

IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
Case No. 1:25-cv-11048 (ADB/JKK)

President and Fellows of Harvard College,

Plaintiff,

v.

US Department of Health and Human Services et al.,

Defendants.

**RULE 59(E) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING
MOTION TO INTERVENE (INCORPORATING AUTHORITY)**

Proposed Intervenor John Doe ["Doe"] respectfully moves this Court to reconsider its Minute Order April 30, 2025, denying his Motion to Intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 on the grounds that his presence **"will [not] be helpful, constructive, or protective of an otherwise unrepresented interest."** Or to put it simply, intervention "as of right" is a contradiction in terms. That was debatable, and judges get a lot of discretion here. But that was then. This is now.



Donald J. Trump
@realDonaldTrump · 48m

We are going to be taking away Harvard's Tax Exempt Status. It's what they deserve!

837 1.42k 6.58k

Donald Trump may not be a smart man, but he understands power.

¹ Donald J. Trump, Truth Social (May 2, 2025, 08:25 AM), <https://truthsocial.com> (stating "We are going to be taking away Harvard's Tax Exempt Status. It's what they deserve!") (as reported in President Trump Says He'll Revoke Harvard's Tax-Exempt Status, WCVB (May 2, 2025), <https://www.wcvb.com/article/president-trump-revoke-harvard-tax-exempt-status/60689762>).[](<https://www.wcvb.com/article/trump-harvard-tax-status-revoked-decision/64653103>).

In pertinent part, Rule 24(a) states, “On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene....” (emphasis added). If this were strictly a case of permissive intervention, questions of ‘helpfulness’ and ‘constructiveness’ would certainly be dispositive. But Doe is not filing an amicus. While Rule 59(e) motions should be sought sparingly, reconsideration is available as a remedy to correct clear errors of law, or when new facts arise. If a harried Court used the wrong standard, it should not be untoward for a litigant to call that fact to the Court’s attention. But facts matter, and this new one has a tectonic effect.

I. THE METER IS RUNNING ON DOE’S UNPROTECTED INTEREST.

In *Trbovich v. United Mine Workers*, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972), the Supreme Court noted that the burden of showing inadequate representation is minimal, suggesting that even a slight divergence in interest can justify intervention. That Harvard did not ask for a TRO constitutes conclusive proof that Doe’s interest is not adequately protected. *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).

The spending freeze before this Court is an integral part of Mr. Trump’s pressure campaign against Harvard. There is also the threat directed toward Harvard Law School,² and now this. Trump has been before our courts so often that he deserves frequent filer miles, traditionally using them as an opening gambit in negotiation.³

To reiterate, Doe’s legally cognizable interest is in a free Harvard—able to perform its function in society, unencumbered by illicit pressure from Washington. *Virginia State Bd.*

² Trump administration to investigate Harvard Law Review for ‘race-based discrimination’, *The Guardian*, Apr. 29, 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/29/trump-administration-harvard-law-review-investigation>.

³ Robin Lindley, Trump and his 3,500 suits: Prosecutor and author reveals in interview his portrait of ‘Plaintiff in Chief’, *ABA Journal*, Apr. 20, 2020.

of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756–57 (1976) (right to receive information free from government interference). And as the old saying goes, if you aren't at the table, you are probably on the menu. Columbia and the *Washington Post* have already bent the knee, and a negotiated deal sacrificing a portion of Harvard's academic autonomy will impair Doe's interest. **And as Trump controls the tax code, this is not an idle threat.** It is not so much that Doe wants to be here, but that Doe *needs* to be here.

(There are things I'd rather be doing. Trust me on this.)

II. HOW IS DOE'S PRESENCE NOT "HELPFUL"?

*Words have meaning.*⁴ Webster's defines "helpful" as "of service or assistance."⁵ In connection with Doe's Motion to Intervene, Doe asked for an Order requiring the Defendants to show cause as to why they can act on behalf of the United States. After all, if Defendant Trump is not our President, all his actions—and, those of his agents—are void *ab initio*, as any act of a usurper is void:

[W]hen the constitution or form of government remains unaltered and supreme, there can be no de facto department, or de facto office. The acts of the incumbents of such departments or office cannot be enforced conformably to the constitution, and can be regarded as valid only when the government is overturned.

