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22 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
23 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

24 JENNIFFER ROIZ, CLAUDINE ) Case No.: 3:25-cv-09978-LB  
25 CASTILLO, CANDYCE MARTO, and )  
26 KEVIN MAEDEL on behalf of themselves )  
27 and all others similarly situated, ) **NOTICE OF ERRATA**

28 Plaintiffs, ) **CLASS ACTION**

v. )  
BLUE SHIELD OF CALIFORNIA LIFE & )  
HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY, )  
MAGELLAN HEALTH, INC., )  
MAGELLAN HEALTHCARE, INC., and )  
HUMAN AFFAIRS INTERNATIONAL )  
OF CALIFORNIA, )

Defendants. )

1 Plaintiffs submit this Notice of Errata. In Plaintiffs' Complaint filed as Dkt. 1, the incorrect  
2 name of a Defendant was in the caption and the body of the Complaint. Instead of BLUE SHIELD  
3 OF CALIFORNIA LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY, it should have said CALIFORNIA  
4 PHYSICIANS' SERVICE DBA BLUE SHIELD OF CALIFORNIA. The correct version of the  
5 Complaint is attached hereto.

6  
7 Dated: November 24, 2025

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9  
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22 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
23 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

24 JENNIFFER ROIZ, CLAUDINE ) Case No.: 3:25-cv-09978-LB  
25 CASTILLO, CANDYCE MARTO, and )  
26 KEVIN MAEDEL on behalf of themselves )  
27 and all others similarly situated, ) **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**  
28 ) **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**  
 )  
 ) **CLASS ACTION**

29 CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS' SERVICE )  
30 DBA BLUE SHIELD OF CALIFORNIA, )  
31 MAGELLAN HEALTH, INC., )  
32 MAGELLAN HEALTHCARE, INC., and )  
33 HUMAN AFFAIRS INTERNATIONAL )  
34 OF CALIFORNIA, )  
35 )  
36 )  
37 Defendants. )  
38 )

1 Plaintiffs Jenniffer Roiz, Claudine Castillo, Candyce Marto, and Kevin Maedel (“Plaintiffs”)  
2 bring this class action for damages, equitable relief, and injunctive relief against CALIFORNIA  
3 PHYSICIANS’ SERVICE DBA BLUE SHIELD OF CALIFORNIA (“Blue Shield”), MAGELLAN  
4 HEALTH, INC., MAGELLAN HEALTHCARE, INC., and HUMAN AFFAIRS INTERNATIONAL  
5 OF CALIFORNIA (“Magellan,” together with MAGELLAN HEALTH, INC. and MAGELLAN  
6 HEALTHCARE, INC.) (Blue Shield and Magellan are collectively referred to as “Defendants”).  
7 Plaintiffs allege the following based upon personal information as to allegations regarding themselves,  
8 their own investigation, and the investigation of their counsel, and on information and belief as to all  
9 other allegations.

## 10 INTRODUCTION

11 1. There is a mental health crisis in this country and in this state. It is afflicting men and  
12 women, children and adults, and people of all income levels and backgrounds. And it is exacerbated  
13 by companies, like Defendants, that mislead vulnerable individuals in need of qualified mental  
14 health providers by publishing grossly inaccurate directories of doctors and therapists. These  
15 inaccurate directories are known as “ghost networks.”

16 2. Ghost networks are directories of supposedly available, in-network providers that  
17 contain so many incorrect or duplicative entries that the network is largely illusory. Mental health  
18 provider directories are more likely than any other medical specialty to be ghost networks.

19 3. When there are very few—or no—accessible, available doctors in Defendants’  
20 networks, the networks do not comply with state and federal network adequacy laws. Such grossly  
21 inaccurate listings in a directory also violate the No Surprises Act, the Mental Health Parity and  
22 Addiction Equity Act, Defendants’ contractual obligations to Plaintiffs, and California state  
23 insurance and consumer protection laws.

24 4. Defendants engage in unfair competition and deceptive business practices by  
25 knowingly publishing inaccurate and misleading provider directories. They do so for several  
26 reasons: 1) a robust provider network is attractive to potential customers; 2) a seemingly robust  
27 directory of providers gives Defendants the appearance of compliance with state and federal network  
28 adequacy laws (without the costs associated with creating and maintaining an adequate network and

1 accurate directory); and 3) when members forego care after a time-consuming and frustrating  
2 provider search, Defendants do not have to pay for the care they would have received.

3 5. By publishing provider directories in which the vast majority of doctors do not exist,  
4 cannot be contacted through the information provided, are not actually in-network with Defendants,  
5 and/or are not accepting new patients, Defendants actively harm their members. When Defendants  
6 misrepresent their networks, members like Plaintiffs pay inflated premiums for an insurance plan  
7 that does not actually offer an adequate provider network to meet their needs. Even when plan  
8 members pay no premium, when Defendants misrepresent their networks, members enroll in an  
9 insurance plan that does not actually provide an adequate network to meet their needs. Many  
10 members, like Plaintiffs, have no choice but to utilize out-of-network doctors, incurring thousands of  
11 dollars in expenses.

12 6. Plaintiffs' insurance policies claim to cover mental health care with robust networks  
13 of available mental health providers made available by Defendants. In reality, those networks are  
14 threadbare: there are very few mental health providers in California who actually take the insurance,  
15 are in-network, and accept new patients. Thus, the promised coverage is largely non-existent. The  
16 failure by an insurance company or health care service plan to have an adequate network to meet  
17 members' needs is itself a violation of federal and state network adequacy laws.

18 7. These harms are not just financial. They also exacerbate members' mental health  
19 problems. The people using Defendants' provider directories are often desperate for mental health  
20 care for themselves or their loved ones. Members searching for care often spend countless hours  
21 calling providers that Defendants have represented as available, accessible, and in-network, only to  
22 find out that the providers do not participate in Defendants' network, do not offer the services listed  
23 in Defendants' provider directories, are not qualified to provide those services, or cannot be reached  
24 at the phone number listed by Defendants.

25 8. Some members, like Plaintiffs, are forced to delay treatment while struggling to find a  
26 provider. Others abandon their search for care, resulting in serious, potentially life-threatening  
27 consequences. Thus, the coverage promised by Defendants is largely illusory.

28

**JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

9. Federal law provides an essential element of Plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

10. This Court also has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the sum or value of \$5,000,000 and at least one member of the proposed class is a citizen of a state other than Delaware, which is the state of citizenship of Defendants Magellan Health, Inc. and Magellan Healthcare, Inc.

11. Venue is proper in this Judicial District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this Judicial District. Venue is also proper under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) because Defendants transact substantial business in this Judicial District.

12. Divisional Assignment: Assignment to the San Francisco or Oakland Division is proper under Civil Local Rules 3-2(c) and 3-2(d) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in Alameda County.

**THE PARTIES**

**I. Plaintiffs**

13. Plaintiff Jenniffer Roiz is a resident of Orange County, California. She has been enrolled in the Blue Shield’s Platinum Full PPO 0/10 OffEx plan since 2024.

14. Plaintiff Claudine Castillo is a resident of Solano County, California. She and her 16-year-old son have been enrolled in the Blue Shield San Francisco Health Service System Trio HMO plan since 2022.

15. Plaintiffs Candyce Marto and Kevin Maedel are residents of San Bernardino County, California. They are enrolled in the TRIO HMO Per Admit 20-250 plan and have been enrolled in a Blue Shield HMO plan through Mr. Maedel’s employer since 2000.

**II. Defendants**

16. Defendant California Physicians’ Services DBA Blue Shield of California (“Blue Shield”) is a nonprofit corporation incorporated and headquartered in Oakland, California, and

1 registered to do business in California. It administers the Blue Shield of California health insurance  
2 plans.

3 17. Defendant Magellan Health, Inc. is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Arizona.  
4 It administers the mental health benefits for many of Blue Shield’s insurance plans.

5 18. Defendant Magellan Healthcare, Inc. is a Delaware corporation and a subsidiary of  
6 Defendant Magellan Health, Inc. headquartered in Arizona. It administers the mental health benefits  
7 for many of Blue Shield’s insurance plans.

8 19. Defendant Human Affairs International of California is a stock corporation  
9 incorporated in California and a subsidiary of Defendant Magellan Healthcare, Inc. It is registered to  
10 do business and headquartered in California. It administers the mental health benefits for many of  
11 Blue Shield’s insurance plans.

## 12 **BACKGROUND & CONTEXT**

### 13 **I. The Mental Health Crisis in America**

14 20. There is a mental health crisis in the United States. According to the National  
15 Institute of Mental Health, an estimated 59.3 million adults in the U.S.—approximately 23.1% of  
16 adults—struggle with mental illness.<sup>1</sup> Mental health problems are even more prevalent in younger  
17 adults, with 36.2% of adults ages 18–25 and 29.4% of adults ages 26–49 reportedly having a mental  
18 illness. Despite this prevalence, roughly half (49.4%) of the 59.3 million adults living with mental  
19 illness have not received mental health treatment within the last year.<sup>2</sup>

20 21. In 2022, an estimated 15.4 million adults in the U.S. (6% of the adult population) had  
21 a *serious* mental illness, defined as “a mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder resulting in serious  
22 functional impairment, which substantially interferes with or limits one or more major life  
23  
24  
25  
26

27 <sup>1</sup> National Institute of Mental Health, *Mental Illness Statistics*,  
<https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness>.

28 <sup>2</sup> *Id.*

1 activities.”<sup>3</sup> Despite the potentially disabling or even life-threatening effects of forgoing treatment,  
2 one third of those with serious mental illness do not receive treatment.<sup>4</sup>

3 22. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), among  
4 adolescents aged 12 to 17 years old, 20.9% have had a major depressive episode; among high school  
5 students, 36.7% have had persistent feelings of sadness or hopelessness, and 18.8% have attempted  
6 suicide.<sup>5</sup>

7 23. With the rates of pediatric self-harm and suicide rising dramatically,<sup>6</sup> the Surgeon  
8 General of the United States has described mental health as “the defining public health crisis of our  
9 time,”<sup>7</sup> and urged that “every child ha[ve] access to high-quality, affordable, and culturally  
10 competent mental health care.”<sup>8</sup>

11 24. Despite the “profound” consequences of untreated mental illness in children and  
12 adolescents, which are associated with “school failure, teenage pregnancy, unstable employment,  
13 substance use, violence including suicide and homicide, and poor medical outcomes,”<sup>9</sup> the CDC  
14  
15  
16

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17 <sup>3</sup> *Id.*

18 <sup>4</sup> *Id.*

19 <sup>5</sup> Rebecca H. Bitsko *et. al.*, *Mental Health Surveillance Among Children – United States, 2013–*  
20 *2019*, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention (2022),  
<https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/su/su7102a1.htm>.

21 <sup>6</sup> Bommersbach *et al.*, *National Trends in Mental Health-Related Emergency Department Visits*  
*Among Youth, 2011-2020*, *J. of the Am. Med. Ass’n* (May 2, 2023),  
22 <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37129655/> (finding a 57% increase in suicide among young  
23 Americans from 2009 to 2019, and a staggering 329% increase in pediatric self-harm visits from  
2007 to 2016).

24 <sup>7</sup> Matt Richtel, *The Surgeon General’s New Mission: Adolescent Mental Health*, *N.Y. TIMES*, (Mar.  
25 21, 2023), [https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/21/health/surgeon-general-adolescents-mental-](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/21/health/surgeon-general-adolescents-mental-health.html)  
[health.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/21/health/surgeon-general-adolescents-mental-health.html).

26 <sup>8</sup> *Protecting Youth Mental Health: The U.S. Surgeon General's Advisory*, Off. of the Surgeon Gen. at  
27 12 (2021), [https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-youth-mental-health-](https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-youth-mental-health-advisory.pdf)  
[advisory.pdf](https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-youth-mental-health-advisory.pdf).

28 <sup>9</sup> *School-Based Mental Health: Pediatric Mental Health Minute Series*, *Am. Academy of Pediatrics*,  
<https://www.aap.org/en/patient-care/mental-health-minute/school-based-mental-health/>.

1 estimates that only approximately 20% of children with a mental, emotional, or behavioral disorder  
2 receive care from a specialized mental health provider.<sup>10</sup>

3 **II. Federal and State Requirements for Health Insurers**

4 **A. Insurers Must Ensure Accuracy of Provider Directories**

5 25. As awareness of the problem and prevalence of ghost networks grows, federal and  
6 state laws and regulations have been promulgated to protect consumers from the harms of ghost  
7 networks.

8 26. The No Surprises Act, which became effective in 2022, requires insurers to update  
9 and verify their plans' provider directories at least every 90 days.<sup>11</sup> Where plans are unable to verify  
10 provider data, they must establish a procedure to remove providers from their directories.<sup>12</sup> Health  
11 plans must also update provider information within two business days of receiving an update from a  
12 provider.<sup>13</sup> When a member telephonically requests information about whether a provider is in-  
13 network, the plan must respond within one business day of the request.<sup>14</sup>

14 27. California Insurance Code Section 10133.15 and Section 1367.27 of the Knox-Keene  
15 Act<sup>15</sup> require insurers to “publish and maintain” a provider directory “with information on  
16 contracting providers that deliver health care services to the insurer’s insureds, including those that  
17 accept new patients.” This directory “shall not list or include information on a provider that is not  
18 currently under contract with the insurer.” This directory must be made available online and upon  
19 request in hard copy to all members of the public. Insurers must update their directories “at least  
20 quarterly, or more frequently, if required by federal law,” and “at least weekly . . . when informed  
21 of” updates from providers. Insurers are required to “take appropriate steps to ensure the accuracy of

22 \_\_\_\_\_  
23 <sup>10</sup> Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, *Improving Access to Children’s Mental Health Care*,  
24 <https://archive.cdc.gov/#/details?q=mproving%20Access%20to%20Care,%20Children%E2%80%99s%20Mental%20Health%22&start=0&rows=10&url=https://www.cdc.gov/childrensmentalhealth/access.html>.

25 <sup>11</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-115(a)(2).

26 <sup>12</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>13</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>14</sup> 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-115(a)(3).

<sup>15</sup> Codified at California Health & Safety Code, section 1340 et seq.

1 the information concerning each provider listed” and must investigate and rectify reported  
2 inaccuracies within 30 business days.

