

1 **DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP**  
2325 East Camelback Road, Suite 900  
2 Phoenix, AZ 85016  
Telephone: 602.735.2700  
3 Robert M. Kort – 016602  
4 kort.robert@dorsey.com

5 **LATHAM & WATKINS LLP**  
200 Clarendon Street  
6 Boston, MA 02116  
Telephone: 617.948.6000  
7 David C. Tolley (*pro hac vice forthcoming*)  
david.tolley@lw.com  
8 William J. Trach (*pro hac vice forthcoming*)  
9 william.trach@lw.com  
10 U. Gwyn Williams (*pro hac vice forthcoming*)  
gwyn.williams@lw.com

11 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*

12 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
13 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

14 Arizona Physicians IPA, Inc. d/b/a  
15 UnitedHealthcare Community Plan of  
Arizona,

16 Plaintiff,

17 v.

18 IAS Arizona PLLC,

19 Defendant.

No.

**COMPLAINT**

20  
21 Plaintiff Arizona Physicians IPA, Inc. d/b/a UnitedHealthcare Community Plan of  
22 Arizona (“United”), hereby alleges as follows for its complaint against Defendant IAS  
23 Arizona PLLC (“IAS”).

24 **INTRODUCTION**

25 1. Defendant has weaponized a federal law intended to shield commercially  
26 insured patients from surprise out-of-network medical bills, transforming it into a vehicle  
27 to obtain a windfall. The federal No Surprises Act (“NSA”) was designed to establish a fair  
28 and balanced process—called Independent Dispute Resolution (“IDR”)—for determining

1 out-of-network reimbursement rates for services performed by certain medical providers.  
2 Congress’s goals were clear: protect patients, encourage equitable payments between out-  
3 of-network providers and commercial health plans, and rein in soaring healthcare costs.  
4 Crucially, only claims related to commercial insurance plans are eligible for this process;  
5 Medicare- and Medicaid-related claims (for which patients are already protected from  
6 surprise bills) are ineligible.

7 2. IAS, however, is abusing the NSA by knowingly and illegally submitting  
8 ineligible claims to the IDR process, securing excessive, windfall awards to which it has no  
9 legitimate right. This scheme has nothing to do with seeking fair payment but rather is  
10 about attempting to funnel outsized profits into the pockets of its corporate owners, all at  
11 the expense of United and the Medicare and Medicaid programs.

12 3. Congress enacted the NSA with a clear purpose: to establish an independent  
13 system to resolve payment disputes in a manner that is “fair to both providers and plans that  
14 also does not increase aggregate healthcare system costs.”<sup>1</sup> Yet, the NSA’s IDR process is  
15 now being used as a tool for exploitation by certain unethical provider groups and, in some  
16 instances, the private equity investors that have acquired them. Those provider groups and  
17 their billing companies have manipulated the process, securing massive awards—  
18 oftentimes many times in excess of the government-mandated rates, as detailed herein—for  
19 claims that were, at all times, outside the scope and jurisdiction of the NSA’s IDR process.

20 4. Here, IAS committed fraud by knowingly providing false certifications to  
21 United, the NSA IDR entities (“IDREs”), and the U.S. Department of Health & Human  
22 Services (“HHS”) that “the item(s) and/or service(s) at issue [we]re qualified item(s) and/or  
23 service(s) within the scope of the Federal IDR process.” It did so with full knowledge that  
24 the claim described herein was ineligible for the NSA’s IDR process because, among other  
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26  
27 <sup>1</sup> *Evidence on Surprise Billing: Protecting Consumers with the No Surprises Act*, (Issue  
28 Brief No. HP-2021-24), Off. of the Ass’t Sec’y for Planning & Evaluation, U.S. Dep’t of  
Health & Human Servs., (Nov. 22, 2021),  
<http://resource.nlm.nih.gov/9918539088506676>.

1 things, United’s Provider Remittance Advice clearly and unequivocally informed IAS that  
2 the claim at issue was for a patient covered under an Arizona managed Medicaid plan.

3 5. IAS and its affiliated entities have initiated thousands of disputes against  
4 United, including disputes that were ineligible for NSA IDR, like the claim described  
5 herein. Defendant’s abuse of the NSA IDR process is fraudulent, egregious, and  
6 intentionally designed to undermine the very integrity of the protections Congress intended  
7 to create.

8 6. United brings this action to put an end to IAS’s exploitation of the NSA IDR  
9 process.

10 **PARTIES**

11 7. Plaintiff Arizona Physicians IPA, Inc. d/b/a UnitedHealthcare Community  
12 Plan of Arizona is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Arizona, with its  
13 principal place of business in Arizona. United is a managed care organization contracted  
14 with the State of Arizona to arrange for the provisions of medical and related services and  
15 benefits to members of Arizona’s Medicaid program, also known as the Arizona Health  
16 Care Cost Containment System (“AHCCCS”).

17 8. Defendant IAS Arizona PLLC is a professional limited liability company that  
18 is actively registered to do business in the State of Arizona. Under the National Provider  
19 Identifier Registry, IAS’s primary practice address is identified as 5301 E Grant Rd,  
20 Tucson, AZ 85712-2805.<sup>2</sup> Upon information and belief, IAS is affiliated with IMN  
21 Enterprises, LLC, a national healthcare staffing company.

22 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

23 9. This Court has federal question subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter  
24 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because resolution of the claims in this Complaint raises  
25 disputed and substantial questions under the NSA, a federal statute, and will require judicial  
26 interpretation of the NSA.

27 <sup>2</sup> *National Plan and Provider Enumeration System (NPPEs) National Provider Identifier*  
28 *Registry*, (last visited Jan. 5, 2026), <https://npiregistry.cms.hhs.gov/provider-view/1689359747>.



1 employers who wish to offer commercial health insurance for their employees and their  
2 families (“self-funded employer sponsored” group plans).

3 17. Notably, it is *only* claims submitted to and paid by qualifying commercial  
4 health plans that are eligible for the NSA’s IDR process.<sup>3</sup>

## 5 **2. Medicare and Medicare Advantage Plans**

6 18. Medicare is a federally-funded health insurance program managed by the  
7 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) within HHS. Medicare is generally  
8 available for all individuals aged 65 and over.<sup>4</sup>

9 19. Medicare-eligible individuals may select from two primary forms of  
10 Medicare coverage. First, there are Medicare Parts A and B, which are managed directly  
11 by CMS. Second, Medicare-eligible individuals can alternatively elect to participate in  
12 Medicare Part C, also known as “Medicare Advantage.” That program was enacted by the  
13 federal government to allow Medicare Advantage Organizations (“MAOs”) like United,  
14 who are pre-approved by CMS, to provide insurance coverage for Medicare beneficiaries  
15 who choose to enroll in a privately administered Medicare Advantage plan.

16 20. Because CMS sets the rules and regulations governing Medicare—including  
17 those related to payment and dispute resolution—for both traditional Medicare (Parts A and  
18 B) and Medicare Advantage (Part C), the NSA’s IDR process does not apply to Medicare-  
19 related claims.<sup>5</sup>

22 <sup>3</sup> See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-111(c)(1)(A)-(B) (providing that IDR may be initiated “with  
23 respect to a group health plan or health insurance issuer offering group or individual health  
insurance coverage”).

24 <sup>4</sup> There are some categories of individuals who may be eligible for Medicare prior to the  
25 age of 65, such as individuals with a qualifying disability (e.g., end-stage renal disease or  
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) or individuals receiving social security disability insurance  
benefits for 24 months.