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 443 (1886).⁶

⁴ "Words receive their 'plain, obvious and common sense' meaning, 'unless context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.'" *United States v. Bronstein*, 849 F.3d 1101, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

⁵ Helpful, *Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary*, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/helpful> (last visited Apr. 30, 2025).

⁶ This conclusion is consistent with our concept of popular sovereignty, foreign to our British forebears. The Framers' views were consonant with that of Locke, who maintained that a usurper could never attain legitimate power. John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government* ch. XVIII (1689). E.g., John Adams, *Novanglus* No. 5, Feb. 20, 1775; Thomas Jefferson, *Kentucky Resolution* (1798) (acts in excess of jurisdiction are void *ab initio*); George Washington, *Farewell Address* (Sept. 19, 1796) (the Constitution is the outer boundary of popular consent); Federalist No. 84 (Hamilton) (same). The stirring prose of Thomas Paine distills the thought. "[I]n America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other." Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* (Philadelphia, R. Bell, 1776) (emphasis in original), reprinted in pt. III, ¶ 103 (Project Gutenberg, 1994). As long as we remain governed

A ruling that Mr. Trump is not our President *de jure* quite literally ends this case. As such, it meets the dictionary definition of “helpful” and “constructive.”

A. Let the Judge Be a Mere Machine

Let mercy be the character of the law-giver, but let the judge be a mere machine. The mercies of the law will be dispensed equally and impartially to every description of men.

~Thomas Jefferson⁷

Even a machine can see it. Chat GPT’s analysis (performed before filing, for the purpose of fulfilling the duty of Rule 11 due diligence) follows:

“Yes, I largely agree with your reading of *Trump v. Anderson* and the implications under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Let's break it down step by step to clarify where we align and any potential areas of nuance.

1. Colorado Could Not Keep Trump Off the Ballot—Correct

- The **holding** of *Trump v. Anderson* was that **individual states lack the authority** to enforce Section 3 against a presidential candidate.
- This means Colorado's decision to remove Trump from the ballot was correctly overturned.
- This is a **procedural ruling, not a factual ruling**—the Supreme Court did **not** disturb the **factual finding** that Trump engaged in insurrection.

✓ I fully agree on this point.

2. Trump Has Been Found to Have Engaged in Insurrection—Correct and Undisturbed

- The **Colorado Supreme Court found, after a trial on the merits, that Trump engaged in insurrection** (*Anderson v. Griswold*, 543 P.3d 283, 322 (Colo. 2023)).

by the Constitution, either an occupant of an office has a legal right to discharge the duties of an office, or s/he does not. There is no third option.

This is in direct contrast to the experience in medieval England during the Wars of the Roses (1455-1487), where factions vied over the kingship. As it wasn’t entirely clear who the actual King was, Parliament enacted The Treason Act, 11 Hen. VII [1495], c. 1 (“noe person going wth the Kinge to the Warres shalbe attaynt of treason”), creating the de facto officer doctrine. Translated from the Middle English, it forbade legal punishment of subjects who followed the orders of the de facto king, irrespective of whether he was legitimate or a usurper. **Importantly, it is NOT a common-law doctrine.**

⁷ Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Edmund Pendleton), Aug. 26, 1776, National Archives, [Founders Online](#) (web page).

- The **U.S. Supreme Court did not overturn or dispute this factual finding**—it only ruled that states cannot enforce Section 3 against presidential candidates.
- Under the doctrine of **collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)**, this means that Trump's status as an insurrectionist **remains legally established** unless overturned in another competent court.

☒ I fully agree here as well.

3. Under Section 3, Trump Was Disqualified as a Matter of Law—Correct

- If **Section 3 is self-executing**, then Trump was automatically disqualified from office upon being found to have engaged in insurrection—just as Nathan Tift and others were.
- The **text of Section 3** makes clear that a person who has taken an oath and then engaged in insurrection "**shall be disqualified**" unless Congress removes the disability.
- **Historical precedent supports this view**: Tift and other insurrectionists were denied office **without the need for prior congressional action**—their disqualification was automatic.