3 28. These federal and state laws reflect that governments recognize the harmful  
4 consequences of inaccurate provider directories. Despite these legislative efforts to shield consumers  
5 from ghost networks, surprise bills, and inadequate in-network care, Defendants continue to violate  
6 these laws.

7 **B. Insurers Must Have an Adequate Network of Providers**

8 29. Federal and state laws also require health plans to offer a network that includes an  
9 adequate number of in-network providers to meet members’ needs.

10 30. The Affordable Care Act first established this network adequacy framework,  
11 requiring that all qualified health plans ensure the provision of a network that is “sufficient in  
12 number and types of providers, including providers that specialize in mental health and substance  
13 use disorder services, to ensure that all services will be accessible without unreasonable delay.”<sup>16</sup>

14 31. In addition, the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (“MHPAEA”), 42  
15 U.S.C. § 300gg-26, incorporated into the Affordable Care Act via 45 C.F.R. 156.115, provides that  
16 mental health and substance use disorder benefits must not be provided on less favorable terms than  
17 medical and surgical benefits, specifically with respect to annual, aggregate, or lifetime limits on  
18 coverage, financial requirements, treatment limitations, and out-of-network coverage.<sup>17</sup>

19 32. MHPAEA regulations provide that “all plan standards that limit the scope or duration  
20 of benefits for services are subject to the nonquantitative treatment limitation parity requirements.  
21 This includes restrictions such as geographic limits, facility-type limits, and network adequacy.”<sup>18</sup>

22 33. California Insurance Code Section 10133.54 and Section 1367.03 of the Knox-Keene  
23 Act require health insurers and health care service plans to provide members with timely access to  
24 care by, among other things, establishing and maintaining a provider network that “has adequate  
25

26 <sup>16</sup> 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a)(1)(ii).

27 <sup>17</sup> 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(a); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(a).

28 <sup>18</sup> Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Services, *The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act* (2023), <https://www.cms.gov/marketplace/private-health-insurance/mental-health-parity-addiction-equity>; see also 29 C.F.R. 2590.712(c)(4).

1 capacity and availability of licensed health care providers to offer insureds” appointments for mental  
2 health care “within 10 business days of the request for appointment.” When the insurer’s network is  
3 inadequate to meet this standard, the insurer is required to “arrange for the provision of services  
4 outside the insurer’s contracted network” at a cost to the member not exceeding “applicable in-  
5 network copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles.”

6 34. Section 2240.01 of Chapter 10 of the California Code of Regulations requires insurers  
7 to ensure that “there are mental health and substance use disorder professionals with skills  
8 appropriate to care for the mental health and substance use disorder needs of covered persons and  
9 with sufficient capacity to accept covered persons within a maximum travel time of 30 minutes or a  
10 maximum travel distance of 15 miles of each covered person’s residence or workplace. The network  
11 must adequately provide for mental health and substance use disorder treatment, including  
12 behavioral health therapy.” Within an insurer’s network, “there must be mental health and substance  
13 use disorder providers of sufficient number and type to provide diagnosis and medically necessary  
14 treatment through providers acting within their scope of license and scope of competence.” Insurers  
15 must also ensure that their plan members can access information about their mental health benefits,  
16 providers, and other relevant information by contacting the insurer. When medically appropriate care  
17 is not available from a qualified, in-network provider, the insurer must “arrange for the required care  
18 with available and accessible providers outside the network, with the patient responsible for paying  
19 only cost-sharing in an amount equal to the cost-sharing they would have paid for provision of that  
20 or a similar service in-network.”

21 35. By inflating their provider directories with inaccurate listings, insurers appear to meet  
22 federal and state network adequacy requirements when in reality they do not.<sup>19</sup>

23 36. Defendants are in violation of federal and state law requiring network adequacy.  
24  
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26 <sup>19</sup> *Barriers to Mental Health Care: Improving Provider Directory Accuracy to Reduce the*  
27 *Prevalence of Ghost Networks*, U.S. Senate Fin. Comm. (May 3, 2023),  
28 [https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/barriers-to-mental-health-care-improving-provider-  
directory-accuracy-to-reduce-the-prevalence-of-ghost-networks](https://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/barriers-to-mental-health-care-improving-provider-directory-accuracy-to-reduce-the-prevalence-of-ghost-networks) (hereinafter “Senate Hearings on  
Mental Health Care”).

1           **C. ERISA Requires Covered Insurers to Meet Benefit Obligations, Uphold**  
2           **Fiduciary Responsibilities, and Provide Truth in Marketing**

3           37. ERISA was enacted by Congress in 1974 in recognition of the proliferation of  
4 employee benefit plans that directly impacted the well-being of millions of employees.<sup>20</sup> The  
5 establishment of national standards for employee benefit plans was deemed necessary, in part, to  
6 guard against exploitation of beneficiaries due to asymmetric information regarding plans.<sup>21</sup>

7           38. ERISA requires insurers to provide coverage in accordance with their plans; to  
8 resolve claims in accordance with their plans; to uphold the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care in  
9 administering their plans; and to ensure that no false statements or representations are made in  
10 connection with the marketing or sale of a plan.<sup>22</sup>

11           39. MHPAEA is incorporated into ERISA at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a and generally requires  
12 that plans offer equally favorable coverage for mental health benefits and medical and surgical  
13 benefits.

14           40. Section 720 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and Section  
15 9820 of the Internal Revenue Code both require health insurers to verify and update their provider  
16 directories not less frequently than once every 90 days, remove a provider from the directory when it  
17 is unable to verify the directory information for that provider, and update the directory within two  
18 days of receiving new information from a provider.

19           **III. Ghost Networks**

20           41. The prevalence and harms of mental health ghost networks have been widely  
21 investigated and confirmed by countless studies and reports, including by *The New York Times*,<sup>23</sup>

22  
23  
24  
25           <sup>20</sup> 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).

26           <sup>21</sup> *Id.*

27           <sup>22</sup> 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1132, 1149.

28           <sup>23</sup> Jay Hancock, *Insurers' Flawed Directories Leave Patients Scrambling for In-Network Doctors*,  
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016), <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/us/inaccurate-doctor-directories-insurance-enrollment.html>.

1 *The Washington Post*,<sup>24</sup> academics,<sup>25</sup> the American Medical Association,<sup>26</sup> the Government  
2 Accountability Office,<sup>27</sup> and more.<sup>28</sup>

3 42. As explained by a Yale Law & Policy Review article on ghost networks, the effects  
4 of Defendants' ghost networks are far-reaching and damage the very structure of our health care  
5 system:

6 Directory errors cost consumers money and erode regulatory consumer  
7 safeguards. They deceive consumers about the value of the coverage they  
8 are purchasing by concealing plans' actual provider networks, subjecting  
9 consumers to predatory billing practices, and breaking the link between  
10 consumer choices and plan practices that undergirds much of the American  
11 health insurance regulatory structure.<sup>29</sup>

12 <sup>24</sup> Katherine Ellison, *73 doctors and none available: How ghost networks hamper mental health*  
13 *care*, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2022), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/02/19/mental-health-ghost-network/>.

14 <sup>25</sup> See, e.g., Abigail Burman, *Laying Ghost Networks to Rest: Combatting Deceptive Health Plan*  
15 *Provider Directories*, 40 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 78 (2021).

16 <sup>26</sup> *Improving Health Plan Provider Directories*, CAQH & AM. MED. ASS'N., 3,  
17 [https://www.caqh.org/sites/default/files/other/CAQH-](https://www.caqh.org/sites/default/files/other/CAQH-AMA_Improving%20Health%20Plan%20Provider%20Directories%20Whitepaper.pdf)  
18 [AMA\\_Improving%20Health%20Plan%20Provider%20Directories%20Whitepaper.pdf](https://www.caqh.org/sites/default/files/other/CAQH-AMA_Improving%20Health%20Plan%20Provider%20Directories%20Whitepaper.pdf) (finding that  
19 “more than half of patients use [the provider directory] to select a physician.”) (hereinafter  
20 “Improving Health Plan Provider Directories”).

21 <sup>27</sup> *Mental Health Care Access Challenges for Covered Consumers and Relevant Federal Efforts*,  
22 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Report to the Chairman, Comm. on Fin., U.S. Senate, 2, (Mar.  
23 2022), <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104597.pdf>.

24 <sup>28</sup> See, e.g., Ellison, supra n. 24; Jack Turban, *Ghost networks of psychiatrists make money for*  
25 *insurance companies but hinder patients' access to care*, Stat News (June 17, 2019),  
26 <https://www.statnews.com/2019/06/17/ghost-networks-psychiatrists-hinder-patient-care/>; *Online*  
27 *Provider Directory Review Report*, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 1,  
28 [https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/ManagedCareMarketing/Downloads/](https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/ManagedCareMarketing/Downloads/Provider_Directory_Review_Industry_Report_Round_3_11-28-2018.pdf)  
29 [Provider\\_Directory\\_Review\\_Industry\\_Report\\_Round\\_3\\_11-28-2018.pdf](https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/ManagedCareMarketing/Downloads/Provider_Directory_Review_Industry_Report_Round_3_11-28-2018.pdf); Cama et al., *Availability*  
30 *of Outpatient Mental Health Care by Pediatricians and Child Psychiatrists in Five U.S. Cities*, INT'L  
31 J. HEALTH SERV. 47(4) (2017), <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28474997/>; Malowney et al.,  
32 *Availability of Outpatient Care From Psychiatrists: A Simulated-Patient Study in Three U.S. Cities*,  
33 *Psychiatry Online* (2015), <https://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/full/10.1176/appi.ps.201400051>; Zhu  
34 et al., *Phantom Networks: Discrepancies Between Reported And Realized Mental Health Care*  
35 *Access in Oregon Medicaid*, *Health Affairs* 41(7) (2022),  
36 <https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2022.00052>; Susan H. Busch & Kelly A. Kyanko,  
37 *Incorrect Provider Directories Associated With Out-Of-Network Mental Health Care And*  
38 *Outpatient Surprise Bills*, *Health Affairs* 39(6) (2020),  
39 <https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2019.01501>.

40 <sup>29</sup> Burman, supra n. 55, at 85.

1           **A.     The United States Senate Finance Committee Ghost Networks Hearings**

2           43.     A recent study of twelve major plan directories by the Senate Finance Committee  
3 majority revealed that over 80% of the listed in-network providers were in reality “either  
4 unreachable, not accepting new patients, or not in-network.”<sup>30</sup> For Oregon, no successful  
5 appointments could be made.<sup>31</sup> On average, “[c]all times ranged from 1-3 hours to contact 10 listings  
6 per plan.”<sup>32</sup>

7           44.     In May 2023, the United States Senate Finance Committee held a hearing on this  
8 exact topic. One testifying witness summarized her Sisyphean experience trying to find a mental  
9 health provider through her insurance plan’s directory:

10                   Calling psychiatrists within D.C. and Maryland, selected out of what  
11                   was like a digital white-pages phone book, turned into one rejection  
12                   after another. . . . I spent countless days and hours scouring the network,  
13                   despite working long hours in a high-level management position. When  
14                   was there time to find a psychiatrist? I had to make the time, though, as  
15                   my job, and more importantly my life, depended on it.<sup>33</sup>

16           45.     People seeking a mental health provider on a ghost network spend countless, difficult  
17 hours searching for care, which is extremely burdensome for a person who may be experiencing a  
18 mental health emergency. As Dr. Robert Trestman, representing the American Psychiatric  
19 Association, testified:

20                   For those who are healthy and well educated, going through an inaccurate  
21                   provider list and being told repeatedly that “we are not taking new patients,”  
22                   “this provider has retired,” “we no longer accept your insurance,” or leaving  
23                   a message with no one returning the call is at best frustrating. For people  
24                   who are experiencing significant mental illness or substance use disorders,  
25                   the process . . . is at best demoralizing and at worst set up to precipitate  
26                   clinical deterioration and a preventable crisis. Many are already  
27                   experiencing profound feelings of worthlessness, fear, grief from loss and  
28                   trauma, and/or the impact of substance use; some are in crisis and suicidal.  
                 . . . Even when they make the effort to reach out to find help, something that  
                 can be very difficult anyway, their efforts to cull through an inaccurate

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30 *Majority Study Findings: Medicare Advantage Plan Directories Haunted by Ghost Networks*,  
Senate Comm. on Fin. at 1 (May 3, 2023), [https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/050323\\_Ghost\\_Network\\_Hearing\\_-\\_Secret\\_Shopper\\_Study\\_Report.pdf](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/050323_Ghost_Network_Hearing_-_Secret_Shopper_Study_Report.pdf).

31 *Id.* at 7.

32 *Id.* at 4.

33 Senate Hearings on Mental Health Care (Testimony of Keris Jän Myrick at 2–3), available at  
[https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/barriers\\_to\\_mental\\_health\\_care\\_improving\\_provider\\_directory\\_accuracy\\_to\\_reduce\\_the\\_prevalence\\_of\\_ghost\\_networks.pdf](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/barriers_to_mental_health_care_improving_provider_directory_accuracy_to_reduce_the_prevalence_of_ghost_networks.pdf).

1 provider list results in more rejection and failure, exacerbating these  
2 feelings. Some give up looking for care. Others delay care.<sup>34</sup>

3 46. When people in need are unable to find an in-network mental health provider, urgent  
4 mental health treatment is often delayed and, at worst, abandoned completely. Others seeking care  
5 rely on the directory to find a provider, only to face significant, unexpected costs when it becomes  
6 clear that the provider is not actually covered by their plan. And, in other cases, people urgently  
7 seeking care knowingly settle for seeing an out-of-network provider at great expense because they  
8 desperately need help and it is their only option.

9 47. Though the effects of ghost networks are far-reaching and complex, the wrongful  
10 conduct at issue is simple: insurance companies' ghost networks mislead consumers. As Senator Ron  
11 Wyden stated in his opening remarks:

12 [W]hen insurance companies host ghost networks, they are selling health  
13 coverage under false pretenses, because the mental health providers  
14 advertised in their plan directories aren't picking up the phone or taking new  
15 patients. In any other business, if a product or service doesn't meet  
16 expectations, consumers can ask for a refund. . . .

17 It's not hard to imagine how many Americans simply give up and go on  
18 struggling without the help they need. . . .