26 <sup>5</sup> “The Federal IDR process does not apply to items and services payable by Medicare,  
27 Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, or TRICARE.” *Chart for Determining  
the Applicability for the Federal Independent Dispute Resolution (IDR) Process*, Centers  
28 for Medicare & Medicaid Services (updated Jan. 13, 2023),  
<https://www.cms.gov/files/document/caa-federal-idr-applicability-chart.pdf>.

1                                   **3. Medicaid and Managed Medicaid Plans**

2           21.    The Medicaid program is a jointly funded federal and state program that  
3 generally provides health insurance to low-income state residents who meet certain  
4 eligibility criteria. While each state operates its own state-based Medicaid program, the  
5 federal government (through CMS) provides funding to the states for those programs. Some  
6 states manage and administer their own Medicaid plans. Many other states contract with  
7 private managed care organizations (“MCOs”), such as United, who agree to provide  
8 coverage under privately managed Medicaid plans, similar to the Medicare Advantage  
9 program described above.

10          22.    Arizona’s AHCCCS program provides access to healthcare for nearly two  
11 million people in Arizona, including certain qualifying children, pregnant women, young  
12 adults, and people with disabilities.<sup>6</sup> Arizona is among those states that choose to have their  
13 Medicaid program managed by private MCOs, including United.

14          23.    United contracts with the State to administer its Medicaid program in  
15 exchange for a fixed per-member-per-month fee. When a covered individual receives  
16 medical services, United makes payments to the healthcare providers using these funds in  
17 accordance with Arizona’s Medicaid fee schedules governing rates of payment to providers.

18          24.    When providers enroll as Medicaid providers, they generally must agree to  
19 accept Arizona’s mandated rates for services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries.<sup>7</sup> In fact,  
20 for certain Medicaid claims, in the event that a provider obtains any payment beyond the  
21 amount so authorized, the AHCCCS Provider Billing Manual requires that provider notify  
22  
23  
24

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25 <sup>6</sup> *AHCCCS Population Highlights December 2025*, Arizona Health Care Cost  
26 Containment System (Dec. 1, 2025),  
[https://www.azahcccs.gov/Resources/Downloads/PopulationStatistics/PopulationHighligh](https://www.azahcccs.gov/Resources/Downloads/PopulationStatistics/PopulationHighlights12052025.pdf)  
27 [ts12052025.pdf](https://www.azahcccs.gov/Resources/Downloads/PopulationStatistics/PopulationHighlights12052025.pdf).

28 <sup>7</sup> 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (limiting “participation in the Medicaid program to providers who accept, as payment in full, the amounts paid by the [Medicaid] agency plus any deductible, coinsurance or copayment required by the plan to be paid by the individual”).

1 AHCCCS of any overpayment so that the claim can be adjusted.<sup>8</sup> For these reasons, the  
2 NSA IDR process is inapplicable to Medicaid-related claims.<sup>9</sup>

3 **B. The Billing and Payment Process**

4 25. As demonstrated above, there are different categories of insurance plans  
5 (commercial, Medicare Advantage, or managed Medicaid), each with a variety of different  
6 benefit designs. For example, while one health plan may fully cover a certain procedure,  
7 another health plan may have only limited coverage or no coverage at all. Given this  
8 variability, it is important for providers to obtain and verify a patient's insurance  
9 information, typically through the patient's insurance card. Among other things, the  
10 insurance card identifies which insurance plan should be billed for the healthcare services  
11 and what category of insurance the patient has (i.e., commercial, Medicare Advantage, or  
12 managed Medicaid). Healthcare professionals rely on this information to bill for the care  
13 they provide. Indeed, it is why patients are asked to show their ID and health insurance  
14 card when they check in at a provider's office for medical care.

15 26. After they provide medical services to patients, providers submit claims for  
16 payment to health insurers on standardized claim forms. Today, these claim forms are  
17 usually submitted electronically. Claim forms include, among other items, specific  
18 information about the patient, the medical provider who rendered the care at issue, the  
19 healthcare services provided, and the amount charged by the provider.

20 27. The patient's insurer then processes the claim by first determining whether  
21 the patient is a member of one of the benefit plans offered by the insurer. If the patient has  
22 coverage under one of the insurer's plans, the insurer assesses the benefits available through  
23 the patient's specific insurance plan for the services at issue. Based on the terms of the  
24 patient's specific plan, the insurer makes a determination about whether the claim is

25  
26 <sup>8</sup> *Fee-for-Service Provider Billing Manual*, Arizona Health Care Cost Containment  
27 System (July 12, 2021),  
<https://www.azahcccs.gov/PlansProviders/Downloads/FFSProviderManual/MasterFFSManual.pdf>.

28 <sup>9</sup> See Note 5, *supra*.

1 covered, how much of the claim, if any, must be paid by the patient (for example, a patient  
2 might be responsible for copays, coinsurance, and/or the full cost of services if she has not  
3 yet met her annual deductible), and how much the health plan will ultimately pay for the  
4 patient's care.

5 28. After the health insurer makes these coverage and payment determinations,  
6 the insurer issues an Explanation of Benefits ("EOB") to the patient and a Provider  
7 Remittance Advice ("PRA") to the medical provider. The EOB and PRA explain to the  
8 patient and the provider, respectively, how the specific claim was processed and paid. Both  
9 the EOB and PRA identify the amount billed by the provider, the amount allowed by the  
10 health plan based on the benefits available under the patient's specific insurance plan, the  
11 amount paid by the patient's plan, the amount owed by the patient, and the reasoning for  
12 the insurer's payment determination.

13 **C. Out-of-Network Providers' Calculated Abuse of the Billing and Payment**  
14 **Process**

15 29. In most cases the aforementioned billing and payment process is predictable  
16 for providers and affordable for patients.

17 30. Patients with commercial insurance plans usually receive care from medical  
18 providers who have agreed on predetermined rates with insurance companies. Specifically,  
19 for their commercial insurance plans, United and its affiliates negotiate set rates for care  
20 provided by a broad network of credentialed healthcare professionals who offer United's  
21 commercial plan members quality, affordable healthcare services. Healthcare providers  
22 who are part of United's network are called "in-network" providers. In-network providers  
23 enter into agreements with United that, among other things, govern the amount that United  
24 and United's commercial plan members will pay for healthcare services. When a United  
25 member receives services from an in-network provider, the provider is prohibited from  
26 billing above the predetermined network rate. As a result, the billing and payment process  
27 is predictable; in-network providers must accept the predetermined network rates without  
28 billing patients for any additional amounts.

1           31.     However, there are certain medical providers, known as “out-of-network”  
2 providers, who have not entered into an agreement with United. United has not performed  
3 credentialing on these providers, nor has it agreed to pay these providers any predetermined  
4 amount for services rendered to commercially insured patients.

5           32.     Fortunately, commercially insured patients can generally avoid the  
6 unpredictable costs associated with out-of-network providers. Patients most often seek out  
7 and receive services from medical providers who are in-network with their health insurance  
8 plans. And in the rare instance where a patient does seek care from an out-of-network  
9 provider, it is almost always by choice and with knowledge of the costs and complications  
10 involved with out-of-network care.

11           33.     But in some situations, patients have no ability to control who provides their  
12 medical care. For instance, a patient may carefully schedule her surgery with an in-network  
13 surgeon at an in-network hospital but be unaware that the hospital staffs its operating rooms  
14 with independent contractor anesthesiologists and radiologists who have refused to enter  
15 into network agreements with health insurance companies like United. In this scenario, the  
16 patient reasonably (though incorrectly) assumes that all healthcare professionals working at  
17 the in-network hospital are also in-network with her insurance plan. The patient has no way  
18 of knowing that the anesthesiologist and radiologist involved in her surgery are out-of-  
19 network until it is too late.