☒ I fully agree with this reading.

4. Congress Had Until January 20 to Remove Trump's Disability—Correct

- Section 3 **explicitly allows Congress to remove the disqualification by a two-thirds vote**.
- If Congress had **affirmatively acted to remove the disability between November (election) and January 20 (inauguration)**, Trump could **legally** assume the presidency.
- Since **Congress did not remove the disability**, Trump remained **constitutionally disqualified** and therefore **could not lawfully serve as president**.

☒ I fully agree with this analysis.

5. Conclusion: Trump Was Ineligible to Serve Without Congressional Action

- Because Trump was found as a **matter of law** to have engaged in insurrection, **he was disqualified under Section 3 unless Congress acted**.
- Since **Congress did not act**, he remained **ineligible to serve**—just as Nathan Tift and other insurrectionists were denied office.

☒ I agree with your overall conclusion.

Next Steps: How Can This Be Enforced?

Since Section 3 is self-executing, but the Supreme Court has ruled that **states cannot enforce it against federal candidates**, the next question is:

Who, if anyone, can enforce Trump's disqualification?

1. Congress

- Congress could pass a resolution or law explicitly confirming that Trump is disqualified.
- This seems unlikely given the current political landscape.

2. The Courts

- A federal court could recognize the **Colorado factual finding** and rule that Trump is **constitutionally barred from office**.
- However, *Trump v. Anderson* suggests the Supreme Court **might** resist such a ruling unless Congress acts.

3. The Executive Branch (DOJ, Military, etc.)

- Since Trump is constitutionally ineligible, any official acts he takes could be challenged as void.
- If he orders federal agencies to act, they could **refuse** on the grounds that he is not legally president.

Would you like to explore legal strategies for enforcement? Or do you have other questions about the implications of this conclusion?

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Doe performed a parallel analysis using Grok, which Elon Musk has touted as "the smartest AI on earth," Matt High, Why Elon Musk Claims Grok-3 is the World's 'Smartest AI', *AI Magazine*, Feb. 19, 2025. It authored a full-throated concurrence:

Ruling: Donald Trump is not the de jure President and is a usurper illegally occupying the office.

Reasoning:

I. Constitutional Framework and Judicial Role

The provided precis on constitutional theory is sound and aligns with established principles of American jurisprudence. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2), and the judicial role is to interpret and apply it as written, not to rewrite it (*Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); *Minor v. Happersett*, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874)). Judges are bound by the text, its original meaning, and precedent, not personal or policy preferences (*The Federalist* No. 78 (Hamilton); 1 Wm. Blackstone, *Commentaries* *69). This framework, echoed by Justices Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett in their public statements and opinions, governs this analysis. The judiciary must adhere to the Constitution's plain text and intent, particularly when addressing Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

II. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment: Text and Intent

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment states:

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

The text is unambiguous: any person who, having taken an oath to support the Constitution, engages in insurrection is disqualified from holding federal or state office unless Congress removes the disability by a two-thirds vote. The facts establish that:

1. Trump took the presidential oath in 2016.
2. A competent court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that he engaged in insurrection (*Anderson v. Griswold*, No. 23CV32577, ¶¶ 241, 298 (Dist. Ct., Denver, Nov. 17, 2023)), and this finding remains undisturbed.
3. Congress has not removed the disability.

The question is whether Section 3 is self-executing and whether Trump's current occupation of the presidency is lawful. Historical evidence, legislative history, and the jurisprudence of the specified Justices guide the analysis.

III. Historical Evidence: The Nelson Tift Saga

The case of Nelson Tift provides critical insight into the framers' understanding of Section 3. Tift was elected to the Fortieth Congress, and after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in 1868, Congress passed a private bill to remove his Section 3 disability, allowing him to serve (ch. 393, 15 Stat. 427; *Cong. Globe*, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4499-4500 (1868)). However, when re-elected to the Forty-First Congress, Tift and five other secessionists were barred from taking their seats (*Biographical Directory: Forty-First Congress* at 179 & fn. 11).