19 If a student were writing an essay and 80 percent of their citations were  
20 incorrect or made up, they'd receive an "F." If a business gave the SEC false  
21 or incorrect information, it would face extremely severe consequences. So  
22 in my view insurance companies should face strict consequences if their  
23 products don't live up to the billing.<sup>35</sup>

24 48. When asked whether plans made their directories "inaccurate by design," testifying  
25 witness Mary Giliberti, the Chief Public Policy Officer of Mental Health America, responded:

26 MS. GILIBERTI: [A]bout 60 percent of the plans [being discussed] don't  
27 have out of network coverage, so if you get really frustrated and you pay on  
28 your own then they're not paying anything.

29 SENATOR WARREN: So the more the Medicare Advantage plan can  
30 frustrate you . . . the more you'll just go somewhere else. And that means  
31 it's not money out of their pockets. . . . So, look, what we are really saying  
32 here is that it is in the financial interests of these . . . plans to discourage

33 <sup>34</sup> *Id.* (Testimony of Robert L. Trestman, PhD, MD at 2–3).

34 <sup>35</sup> *Wyden Calls for Action to Get Rid of Ghost Networks, Releases Secret Shopper Study*, U.S. Senate  
35 Fin. Comm., Chairman Ron Wyden (May 3, 2023),  
36 [https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wyden%20Ghost%20Networks%20Hearing%20Re  
37 marks%205.3.23.pdf](https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wyden%20Ghost%20Networks%20Hearing%20Remarks%205.3.23.pdf).

1 beneficiaries from accessing care . . . . Because here’s the key that  
2 underlines this. Whatever insurers don’t spend on care as a result of tactics  
3 like outdated provider directories or overly restrictive networks or  
inaccurate information, whatever they don’t spend on care, they get to  
keep.<sup>36</sup>

4 **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

5 **I. Plaintiffs’ Needs for Mental Health Care**

6 **A. Jenniffer Roiz**

7 49. Plaintiff Jenniffer Roiz is a resident of Orange County, California.

8 50. Ms. Roiz has been enrolled in the Blue Shield’s Platinum Full PPO 0/10 OffEx plan  
9 since August 2024.

10 51. When enrolling in health coverage through her employer in August 2024, Ms. Roiz  
11 specifically selected Blue Shield’s Platinum offering—the most expensive option—because she  
12 understood it to offer the “best” coverage. She was seeing a therapist weekly at the time she  
13 enrolled, so she selected the Platinum plan because it required the lowest copayment for in-network  
14 mental health services. She relied on Blue Shield’s misrepresentations about the extent of coverage  
15 and the breadth of the provider network when she decided to enroll in this plan.

16 52. Ms. Roiz pays a premium of approximately \$200 per month for her insurance through  
17 Blue Shield.

18 53. After enrolling in coverage with Blue Shield and learning that her existing therapist  
19 was not in-network, Ms. Roiz began searching for an in-network provider while continuing to see  
20 her existing therapist. Ms. Roiz consulted the provider directory on Blue Shield’s website, which  
21 redirected her to the Magellan directory, which listed hundreds of providers matching her search  
22 criteria, including accepting new patients. Ms. Roiz called ten providers from the list, but none  
23 answered the phone. Ms. Roiz left voicemails for each of the providers, and only two returned her  
24 calls. Both providers told her they were not accepting new patients.

25 54. Following her unsuccessful search in the Defendants’ online directories, Ms. Roiz  
26 contacted Blue Shield by phone to report her difficulties locating an in-network provider. Blue  
27

28 <sup>36</sup> Senate Hearings on Mental Health Care, *supra* n. 33 (Testimony of Senator Elizabeth Warren).

1 Shield informed her that the directory online may not be up-to-date and offered to mail her a hard  
2 copy of the current directory. However, after receiving the hard copy directory, Ms. Roiz realized  
3 that the same providers were inaccurately listed there as well.

4 55. Unable to find care through Defendants' directories, Ms. Roiz continued to see her  
5 out-of-network therapist, paying \$150 per weekly session and incurring hundreds of dollars in bills.  
6 Eventually, unable to afford any additional out-of-network care, she stopped seeing her therapist.

7 56. Although Blue Shield agreed to cover three months of services with her current  
8 therapist at the in-network rate so that Ms. Roiz could identify an in-network provider, they did not  
9 extend this three-month allowance when Ms. Roiz was unable to find an in-network provider. After  
10 the end of the three-month period, Ms. Roiz was required to pay the out-of-network coinsurance for  
11 each visit with her therapist. She stopped seeing the therapist shortly after that point because she  
12 could not afford the high cost of the plan's out-of-network coinsurance.

13 57. Ms. Roiz relied on Defendants' marketing materials, website, provider directories,  
14 and plan documents when deciding to enroll in Defendants' plan; and, once enrolled, to understand  
15 her benefits.

16 58. When selecting the Platinum PPO plan, Ms. Roiz relied on implicit and explicit  
17 representations by Defendants that the provider directory was robust and accurate, especially with  
18 respect to mental health providers.

19 59. Over the same time period during which Defendants failed to supply in-network  
20 mental health providers within a reasonable distance of Ms. Roiz's residence, Ms. Roiz identified  
21 and received treatment from in-network providers within a reasonable distance for a variety of types  
22 of medical care including primary care, gastroenterology, and gynecology.

23 60. On information and belief, over the same period, other members of the class were  
24 able to identify in-network providers within a reasonable distance for analogous medical and  
25 surgical services, including physical therapy, orthopedics, pain management, psychiatry, neurology,  
26 cardiology, podiatry, dermatology, rheumatology, gastroenterology, oncology, immunology,  
27 anesthesiology, and internal medicine and Defendants approved claims for these services.  
28

1           **B. Claudine Castillo**

2           61. Plaintiff Claudine Castillo is a resident of Solano County, California.

3           62. Ms. Castillo and her 16-year-old son have been enrolled in the Blue Shield San  
4 Francisco Health Service System Trio HMO plan since 2022.

5           63. Ms. Castillo is enrolled in her plan through her employer. When deciding between the  
6 insurance plans offered by her employer, she opted for this plan because they believed that Blue  
7 Shield offered more comprehensive coverage and better service than the other available insurer. She  
8 relied on Blue Shield’s misrepresentations about the extent of coverage and the breadth of the  
9 provider network when she decided to enroll in this plan.

10          64. Ms. Castillo pays a premium of approximately \$80 per month for her insurance, and  
11 her employer pays an additional \$1760 per month.

12          65. In August 2025, Ms. Castillo’s son told her that he was considering committing  
13 suicide. Desperate to find mental health care for him, she called Blue Shield for assistance in  
14 locating a provider in her area.

15          66. Blue Shield referred her to Magellan, which administers mental health benefits for  
16 Ms. Castillo’s plan. After contacting Magellan and explaining the type of care she was looking for,  
17 she received a list of four providers that were supposedly in her area and accepting new patients.  
18 However, Ms. Castillo’s calls to these providers revealed that two were not taking new patients. The  
19 other two never returned her calls.

20          67. Ms. Castillo then contacted Magellan again to inform them that none of the providers  
21 they had previously listed were available. Magellan broadened its search radius to 25 miles from Ms.  
22 Castillo’s home. This search yielded six providers, none of which were located in an area that Ms.  
23 Castillo or her son would be practically able to travel to on a regular basis.

24          68. When Ms. Castillo informed Magellan that none of these providers were within reach,  
25 she was told that there were no other in-network providers in her area. Ms. Castillo asked what she  
26 should do when there are no available in-network providers in her area, and Magellan responded that  
27 she and her son would need to be willing to travel farther for care. Magellan did not make any offer  
28

1 to cover the services and did not acknowledge to Ms. Castillo that they are legally required to cover  
2 services from an out-of-network provider when an in-network provider is not otherwise available.

3 69. In addition to contacting Magellan by phone for a list of providers, Ms. Castillo also  
4 consulted Blue Shield's website, which gave her the same list of providers that were not actually  
5 available in her area.

6 70. To date, Ms. Castillo has not been able to find in-network care for her son, despite the  
7 provider directory falsely listing multiple available in-network providers.

8 71. Ms. Castillo relied on Defendants' marketing materials, website, provider directory,  
9 and plan documents when deciding to enroll in Defendants' plan and, once enrolled, to understand  
10 her benefits.

11 72. When selecting her plan, Ms. Castillo relied on implicit and explicit representations  
12 by Defendants that the provider directory was robust and accurate, especially with respect to mental  
13 health providers.

14 73. Over the same time period during which Defendants failed to supply in-network  
15 mental health providers within a reasonable distance of Ms. Castillo's residence, Ms. Castillo  
16 identified and received treatment from in-network providers within a reasonable distance for a  
17 variety of types of medical care including primary care and endocrinology.

18 **C. Candyce Marto**

19 74. Plaintiff Candyce Marto is a resident of San Bernardino County, California.

20 75. Ms. Marto is enrolled in the Blue Shield TRIO HMO Per Admit 20-250. She and her  
21 husband, Kevin Maedel, have been enrolled in a Blue Shield HMO plan through his employer since  
22 2000. She and her husband pay approximately \$100 per month for their coverage.

23 76. When deciding between the insurance plans offered by her husband's employer, she  
24 and her husband opted for this plan because they believed that Blue Shield offered more  
25 comprehensive coverage and better service than the other available insurer. She relied on Blue  
26 Shield's misrepresentations about the extent of coverage and the breadth of the provider network  
27 when she decided to enroll in this plan.  
28

1           77. After enrolling in the plan, Ms. Marto began searching for an in-network mental  
2 health provider for regular talk therapy. She found the options to be extremely limited, and was only  
3 able to find one provider who was actually in-network and available to see new patients. After a few  
4 initial sessions, it became clear that his therapeutic methodology was not well-suited to her needs.

5           78. In 2022, after experiencing challenging medical issues, Ms. Marto decided to seek  
6 mental health care again. When she attempted to search for a provider using the Blue Shield online  
7 directory, she was redirected to the Magellan directory. There, she input her search criteria, and  
8 Magellan generated a list of hundreds of supposedly local, available, in-network providers.

9           79. Once she began calling providers from the list, however, it became clear that the  
10 search was futile. Many of the providers she called did not answer the phone or return her calls.  
11 Others informed her that they were not actually accepting new patients, despite the fact that they  
12 were listed in the directory as doing so. Of the approximately 15 providers she contacted, none were  
13 available to provide care.

14           80. Unable to locate an in-network provider and unable to afford out-of-network care for  
15 which her plan offers no coverage, she has gone without care for the last three years.

16           81. Ms. Marto relied on Defendants' marketing materials, website, provider directory,  
17 and plan documents when deciding to enroll in Defendants' plan and, once enrolled, to understand  
18 her benefits.

19           82. When selecting her plan, Ms. Marto relied on implicit and explicit representations by  
20 Defendants that the provider directory was robust and accurate, especially with respect to mental  
21 health providers.

22           83. Over the same time period during which Defendants failed to supply in-network  
23 mental health providers within a reasonable distance of Ms. Marto's residence, Ms. Marto identified  
24 and received treatment from in-network providers within a reasonable distance for primary care,  
25 pulmonology, urology, and radiology services.

26           **D. Kevin Maedel**

27           84. Plaintiff Kevin Maedel is a resident of San Bernardino County, California.  
28

1           85. Mr. Maedel is enrolled in the Blue Shield TRIO HMO Per Admit 20-250. He and his  
2 wife, Candyce Marto, have been enrolled in a Blue Shield HMO plan through his employer since  
3 2000. They pay approximately \$100 per month for their coverage.

4           86. When deciding between the insurance plans offered by his employer, he and his wife  
5 opted for this plan because they believed that Blue Shield offered more comprehensive coverage and  
6 better service than the other available insurer. He relied on Blue Shield's misrepresentations about  
7 the extent of coverage and the breadth of the provider network when he decided to enroll in this  
8 plan.

9           87. Mr. Maedel has been searching for a therapist for the last five years. During these  
10 searches, Ms. Marto uses the Blue Shield and Magellan websites to generate a list of supposedly in-  
11 network, available providers, and Mr. Maedel then attempts to contact those providers to schedule an  
12 appointment. The vast majority of providers have never answered the phone or returned his calls.  
13 When a provider has returned his call, they have informed him that they were not accepting new  
14 patients, were not in-network with Blue Shield, did not offer in-person appointments, or did not have  
15 the specialized practice that the directory had listed. Each time Mr. Maedel has begun searching for  
16 mental health care, he has been unable to locate an available, in-network provider and has had to  
17 abandon his search for care.

18           88. Mr. Maedel was looking for a therapist most recently in August 2025. Ms. Marto  
19 generated a list from the Magellan directory, and Mr. Maedel began contacting providers from the  
20 list. In total, he reached out to at least ten providers, but was not able to make an appointment with  
21 any of them because they did not return his calls, did not accept the insurance, or did not have any  
22 availability for new patients.

23           89. Mr. Maedel has also been unable to locate an available, in-network psychiatric  
24 provider. Earlier this year, his primary care provider told him that they would be unable to continue  
25 prescribing the psychiatric medication that Mr. Maedel relies on and recommended that he find a  
26 psychiatrist to issue the prescription going forward.

1 90. Together, Ms. Marto and Mr. Maedel began searching for an in-network psychiatrist  
2 through the Magellan directory, which they were directed to by Blue Shield. Ms. Marto generated a  
3 list of providers using the directory, then provided the list to Mr. Maedel to contact.

4 91. In total, Mr. Maedel contacted more than 20 providers from the list, none of which  
5 were available to provide care. Many of the providers did not return his phone calls or were not  
6 accepting new patients.

7 92. To date, Mr. Maedel has not been able to find an available, in-network provider for  
8 therapy or psychiatric care.

## 9 **II. Defendants' Ghost Network**

### 10 **A. Blue Shield's Partnership with Magellan**

11 93. Blue Shield is a health care service plan under the Knox-Keene Act of 1975 ("Knox-  
12 Keene Act").

13 94. For many of its plans, including ERISA and non-ERISA plans, Blue Shield partners  
14 with Defendant Magellan to administer behavioral health benefits.

15 95. For these plans, Magellan serves as the plan's Mental Health Service Administrator  
16 ("MHSA"). Magellan is also a specialized health care service plan under the Knox-Keene Act. As  
17 described by Blue Shield in various Evidences of Coverage, as the MHSA Magellan will  
18 "administer" or "underwrite and deliver" Blue Shield's Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder  
19 services "through a unique network of MHSA Participating Providers."