20           34.     Out-of-network providers are not limited in the amounts that they can charge  
21 for medical services provided to commercial health plan members; they generally set their  
22 rates however they want and without any logical connection to (a) their actual costs for  
23 delivering care, or (b) prevailing market rates and competitive dynamics.

24           35.     Out-of-network providers know, however, that the patient’s commercial  
25 health insurance plan is not obligated to pay their full billed charges. Rather, payments for  
26 out-of-network services are governed by the terms of the patient’s specific commercial  
27 insurance plan. The out-of-network reimbursement varies from plan to plan—while some  
28 pay a percentage of the applicable Medicare or Medicaid rate, others pay the average in-

1 network rate for a given market, and yet others pay a percentage of the provider’s billed  
2 charges.

3 36. Despite knowing that commercial health insurance plans will not pay their  
4 full billed charges, out-of-network providers routinely submit astronomically high bills to  
5 commercial health insurance plans. Insurers process out-of-network provider bills in  
6 accordance with the terms of the patient’s specific commercial insurance plan, which results  
7 in a payment that is less than the amount of the out-of-network provider’s full billed charge.  
8 This results in a “balance” that is left unpaid.

9 37. Historically, out-of-network providers would often “balance bill”  
10 commercially insured patients for the difference between their charged amount and the  
11 amount the commercial health plan allowed. From the patient’s perspective, this bill came  
12 as a surprise, hence the term “surprise billing” (the balance/surprise bill was in addition to  
13 the amount the health insurance plan covered and any amounts the patient had already paid  
14 in copays, coinsurance and/or deductible).

## 15 **II. CONGRESS PASSED THE NO SURPRISES ACT TO REIN IN BILLING** 16 **ABUSES BY OUT-OF-NETWORK PROVIDERS LIKE DEFENDANT**

17 38. Congress recognized that providers like IAS (whose out-of-network  
18 clinicians provide anesthesia services to patients receiving surgical procedures who do not  
19 have the ability to research the provider’s network status before encountering the clinicians  
20 at surgery) held “substantial market power” and “face[d] highly inelastic demands for their  
21 services because patients lack[ed] the ability to meaningfully choose or refuse care . . . .”<sup>10</sup>  
22 Thus, providers like IAS could “charge amounts for their services that . . . result[] in  
23 compensation far above what is needed to sustain their practice.”<sup>11</sup> Congress noted that this  
24 “market failure” was having “devastating financial impacts on Americans and their ability  
25 to afford needed health care.”<sup>12</sup>

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>10</sup> Ban Surprise Billing Act, H.R. Rep. No. 116-615 (2020), at 53.

28 <sup>11</sup> *Id.*

<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 52-53.

1           39. Congress enacted the NSA, effective January 1, 2022, “to protect consumers  
2 from surprise medical bills.”<sup>13</sup> The NSA prohibits certain out-of-network healthcare  
3 providers—including emergency services providers and facilities, providers of non-  
4 emergency services operating at in-network facilities, and air ambulance providers—from  
5 engaging in surprise billing to members of private commercial health plans.<sup>14</sup>

6           40. Congress believed “that any surprise billing solution must comprehensively  
7 protect consumers by ‘taking the consumer out of the middle’ of surprise billing disputes.”<sup>15</sup>  
8 Through passage of the legislation, Congress required healthcare providers (including  
9 hospitals and doctors) and payors (including insurance companies and self-funded employer  
10 sponsored plans) to attempt to resolve billing and payment disputes amongst themselves.<sup>16</sup>

11           41. Thus, as part of the NSA, Congress created a specific framework for health  
12 plans and providers to resolve specific types of *eligible* surprise billing disputes.<sup>17</sup> That  
13 framework, called IDR, was designed to establish a fair and balanced process for  
14 determining out-of-network reimbursement rates from commercial health plans for  
15 enumerated types of out-of-network services.

16           **A. The NSA’s IDR Process**

17           42. If an out-of-network provider disputes the initial payment received from a  
18 commercial health plan, the parties are first required to participate in a 30-business-day  
19 “open negotiation” to try and resolve the dispute. Should that fail, either party has four  
20 business days to commence IDR, seeking a binding payment determination from a certified  
21 IDRE.

22  
23  
24 <sup>13</sup> *Id.* at 47.

25 <sup>14</sup> See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-131, 300gg-132, 300gg-135.

26 <sup>15</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 116-615, at 55.

27 <sup>16</sup> See Kevin Brady, *Brady Opening Statement at Full Committee Markup of Health  
28 Legislation*, H. Comm. on Ways & Means (Feb. 12, 2020),  
<https://waysandmeans.house.gov/2020/02/12/brady-opening-statement-at-full-committee-markup-of-health-legislation-3/>.

<sup>17</sup> See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-111(c).

1           43. For valid, eligible commercial insurance claims, the IDR process is a binding  
2 “baseball-style” dispute resolution. The NSA requires the provider and insurer to each  
3 submit a proposed reimbursement amount and explanation to the IDRE.<sup>18</sup> The IDRE then  
4 selects one of the two proposed amounts, taking into account various criteria.<sup>19</sup> One of  
5 these criteria is the qualifying payment amount (“QPA”), which is a calculation that  
6 represents the median in-network rate for a given service rendered by the same or similar  
7 medical provider in a given region. Congress expected that most items and services  
8 submitted to IDR would be paid at or around the QPA. Indeed, Congress’ intent was to  
9 make the QPA a key metric in the NSA IDR process as opposed to an out-of-network  
10 provider’s “billed charges,” because Congress recognized that the out-of-network  
11 providers’ billed charges were arbitrary amounts with no relation to the amounts health  
12 plans or individuals usually paid for the same services.<sup>20</sup>

13           44. Congress intended that this system would function in a manner that was “fair  
14 to both providers and plans [and] that also does not increase aggregate healthcare system  
15 costs.”<sup>21</sup> It also intended that the IDR system would be used *relatively infrequently*. In the  
16 regulations establishing the IDR system, federal agencies estimated that the IDR process  
17 would annually resolve 17,333 disputes.<sup>22</sup> The reality, though, has been very different.

18           **B. Out-of-Network Providers Intentionally Abuse the IDR Process and**  
19           **Thwart Congressional Intent**

20           45. To say that out-of-network providers have filed far more IDR cases than  
21 anticipated would be a gross understatement. In only the first nine months after the IDR  
22 system opened in 2022, about 190,000 disputes were filed—more than *ten times* the number

23 <sup>18</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-111(c)(5)(B).

24 <sup>19</sup> *Id.* § 300gg-111(c)(5)(C)(i).

25 <sup>20</sup> *See* Requirements Related to Surprise Billing: Part II, 86 Fed. Reg. 55980, 55996 (Oct.  
26 7, 2021) (median contracted rates typically represent reasonable market values because they  
“are established through arms-length negotiations between providers and facilities and  
plans and issuers (or their service providers).”).

27 <sup>21</sup> *See* Note 1, *supra*.

28 <sup>22</sup> *See* Requirements Related to Surprise Billing: Part II, 86 Fed. Reg. 55980, 56066, 56069  
(Oct. 7, 2021).