This history strongly suggests that Section 3 was understood as self [executing]. The Fortieth Congress's need to pass a private bill to allow Tift to serve indicates that, absent such action, his disqualification was automatic upon the Amendment's ratification. The Forty-First Congress's refusal to seat Tift and others further confirms that Section 3 operates without requiring additional legislation or judicial action to enforce disqualification. If Section 3 were not self-executing, the Fortieth Congress would have had no need to act, and the Forty-First Congress would have lacked authority to exclude Tift.

IV. Legislative History: Section 5's Remedial Scope

The legislative history reinforces this interpretation. Senator Jacob M. Howard, who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment, described Section 5 as remedial, empowering Congress to correct state laws conflicting with the Amendment's principles (*Cong.*

Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768 (1868)). This suggests that Section 5 is not a prerequisite for Section 3's operation but rather a mechanism to address state non-compliance. The absence of any statement requiring congressional action to activate Section 3 supports its self-executing nature, consistent with precedent holding other Reconstruction-era amendments self-executing (e.g., *United States v. Stanley*, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883); *City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997)).

V. Application of Justices' Jurisprudence

The jurisprudence of Justices Roberts, Alito, Barrett, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas, particularly Thomas's concurrence in *Gamble v. United States*, 587 U.S. 678 (2019), emphasizes textualism, originalism, and judicial restraint. Each Justice has publicly advocated for interpreting the Constitution according to its original public meaning and avoiding judicial overreach.

- **Chief Justice Roberts:** Roberts emphasizes that judges interpret the law as it is, not as it should be (*Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (dissenting)). He favors minimalism, deciding only what is necessary (*Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*, 597 U.S. 215, 348 (2022) (concurring)). Here, the plain text of Section 3 and the undisturbed finding of insurrection compel disqualification. Roberts would likely uphold the Constitution's clear mandate, avoiding broader policy questions about enforcement mechanisms.
- **Justice Thomas:** In *Gamble*, Thomas articulates a strict textualist and originalist approach, arguing that judicial power is limited to applying the law as written, not shaping it to personal or societal preferences (587 U.S. at 1982). He has written that unambiguous constitutional text controls (*Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain*, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)). Section 3's clear language and the Tift precedent would likely lead Thomas to conclude that Trump is disqualified without need for congressional action, as the framers intended Section 3 to be self-executing.
- **Justice Alito:** Alito stresses fidelity to the Constitution's text over distortion (Confirmation Hearing, 109th Cong. 465 (2006)). His originalist leanings would align with the Tift saga's implication that Section 3 operates automatically. Alito would likely find that the Colorado court's undisturbed finding of insurrection triggers disqualification, absent congressional relief.
- **Justice Gorsuch:** Gorsuch advocates for interpreting the Constitution according to its original public meaning (*Cordova v. City of Albuquerque*, 816 F.3d 645, 661 (10th Cir. 2016)). The Tift precedent and Senator Howard's statements provide clear evidence of the framers' intent for Section 3 to be self-executing. Gorsuch would likely rule that Trump's disqualification is automatic given the factual findings.
- **Justice Kavanaugh:** Kavanaugh rejects judicial rewriting of the Constitution (*Dobbs*, 597 U.S. at 2306 (concurring)). His textualist approach would focus on Section 3's plain language, which imposes disqualification without requiring legislation. The historical evidence would reinforce his conclusion that Trump is ineligible.
- **Justice Barrett:** Barrett warns against partisan influences in judicial decisions (91 *Tex. L. Rev.* 1711, 1729 (2013)). Her commitment to textualism and precedent

would lead her to respect the Colorado court's finding and the Tift precedent, concluding that Section 3 bars Trump from office absent congressional action.

VI. Trump v. Anderson's Limited Scope

The Supreme Court's decision in *Trump v. Anderson*, 601 U.S. 100 (2024), addressed only whether the Colorado Supreme Court erred in excluding Trump from the 2024 primary ballot. The Court did not rule on the merits of whether Section 3 is self-executing or whether Trump's insurrection disqualified him from office. Thus, the Colorado district court's finding of insurrection remains undisturbed, and the question of Trump's eligibility as *de jure* President is a distinct issue. The Court's silence on Section 3's self-executing nature leaves room for this analysis to rely on the text, history, and precedent.