### 20 **B. Defendants' Plans and Mental Health Coverage**

#### 21 **i. Platinum Full PPO 0/10 OffEx Plan**

22 96. Blue Shield's Platinum Full PPO 0/10 OffEx ("Platinum Full") Plan is an ERISA  
23 plan that offers members access to low-cost care when using an in-network provider. Both individual  
24 and family members have no deductible for in-network care, but have a \$1,000 individual and  
25 \$2,000 family medical deductible for out-of-network care. The plan has an annual out-of-pocket  
26 maximum of \$4,700 for individuals using in-network providers and \$9,400 for a combination of in-  
27 and out-of-network providers.  
28

1 97. Members are responsible for a copay of \$10 per visit for outpatient mental health  
2 office visits when the provider is in-network with Blue Shield’s Mental Health Service  
3 Administrator.

4 98. Other outpatient mental health services, including intensive outpatient care and  
5 behavioral health treatment for pervasive developmental disorders or autism, are subject to 10%  
6 coinsurance when provided by an in-network practitioner.

7 99. For out-of-network behavioral healthcare, members must pay 40% coinsurance.

8 100. The plan includes both inpatient and outpatient mental health coverage.

9 **ii. TRIO HMO Basic Plan**

10 101. The Blue Shield TRIO HMO Basic Plan is a non-ERISA plan offered by Blue Shield  
11 to some public employees of California pursuant to a contract between Blue Shield and the San  
12 Francisco Health Service System.

13 102. The plan’s annual out-of-pocket maximum for in-network medical costs is \$1,500 for  
14 individuals and \$3,000 for families.

15 103. Outpatient mental health services require a \$15 copay per visit. Coverage only applies  
16 to services received from in-network providers, and the plan offers no coverage for out-of-network  
17 providers.

18 104. The plan includes both inpatient and outpatient mental health coverage.

19 **iii. TRIO HMO Per Admit 20-250 Plan**

20 105. The TRIO HMO Per Admit 20-250 (“TRIO HMO 20-250”) Plan is a non-ERISA  
21 plan offered by Blue Shield to some public employees of California pursuant to a contract between  
22 Blue Shield and the Upland Unified School District.

23 106. The plan has no deductible when using an in-network provider, but offers no  
24 coverage for out-of-network care. Individual coverage is subject to an annual out-of-pocket  
25 maximum of \$2,000 for in-network care, while family coverage also has a separate \$4,000 family  
26 maximum.

27 107. For outpatient mental health services, members are responsible for a \$20 copay per  
28 office visit, but only have coverage for providers that are in-network with the MHSA.

1 108. The plan includes both inpatient and outpatient mental health coverage.

2 **C. Defendants' Provider Directories**

3 109. At all relevant times, Defendants published online directories of mental health  
4 providers who are supposedly in-network with Defendants, available to see new patients, and  
5 qualified to provide specified mental health services. These directories are the definitive resource to  
6 identify which providers are in Defendants' networks and are thereby covered at the plan's  
7 in-network rate. These directories are publicly available to members and non-members of Blue  
8 Shield plans.

9 110. The directory requires users to either search for a specific provider by name or select  
10 a specific specialty or condition for which they are seeking care. However, users must select from a  
11 set list of terms provided by Blue Shield, limiting the functionality of the directory. Without  
12 providing a doctor's name, specialty, or condition, a user cannot access the directory.

13 111. The Blue Shield directory allows the user to input their location and search radius,  
14 and can be sorted based on provider gender, clinical focus, and whether a provider is accepting new  
15 patients or offers virtual or in-person appointments.

16 112. For some insurance plans, if a user enters search terms suggesting a search for mental  
17 health care, Blue Shield redirects the user to Magellan's directory.

18 113. The Magellan directory allows the user to input their location and search radius, then  
19 allows for filtering search results by "Accepting New Patients," virtual or in-person visits, provider  
20 gender, specialty, and professional credentials, among other things.

21 114. Defendants' provider directories affirmatively misrepresent to current and prospective  
22 members that the mental health providers listed are in fact in-network and will be accessible and  
23 available to provide care. In reality, the vast majority of providers listed in the directories are not in-  
24 network, not available, not reachable, not qualified to provide the services listed for them, or not  
25 actually practicing at the listed location.

26 115. Moreover, Defendants' provider directories are replete with inaccuracies of all kinds,  
27 including incorrect addresses and phone numbers, as well as repeated entries of the same provider.  
28 These inaccuracies may appear at first glance to be a minor oversight, but such errors are far from

1 trivial for a person who needs mental health care for themselves or a loved one. The inclusion of  
2 incorrect telephone numbers artificially inflates the perceived size and adequacy of Defendants'  
3 networks and forces members to invest more time and energy trying to find a mental health  
4 provider—only to be repeatedly led to a dead end.

5 116. These inaccuracies make it appear that Defendants contract with vastly more mental  
6 health providers than they do. Accordingly, Defendants' provider directories, and representations  
7 about their comprehensive mental health coverage, are inaccurate, deceptive, and misleading.

8 **D. "Secret Shopper" Study**

9 117. In July 2025, Plaintiffs' counsel conducted a secret shopper study to replicate  
10 Plaintiff Jenniffer Roiz's experience trying to locate a provider. Counsel utilized experienced and  
11 qualified researchers to conduct this study.

12 118. Using Defendant Magellan's online directory, Ms. Roiz generated a list of supposedly  
13 in-network mental health providers accepting new patients within a 25-mile radius of Santa Ana,  
14 California, where Ms. Roiz resides. This search yielded a list of 149 supposedly available, in-  
15 network providers.

16 119. The research consultant then called each of the listed providers. If a call was not  
17 answered, the consultant would make a second attempt over multiple days and would leave a  
18 voicemail asking for a return call after each attempt. For every completed call, researchers recorded  
19 the provider's response: whether they were indeed the type of provider listed in the directory;  
20 whether they accepted Defendants' plan; whether the provider was accepting new patients; and how  
21 long the wait was for an appointment.

22 120. Overall, only 13% of the listed providers were in-network, could be reached,  
23 provided the listed services, and were willing to schedule an initial appointment within one month.

24 121. Out of the total 100 directory listings called, it was not possible to make an  
25 appointment with 87 of the providers listed. Fully 47 providers were unreachable—they never  
26 returned the calls or the phone number was incorrect or out of service. Of the 53 providers that were  
27 reachable, 40 did not accept the insurance plan, were not accepting new patients, did not provide the  
28

1 necessary services, had no appointments available within one month, and/or were not practicing at  
2 the listed location.

3 122. That is an 87% ghost rate for Magellan’s mental health network.

4 **III. Defendants’ Deceptive and Misleading Activity**

5 **A. Defendants’ Misrepresentations and Omissions**

6 123. Defendants hold themselves out to consumers—through the provider directories and  
7 marketing materials—as having robust networks of providers to meet members’ mental health care  
8 needs. These representations are deceptive, as the directories misrepresent the breadth of the  
9 networks and the ease of utilizing the benefits available under the insurance plan.

10 124. In addition to publishing and maintaining inaccurate provider directories, Defendants  
11 provide consumers with deceptive and materially misleading marketing and program materials about  
12 the benefits offered under their plans. These materials promise mental health benefits, easy access to  
13 care, and robust networks of providers. For example, in its Evidence of Coverage for the Platinum  
14 Full plan, Blue Shield states that “A Blue Shield health plan will help you pay for medical care and  
15 provide you with access to a network of doctors, Hospitals, and other Health Care Providers.”<sup>37</sup>

16 125. On a page titled “Blue Shield’s network,” Blue Shield says that “Our network of  
17 doctors and hospitals is designed to meet the needs of members . . . . A full selection of behavioral  
18 health providers for mental health care and substance use treatment are available. Additional  
19 specialists are included in our network if they meet our credentialing requirements to help make sure  
20 members have access to a larger number of doctors within a reasonable distance from home.” This  
21 page then directs the user to Blue Shield’s directory page to “Find a doctor.”

22 126. Defendants’ representations about the size and breadth of their provider networks are  
23 grossly misleading because an estimated 76-92% of those listings are “ghosts.” Defendants’  
24 networks are far smaller than advertised.

25  
26  
27 <sup>37</sup> Defendants also encourage members and prospective members to rely on Evidence of Coverage  
28 documents by stating that they should “read [the] Evidence of Coverage and Disclosure Form  
carefully and completely so that you understand which services are covered health care services, and  
the limitations and exclusions that apply to your plan.”

1 127. Defendants’ directories are intentionally and grossly inaccurate, and consumers are  
2 often left struggling and wasting time searching for treatment long after they start to seek out a  
3 mental health professional. Consumers often have to seek help from costly out-of-network providers  
4 because Defendants’ networks lack adequate providers.

5 128. In its plan materials, Blue Shield repeatedly directs members to consult its directory  
6 and/or the directory of its MHSA to find in-network care. For example, as explained in the Evidence  
7 of Coverage for the Platinum Full plan, “Blue Shield contracts with Benefit Administrators to  
8 manage the Benefits . . . through their own network of providers,” noting that mental health services  
9 are administered by the Mental Health Service Administrator. It goes on to encourage members to  
10 “Visit blueshieldca.com and click on Find a Doctor to access the MHSA network.”

11 129. On a page titled “Information about the provider directory,” Blue Shield says that it  
12 “makes every attempt to validate the information in the directories.” Blue Shield claims to validate  
13 information in its directory every three months, and credentials contracted providers every three  
14 years.

15 130. Defendants mislead consumers by making them believe that they will have access to  
16 sufficiently broad networks of providers to meet their care needs and make use of the coverage  
17 provided by Defendants, when, in reality, Defendants’ directories are inaccurate and their networks  
18 are sparse.

19 131. Consumers rely on an insurer’s directory to find providers in their health plan. As  
20 stated by the American Medical Association and the Council for Affordable Quality Healthcare:

21 Health plans are expected by their members and their contracted practices  
22 to display a provider directory to the public that represents an accurate  
23 reflection of their networks. It is the most public-facing data that health  
plans provide, and patients are dependent on accurate directories to access  
care.<sup>38</sup>

24 132. Blue Shield directs plan members to consult Defendants’ directories in order to find  
25 in-network care. For plans that include mental health benefits administered by Magellan, Blue Shield  
26 also directs members to consult the Magellan directory to find in-network care. For example,

27  
28 <sup>38</sup> Improving Health Plan Provider Directories, *supra* n. 26, at 7.

1 according to the Evidence of Coverage for the TRIO HMO Basic plan, Blue Shield of California  
2 contracts with a Mental Health Service Administrator to deliver all mental health services “through a  
3 unique network of mental health Participating Providers.” The Evidence of Coverage requires that  
4 all mental health services be provided by a MHSA participating provider and states that “A list of  
5 MHSA Participating Providers is available in the online Blue Shield of California Provider  
6 Directory. Members may also contact the MHSA directly for information and to select a MHSA  
7 Participating Provider.”

8 133. Defendants’ repeated focus on the importance of using an in-network provider, and  
9 repeated direction of members to use the provider directories to find an in-network provider, implies  
10 that members can rely on the directories to accurately reflect the pool of available, in-network  
11 providers. For example, Blue Shield encourages prospective TRIO HMO Basic plan members in its  
12 Evidence of Coverage to “review the list of providers within the Trio HMO physician and hospital  
13 directory before enrolling in this health plan.”

14 134. Defendants represent that they regularly monitor and update their network directories  
15 for accuracy. For example, Blue Shield represents that it updates its directory at least once every 90  
16 days. Magellan’s directory page for Blue Shield plans includes the date of the “Provider Directory  
17 Last Update,” which is typically within one to two business days of the current date. In truth,  
18 Defendants’ directories reflect ghost rates over 75%.

19 135. Any argument by Defendants that the members should have themselves verified that  
20 the providers were in fact in-network does not absolve Defendants of their obligation to accurately  
21 represent the mental health providers available in their network.

22 136. Any boilerplate disclaimers Defendants might provide would be woefully  
23 insufficient. Put another way, no reasonable consumer viewing a boilerplate disclaimer would  
24 understand that more than 75% of mental health providers listed in Defendants’ directories are not  
25 available to treat members of Defendants’ plans. Indeed, there is no disclaimer broad enough to  
26 absolve that level of deception.

27 137. Defendants also misrepresent their willingness to allow members to see out-of-  
28 network providers at in-network rates when their networks are not adequate to meet members’ care

1 needs. For example, the Evidence of Coverage for the Platinum Full plan explains members' rights  
2 when they cannot find in-network mental health care: "If you are unable to schedule an appointment  
3 with a Participating Provider for Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder services, contact Mental  
4 Health Customer Service. The MHSA will help you either schedule an appointment with a  
5 Participating Provider, or select a Non-Participating Provider in your area within five calendar days  
6 and contact you regarding available appointment times. For any Covered Services, you will be  
7 responsible for no more than the Cost Share for seeing a Non-Participating Provider." Similarly,  
8 according to the Evidence of Coverage for the TRIO HMO Basic plan, when in-network care is not  
9 available because "no MHSA Participating Provider is available to perform the needed service, the  
10 MHSA will refer you to a non-Plan Provider and authorize services to be received. If a Plan Provider  
11 is not available, the Member can ask to see a non-Plan Provider at the Plan Provider Cost Share. If  
12 the services cannot reasonably be obtained from a Plan Provider, Blue Shield will approve the  
13 request and the Member will only be responsible for the Plan Provider Cost Share." In the Evidence  
14 of Coverage for the SFHSS Trio HMO plan, Blue Shield states that when a member cannot find in-  
15 network mental health care, "The MHSA will help you either schedule an appointment with a  
16 Participating Provider, or select a Non-Participating Provider in your area within five calendar days  
17 and contact you regarding available appointment times. For any Covered Services, you will be  
18 responsible for no more than the Cost Share for using an MHSA Participating Provider."

19 138. In its provider directory, Magellan misrepresents the network status of providers as  
20 well as other crucial information such as their availability to accept new patients, their contact  
21 information, the services they provide, and their locations. Members and prospective members rely  
22 on these representations to understand the availability of care within the Magellan network.