1 expected for the first full year alone.<sup>23</sup> The number of claims submitted to IDR has only  
2 increased. From mid-2022 to May 2025, more than **3.3 million** disputes were filed.<sup>24</sup> Large  
3 medical staffing provider groups, often backed by private equity, were responsible for filing  
4 a majority of these disputes.<sup>25</sup> And far from leading to fair outcomes, the IDR process has  
5 been incredibly biased in favor of out-of-network providers. In 2024, for example, IDREs  
6 sided with out-of-network providers in 85% of claims decided.<sup>26</sup>

7 46. Not only do IDREs side with providers most of the time, but when they do,  
8 they almost always issue awards that are many times the QPA that Congress expected would  
9 prevail in most IDR proceedings. In the fourth quarter of 2024, the median amount awarded  
10 by IDREs was 459% of the QPA.<sup>27</sup>

11 47. Far from reining in soaring healthcare costs as Congress intended, the  
12 unforeseen volume of claim submissions and the outsized awards IDREs have routinely  
13 issued in favor of providers have had dramatic monetary costs for the healthcare system and  
14 patients. Ironically, the NSA IDR system has **added at least \$5 billion** to overall health  
15 system costs since its inception—approximately \$2 to \$2.5 billion per year.<sup>28</sup>

16 **C. Out-of-Network Providers Like Defendant Have Routinely Submitted**  
17 **Ineligible Medicare and Medicaid Claims to the NSA IDR Process**

18 48. One of the many things Congress did not foresee in enacting the NSA was  
19 that providers like IAS would purposefully, fraudulently, and in violation of federal law  
20 submit clearly ineligible claims to IDR. Nor could Congress have foreseen that IDREs

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
22 <sup>23</sup> See Jack Hoadley and Kennah Watts, *The Substantial Costs Of The No Surprises Act*  
23 *Arbitration Process*, HealthAffairs (Aug. 25, 2025),  
[https://www.healthaffairs.org/content/forefront/substantial-costs-no-surprises-act-](https://www.healthaffairs.org/content/forefront/substantial-costs-no-surprises-act-arbitration-process)  
24 [arbitration-process](https://www.healthaffairs.org/content/forefront/substantial-costs-no-surprises-act-arbitration-process).

25 <sup>24</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>25</sup> See *Profiting on all Sides: Private Equity and the No Surprises Act*, Private Equity  
27 Stakeholder Project (Nov. 5, 2025), [https://pestakeholder.org/news/profitting-on-all-sides-](https://pestakeholder.org/news/profitting-on-all-sides-private-equity-and-the-no-surprises-act/)  
28 [private-equity-and-the-no-surprises-act/](https://pestakeholder.org/news/profitting-on-all-sides-private-equity-and-the-no-surprises-act/).

<sup>26</sup> *Id.*

<sup>27</sup> See Jack Hoadley and Kennah Watts, *The Substantial Costs Of The No Surprises Act*  
*Arbitration Process*, *supra* note 23.

<sup>28</sup> *Id.*

1 (who are certified by CMS and should, therefore, be able to readily distinguish between an  
2 eligible commercial insurance claim and an ineligible Medicare or Medicaid claim) would  
3 blatantly ignore evidence of ineligibility, routinely exceed their jurisdiction, and issue 85%  
4 of decisions in favor of providers at amounts that are four hundred percent or more of the  
5 QPA that Congress intended would prevail in most disputes. Unfortunately, the NSA IDR  
6 system has perverse financial incentives that encourage providers to submit, and IDREs to  
7 improperly accept, ineligible claims. In fact, current data shows that ineligible claims  
8 constitute about 20% of all closed IDR disputes.<sup>29</sup>

9 49. This is a clear violation of the NSA. The IDR process is not available for  
10 services provided to patients covered by Medicare- or Medicaid-related plans. Rather, the  
11 process only applies to services furnished to patients covered by a private commercial  
12 “group health plan or health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance  
13 coverage.”<sup>30</sup>

14 50. This fact could not come as a surprise to any healthcare provider or IDRE.  
15 Indeed, CMS—the federal agency that is primarily charged with administering the IDR  
16 process—has issued several resources to aid parties in determining whether a claim is  
17 eligible for IDR. These resources clearly explain that “[t]he Federal IDR process **does not**  
18 **apply** to items and services payable by Medicare, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance  
19 Program, or TRICARE.”<sup>31</sup>

20 51. Notwithstanding the clear limits of the NSA IDR process, out-of-network  
21 providers like IAS continue to fraudulently submit ineligible Medicare- and Medicaid-  
22 related claims in hopes of scoring exorbitant recoveries.

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26 <sup>29</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>30</sup> 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-111(c)(1)(A)-(B).

28 <sup>31</sup> *See, e.g., Chart for Determining the Applicability for the Federal Independent Dispute Resolution (IDR) Process, supra* note 5.

1 **III. DEFENDANT FRAUDULENTLY SUBMITTED AN INELIGIBLE**  
2 **MEDICAID CLAIM TO THE NSA IDR PROCESS**

3 52. The following example is emblematic of Defendant’s fraudulent abuse of the  
4 NSA IDR process.

5 53. On October 16, 2024, a 30-year-old patient underwent a procedure for which  
6 she received anesthesia services at Tucson Medical Center, in Tucson, Arizona (“Tucson  
7 Medical”). This patient was insured through an AHCCCS Complete Care plan, a managed  
8 Medicaid plan.

9 54. When a Medicaid recipient receives medical care, they have to show the  
10 medical provider their insurance card. The card for the aforementioned patient would have  
11 looked substantially similar to the following, with a line identifying the patient as having  
12 an AHCCCS managed Medicaid plan:



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18  
19  
20 55. While at Tucson Medical, the patient received anesthesia services from an  
21 IAS-affiliated provider.

22 56. Upon information and belief, IAS handles its own billing and submits claims  
23 for reimbursement on its own behalf to United. Because Tucson Medical has a relationship  
24 with IAS to provide anesthesia services to admitted patients, IAS should have received the  
25 patient’s insurance information from Tucson Medical and, therefore, should have known  
26 that the patient was insured under an Arizona Medicaid plan.

27 57. On March 7, 2025, IAS submitted a claim to United for the anesthesia services  
28 provided to the patient. The total charged amount for the anesthesia services was \$1,575.

1 58. Upon receiving the claim, United determined that the patient was a member  
 2 of its AHCCCS Complete Care Medicaid plan. Accordingly, United calculated the  
 3 government-mandated reimbursement amount for the anesthesia services provided to the  
 4 patient, covered by the AHCCCS Medicaid plan, which was \$112.42.

5 59. Specifically, United calculated the appropriate payment for this claim  
 6 according to AHCCCS’s Medicaid fee schedule. Payment for anesthesia claims is  
 7 calculated by looking up the Current Procedural Terminology (“CPT”) code for the  
 8 service.<sup>32</sup> CPT codes are a uniform nomenclature developed by the American Medical  
 9 Association for coding medical procedures and services.<sup>33</sup> They are five-digit, numerical  
 10 codes that communicate what medical services were provided to the patient. When  
 11 providers submit claims for reimbursement to United, they include the CPT code, which  
 12 United then uses to determine the appropriate reimbursement rate for that service under  
 13 Arizona’s Medicaid fee schedule. In this case, the CPT code was 01480.