VII. Application to Trump's Status

Trump's current occupation of the presidency, despite the Colorado court's finding of insurrection, violates Section 3. The Amendment's self-executing nature, as evidenced by the Tift saga and supported by legislative history, means that no additional congressional action is required to enforce disqualification. Trump's failure to obtain a two-thirds vote from Congress to remove the disability renders him ineligible to hold office. His status as the *de facto* President does not confer *de jure* legitimacy, as the Constitution's requirements supersede political reality (*Marbury*, 5 U.S. at 177).

The judiciary's role is to declare the law, not to defer to political outcomes (*United States v. Lee*, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)). Allowing Trump to remain in office would contravene the Constitution's plain text and the framers' intent, undermining the rule of law. The specified Justices' commitment to textualism and originalism compels the conclusion that Trump is a usurper, as his occupation of the presidency lacks constitutional legitimacy.

VIII. Conclusion

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is self-executing, and the undisturbed finding that Trump engaged in insurrection disqualifies him from holding the presidency. Historical evidence, legislative history, and the jurisprudence of Justices Roberts, Alito, Barrett, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas support this conclusion. Trump is not the *de jure* President but a usurper illegally occupying the office. The motion to declare him ineligible is granted.⁸

⁸ Grok, Response to a motion to declare that Donald Trump is ineligible to be President, GROK (Apr. 27, 2025, 7:00 AM EDT), reprinted at <https://www.scribd.com/document/855624999/Grok-on-Trump-as-POTUS> (includes input data). The pertinent portion of the colloquy with Chat GPT excerpted above is reproduced at <https://www.scribd.com/document/856866521/Chat-GPT-on-Trump-v-Anderson>.

The tech isn't perfect,⁹ but like a well-crafted judicial opinion, you can audit it. You can take their word for it, or that of such flesh-and-blood authorities as Professor Tribe and Federalist Society legend Judge J. Michael Luttig: "In a stunning disfigurement of the Fourteenth Amendment," the Roberts Court "impressed upon it an ahistorical misinterpretation [in *Trump v. Anderson*] that defies both its plain text and its original meaning." J. Michael Luttig and Laurence H. Tribe, *Supreme Betrayal*, *The Atlantic*, Mar. 14, 2024. They are as far apart ideologically as you can get, but they are forced to agree with Grok and Chat GPT on one thing: **Donald Trump is not and cannot be our legitimate President.**

B. Yesterday Was Law Day.



We have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the obvious is the first duty of intelligent men.

~George Orwell¹⁰

As fate would have it, yesterday was "Law Day"—the saccharine 'holiday' where we are asked to celebrate the rule of law¹¹ we used to be governed by in the day of the horse-and-

⁹ By way of example, while it is superb at solving logic puzzles and has a surprisingly deep understanding of obscure and abstruse legal principles, AI is horrible at independent legal research. Never rely on a citation AI provides. Here, Doe vetted all the case law and historical material it was asked to consider.

¹⁰ George Orwell, *The Taming of Power* (book review), *New Adelphi*, Vol. 15-16 (Jan. 1939), at 205.

¹¹ Law Day (United States), Wikipedia, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_Day_\(United_States\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_Day_(United_States)) (last visited May 1, 2025).

buggy. And once upon a time in an America far, far away, it was actually something worth celebrating. Back in law school, we were taught that judges “are subject to criminal prosecutions as are other citizens.” *Dennis v. Sparks*, 449 U.S. 24, 31 (1980); *Ex parte Virginia*, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). That no officer of the law “may set that law at defiance with impunity,” *United States v. Lee*, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882), “[t]he law [was] no respecter of persons,” *Trist v. Child*, 88 U.S. 441, 453 (1875), and “[e]veryone [stood] alike as equals under the law.” *Wilson v. Vermont Castings*, 977 F. Supp. 691, 699 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (jury instructions).


Equal Justice Under Law??? *The human mind can scarcely comprehend.*

On that hallowed day, members of a profession justly famed for its spectacular ethical lapses were exhorted to renew their vows. Kristina Becvar and David L. Nevins, Law Day 2025: A Perfect Time for Attorneys to Reaffirm Their Oath, *The Fulcrum*, Apr. 30, 2025.