23 139. Separately and together, Defendants' representations mislead consumers to believe  
24 that members will have access to a network of providers that is robust enough to allow them to  
25 utilize their comprehensive coverage with Defendants, and that they only need to look to and rely on  
26 the provider network to find necessary mental health care. In reality, Defendants' failure to maintain  
27 accurate directories makes it nearly impossible to obtain in-network mental health care.  
28

1           140. The incorporation of the inaccurate directories into the plans’ marketing materials  
2 through references to providers, services, and network on Defendants’ public websites constituted a  
3 knowing untrue, deceptive, and misleading statement in connection with the marketing and sale of  
4 the plan.

5           141. In addition to the affirmative misrepresentations made by Defendants about the  
6 breadth of their provider networks and comprehensiveness of Defendants’ mental health care  
7 coverage, Defendants also makes material omissions, including but not limited to their failure to  
8 disclose:

- 9           a) the inadequacy of Defendants’ networks to meet members’ care needs;
- 10           b) the extent of provider directory inaccuracies;
- 11           c) that the vast majority of in-network mental health providers are not accessible;
- 12           d) the likelihood that members will be unable to find an in-network mental health  
13 provider through the directories;
- 14           e) the likelihood that members will need to delay or forgo coverage, or resort to using an  
15 out-of-network provider; and
- 16           f) the likelihood that members will be unable to use the coverage that their plan  
17 provides for in-network mental health care.

18           142. There is complete information asymmetry between Defendants and consumers:  
19 Defendants have an obligation under the law to access all the relevant information, including their  
20 own contracts with in-network providers, to determine whether providers are accurately listed, and  
21 to make regular updates to ensure accuracy. On the other hand, a member can only become aware of  
22 the extent of the directory inaccuracies after expending significant time and energy through trial and  
23 error, hours of calls, and extensive research. The information is not readily available to Plaintiffs and  
24 other consumers.

25           **B. Defendants’ Misrepresentations and Omissions Are Material**

26           143. Plaintiffs relied on Defendants’ provider directories and representations regarding  
27 their provider networks when choosing their health plans. Consumers in general regularly rely on a  
28

1 health plan’s provider directory to inform their choice of health plan.<sup>39</sup> Over half of consumers in  
2 one poll identified provider choice as the most important non-financial consideration they make  
3 when selecting a health plan.<sup>40</sup> In another survey, participants were willing to pay higher premiums  
4 for the ability to continue seeing their existing provider and for a plan with a wider network of  
5 providers in their area.<sup>41</sup> And, in a Kaiser Family Foundation survey, 60% of non-group health  
6 insurance enrollees reported that having a choice of providers was either “very important” or  
7 “extremely important” to them.<sup>42</sup>

8 144. Given the importance of the provider network to prospective members, Defendants’  
9 misrepresentations and omissions in their directories would influence the decision of a reasonable  
10 consumer—and did influence Plaintiffs’ decisions—to enroll in Defendants’ plans. The provider  
11 directories and network information are disseminated by the insurance company, which Plaintiffs  
12 and other consumers logically view as the authoritative source of information about their in-network  
13 providers, scope of coverage, and other plan policies.

14 145. As a result of Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions, a reasonable consumer  
15 would understandably believe—and Plaintiffs did believe—that each provider listed in the provider  
16 directories as being in-network and available to see new patients actually was in-network with  
17 Defendants and accepting new patients. If a reasonable consumer were aware of the extent of the  
18 inaccuracies of Defendants’ directories, the sparse nature of Defendants’ provider networks, and the  
19

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20  
21 <sup>39</sup> See Statista, *Most Important Considerations for Americans in Choosing a Plan from a Health*  
22 *Insurance Company as of 2016*, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/654828/most-important-considerations-for-choosing-health-insurance-plan/>.

23 <sup>40</sup> See Blumberg et al., *Factors Influencing Health Plan Choice among the Marketplace Target*  
24 *Population on the Eve of the Health Reform*, Urban Inst., 2 (Feb. 6, 2014),  
[https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/hrms\\_decision\\_factors.pdf](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2024-05/hrms_decision_factors.pdf).

25 <sup>41</sup> Eline M. van den Broek-Altenburg & Adam J. Atherly, *Patient Preferences for Provider Choice:*  
26 *A Discrete Choice Experiment*, Am. J. of Managed Care 26(7) (July 2020),  
<https://www.ajmc.com/view/patient-preferences-for-provider-choice-a-discrete-choice-experiment>.

27 <sup>42</sup> Hamel et al., *Survey of Non-Group Health Insurance Enrollees, Wave 2*, Kaiser Family  
28 Foundation (May 2015), <https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/survey-of-non-group-health-insurance-enrollees-wave-2/> (finding a combined 60% of respondents consider choice of providers to be “extremely important” or “very important”).

1 consequent difficulties that members face in accessing in-network care, they would not enroll in  
2 Defendants’ plan. If Plaintiffs had been so aware, they would not have enrolled in Defendants’ plan.

3 146. Accordingly, Defendants’ misrepresentations about their mental health provider  
4 networks and coverage are materially misleading to consumers.

5 **C. Members’ Reliance on Defendants’ Misrepresentations and Omissions**

6 147. Plaintiffs had a range of choices when selecting health insurance plans. For example,  
7 public employees like Claudine Castillo and Kevin Maedel are able to select from a wide range of  
8 plans from multiple insurers during their employers’ open enrollment period.

9 148. In the absence of a qualifying event like a marriage, change in employment, or birth  
10 of a child, most consumers are not eligible to change insurance plans mid-year. As a result,  
11 consumers are locked into their selected plan for a full year and do not have an opportunity to switch  
12 to a different plan if they discover mid-year that their insurance company has not accurately  
13 represented its coverage.

14 149. When selecting a plan, Plaintiffs relied on Defendants’ representations that members  
15 would have access to in-network mental health care, that Defendants contract with an adequate  
16 network of providers to meet members’ care needs, and that Defendants maintained accurate  
17 provider directories to enable members to locate in-network care.

18 150. These misrepresentations about the size and breadth of the mental health provider  
19 network, the ease of finding mental health treatment by using the provider directories, the freedom to  
20 choose any listed in-network provider, the ability to control costs by seeing an in-network provider,  
21 and the comprehensive coverage of mental health care would induce a reasonable consumer—and  
22 did induce Plaintiffs—to choose the Blue Shield plans in which they enrolled.

23 **D. Defendants Knew That Their Provider Directories Were Inaccurate and That**  
24 **Their Representations Regarding Their Networks Were Deceptive**

25 151. At all relevant times, Defendants have willfully and knowingly maintained inaccurate  
26 and inflated provider directories to induce consumers to enroll in their coverage and to hide their  
27 non-compliance with network adequacy standards.

28

1 152. As discussed above, there are numerous studies documenting the prevalence of ghost  
2 networks, especially for mental health providers, as well as recent congressional inquiries.

3 153. As one state senator put it, insurance companies have “known about this for a long  
4 time and they haven’t done anything about it. It’s difficult not to assume that this kind of barrier is  
5 intentional.”<sup>43</sup> Several insurance companies have been successfully sued over the issue.<sup>44</sup>

6 154. The sheer magnitude of the inaccuracies in Defendants’ directories—as many as 92%  
7 of the mental health providers listed—can only be the product of knowing misconduct or willful  
8 blindness, particularly in light of Defendants’ legal obligation to update and maintain the directories.

9 155. As demonstrated by the secret shopper study discussed above, in July 2025,  
10 Defendants published false lists of mental health providers in California. Defendants falsely listed  
11 non-existent, unavailable, out-of-network, and irrelevant providers (*i.e.*, providers who do not  
12 provide the services specified in the directories).

13 156. Defendants knew that members were having significant problems accessing in-  
14 network care. Members, including Plaintiffs, have repeatedly contacted Defendants to report these  
15 difficulties.

16 157. Defendants are incentivized to maintain, generate, and continue to publish inaccurate  
17 directories to attract new enrollees, maintain current enrollees, and profit from enrollees’ premiums  
18 while not actually providing the coverage that Defendants falsely represented that they provide.

19 158. On information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants fraudulently and  
20 intentionally maintained and published materially false directories of mental health providers in  
21 California to deceive current and prospective enrollees about the extent of their provider networks.  
22 These intentional and fraudulent misrepresentations were made for the enrichment of Defendants.

23 //

24 //

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25  
26 <sup>43</sup> Turban, *supra* n. 28.

27 <sup>44</sup> See, e.g., *Anthem Resolves Calif. Provider Directory Error Case*, Bloomberg Law (Aug. 17,  
28 2016), <https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/anthem-resolves-calif-provider-directory-error-case>.

1 **IV. Defendants Have Been Enriched and Members Have Been Injured by Defendants’**  
2 **Misrepresentations and Omissions**

3 159. Defendants’ knowing misrepresentations about the breadth of their provider networks  
4 confer significant financial benefits on Defendants and, conversely, deprive plan members of the  
5 benefit of their bargain.

6 160. Prospective plan members are more likely to enroll if they see their existing provider  
7 listed as in-network or if the list of in-network providers is robust. Masking their inadequate  
8 networks with inaccurate provider directories therefore allows Defendants to attract more customers  
9 and charge higher premiums—all unjustly boosting Defendants’ profits. Indeed, the more customers  
10 who enroll in their plans, and the more they pay in premiums, the more Defendants profit. Likewise,  
11 every time a member delays or forgoes care after failing to locate an available in-network provider,  
12 Defendants evade their obligation to pay for that member’s care, reducing costs.<sup>45</sup> Defendants also  
13 reduce costs by not having to expend resources creating and maintaining robust provider networks  
14 and accurate provider directories.

15 161. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated have been grievously injured by Defendants’  
16 illegal conduct and the resulting inability to access necessary mental health treatment for themselves  
17 and their families.

18 162. As a result of Defendants’ illegal conduct, Plaintiffs and other class members have  
19 suffered grievous injury, including facing significant, years-long delays in receiving critical mental  
20 health care; having to pay an inflated premium for a worthless product; having to pay exorbitant fees  
21 for out-of-network care for themselves and their dependents; and being unable to find appropriate  
22 treatment or, alarmingly, any treatment at all.

23 163. Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions are the direct and proximate causes of  
24 the harms Plaintiffs have endured. Had Defendants accurately represented their mental health care  
25 coverage, Plaintiffs—and countless other consumers—would not have enrolled in coverage with this  
26 company. By enrolling in one of the other health insurance plans available to them, Plaintiffs would

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>45</sup> See Alicia Atwood & Anthony T. Lo Sasso, *The Effect of Narrow Provider Networks on Health Care Use*, J. of Health Econ. (Dec. 2016), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.09.007>.

1 have had access to the care they were promised and saved thousands of dollars in out-of-pocket  
2 expenses—not to mention the countless hours and emotional expense they would have been saved.

3 164. Moreover, Defendants’ misrepresentations artificially inflated the market price of  
4 their product, causing Plaintiffs to pay more than they otherwise would have for premiums. As a  
5 direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unfair and deceptive acts and practices, Plaintiffs suffered  
6 injury by paying insurance premiums but failing to receive commensurate benefits.

7 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

8 165. This action is brought by Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of a class (the “Class”)  
9 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Class includes all those who have purchased or  
10 enrolled in a Blue Shield plan in California at any point from 2019 through the date of class  
11 certification.

12 166. Plaintiffs also seek certification of the following three Sub-Classes:

13 **A.** All Class members who are currently, or were previously, enrolled in any of Blue  
14 Shield’s non-ERISA Plans in California at any point from four years prior to the  
15 filing of the complaint through the date of class certification.

16 **B.** All Class members who are currently, or were previously, enrolled in any of Blue  
17 Shield’s ERISA Plans in California at any point from 2019 through the date of  
18 class certification.

19 **C.** All Class members who, during the class period, paid for out-of-network care  
20 from a provider listed as in-network on Defendants’ provider directories or paid  
21 for out-of-network care when there was no available in-network provider with  
22 similar qualifications within a reasonable distance.

23 167. Excluded from the Class are Defendants’ officers, directors, employees,  
24 co-conspirators, and legal representatives, and any judge, justice, or judicial officer to whom the  
25 litigation is assigned.

26 168. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend or modify the Class and Sub-Class definitions.

27 169. **Numerosity.** The Class as a whole and each of the three Sub-Classes consist of  
28 thousands of individuals and entities, and is thus so numerous that joinder of all members is

1 impracticable. The exact number and identity of Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time  
2 but can be ascertained through appropriate discovery.

3       170. **Commonality and predominance.** This action is appropriate as a class action  
4 because common questions of law and fact affecting the Class predominate over those questions  
5 affecting only individual members. Those common questions include, but are not limited to, the  
6 following:

7       a) whether Defendants breached their contractual obligations by failing to provide the  
8 promised networks of providers and/or by failing to comply with ERISA, the No Surprises  
9 Act, the MHPAEA, and/or other statutes, regulations, and rules with which Defendants are  
10 contractually obligated to comply;

11       b) whether Defendants' representations and/or omissions with respect to the plan were  
12 false or misleading under ERISA, California Insurance Code Section 790, California  
13 Business & Professions Code Section 17500, California Business & Professions Code  
14 Section 17200, and/or common law;

15       c) whether Defendants' violations of law were willful and knowing;

16       d) whether Defendants' mental health provider directories were inaccurate and/or  
17 inadequate;

18       e) whether Defendants failed to disclose to members and prospective members that the  
19 provider directories were inaccurate and/or inadequate;

20       f) whether a reasonable consumer would be misled by Defendants' acts and practices;

21       g) whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to receive specific types of relief  
22 such as actual damages, and the methodology for calculating those damages;

23       h) whether Plaintiffs and Class members conferred a benefit on Defendants through  
24 enrollment in Defendants' Plans, payment of premiums, and not utilizing in-network  
25 providers or otherwise not obtaining mental health care; and

26       i) whether equity and good conscience require restitution to Plaintiffs and Class  
27 members and/or the establishment of a constructive trust, and the amount of such restitution  
28 or constructive trust.

1           171. **Typicality.** The claims asserted by Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class. At  
2 all relevant times, Defendants' provider networks were inadequate and their provider directories  
3 were inaccurate, and all Class members' claims arise out of this common source of  
4 misrepresentations and omissions. Plaintiffs, like all Class members, were subject to deceptive and  
5 misleading representations and omissions found in Defendants' provider directories and other  
6 marketing and plan documents regarding the comprehensiveness of mental health coverage and the  
7 provider network. Plaintiffs' interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, those of the other  
8 Class members, and Plaintiffs and other Class members have been damaged by the same  
9 wrongdoing set forth in this Complaint.