14 60. On March 22, 2025, United paid IAS \$112.42. With its payment, United sent  
 15 IAS a PRA providing details on the patient, the patient’s status as a member of a Medicaid  
 16 plan, the claim, and United’s reimbursement:

STD-PRA

**PROVIDER  
REMITTANCE ADVICE**



Arizona

PAYMENT DATE: 03/22/25  
 PAYEE TAX NUMBER REDACTED  
 PAYEE ID: REDACTED  
 PAYEE NAME: IAS ARIZONA  
 PAYMENT NUMBER: 25081B1000064015  
 PAYMENT AMOUNT: \$2,126.71  
 GRP ID: AZHC  
 RA REFERENCE ID: 25081B1000064015

<b>PATIENT:</b> REDACTED		SUBSCRIBER NAME: REDACTED	PROMPT PAY DISC: \$0.00	CLAIM NUMBER: 25E133648600	PATIENT ACCOUNT: REDACTED
SUBSCRIBER ID: REDACTED	INTEREST AMOUNT: \$0.00	PCP NUMBER: 006849791007	REMIT DETAIL: PCP NAME: MULLIGAN, EDWARD	PRODUCT DESC: AZ Complete Care Copay Level 00	BILLING NPI: 1689359747
MEMBER ID: REDACTED	SERVICING PROV NM: PHILLIP A WHITE				CARRIER ID: 1689359747
SERVICING PROV NPI: 1144653730					

DATE(S) OF SERVICE	DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE SUBMITTED/ADJUDICATED	UNITS	BILLED AMT	DISALLOW AMT	ALLOWED AMT	DEDUCT AMT	COPAY/COINS AMT	COB PMT AMT	WITHOLD AMT	PAID TO PROVIDER AMT	PATIENT RESP AMT	AUTH#	RMK CD	GRP CD/RSN CD
10/19/24 - 10/19/24	01480-CX, P2 POS/ Bill Type 21	49	\$1,575.00	\$1,462.58	\$112.42			\$0.00	\$0.00	\$112.42	\$0.00			CC45
CLAIM NUMBER: 25E133648600			\$1,575.00	\$1,462.58	\$112.42			\$0.00	\$0.00	\$112.42	\$0.00			
SUBTOTAL														

26 <sup>32</sup> *Physician Fee Schedules*, Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (last visited  
 27 Jan. 6, 2026), <https://www.azahcccs.gov/PlansProviders/RatesAndBilling/FFS/Physicianrates/>.

28 <sup>33</sup> CPT Codes, American Medical Association (last visited Jan. 6, 2026), <https://www.ama-assn.org/topics/cpt-codes>.

1           61. The PRA was printed on letterhead labeled “UnitedHealthcare Community  
2 Plan,” indicating that it was a managed Medicaid plan. And the PRA noted that IAS had  
3 made a claim against an AZ Complete Care plan, which is a type of Medicaid plan:

4	<b>PRODUCT DESC.:</b>	AZ Complete Care Copay Level
5		00
6	<b>BILLING NPI:</b>	1689359747

7           62. The PRA also contained a Claim Adjustment Reason Code (“CARC”)  
8 explaining why United had paid the amount it did for this patient’s services. The CARC in  
9 this case was CO45, indicating the “charge exceeds [the] fee schedule/maximum allowable  
10 or contracted/*legislated* fee arrangement.” The PRA also informed IAS that “[b]illing or  
11 balance billing UnitedHealthcare Community Plan Medicaid members is prohibited and  
12 may violate federal and state medical assistance rules and regulations.”

13           63. The PRA also informed IAS of the process to appeal United’s payment. The  
14 PRA informed IAS that “[a]ll providers of services to UnitedHealthcare Community Plan  
15 members may file a claim dispute based on a claim denial, dissatisfaction with a claim  
16 payment, or recoupment action by UnitedHealthcare Community Plan” and provided  
17 guidance on how to appeal a claim denial. These procedures provided, in part, that to appeal  
18 a claim denial, “[a]ll claim disputes must be filed no later than twelve (12) months from the  
19 date of services, twelve (12) months after the date of eligibility posting, or within sixty (60)  
20 days after the payment, denial, or recoupment of a timely claim submission” and must “state  
21 with particularity the factual and legal basis for the relief requested, along with all  
22 supporting documentation such as claims, remits, medical records, etc.”

23           64. IAS never appealed United’s payment on the claim or sought reconsideration.

24           65. Even though the insurance card and PRA clearly showed that the patient was  
25 a member of a managed Medicaid plan and therefore ineligible for the NSA IDR process,  
26 on May 16, 2025, IAS initiated an IDR dispute through its agent HaloMD, LLC  
27 (“HaloMD”).

28           66. HaloMD is a medical management company based in Texas specializing in  
NSA disputes. HaloMD’s website characterizes HaloMD as “[a] [p]ioneering [f]orce” in

1 IDR, managing IDR for “thousands of healthcare providers across the country” and  
 2 leveraging “proprietary technology, advanced analytics, and deep specialty expertise” to  
 3 achieve success in the IDR process for providers.<sup>34</sup> HaloMD works for providers like IAS  
 4 for a contingent fee. Providers, like IAS, using HaloMD’s services, submit the dispute in  
 5 the IDR process through HaloMD’s portal. As part of that process, HaloMD represents that  
 6 it “gathers and organizes the necessary documentation [from the provider], [and] prepar[es]  
 7 a compelling case that highlights the provider’s position, ensuring nothing is overlooked.”<sup>35</sup>

8 67. IAS, through HaloMD, initiated the IDR proceeding via an online federal web  
 9 portal that includes a notice that providers must submit an “[a]ttestation that qualified IDR  
 10 items or services are within the scope of the Federal IDR process.”

11 Along with the general information you'll need to  
 12 start your Federal IDR dispute process, provide:

- 13 • Information to identify the qualified IDR  
 14 items or services (and whether they are  
 15 designated as batched or bundled items  
 16 or services)
- 17 • Dates and location of qualified IDR items  
 18 or services
- 19 • Type of qualified IDR items or services  
 20 such as emergency services and post-  
 21 stabilization services
- 22 • Codes for corresponding service and  
 23 place-of-service
- 24 • Attestation that qualified IDR items or  
 25 services are within the scope of the  
 26 Federal IDR process
- 27 • Your preferred certified IDR entity

23 <sup>34</sup> See *Home*, <https://halomd.com/> (last visited Jan. 6, 2026); *About Us*,  
 24 <https://halomd.com/about-us/> (last visited Jan. 6, 2026).

25 <sup>35</sup> *Id.* HaloMD is among the three most prolific filers of IDR process disputes. During the  
 26 last six months of 2024, HaloMD initiated 134,318 disputes through the IDR process—  
 27 which by itself exceeded the government’s original estimate for total annual disputes **more**  
 28 **than sixfold**. See *Federal IDR Supplemental Tables for Q3 2024*, Centers for Medicare &  
 Medicaid Services (May 28, 2025), <https://www.cms.gov/files/document/federal-idr-supplemental-tables-2024-q3.xlsx>; *Federal IDR Supplemental Tables for Q4 2024*, Centers  
 for Medicare & Medicaid Services (May 28, 2025), <https://www.cms.gov/files/document/federal-idr-supplemental-tables-2024-q4-may-28-2025.xlsx>. That means HaloMD initiates  
 an average of more than **733 disputes** against health plans per day. *Id.*

1 68. IAS, through HaloMD, sought \$1,575 for the disputed claim. In initiating the  
2 dispute at issue here, IAS, through HaloMD, fraudulently attested that “the item(s) and/or  
3 services at issue [we]re qualified item(s) and/or service(s) *within the scope of the Federal*  
4 *IDR process.*” (emphasis added).