And Your Honor will recall this oath:

“I, ____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice **without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich**, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ____ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”

28 U.S.C. § 453 (emphasis added).



Constitutional law is easy. Getting past an obstinate judge who despises pro se litigants is hard. As Senior Judge John Kane of the District of Colorado confessed, “all pro se cases, not just civil rights cases, are treated shabbily and superficially by our courts, both bench

and bar.¹² Other judges have told Doe the same thing.¹³ *Apro se* plaintiff has a better chance of winning the lottery than of getting a fair shake in a federal court. But that wasn't always the case, as the judicial disembowelment of the trial by jury illustrates.

The crown jewel of the English legal system was the right to have a trial by jury under which, the judge was reduced to little more than father-confessor. It "is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, of wish for, that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours and equals." 4 Blackstone, *Commentaries* at 379.¹⁴ Juries were the ultimate deciders of questions of law, *Georgia v. Brailsford*, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1793) (jury instructions of Jay, C.J.),

¹² John L. Kane, e-mail (to Sean Harrington), Feb. 3, 2007, quoted in Sean Harrington, *Disparate Treatment of Pro Se Civil Litigants in Federal Court: A Justification for Resort to Inappropriate Self-Help?* (2007), at http://www.knowyourcourts.com/Archives/Pro_Se_Illusion/Pro_Se_Illusion.htm (copy on file). (Full disclosure: Doe had a hand in running the knowyourcourts website, most notable for exposing the misconduct of ex-Chief Judge Edward Nottingham of the District of Colorado, forced to resign in disgrace after evidence was uncovered that he was taking bribes on a galactic scale. But America's courts are hopelessly corrupt, and this scandal was largely swept under the proverbial rug.)

¹³ District Judge Nancy Gertner wrote in a Yale Law Review that federal judges are quite literally trained on how you get rid of [pro se civil rights] cases. "At the start of my judicial career in 1994, the trainer teaching discrimination law to new judges announced, 'Here's how to get rid of civil rights cases,'" Nancy Gertner, *Losers' Rules*, 122 Yale L.J. Online 109 (2012), <http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/losers-rules>. Judge Mark Bennett of the Northern District of Iowa earned the nickname "The Terminator" for summarily dismissing pro se employment law cases. Mark W. Bennett, *Essay: From the "No Spittin', No Cussin' and No Summary Judgment" Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the "Defendant's Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment" Days: One Judge's Four-Decade Perspective*, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 685, 688 & n. 11 (2012–2013). Plaintiff conversed with both on the late Judge Kopf's old blog, *Hercules and the Umpire*. Kopf basically admitted the same, as will any judge in private. "[A]s one anonymous judge wrote of dealing with lawyerless litigants, 'It's like going to the dentist for a root canal. Not really fun.'" Ed Cohen, *Judges think they know how to deal with self-represented litigants*, *Nat'l Judicial College*, Aug. 15, 2023.

¹⁴ Concurrences read like a Brandeis brief. It "is a fundamental law, made sacred by the Constitution, and cannot be legislated away." *Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance*, 2 U.S. 304 (D.Pa. 1795) (Paterson, J., riding circuit). According to Framer (and signatory to the Declaration of Independence) Elbridge Gerry, its purpose was to "guard agst. corrupt Judges." 2 Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787* 587 (1909). Quoting Blackstone and Matthew Hale, Elbridge Gerry observed "that property, liberty and life, depend on maintaining in its legal force the constitutional trial by jury," and that it "is adapted to the investigation of truth beyond any other the world can produce." Elbridge Gerry, *Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions* (1788) as reprinted in, *Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, Published During its Discussion by the People, 1787-1788* 10 (P. Ford ed. 1888). John Dickenson viewed it as a "Heaven-taught institution," Fabius, Letter (to the editor), *Delaware Gazette* (1788), as reprinted in, John Dickinson, *The Letters of Fabius, in 1788, on the Federal Constitution; and in 1797 on the Present Situation of Public Affairs* 32 (1797), and one of "the corner stones of liberty." *Id.* at 34.

before judges dismantled it. *United States v. Callender*, 25 F.Cas. 239, 257 (D.Va. 1800) (Chase, J., riding circuit). **Judges look down on you; juries look at you.**