10           172. **Adequacy of representation.** Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the  
11 interests of the Class and do not have any interests antagonistic to those of the Class members.  
12 Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions and health insurance and  
13 consumer protection litigation, who are competent to serve as Class counsel. Plaintiffs and their  
14 counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class members.

15           173. **Superiority.** A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and  
16 efficient adjudication of this controversy for at least the following reasons:

- 17           a) given the complexity of issues involved in this action, the expense of litigating the  
18 claims, and the money at stake for any individual Class member, few, if any, Class members  
19 could afford to seek legal redress individually for the wrongs that Defendants have  
20 committed against them;
- 21           b) the prosecution of thousands of separate actions by individual members would risk  
22 inconsistency in adjudication and outcomes that would establish incompatible standards of  
23 conduct for Defendants and burden the courts;
- 24           c) when Defendants' liability has been adjudicated, claims of all Class members can be  
25 determined by the Court;
- 26           d) this action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of the Class claims  
27 and foster economies of time, effort, and expense, and ensure uniformity of decisions;
- 28

- 1 e) without a class action, many Class members would continue to suffer injury while
- 2 Defendants retain the substantial proceeds of their wrongful conduct; and
- 3 f) this action does not present any undue difficulties that would impede its management
- 4 by the Court as a class action.

5 174. **Ascertainability.** The identities and addresses of Class members can be readily  
6 ascertained from business records maintained by Defendants, and/or self-authentication. The precise  
7 number of Class members, and their addresses, can be ascertained from Defendants' records.  
8 Plaintiffs anticipate providing appropriate notice to the Class to be approved by the Court after class  
9 certification, or pursuant to court order.

10 175. Plaintiffs request that the Court afford Class members with notice and the right to opt  
11 out of any Class certified in this action.

12 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**

13 **Improper Denial of Benefits under ERISA**

14 **(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members who purchased or enrolled in an ERISA plan)**

15  
16 176. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them  
17 as if fully set forth herein.

18 177. Plaintiff Roiz purchased and/or enrolled in an ERISA plan. She brings this count on  
19 her own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) for  
20 damages at law.

21 178. Defendants were responsible for reviewing, processing, and making final decisions  
22 approving or denying Plaintiff's and Class members' requests and claims under the plan.

23 179. Defendants improperly denied Plaintiff's and Class members' requests for coverage  
24 and reimbursement for health services covered under the terms of the plan and Defendants'  
25 agreements under the plan.

26 180. Defendants improperly denied requests for coverage and reimbursement, in part,  
27 based on the faulty premise that in-network providers were available to provide the requested  
28 services.

1 181. In reality, because of Defendants’ ghost network, in-network providers within a  
2 reasonable distance of Plaintiff were unavailable to provide Plaintiff’s requested services. This lack  
3 of providers—despite the false representations in Defendants’ directories that numerous in-network  
4 providers were available to provide the requested services—denied Plaintiff the coverage and  
5 benefits due to her under the plan.

6 182. Defendants improperly failed to provide the health coverage affirmed under the plan;  
7 failed to reimburse Plaintiff in accordance with the terms of the plan; and failed to accurately apply  
8 Plaintiff’s expenditures to deductibles in accordance with the terms of the plan.

9 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

10 **Breach of Fiduciary Duty under ERISA**

11 **(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members who purchased or enrolled in an ERISA plan)**

12  
13 183. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them  
14 as if fully set forth herein.

15 184. Plaintiff Roiz purchased and/or enrolled in an ERISA plan. She brings this count on  
16 her own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and  
17 (a)(3) for equitable relief and damages at law.

18 185. Defendants are responsible for interpreting the plans they administer and formulating  
19 policies and guidance for beneficiaries under the plans. Defendants are also responsible for  
20 maintaining the accuracy of plan materials, including provider directories. Defendants are  
21 additionally responsible for making final and binding decisions about whether to approve coverage  
22 requested by plan members. As such, Defendants exercise discretionary authority with respect to the  
23 administration of the plans and the payment of plan benefits. Defendants are therefore ERISA  
24 fiduciaries as defined by 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(A) and 1104(a).

25 186. As ERISA fiduciaries, and pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a), Defendants have a duty  
26 of loyalty to plan participants and beneficiaries which requires them to discharge their duties “solely  
27 in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries” of the plans they administer and for the  
28

1 “exclusive purpose” of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and paying reasonable  
2 expenses of administering the plans.

3 187. Defendants also owe plan participants and beneficiaries a duty of care, which requires  
4 them to act with reasonable “care, skill, prudence, and diligence” and in accordance with the terms  
5 of the plan.

6 188. Defendants violated their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to Plaintiff and Class  
7 members by grossly inflating the size of their provider networks and exaggerating plan benefits in  
8 order to increase enrollment and profits. Defendants knew that beneficiaries would not receive the  
9 coverage and benefits falsely represented in plan materials, including the provider directories, but  
10 made these misrepresentations to enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and Class members.

11 189. Defendants also elevated their own financial interests above the interests of the plan  
12 participants and beneficiaries, by failing to pay the appropriate amounts to providers who  
13 Defendants classified as Authorized Service providers, thereby causing these plan participants and  
14 beneficiaries significant damages.

15 **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**

16 **False Statements & Representations under ERISA**

17 **(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members who purchased or enrolled in an ERISA plan)**

18  
19 190. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them  
20 as if fully set forth herein.

21 191. Plaintiff Roiz purchased and/or enrolled in an ERISA plan. She brings this count on  
22 her own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B),  
23 (a)(3), and 1149 for equitable relief and damages at law.

24 192. Defendants, in connection with a plan or other arrangement that is a multiple  
25 employer welfare arrangement, made false statements and false representations of fact, knowing  
26 them to be false, in connection with the marketing or sale of the plan or arrangement, to Plaintiff,  
27 concerning the benefits provided by such plan or arrangement.

1 193. Defendants knowingly listed providers in their directories who did not exist, were not  
2 in-network, provided services other than the services listed, were not accepting new patients, were  
3 not accessible, and/or were duplicates. These intentionally false and inflated provider listings  
4 constitute knowing false statements and false representations of fact concerning the benefits  
5 provided by the plan, in connection with the marketing or sale of Defendants' health insurance.

6 **FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

7 **Parity in Mental Health Benefits under ERISA & MHPAEA**

8 **(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members who purchased or enrolled in an ERISA plan)**

9  
10 194. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them  
11 as if fully set forth herein.

12 195. Plaintiff Roiz purchased and/or enrolled in an ERISA plan. She brings this count on  
13 her own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B),  
14 (a)(3), and 1185a for equitable relief and damages at law.

15 196. Defendants, in administering a group health plan that provides both medical and  
16 surgical benefits and mental health benefits, included financial requirements and treatment  
17 limitations applicable to mental health benefits that were more restrictive than those applied to  
18 substantially all medical and surgical benefits covered by the plan.

19 197. Among the many ways in which Defendants created a disparity in benefits,  
20 Defendants failed to maintain adequate networks of mental health providers while maintaining  
21 adequate networks of medical providers within the same geographic area. When Plaintiff and Class  
22 members could not find in-network mental health care as a result of the inadequate network,  
23 Defendants denied requests to extend in-network cost-sharing benefits to available out-of-network  
24 providers to enable Plaintiff and Class members to access mental health care. Defendants did not  
25 apply such treatment limitations to claims for medical and surgical benefits because in-network  
26 providers for medical and surgical treatments were more widely available under Defendants' health  
27 insurance.

1 198. By falsely representing the availability of in-network mental health providers and by  
2 not honoring their legal obligations to cover out-of-network providers at in-network cost-sharing  
3 rates when in-network care is not available, Defendants required Plaintiffs and Class members to  
4 disproportionately seek treatment from out-of-network providers and pay higher costs than those  
5 required of beneficiaries seeking medical and surgical benefits. This financial requirement was more  
6 restrictive for mental health benefits than for medical or surgical benefits.

7 **FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

8 **Breach of Contract**

9 **(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members who are public employees and purchased or**  
10 **enrolled in a non-ERISA plan through their employer)**

11 199. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them  
12 as if fully set forth herein.

13 200. A contract exists between Plaintiffs' employers and Defendant Blue Shield to provide  
14 health insurance benefits, including mental health benefits, to public employees.

15 201. A contract exists between Plaintiffs' employers and Defendant Magellan to provide  
16 health insurance benefits, including mental health benefits, to public employees.

17 202. Plaintiffs, as public employees receiving health insurance through their employment,  
18 are intended third-party beneficiaries of these contracts between the employers and Defendants. A  
19 motivating purpose of the employers and Defendants entering these contracts was for Plaintiffs to  
20 benefit from their contract, and Plaintiffs would in fact benefit from the contracts.

21 203. Plan members, i.e. Plaintiffs and the Class members, are mentioned throughout the  
22 Contracts.

23 204. The contracts require Defendants to comply with federal law, including, *inter alia*,  
24 sections 2799A-1, 2799A-2, 2799A-3, 2799A-4, 2799A-5, 2799A-7, and 2799A-8 of the Public  
25 Health Service Act; sections 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 722, and 723 of the Employee Retirement  
26 Income Security Act of 1974; and sections 9816, 9817, 9818, 9819, 9820, 9822, and 9823 of the  
27 Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

1           205. Defendants have breached the contracts by failing to contract with a sufficient  
2 number of mental health providers to allow members to access timely in-network mental health  
3 services.

4           206. The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26,  
5 incorporated into the Affordable Care Act via 45 C.F.R. 156.115, provides that mental health and  
6 substance use disorder benefits must not be provided on less favorable terms than medical and  
7 surgical benefits, specifically with respect to annual, aggregate, or lifetime limits on coverage,  
8 financial requirements, treatment limitations, and out-of-network coverage.<sup>46</sup> MHPAEA regulations  
9 provide that “all plan standards that limit the scope or duration of benefits for services are subject to  
10 the nonquantitative treatment limitation parity requirements. This includes restrictions such as  
11 geographic limits, facility-type limits, and network adequacy.”<sup>47</sup>

12           207. Defendants, in administering plans that provide both medical and surgical benefits  
13 and mental health benefits, included financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to  
14 mental health benefits that were more restrictive than those applied to substantially all medical and  
15 surgical benefits covered by the plan.

16           208. Among the many ways in which Defendants created a disparity in benefits, by falsely  
17 representing the scope of available in-network mental health providers, Defendants required  
18 Plaintiffs and Class members to disproportionately seek treatment from out-of-network providers  
19 and pay higher costs than required of beneficiaries seeking medical and surgical benefits. This  
20 financial requirement was more restrictive for mental health benefits than for medical or surgical  
21 benefits. Defendants did not apply such treatment limitations to claims for medical and surgical  
22 benefits because in-network providers for medical and surgical treatments were more widely  
23 available under Defendants’ health insurance.

24           209. Sections 2799A-5 of the Public Health Service Act, 720 of the Employee Retirement  
25 Income Security Act of 1974, and 9820 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 require health insurers

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26 <sup>46</sup> 29 U.S.C. §1185a(a); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(a).

27 <sup>47</sup> Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Services, *The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act*  
28 (2023), <https://www.cms.gov/marketplace/private-health-insurance/mental-health-parity-addiction-equity>;  
see also 29 C.F.R. 2590.712(c)(4).

1 to verify and update their provider directories not less frequently than once every 90 days, remove a  
2 provider from the directory when they are unable to verify the directory information for that  
3 provider, and update the directory within two days of receiving new information from a provider.

4 210. Defendants' failure to maintain accurate directories of in-network providers violates  
5 the requirements in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and Internal Revenue Code, and  
6 was thus a breach of the contracts between Defendants and Plaintiffs' employers.

7 211. Defendants have violated the above laws (and, by extension, their contractual  
8 obligations to Plaintiffs and the Class) by, among other things, failing to ensure mental health  
9 network adequacy and failing to provide accurate provider directories.

10 212. These breaches have directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs and Class members  
11 significant harm, including monetary and non-monetary losses. Among other injuries, Defendants'  
12 breaches have caused millions of dollars in damages; denied Plaintiffs the benefits to which they  
13 were entitled under their health plans and for which they paid premiums (most notably, coverage for  
14 in-network mental health care and access to the supposedly broad networks of available providers);  
15 forced Plaintiffs and Class members to delay and/or forgo crucial and necessary mental health care;  
16 caused Plaintiffs and Class members to pay inflated premiums for a virtually worthless product;  
17 caused Plaintiffs and Class members to incur significant out-of-pocket expenses for out-of-network  
18 provider payments, which greatly exceed the costs Plaintiffs would have incurred for the same  
19 services from in-network providers; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to reduce spending on  
20 necessities and other life costs; induced Plaintiffs and Class members to enroll in Defendants' plan  
21 instead of better and/or cheaper plans; prevented Plaintiffs and Class members from making  
22 informed financial and health care decisions; and caused Plaintiffs and Class members to suffer  
23 severe emotional and psychological distress due to the unsuccessful provider search and their  
24 inability to receive treatment for themselves and their loved ones.

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26 //

27 //

28 //

**SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

**Breach of Contract**

**(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members who purchased or enrolled in a non-ERISA plan)**

213. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them as if fully set forth herein.

214. Defendants and Plaintiffs have a direct contractual relationship. The terms of that direct contractual relationship are governed by the insurance materials provided by Defendants.

215. In their contracts with each enrollee, Defendants agree to provide coverage for in-network mental health care, to assist members in accessing in-network care via their directories, and to cover out-of-network services at the in-network rate when in-network care is not available and accessible to members.

216. Defendants breached their contracts with Plaintiffs by failing to provide meaningful coverage for outpatient mental health services and by failing to update and convey accurate information about the providers listed in their directories. Because Defendants do not maintain accurate provider directories and do not contract with adequate networks of mental health care providers, it has been impossible for Plaintiffs to locate in-network care and therefore make use of the coverage supposedly provided.

217. Defendants breached their contracts with Plaintiffs by failing to adhere to promises in the Evidences of Coverage that Defendants would assist members in identifying appropriate out-of-network providers and approve and authorize members to receive services from those providers at in-network cost-sharing levels when in-network care is not available.