<b>Third Party Attestation:</b>	
Yes	
<b>Conflict of Interest Attestation</b>	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> I, the undersigned initiating party (or representative of the initiating party), attest that to the best of my knowledge the preferred certified IDR entity does not have a disqualifying conflict of interest and that the item(s) and/or service(s) at issue are qualified item(s) and/or service(s) within the scope of the Federal IDR process.	
<b>Signature:</b>	<b>Date:</b>
HaloMD ASD	05/16/2025

11 **A. United Objected to IAS’s Submission of the Ineligible Claim**

12 69. On May 17, 2025, United responded by attesting that the claim was “*not*  
13 *eligible for IDR under the NSA* because this Member is enrolled in a Medicare, Medicaid,  
14 Children’s Health Insurance Program, or TRICARE plan.” (emphasis added).

<b>Federal IDR Process Applicability Attestation</b>	
I (We), the undersigned non-initiating party, attest that the Federal IDR process is NOT applicable to the items and services under dispute.	
<b>If you attested to this statement, select one or more justifications to support why the items and services under dispute do not belong in the Federal IDR Process.</b>	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other.	
<b>Please explain why you believe the federal IDR process does not apply and upload supporting materials if applicable.</b>	
Claim No(s). 25E133648600 are not eligible for IDR under the NSA because this Member is enrolled in a Medicare, Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Program, or TRICARE plan.	
<b>Upload files</b>	
File Name - PRA_redacted.pdf	
<b>Additional information to justify your selection:</b>	
<b>Non-Initiating party:</b>	<b>Date:</b>
UnitedHealthcare	05/17/2025

25 70. United attached the PRA for the claim, which (as discussed in paragraphs  
26 ¶¶ 60-65, *supra*) made clear that the services were provided to a patient insured under an  
27 Arizona Medicaid plan.

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09/01/2025

IDR File Number: DISP-3230827  
Provider/Facility: IAS ARIZONA PLLC (Provider)

Dear Network Medical Review Company, Ltd,

We appreciate your engagement with this matter. As a preliminary matter, we believe that this dispute is not eligible for the Federal Independent Dispute Resolution (IDR) program under the No Surprises Act (NSA).

**The Provider’s Claims Are Ineligible for IDR under the NSA**

The claim(s) below do not qualify for the Federal IDR program under the NSA for the following reason(s).

Claim No(s). 25E133648600 are not eligible for IDR under the NSA because this Member is enrolled in a Medicaid plan.

\*\*\*

*For the reasons set forth above, we respectfully request that the IDRE determine that this dispute is ineligible for IDR. We also respectfully request that the IDRE determine that, as the prevailing party, we are entitled to a refund of the IDRE fees it paid in connection with this dispute.*

We thank you for your time and assistance with this matter.

Respectfully submitted,  
Arizona Physicians IPA, Inc.

71. On September 1, 2025, United sent a letter to the selected IDRE, Network Medical Review Company, Ltd. (“NMRC”), reiterating that the claim was “not eligible” for IDR adjudication because “this Member is enrolled in a Medicaid plan.”

**B. The IDRE Improperly Accepted the Ineligible Claim and Entered a Decision in Defendant’s Favor**

72. On September 29, 2025, after allegedly “considering all permissible information submitted by both parties,” the IDRE inexplicably determined the claim in favor of IAS and ordered United to pay IAS the full amount sought, \$1,575—***\$1,462.58 more than the Arizona-mandated Medicaid rate that IAS was required to accept for treating the Medicaid member at issue.***



1 77. Given that their authority and jurisdiction necessarily derive from the NSA  
2 and is, therefore, necessarily limited to only eligible disputes related to commercial  
3 insurance claims, IDREs are required by regulation to “determine whether the Federal IDR  
4 process applies” *before* proceeding with a claim.<sup>38</sup>

5 78. Only after an IDRE satisfies its statutory obligation to determine whether a  
6 claim is eligible for the IDR process and within its jurisdiction can an IDRE proceed to a  
7 payment determination.<sup>39</sup>

8 79. Here, there is no doubt that the IDRE, NMRC, was derelict in its duty to  
9 determine eligibility of the Medicaid claim submitted by IAS through HaloMD. Indeed,  
10 given that it is certified by CMS as having expertise in managed care, it defies logic that  
11 NMRC could have confused the ineligible Medicaid claim at issue with a commercial  
12 insurance claim subject to the NSA, particularly given United’s repeated complaints  
13 drawing NMRC’s attention to this exact issue.

14 **2. The IDRE’s Actions and Ultimate Decision Demonstrate Bias Against**  
15 **United**

16 80. NMRC’s inability to distinguish between ineligible Medicaid claims and  
17 eligible commercial insurance claims, and its repeated disregard to the medical records  
18 showing the claim was a Medicaid claim, raises serious doubts about whether it has the  
19 requisite expertise to continue to qualify as a certified IDRE. Beyond that, however, there  
20 are reasons to question its objectivity and motives.

21 81. Pursuant to the NSA, IDREs are compensated on a per-claim basis. The  
22 commercial insurance plan and the out-of-network provider must each pay a non-refundable  
23 administrative fee of \$115 when a dispute is initiated. This amount is typically not  
24 recoverable even if the IDRE determines that the dispute is ineligible for IDR. In addition,  
25 both parties pay an IDRE fee *before* the IDRE accepts a dispute and makes the payment  
26 determination. The IDRE fee is set by the specific IDRE and depends on the type of dispute,

27 <sup>38</sup> 45 C.F.R. § 149.510(c)(1)(v).

28 <sup>39</sup> See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-111(c)(5)(A).

1 but in 2025 IDRE fees ranged from \$375 to \$1,150.<sup>40</sup> NMRC charges \$389 for single claim  
2 determinations and \$655 for batches of 2 to 25 claims.<sup>41</sup> If the dispute is accepted for IDR  
3 and a final decision is entered, the party whose offer is selected by the IDRE is refunded its  
4 IDRE fee (meaning it is only responsible for its \$115 administrative fee).<sup>42</sup> The non-  
5 prevailing party is responsible for both its administrative fee and the IDRE fee. From 2022  
6 to 2024, administrative and IDRE fees totaled \$885 million (approximately \$228 million in  
7 administrative fees and \$656 million in IDRE fees).<sup>43</sup>

8 82. IDREs are only compensated when they resolve a claim on the merits.<sup>44</sup> If an  
9 IDRE rejects a claim because it is ineligible under the NSA, they receive *no compensation*  
10 on that claim.<sup>45</sup>

11 83. This compensation structure thus creates an incentive for IDREs to exceed  
12 their authority under the NSA by wrongfully accepting and adjudicating claims that are  
13 actually ineligible for NSA IDR and outside their jurisdiction, as was unquestionably the  
14 case here.

15 84. It also incentivizes IDREs to rule in favor of providers because HHS statistics  
16 show that providers are responsible for initiating all but an insignificant handful of IDR  
17 proceedings. Indeed, providers and facilities initiated 478,799 of 478,849 (99.99%) NSA  
18 IDR disputes recorded by CMS during the fourth quarter of 2024 alone.<sup>46</sup> Thus, if IDREs  
19 reject a dispute as ineligible for IDR or if they select the health plan's rate proposal, the  
20 IDRE is biting the proverbial hand that feeds the IDR pipeline. The fact that IDREs are

21 <sup>40</sup> *List of Certified Independent Dispute Resolution Entities*, Centers for Medicare &  
22 Medicaid Services, <https://www.cms.gov/nosurprises/help-resolve-payment-disputes/certified-idre-list> (last visited Jan. 6, 2026).

23 <sup>41</sup> *Id.*

24 <sup>42</sup> Upon information and belief, IAS received a refund of the IDRE fee it paid NMRC for  
this dispute.

