first learned that the plaintiff was employed by Scoutware. Scoutware did not produce the text messages and alleged that it could not recover them. However, it later clarified that it had asked an expert to review the plaintiff's co-worker's phone, but the expert could not recover the text messages or any voice messages. The plaintiff applied to the court seeking an order, inter alia, requiring Scoutware to turn over the cellphone at issue for examination by his expert. The plaintiff argued that the five missing and two available voice messages were the only recorded pieces of evidence pertaining to the communications between plaintiff's former employer and current employer.

Acknowledging this specificity and the relevance of the evidence, the court allowed the imaging, explaining that "if defendant had the cellphone in its possession and was able to examine it with an expert, that plaintiff also should have the ability to examine the phone."

Be Smart: Mobile Devices and Forensic Imaging
Scott J. Etish, *The Legal Intelligencer*

In contrast, mobile device imaging and examination requests are likely to be denied where the request is broad in nature, and where the request is based on a "mere suspicion" that the responding party is withholding ESI from production, as in *A.M. Castle & Co. v. Byrne*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106146 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2015), and in *Babcock Power v. Kapsalis*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168709 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 17, 2015).

Practice Tips

These decisions emphasize the general rule that while forensic examination remains an extraordinary discovery device, such requests are more likely to be granted where a party is able to demonstrate that they have been unable to secure the requested information through traditional discovery. Applications for a forensic imaging of a mobile device will often be aided by evidence demonstrating the inability to retrieve the requested evidence from other, more traditional data sources, a party's failure to comply with their discovery obligations, failure to preserve devices (despite explicit requests to opposing counsel requesting the same), or unusual computer use and data management practices. A party must be specific in identifying both the evidence sought, and the rationale for seeking it from these atypical sources. While a party may be inclined to seek mobile-device discovery based upon the mere suspicion that evidence exists and is being withheld, such suspicions, without more, are very unlikely to carry the day on a motion. As courts become more familiar with mobile devices as legitimate discovery sources, litigants would be well-served to develop a record supporting both the "sole location of discovery" and spoliation/discovery abuse arguments before seeking the court's intervention.