218. These breaches have directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs and Class members significant harm, including monetary and non-monetary losses. Among other injuries, Defendants' breaches have caused millions of dollars in damages; denied Plaintiffs the benefits to which they were entitled under their health plans and for which they paid premiums (most notably, coverage for in-network mental health care and access to the supposedly broad networks of available providers); forced Plaintiffs and Class members to delay and/or forgo crucial and necessary mental health care;

1 caused Plaintiffs and Class members to pay inflated premiums for a virtually worthless product;  
2 caused Plaintiffs and Class members to incur significant out-of-pocket expenses for out-of-network  
3 provider payments, which greatly exceed the costs Plaintiffs would have incurred for the same  
4 services from in-network providers; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to reduce spending on  
5 necessities and other life costs; induced Plaintiffs and Class members to enroll in Defendants' plan  
6 instead of better and/or cheaper plans; prevented Plaintiffs and Class members from making  
7 informed financial and health care decisions; and caused Plaintiffs and Class members to suffer  
8 severe emotional and psychological distress due to the unsuccessful provider search and their  
9 inability to receive treatment for themselves and their loved ones.

10 **SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

11 **Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

12 **(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members who purchased or enrolled in a non-ERISA**  
13 **plan)**

14 219. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them  
15 as if fully set forth herein.

16 220. Plaintiffs and Defendants have a direct contractual relationship.

17 221. The contract includes an implied covenant that Defendants will act in good faith and  
18 deal fairly with Plaintiffs.

19 222. Plaintiffs did all of the significant things that the contract required of them. All  
20 conditions required for Defendants' full performance of the contract were met.

21 223. Defendants materially breached the implied covenant in several respects, including  
22 but not limited to the following:

- 23 a) Defendants have failed to make a good-faith effort to maintain accurate and updated  
24 provider directories;
- 25 b) Defendants have failed to maintain, and failed to make a good-faith effort to  
26 maintain, adequate networks of providers;
- 27 c) Defendants have presented providers as being in-network and available to see new  
28 patients that were not, in fact, in-network and available to see new patients;

- 1 d) Defendants have failed to support Plaintiffs in locating accessible, in-network care;
- 2 e) Defendants have required Plaintiffs to pay out-of-network rates for care that was
- 3 required to be covered at in-network rates due to deficiencies in Defendants'
- 4 networks; and
- 5 f) Defendants have denied claims and/or failed to pay claims for providers that were
- 6 listed as in-network in the directories.

7 224. By engaging in the above-listed activities, Defendants did not act fairly or in good  
8 faith.

9 225. Defendants' breaches were conscious and deliberate acts, which were designed to and  
10 did unfairly frustrate the agreed common purposes of the contract and which disappointed Plaintiffs'  
11 and the Class's reasonable expectations by denying Plaintiffs and the Class the benefits of the  
12 contract.

13 226. These misrepresentations have directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs and Class  
14 members significant harm, including monetary and non-monetary losses. Among other injuries,  
15 Defendants' misrepresentations have caused millions of dollars in damages; denied Plaintiffs the  
16 benefits to which they were entitled under their health plans and for which they paid premiums (most  
17 notably, coverage for in-network mental health care and access to the supposedly broad networks of  
18 available providers); forced Plaintiffs and Class members to delay and/or forgo crucial and necessary  
19 mental health care; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to pay inflated premiums for a virtually  
20 worthless product; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to incur significant out-of-pocket expenses  
21 for out-of-network provider payments, which greatly exceed the costs Plaintiffs would have incurred  
22 for the same services from in-network providers; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to reduce  
23 spending on necessities and other life costs; induced Plaintiffs and Class members to enroll in  
24 Defendants' plan instead of better and/or cheaper plans; prevented Plaintiffs and Class members  
25 from making informed financial and health care decisions; and caused Plaintiffs and Class members  
26 to suffer severe emotional and psychological distress due to the unsuccessful provider search and  
27 their inability to receive treatment for themselves and their loved ones.

**EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

**Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing**

**(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members who are public employees and purchased or enrolled in a non-ERISA plan through their employer)**

227. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them as if fully set forth herein.

228. A contract exists between Plaintiffs' employers and Defendant Blue Shield to provide health insurance benefits, including mental health benefits, to public employees.

229. A contract exists between Plaintiffs' employers and Defendant Magellan to provide health insurance benefits, including mental health benefits, to public employees.

230. Plaintiffs, as public employees receiving health insurance through their employment, are intended third-party beneficiaries of these contracts between the employers and Defendants. A motivating purpose of the employers and Defendants entering these contracts was for Plaintiffs to benefit from their contract, and Plaintiffs would in fact benefit from the contracts.

231. Plan members, i.e. Plaintiffs and the Class members, are mentioned throughout the Contracts.

232. The contracts include an implied covenant that Defendants will act in good faith and deal fairly with Plaintiffs.

233. Plaintiffs did all of the significant things that the contract required of them. All conditions required for Defendants' full performance of the contract were met.

234. Defendants materially breached the implied covenant in several respects, including but not limited to the following:

- a) Defendants have failed to make a good-faith effort to maintain accurate and updated provider directories;
- b) Defendants have failed to maintain, and failed to make a good-faith effort to maintain, adequate networks of providers;
- c) Defendants have presented providers as being in-network and available to see new patients that were not, in fact, in-network and available to see new patients;

- 1 d) Defendants have failed to support Plaintiffs in locating accessible, in-network care;
- 2 e) Defendants have required Plaintiffs to pay out-of-network rates for care that was
- 3 required to be covered at in-network rates due to deficiencies in Defendants'
- 4 networks; and
- 5 f) Defendants have denied claims and/or failed to pay claims for providers that were
- 6 listed as in-network in the directories.

7 235. By engaging in the above-listed activities, Defendants did not act fairly or in good  
8 faith.

9 236. Defendants' breaches were conscious and deliberate acts, which were designed to and  
10 did unfairly frustrate the agreed common purposes of the contract and which disappointed Plaintiffs'  
11 and the Class's reasonable expectations by denying Plaintiffs and the Class the benefits of the  
12 contracts.

13 237. These misrepresentations have directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs and Class  
14 members significant harm, including monetary and non-monetary losses. Among other injuries,  
15 Defendants' misrepresentations have caused millions of dollars in damages; denied Plaintiffs the  
16 benefits to which they were entitled under their health plans and for which they paid premiums (most  
17 notably, coverage for in-network mental health care and access to the supposedly broad networks of  
18 available providers); forced Plaintiffs and Class members to delay and/or forgo crucial and necessary  
19 mental health care; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to pay inflated premiums for a virtually  
20 worthless product; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to incur significant out-of-pocket expenses  
21 for out-of-network provider payments, which greatly exceed the costs Plaintiffs would have incurred  
22 for the same services from in-network providers; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to reduce  
23 spending on necessities and other life costs; induced Plaintiffs and Class members to enroll in  
24 Defendants' plan instead of better and/or cheaper plans; prevented Plaintiffs and Class members  
25 from making informed financial and health care decisions; and caused Plaintiffs and Class members  
26 to suffer severe emotional and psychological distress due to the unsuccessful provider search and  
27 their inability to receive treatment for themselves and their loved ones.

**NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

**Unfair Competition in Violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200**

**(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members)**

238. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them as if fully set forth herein.

239. Section 17200 of the California Business & Professions Code prohibits unfair competition, including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.”

240. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition by, among other things, engaging in fraudulent and deceptive advertising and business practices which are unlawful under California Business & Professions Code Section 17500, California Insurance Code Sections 790.02, 10133.15, and 10133.54, Sections 1367.03, 1367.27, and 1360 of the Knox-Keene Act, and Section 2240.01 of Chapter 10 of the California Code of Regulations.

241. California Business & Professions Code Section 17500 prohibits false advertising by making it unlawful for a corporation to “make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public” any untrue or misleading statement which the corporation knew or should have known to be untrue or misleading. It also prohibits such statements when made “as part of a plan or scheme with the intent not to sell” personal property or services “as so advertised.”

242. Defendants violated Business & Professions Code Section 17500 by disseminating untrue and misleading statements regarding providers’ network status and availability and the mental health benefits included in their plans.

243. California Insurance Code Section 790.02 prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance, including making, issuing, or circulating a statement misrepresenting “the terms of any policy issued or to be issued or the benefits or advantages promised thereby” or a statement “which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue, deceptive, or misleading.”

1           244. Defendants violated Insurance Code Section 790.02 by making false statements,  
2 which they knew or should have known to be untrue, deceptive, or misleading, regarding the  
3 availability of in-network mental health care and the mental health coverage provided by their plans.

4           245. Section 1360 of the Knox-Keene Act prohibits health care services plans from using  
5 or permitting the use of advertising that is untrue or misleading, including any written or printed  
6 statement that is misleading “in any respect which is, or may be significant to an enrollee or  
7 subscriber, or potential enrollee or subscriber.” This Section applies to Evidences of Coverage that  
8 cause a reasonable person “to expect benefits, service charges, or other advantages which the  
9 evidence of coverage does not provide or which the plan issuing such coverage or evidence of  
10 coverage does not regularly make available to enrollees.”

11           246. Defendants violated Section 1360 of the Knox-Keene Act by, among other things,  
12 making misleading statements in their written advertising materials and Evidences of Coverage that  
13 would cause a reasonable person to believe that their plans include access to an adequate network of  
14 mental health providers, coverage for in-network mental health care, and access to out-of-network  
15 mental health care at in-network cost-sharing rates when in-network care is unavailable.

16           247. California Insurance Code Section 10133.15 and Section 1367.27 of the Knox-Keene  
17 Act require insurers and health care service plans to “publish and maintain” a provider directory  
18 “with information on contracting providers that deliver health care services” to the plan’s members,  
19 “including those that accept new patients.” This directory “shall not list or include information on a  
20 provider that is not currently under contract with the insurer” or plan. This directory must be made  
21 available online and upon request in hard copy to all members of the public. Insurers must update  
22 their directories “at least quarterly, or more frequently, if required by federal law,” and “at least  
23 weekly . . . when informed of” updates from providers. Insurers are required to “take appropriate  
24 steps to ensure the accuracy of the information concerning each provider listed” and must investigate  
25 and rectify reported inaccuracies within 30 business days.

26           248. Defendants violated Insurance Code Section 10133.15 and Section 1367.27 of the  
27 Knox-Keene Act by, among other things, failing to publish and maintain an accurate directory of  
28 mental health providers under their plans. Defendants’ directories list an overwhelming percentage

1 of providers that, contrary to Defendants’ representations, are not actually in-network, that are not  
2 accepting new patients despite being listed as doing so, and that do not have accurate contact  
3 information. Defendants do not take reasonable or appropriate steps to ensure the accuracy of the  
4 information listed in their directories. In fact, Defendants intentionally lie about the provider  
5 networks in order to induce people to enroll in their plans based on misinformation.

6 249. California Insurance Code Section 10133.54 and Section 1367.03 of the Knox-Keene  
7 Act require health insurers and health care service plans to provide members with timely access to  
8 care by, among other things, establishing and maintaining a provider network that “has adequate  
9 capacity and availability of licensed health care providers to offer insureds” appointments for mental  
10 health care “within 10 business days of the request for appointment.” When the insurer’s network is  
11 inadequate to meet this standard, the insurer is required to “arrange for the provision of services  
12 outside the insurer’s contracted network” at a cost to the member not exceeding “applicable in-  
13 network copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles.”

14 250. Defendants violated Insurance Code Section 10133.54 and Section 1367.03 of the  
15 Knox-Keene Act by failing to maintain adequate networks of providers to allow Plaintiffs and Class  
16 members to access mental health care within 10 business days of requesting an appointment. Instead,  
17 Plaintiffs were often unable to find any in-network providers with availability and encountered  
18 months-long wait lists for appointments when they did find providers that were actually in-network.  
19 When Plaintiffs alerted Defendants to their difficulties locating timely in-network care, Defendants  
20 did not arrange for Plaintiffs to receive out-of-network care.

21 251. Section 2240.01 of Chapter 10 of the California Code of Regulations requires insurers  
22 to ensure that “there are mental health and substance use disorder professionals with skills  
23 appropriate to care for the mental health and substance use disorder needs of covered persons and  
24 with sufficient capacity to accept covered persons within a maximum travel time of 30 minutes or a  
25 maximum travel distance of 15 miles of each covered person’s residence or workplace. The network  
26 must adequately provide for mental health and substance use disorder treatment, including  
27 behavioral health therapy.” Within an insurer’s network, “there must be mental health and substance  
28 use disorder providers of sufficient number and type to provide diagnosis and medically necessary

1 treatment through providers acting within their scope of license and scope of competence.” Insurers  
2 must also ensure that their plan members can access information about their mental health benefits,  
3 providers, and other relevant information by contacting the insurer. When medically appropriate care  
4 is not available from a qualified, in-network provider, the insurer must “arrange for the required care  
5 with available and accessible providers outside the network, with the patient responsible for paying  
6 only cost-sharing in an amount equal to the cost-sharing they would have paid for provision of that  
7 or a similar service in-network.”

8 252. Defendants violated Section 2240.01 of Chapter 10 of the California Code of  
9 Regulations by, among other things, failing to ensure that they had adequate networks of qualified,  
10 available professionals to meet the needs to their plan members, failing to make accurate information  
11 about plan benefits and providers available to members, and failing to arrange for medically  
12 appropriate care from out-of-network providers when members notified them of a lack of available  
13 in-network providers.

14 253. In addition to being unlawful, Defendants’ misrepresentations of the coverage  
15 provided by their plans and the breadth of their provider networks constitute unfair and fraudulent  
16 business practices and deceptive advertising. Defendants encourage consumers to enroll in their  
17 plans using misleading statements about the availability of and coverage for in-network care, and  
18 continue to make misrepresentations to members after they have enrolled in a plan.

19 254. Plaintiffs and other Class members relied on Defendants’ false and deceptive  
20 advertising when deciding to enroll in coverage with Defendants.

21 255. As a result of Defendants’ unfair competition, Plaintiffs have suffered injury in fact  
22 and have lost money.