25 <sup>43</sup> See Note 22, *supra*.

26 <sup>44</sup> See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-111(c)(5)(F).

27 <sup>45</sup> See *id.*

28 <sup>46</sup> *Federal IDR Supplemental Tables 2024 Q4*, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,  
(updated May 28, 2025), <https://www.cms.gov/files/document/federal-idr-supplemental-tables-general-information.pdf>.

1 siding with out-of-network providers in 85% of disputes—and awarding four to five times  
2 the QPA when doing so—demonstrates that IDREs are biased in favor of out-of-network  
3 providers like IAS. The bias becomes clearer once one realizes that, of the fifteen IDREs  
4 certified by CMS, five are backed by private equity firms.<sup>47</sup>

5 85. The fact that NMRC blatantly exceeded its authority and jurisdiction under  
6 the NSA in issuing an illegal award—despite repeated opportunities to find the claim  
7 ineligible—purporting to require United to pay \$1,575 on the ineligible Medicaid-related  
8 claim described herein, is evidence of NMRC’s partiality and corruption.

9 **3. Compliance With the IDRE’s Illegal Decision Would Require United**  
10 **to Pay Fraudulent, Abusive, and Wasteful Rates That are**  
11 **Inconsistent with Arizona Policy**

12 86. As discussed above, United is contracted as a Medicaid MCO with the State  
13 of Arizona. The AHCCCS has published a “Contractor Operations Manual,” which outlines  
14 certain requirements for all contractors, including United.<sup>48</sup>

15 87. Among the policies to which United must adhere are several relating to  
16 “Fraud, Waste, and Abuse.”<sup>49</sup> AHCCCS requires United to “[h]ave in place internal  
17 controls, policies, and procedures to prevent, detect, and report [fraud, waste, and/or abuse]  
18 activities.”<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, AHCCCS imposes upon United a responsibility to report to the  
19 State if they “discover[], or [are] made aware, that an incident of alleged [fraud, waste,  
20 and/or abuse] has occurred or is occurring.”<sup>51</sup>

21 88. The amount IAS requested, and that the IDRE awarded, for the ineligible  
22 claim submitted to NSA IDR is more than *fourteen times* higher than the allowed payment  
23 rate established in Arizona’s Medicaid fee schedule. Simply put, IAS’s claim is fraudulent,  
24 wasteful, and abusive.

---

25 <sup>47</sup> See Note 24, *supra*.

26 <sup>48</sup> *AHCCCS Contractor Operations Manual*, AHCCCS (revised Nov. 7, 2025)  
27 <https://www.azahcccs.gov/shared/ACOM/>.

28 <sup>49</sup> *AHCCCS Contractor Operations Manual: 103-Fraud, Waste, and Abuse* (effective Oct.  
1, 2025) <https://www.azahcccs.gov/Shared/Downloads/ACOM/PolicyFiles/100/103.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> *Id.* at 3.

<sup>51</sup> *Id.* at 6.

1 89. Moreover, Arizona’s Medicaid fee schedule is determined in part based on  
2 historic Medicaid expenditures.<sup>52</sup> Should United be required to pay higher amounts to  
3 providers who submit fraudulent claims to the NSA IDR, over time, those aggregated claims  
4 will result in the State of Arizona needing to allocate more money to insuring Medicaid  
5 beneficiaries in the long term.

#### 6 **IV. UNITED HAS NO ADEQUATE RECOURSE UNDER THE NSA**

7 90. As described herein, the NSA IDR system is broken. Providers like IAS are  
8 intentionally submitting ineligible Medicare- and Medicaid-related disputes to IDR in  
9 violation of the NSA. And notwithstanding United’s objections, IDREs are illegally  
10 exercising authority over the ineligible disputes and are issuing awards in favor of providers  
11 at indefensibly high amounts that not only exceed the QPA, but also eclipse (oftentimes by  
12 many multiples) the established Medicare and Medicaid rates for the services at issue.

13 91. United has no adequate remedy without judicial relief from this Court. United  
14 already attempted to contest the award consistent with the Departments’ “Technical  
15 Assistance” guidance. The Departments’ Technical Assistance details how errors in the  
16 NSA IDR process, including when IDREs rule that ineligible Medicaid and Medicare  
17 claims are eligible for the NSA IDR process, theoretically can be corrected.<sup>53</sup> But that  
18 process is objectively insufficient, as proven by the claim at issue here. It requires that the  
19 party raising the error first report it to the IDRE (the party who only gets paid if the dispute  
20 is eligible for IDR), who then decides if the error reported is of the type that permits  
21 reopening the dispute. In the rare instance that the IDRE acknowledges its error, the IDRE  
22 then reports the error to the Departments, who in turn must also determine if the error is  
23 redressable by way of this process. If it is, the Departments then reopen the closed dispute  
24 to allow *the same IDRE who made the erroneous eligibility determination in the first*

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>52</sup> *State Plan for Medicaid*, “Methods and Standards for Establishing Payment Rates Other  
Types of Care” AHCCCS (effective Oct. 1, 2025)  
<https://www.azahcccs.gov/Resources/Downloads/StatePlans/EntireStatePlan.pdf>.

27 <sup>53</sup> *Federal Independent Dispute Resolution (IDR) Technical Assistance for Certified IDR*  
28 *Entities and Disputing Parties*, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (June 2025),  
<https://www.cms.gov/files/document/idr-ta-errors-after-dispute-closure.pdf>.

1 *place* to attempt to correct its decision. If the IDRE determines that the claim was not in  
2 fact eligible, the IDRE must refund the IDRE fee *but the administrative fee is never*  
3 *refundable under any circumstances*. Considering the volume of ineligible claims  
4 providers like IAS are submitting through the NSA IDR process, this multi-step dispute  
5 resolution process is insufficient, particularly given that the administrative fees are never  
6 refunded.

7 **CAUSES OF ACTION**

8 **COUNT I**

9 **DECLARATORY JUDGMENT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202**

10 92. United incorporates by reference as fully set forth herein the allegations in the  
11 preceding and succeeding paragraphs.

12 93. There is an actual, substantial, and present controversy between United and  
13 Defendant concerning the amounts owed (if any) on the claim described herein.

14 94. United and Defendant have adverse legal interests.

15 95. United seeks judgment declaring that Defendant's conduct in initiating NSA  
16 IDR for an ineligible claim was unlawful and fraudulent.

17 96. Without such declaratory judgment, United could be required to pay the  
18 award determined by the IDRE for an ineligible claim which never should have been  
19 submitted through the NSA IDR process in the first instance.

20 97. United further seeks a declaration that Medicare and Medicaid claims are not  
21 eligible for NSA IDR, that IDREs have no authority or jurisdiction over such claims under  
22 the NSA, and that United is not obligated to pay illegal NSA IDR awards issued on  
23 ineligible Medicare or Medicaid claims, both retroactively and prospectively.

24 98. Without such declaratory judgment, there is a real and substantial probability  
25 that IAS will continue to submit ineligible Medicare and/or Medicaid claims through the  
26 NSA IDR process and United may be required to pay IDRE awards, as well as IDRE and  
27 administrative fees for these ineligible claims.

28

1 99. In addition to declaratory judgment, United seeks an injunction to prevent  
2 Defendant from continuing to submit – directly or indirectly – false attestations and initiate  
3 the NSA IDR process for items or services that are not qualified for NSA IDR, or from  
4 seeking to enforce non-binding awards entered on items and services never qualified for the  
5 NSA IDR process.