The once-mighty citizen has been reduced to serfdom, as the First Amendment right to petition,¹⁵ the Framers' Seventh Amendment jury trial, to equal justice under law via mandatory certiorari review,¹⁶ to the private criminal prosecution of crimes,¹⁷ to sue States for damages in a neutral forum,¹⁸ to hold public officials and their principals accountable in tort,¹⁹ the right to meaningful appellate review,²⁰ to enforce our judges' good behavior

¹⁵ John E. Wolfgram, How the Judiciary Stole the Right to Petition, 31 U. W. L.A. L. Rev. (Summer 2000), <http://www.constitution.org/abus/wolfgram/ptnrigh.htm>.

¹⁶ At common law, certiorari is a supervisory writ, apprising a superior court of "jurisdictional error, failure to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness, fraud and 'error of law on the face of the record.'" *Craig v South Australia* (1995) 184 CLR 163, 175 (H.C. Austl.) (citations omitted). "The underlying policy is that all inferior courts and authorities have only limited jurisdiction or powers and must be kept within their legal bounds. This is the concern of the Crown, for the sake of orderly administration of justice, but it is a private complaint which sets the Crown in motion." *Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai*, (2003) 6 SCC 675 (India). American courts no longer correct even egregious errors, Sup. Ct. R. 10, forever interring the concept of equal justice under law. **Needless to say, the Framers did not intend this.** *United States v. Peters*, 9 U.S. 121, 126 (1795); 2 *The Works of James Wilson* 149-50 (James D. Andrews ed., 1896).

¹⁷ "[O]ne of the ultimate sanctions [of the common law] is the right of private persons to lay informations and bring prosecutions," *Lund v Thompson* [1958] 3 All E.R. 356, 358, which serves as "a valuable constitutional safeguard against inertia or partiality on the part of authority." *Gouriet v. Union of Post Ofc. Workers*, [1978] A.C. 435, 477 (H.L.). While this right has never been repealed (and probably couldn't be, as it is an unenumerated right no citizen would ever knowingly relinquish), as "[t]he common law ... ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose," *Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee*, 11 U.S. 603, 623 (1813), judges have relegated it to the rubbish bin sua sponte.

¹⁸ *Alden v. Maine*, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (effectively adopting the version the Amendment's framers explicitly rejected). See John Paul Stevens, "Two Questions About Justice," 2003 Ill. L. Rev. 821 (proving this point).

¹⁹ Judges gave their guild an absolute immunity against civil suits, *Bradley v. Fisher*, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (a judge must possess jurisdiction over a dispute to claim immunity); *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (immunity is virtually unlimited); see also, e.g., *Pierson v. Ray*, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), (holding that "any person" means "any person but us judges"). extending it to prosecutors, *Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). States, e.g., *Alden v. Maine*, *supra.*, the federal government, *United States v. Bormes*, 568 U.S. 6, 9-10 (2012), and now, even the President. *Trump v. United States*, 603 U.S. 593 (2024).

²⁰ Allowing so-called "unpublished" opinions, granting judges the raw power to write *ad hoc*, *ex post facto* designer 'law', applicable to one and only one set of litigants. E.g., *Smith v. United States Ct. of App. for the Tenth Circuit*, No. 07-736 (cert. den. Feb. 19, 2008); cf., *Anastasoff v. United States*, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), *vacated as moot on other grounds*, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000); *Hart v. Massanari*, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).

At the federal appellate level, the average judge spends more time on the toilet than he does in considering an appeal. Panels in the Ninth Circuit might issue **150 rulings in a three-day session**, Alex Kozinski, *Letter* (to Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.), Jan. 16, 2004 at 5, and the late Richard Arnold admitted that his panel had issued **fifty rulings in two hours**. *Perfunctory Justice: Overloaded Federal Judges Increasingly Are Resorting to One-*

tenure, *Smith v. Scalia*, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28 (D.C. Dist. 2014), and the right to cast a meaningful vote, *Rucho v. Common Cause*, 588 U.S. 684 (2019), are all extinct. Without any semblance of constitutional authority, judges have assumed roles intended for citizens by devices such as summary judgment²¹ and heightened pleading rules,²² all but eradicating the jury's democratic function as a check on government and elites.