23 256. These violations have directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs and Class members  
24 significant harm, including monetary and non-monetary losses. Among other injuries, Defendants’  
25 violations have caused millions of dollars in damages; denied Plaintiffs the benefits to which they  
26 were entitled under their health plans and for which they paid premiums (most notably, coverage for  
27 in-network mental health care and access to the supposedly broad networks of available providers);  
28 forced Plaintiffs and Class members to delay and/or forgo crucial and necessary mental health care;

1 caused Plaintiffs and Class members to pay inflated premiums for a virtually worthless product;  
2 caused Plaintiffs and Class members to incur significant out-of-pocket expenses for out-of-network  
3 provider payments, which greatly exceed the costs Plaintiffs would have incurred for the same  
4 services from in-network providers; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to reduce spending on  
5 necessities and other life costs; induced Plaintiffs and Class members to enroll in Defendants' plan  
6 instead of better and/or cheaper plans; prevented Plaintiffs and Class members from making  
7 informed financial and health care decisions; and caused Plaintiffs and Class members to suffer  
8 severe emotional and psychological distress due to the unsuccessful provider search and their  
9 inability to receive treatment for themselves and their loved ones.

10 257. Plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief and restitution under California Business &  
11 Professions Code § 17200 as a result of these violations.

12 **TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

13 **Intentional Misrepresentation**

14 **(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members)**

15 258. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them  
16 as if fully set forth herein.

17 259. Insurance companies have statutory and common law obligations to provide accurate  
18 and complete information about their health care plans.

19 260. Defendants made deceptive affirmative misrepresentations and omissions to Plaintiffs  
20 and Class members by publishing and disseminating misleading informational and marketing  
21 materials prior to and during the open enrollment periods. Defendants' misrepresentations were  
22 conveyed in Defendants' online provider directories and other marketing and publicly available  
23 materials. The provider directories themselves, on which Plaintiffs, as well as other members and  
24 prospective members, were directed to rely and did rely, intentionally inflated and misled them  
25 regarding the breadth and adequacy of the networks and the availability of mental health providers.

26 261. The omissions from these same materials include, *inter alia*, any reference to the  
27 limited number of mental health providers who are actually in-network with Defendants, accepted  
28 Defendants' insurance, and were available to see new patients, and to the fact that members and

1 prospective members have to utilize out-of-network providers—and incur substantial costs—should  
2 they need mental health services.

3 262. False representations include, *inter alia*, that Defendants have adequate networks of  
4 providers; that providers listed on the provider directories are in-network; that providers listed as  
5 accepting new patients actually accept new patients; that there are sufficient and available mental  
6 health care providers in that network; that members can rely on the directories to find and contact  
7 providers with the listed qualifications offering the listed services; that Defendants regularly update  
8 the directories; and that mental health care coverage is comprehensive.

9 263. Omitted and concealed from the representations were material and relevant facts that  
10 Plaintiffs and Class members would have used in selecting their health insurance plans including,  
11 *inter alia*, the extent of inaccuracies in the provider directories; the true breadth of the provider  
12 network; the likelihood that a member seeking mental health care would have to obtain  
13 out-of-network treatment, and the costs of such services; and the number of hours and expenditures  
14 that would be needed to find appropriate mental health care.

15 264. These misrepresentations and omissions were intended to, and did, induce reliance by  
16 Plaintiffs and Class members as to the services and benefits that would be delivered to them as a  
17 result of choosing Defendants' plan. Plaintiffs and Class members chose to enroll in Defendants'  
18 plan (instead of better, cheaper options) based on the lies Defendants told about their provider  
19 networks. And Plaintiffs and Class members detrimentally relied on Defendants' inaccurate  
20 directories when searching for in-network providers.

21 265. Plaintiffs and Class members reasonably relied on Defendants' representations and  
22 omissions, as Defendants had unique knowledge of the facts underlying their representations.

23 266. These fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, when considered as a whole from  
24 the perspective of a reasonable consumer, conveyed that Defendants' provider directories were  
25 accurate and broad, and that mental health care would be covered to the full extent that Defendants  
26 had represented. A reasonable consumer would—and Plaintiffs and Class members did—attach  
27 importance to such representations and were induced to enroll in Defendants' health insurance plan  
28 as a result.

1           267. These fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions alleged herein were intentional  
2 and materially misleading. Defendants intentionally led Plaintiffs and Class members to believe that  
3 their networks of available providers were adequate and robust in order to induce them to enroll in,  
4 and remain enrolled in, their plans. In reality, however, these misrepresentations and omissions  
5 prevented Plaintiffs and Class members from receiving promised care. Such deception was designed  
6 to, and did, allow Defendants to reap enormous financial gain through increased income (by way of  
7 premiums paid by Plaintiffs and Class members) and reduced costs (by way of delayed, forgone, and  
8 unreimbursed care and avoidance of the expenses that would be incurred by creating and  
9 maintaining robust provider networks and accurate provider directories).

10           268. Defendants willfully and knowingly made the fraudulent misrepresentations and  
11 omissions alleged herein. Alternatively, Defendants made these intentional misrepresentations  
12 recklessly and without regard for their truth. Defendants, as parties to the contracts with in-network  
13 providers and as administrators of the provider networks, had access to all the information necessary  
14 to maintain accurate network directories. Likewise, Defendants continued to make the fraudulent  
15 misrepresentations and omissions even after Plaintiffs, other Class members, and other consumers  
16 notified Defendants of the inaccuracies in the directories and the difficulties members face when  
17 trying to locate in-network mental health care.

18           269. Defendants' efforts to include affirmative misrepresentations and omissions in their  
19 marketing materials and provider directories was undertaken intentionally to induce individuals to  
20 choose their plan over other plans and to prevent them from obtaining covered care, thus increasing  
21 their profits.

22           270. These misrepresentations have directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs and Class  
23 members significant harm, including monetary and non-monetary losses. Among other injuries,  
24 Defendants' misrepresentations have caused millions of dollars in damages; denied Plaintiffs the  
25 benefits to which they were entitled under their health plans and for which they paid premiums (most  
26 notably, coverage for in-network mental health care and access to the supposedly broad networks of  
27 available providers); forced Plaintiffs and Class members to delay and/or forgo crucial and necessary  
28 mental health care; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to pay inflated premiums for a virtually

1 worthless product; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to incur significant out-of-pocket expenses  
2 for out-of-network provider payments, which greatly exceed the costs Plaintiffs would have incurred  
3 for the same services from in-network providers; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to reduce  
4 spending on necessities and other life costs; induced Plaintiffs and Class members to enroll in  
5 Defendants' plan instead of better and/or cheaper plans; prevented Plaintiffs and Class members  
6 from making informed financial and health care decisions; and caused Plaintiffs and Class members  
7 to suffer severe emotional and psychological distress due to the unsuccessful provider search and  
8 their inability to receive treatment for themselves and their loved ones. Plaintiffs' reliance on  
9 Defendants' misrepresentations was a substantial factor in causing this harm.

10 **ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

11 **Negligent Misrepresentation**

12 **(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members)**

13 271. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them  
14 as if fully set forth herein.

15 272. Insurance companies have a statutory and common law duty to provide accurate and  
16 complete information about their health care plans.

17 273. Nevertheless, Defendants negligently misrepresented their provider networks and the  
18 availability of mental health providers for members because they failed to provide accurate  
19 information with regard to the breadth, qualifications, availability, identities, and contact information  
20 of providers in their networks.

21 274. Defendants' false representations include, *inter alia*, that they have adequate  
22 networks of providers; that providers listed on the provider directories are in-network; that there are  
23 sufficient and available mental health care providers in that network; that providers listed as  
24 accepting new patients actually accept new patients; that members can rely on the directories to find  
25 and contact providers with the listed qualifications offering the listed services; and that mental health  
26 care coverage is comprehensive.

27 275. Omitted and concealed from Defendants' representations were material and relevant  
28 facts that Plaintiffs and Class members used, and would have used in selecting their health insurance

1 plans, including, *inter alia*, the extent of inaccuracies in the provider directories; the true breadth of  
2 the provider network; the likelihood that a member seeking mental health care would have to obtain  
3 out-of-network treatment, and the costs of such services; and the number of hours and expenditures  
4 needed to find appropriate mental health care.

5 276. Defendants had no reasonable grounds for believing the representations were true  
6 when they were made.

7 277. These misrepresentations and omissions were intended to, and did, induce reliance by  
8 Plaintiffs and Class members as to the services and benefits that would be delivered to them as a  
9 result of choosing Defendants' plan. Plaintiffs and Class members chose to enroll in Defendants'  
10 plans (instead of better, cheaper options) based on the lies Defendants told about their provider  
11 networks. And Plaintiffs and Class members detrimentally relied on Defendants' inaccurate  
12 directories when searching for in-network providers.

13 278. Plaintiffs and the Class reasonably relied upon the information that Defendants  
14 provided.

15 279. Defendants have not used reasonable care or competence in providing accurate  
16 information about their networks of providers and in publishing their provider directories.

17 280. These misrepresentations have directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs and Class  
18 members significant harm, including monetary and non-monetary losses. Among other injuries,  
19 Defendants' misrepresentations have caused millions of dollars in damages; denied Plaintiffs the  
20 benefits to which they were entitled under their health plans and for which they paid premiums (most  
21 notably, coverage for in-network mental health care and access to the supposedly broad networks of  
22 available providers); forced Plaintiffs and Class members to delay and/or forgo crucial and necessary  
23 mental health care; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to pay inflated premiums for a virtually  
24 worthless product; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to incur significant out-of-pocket expenses  
25 for out-of-network provider payments, which greatly exceed the costs Plaintiffs would have incurred  
26 for the same services from in-network providers; caused Plaintiffs and Class members to reduce  
27 spending on necessities and other life costs; induced Plaintiffs and Class members to enroll in  
28 Defendants' plan instead of better and/or cheaper plans; prevented Plaintiffs and Class members

1 from making informed financial and health care decisions; and caused Plaintiffs and Class members  
2 to suffer severe emotional and psychological distress due to the unsuccessful provider search and  
3 their inability to receive treatment for themselves and their loved ones.

4 281. Plaintiffs' reliance on Defendants' misrepresentations was a substantial factor in  
5 causing this harm.

6 **TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION**

7 **Unjust Enrichment**

8 **(On behalf of all Plaintiffs and Class members)**

9 282. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations in this Complaint and restate them  
10 as if fully set forth herein.

11 283. Defendants have been and continue to be significantly and unjustly enriched as a  
12 result of their inaccurate provider directories and inadequate mental health provider network.  
13 Because they portrayed their provider networks as comprehensive, Plaintiffs and countless other  
14 individuals selected Defendants' plans over other plans, paid substantial premiums, and did not  
15 receive the coverage or care to which they were entitled. As a result, Defendants' market share and  
16 profits increased and their costs decreased, thus unjustly enriching them at Plaintiffs' and Class  
17 members' expense. Defendants' lies artificially inflated the price of, and induced Plaintiffs to enroll  
18 in, Defendants' plan, which increased the premiums paid to Defendants.

19 284. Plaintiffs and Class members have conferred a benefit on Defendants by enrolling in  
20 their health insurance plans and thereby directing their medical premiums to Defendants.

21 285. Plaintiffs and Class members have further conferred a benefit on Defendants because  
22 Defendants' inaccurate and inadequate networks force Plaintiffs and Class members to pay a portion  
23 of the mental health care expenses that Defendants represented would be covered. Effectively,  
24 Defendants represent that their insurance broadly covers mental health care, including care from  
25 providers listed in their directories, yet their bait-and-switch tactics ensure that they do not pay the  
26 full costs of actually covering mental health care services.

27 286. Defendants have thus enriched themselves by reaping the benefits of increased  
28 membership, while reducing or eliminating their own coverage, reimbursement, and other financial

1 duties. This and other benefits were obtained at the expense of Plaintiffs and Class members, who  
2 did not receive the full value of what Defendants promised.

3 287. In addition, Defendants’ inflated mental health provider networks make it appear that  
4 they comply with federal and state statutory and regulatory requirements that their provider networks  
5 be sufficient, adequate, and accurate, thereby saving them the costs of actual compliance with these  
6 requirements—shielding them from government investigation, and the associated costs, at the  
7 expense of their members.

8 288. An unjust enrichment cause of action is appropriate because Defendants failed to  
9 make restitution to Plaintiffs and Class members for the economic and non-economic harms,  
10 including out-of-pocket costs unjustly incurred, and more.

11 289. It is inequitable and unjust for Defendants to retain the benefits from falsely  
12 portraying their provider networks in a way that increases enrollment while decreasing Defendants’  
13 obligations to do exactly what they say they will with respect to providing coverage for mental  
14 health treatment.

15 290. These expenses and inconveniences should have been borne by Defendants. The  
16 profits made by Defendants as a result of their misconduct should be disgorged.

17 291. Defendants must restore to Plaintiffs and Class members those premiums received  
18 from them and their employers. Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution of these funds because  
19 Defendants knew and had reason to know that they falsely portrayed their non-existent provider  
20 networks and the non-existent coverage available under their plans, inducing Plaintiffs to enroll in  
21 the plans.

22 **DEMAND FOR RELIEF**

23 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that judgment be entered as follows:

- 24 a. declaring that the instant action may be maintained as a class action under Rule 23 of  
25 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, certifying the Class and Sub-Classes as requested  
26 herein, designating Plaintiffs as the Class Representatives, and appointing the undersigned  
27 counsel as Class Counsel;
- 28 b. awarding all injunctive relief permitted by law or equity;

- 1 c. awarding compensatory damages, restitution, disgorgement, and any other relief
- 2 permitted by law or equity;
- 3 d. awarding statutory damages and penalties in addition to actual damages;
- 4 e. awarding treble damages;
- 5 f. awarding punitive damages in an amount deemed appropriate by the Court;
- 6 g. awarding Plaintiffs and the Class pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
- 7 h. awarding Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and
- 8 i. awarding Plaintiffs and the Class such other relief as this Court may deem just and
- 9 proper under the circumstances.

10 \* \* \*

11 **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

12 Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury.

13  
14 Dated: November 19, 2025

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**ATTESTATION OF FILER**

I, Ben Travis, am the ECF user whose ID and password are being used to file this document.  
In compliance with Civil L.R. 5-1(i)(3), I hereby attest that all counsel have concurred in this filing.

Dated: November 19, 2025

/s/ Ben Travis  
Ben Travis