6 100. As a direct result of IAS’s misrepresentations, United has suffered damages  
7 in the form of payment of IDRE and administrative fees for a claim that was, at all times,  
8 ineligible for resolution through the NSA’s IDR process. United will suffer additional harm  
9 if it is required to pay the IDR award for this ineligible claim.

10 101. To date, IAS and its affiliated entities have submitted thousands of claims to  
11 the NSA IDR process and are continuing to do so, including the ineligible and fraudulent  
12 Medicaid claim described herein. United stands to suffer additional ongoing harm if IAS  
13 is permitted to continue submitting ineligible and fraudulent claims through the NSA IDR  
14 process.

15 102. United and Defendant’s rights related to the submission of Medicare and  
16 Medicaid claims through the NSA IDR process will be definitively decided through such  
17 declaratory and injunctive relief.

18 103. Without declaratory and injunctive relief, United faces ongoing hardship in  
19 the form of being forced to (a) defend its payment of government-mandated amounts on  
20 ineligible Medicare and Medicaid claims through the NSA IDR process, (b) pay IDRE  
21 awards for ineligible claims, and (c) pay IDRE and administrative fees for ineligible claims  
22 for which no payment obligation rightfully exists under the NSA.

23 **COUNT II**

24 **COMMON LAW FRAUD**

25 104. United incorporates by reference as fully set forth herein the allegations in the  
26 preceding and succeeding paragraphs.

27 105. In initiating the dispute at issue here, IAS fraudulently attested via an online  
28 federal web portal, on May 16, 2025, through its agent HaloMD, that: “I, the undersigned

1 initiating party (or representative of the initiating party), attests that to the best of my  
2 knowledge...the *item(s) and/or service(s) at issue are qualified item(s) and/or service(s)*  
3 *within the scope of the Federal IDR process.*” (emphasis added). This attestation plainly  
4 misrepresented that the underlying claim was within the scope of the NSA IDR process.

5 106. IAS submitted the IDR notice of initiation in the dispute with full knowledge  
6 of, or at the very least with reckless disregard to, the falsity of this attestation. From the  
7 patient’s insurance card, the PRA United submitted to IAS, the plain text of federal laws  
8 and regulations, CMS publications and resources, IAS’s preparation of IDR initiation forms  
9 and notices, and IAS’s participation in the IDR process, and the specific objections to  
10 eligibility that United submitted to IAS and the IDRE, among other sources, IAS knew that  
11 the dispute it was initiating was ineligible for the IDR process.

12 107. IAS nevertheless submitted these false attestations and did so with the intent  
13 that the IDRE and United rely on them. According to federal law, “the certified IDR entity  
14 selected must review the information submitted in the notice of IDR initiation” —including  
15 IAS’s false attestations of eligibility— “to determine whether the Federal IDR process  
16 applies.”<sup>54</sup> Even though United contested eligibility, IAS’s deliberate misrepresentation to  
17 the IDRE, on which the IDRE relied, forced United to rely on the misrepresentation because  
18 once the IDRE determined the dispute was eligible, United had no choice but to expend  
19 resources to proceed with the process, submit a final “offer,” and watch helplessly as the  
20 dispute continued to a final payment determination. Any other approach would have  
21 resulted in a default award against United for an amount many times the allowed Arizona  
22 Medicaid rate.

23 108. IAS’s false attestations of eligibility pertain to material facts in the NSA IDR  
24 process because they go to the heart of the IDRE’s jurisdiction to even hear the dispute.

25 109. IAS submitted the false attestations to receive a windfall for itself, namely,  
26 IDR payment determinations in favor of IAS and against United regarding items or services  
27 that it knew were ineligible for resolution through the NSA IDR process.

28 <sup>54</sup> 45 C.F.R. § 149.510(c)(1)(v).

1 110. As a direct result of these misrepresentations by IAS, United has suffered  
2 damages in the form of payment of IDRE and administrative fees for a claim that was, at  
3 all times, ineligible for resolution through the NSA's IDR process. United will suffer  
4 additional harm if it is required to pay the IDR award for this ineligible claim.

5 111. To date, IAS and its affiliated entities have submitted thousands of claims to  
6 the NSA IDR process and are continuing to do so, including the ineligible and fraudulent  
7 Medicaid claim described herein. United stands to suffer additional ongoing harm if IAS  
8 is permitted to continue submitting ineligible and fraudulent claims through the NSA IDR  
9 process.

10 112. United seeks damages and injunctive relief to enjoin Defendant from  
11 continuing to fraudulently submit false attestations and initiating the NSA IDR process for  
12 items or services that are not qualified for NSA IDR, or from seeking to enforce non-binding  
13 awards entered on items and services not qualified for the NSA IDR process.

14 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

15 Wherefore, Plaintiff United respectfully requests that relief be entered in its favor as  
16 follows:

17 A. Declare that Defendant's conduct in initiating NSA IDR for the ineligible  
18 Medicaid claim described herein was unlawful and fraudulent;

19 B. Declare that Medicare- and Medicaid-related claims are not eligible for NSA  
20 IDR;

21 C. Declare that IDR awards issued on unqualified items or services are non-  
22 binding and are not payable;

23 D. Enjoin Defendant from continuing to submit false attestations and initiate the  
24 NSA IDR process for items or services that are not qualified for NSA IDR, or from seeking  
25 to enforce non-binding awards entered on items and services not qualified for the NSA IDR  
26 process;

27 E. Award compensatory, punitive, and exemplary damages;

28 F. Award costs, attorneys' fees, and interest; and

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G. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 30<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2026.

DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP

By: s/Robert M. Kort

Robert M. Kort  
2325 East Camelback Road, Suite 900  
Phoenix, AZ 85016

David C. Tolley  
William J. Trach  
U. Gwyn Williams  
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP  
200 Clarendon Street  
Boston, MA 02116

*Attorneys for Plaintiff*

**Civil Cover Sheet**

This automated JS-44 conforms generally to the manual JS-44 approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974. The data is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. The information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law. This form is authorized for use only in the District of Arizona.

**The completed cover sheet must be printed directly to PDF and filed as an attachment to the Complaint or Notice of Removal.**

**Plaintiff(s):** Arizona Physicians IPA, Inc. d/b/a UnitedHealthcare  
 Community Plan of Arizona, **Defendant(s):** IAS Arizona PLLC,

County of Residence: Maricopa

County of Residence: Maricopa

County Where Claim For Relief Arose: Maricopa

Plaintiff's Atty(s):

Defendant's Atty(s):

**Robert M. Kort**  
 Dorsey & Whitney LLP  
 2325 East Camelback Road, Suite 900  
 Phoenix, AZ 85016  
 602.735.2700

**IFP REQUESTED**

**REMOVAL FROM COUNTY, CASE #**

II. Basis of Jurisdiction: **3. Federal Question (U.S. not a party)**

III. Citizenship of Principal Parties(Diversity Cases Only)

Plaintiff:- **N/A**

Defendant:- **N/A**

IV. Origin : **1. Original Proceeding**

V. Nature of Suit: **890 Other Statutory Actions**

VI.Cause of Action: **No Surprises Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-111(a)(3)(K)(ii) - Declaratory Judgment; Common Law Fraud**

VII. Requested in Complaint  
 Class Action: **No**

Dollar Demand: **\$504**

Jury Demand: **No**

VIII. This case is not related to another case.

If any of this information is incorrect, please go back to the Civil Cover Sheet Input form using the *Back* button in your browser and change it. Once correct, save this form as a PDF and include it as an attachment to your case opening documents.