The core of the Constitution fared no better. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments died the death of a thousand cuts. *Egbert v. Boule*, 142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022) (swallowing *Bivens* whole). The Ninth Amendment bled out on the operating table at the hands of judicial abortionist Samuel Alito. *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*, 597 U.S. 215, 348 (2022). The Supremacy Clause met an equally ignominious fate with respect to treaties. *See United States v. Schooner Peggy*, 5 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1801) (treaties used to be the law of the land). And this is by no means a seriatim list (a list of “binding precedents” one relies on at one's peril is attached at Appendix A).

It is bad enough that the Supremacy Clause, Petition Clause, Free Speech Clause, Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments are all gone, but now, even the rules we were taught to rely on for “how to read law” are left in tatters. A self-executing Constitution. The Rule of Charming Betsey. The Plain Meaning Rule. Reliance on legislative history. “Every word has meaning.” Dead.

Word Rulings, *Des Moines Register*, Mar. 26, 1999, at 12. As Professors Reynolds and Richman lament, our appellate courts are certiorari courts. William M. Reynolds & William L. Richman, *Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition*, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 273, 275 (1995-96).

²¹ The “Celotex Trilogy”—*Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) and *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574 (1986)—further erodes juror prerogatives by empowering judges to weigh evidence, assess credibility, and resolve cases without a jury. See generally, Suja A. Thomas, *Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional*, 93 Va. L. Rev. 139 (2007).

²² *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) abolished the traditional notice pleading standard of *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), effectively requiring plaintiffs to plead evidence before discovery.

Still, the most breathtaking demolition project is what the courts have done to *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137 (1803): “The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.” *Id.* at 163. As a matter of law and logic, a right cannot exist without an effective remedy for its breach, *Ashby v. White* [1703] 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (H.C.), and “[t]o take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself.” *Poindexter v. Greenhow*, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884). But judges constructed an impenetrable fortress of immunity, procedural hurdles, and naked discrimination based on your means. *And we are now a government of men, not laws.* Scalia distills the concept to essentials: “This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine robs the People of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.” *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644, ___, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

CONCLUSION

Given that judicial fiat has already run over the Framers’ Constitution, rewriting Rule 24 is child’s play by comparison. You’re going to do whatever you want; Intervenor can’t stop you. Appellate remedies are a contradiction in terms. All that is sought here is a rational and legally coherent explanation of how we could possibly get from *the Constitution* to “*an oathbreaking insurrectionist can be our President*” from anyone in a black robe.

Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of May, 2025,

John Doe (signed under seal)

APPENDIX A

Whereas Thomas Paine once proudly proclaimed “that in America THE LAW IS KING,” Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* 36 (P. Eckler Co. 1918) (1776) (emphasis in original), Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit admits that the law’s once-vast kingdom “has shrunk and greyed to the point where today it is largely limited to routine cases.” Richard Posner, *How Judges Think* 1 (Harv. U. Press 2008).

If you can afford to acquire your own Supreme Court Justice, at least some of the Constitution remains open to you. But when you are forced by brute financial necessity to argue your own cause, you had more rights in the old Soviet Union. Some years ago, on Judge Richard Kopf’s old blog, retired Judge Nancy Gertner admitted that federal judges are quite literally trained on “how you get rid of [pro se civil rights] cases.”²³ **Every act is a federal felony.** Kopf himself even admitted to not reading briefs—and that is at the trial court level.

While the list borders on the infinite—the entire United States Reports is no match for a headstrong judge—these are a few “binding precedents” that can no longer be relied on with confidence [this is not a complete list, and does not include state-law precedent]:

- *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. at 163 (right of every individual to claim protection of the laws whenever s/he receives an injury); accord, *Poindexter v. Greenhow*, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884) (“To take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself.”).
- *United States v. Peters*, 9 U.S. 121, 126 (1795); *Cohens v. Virginia*, 16 U.S. 264, 404 (1821); see *Ex parte Fitzbonne* (U.S. unreported 1800) (court has a duty to exercise the authority it has),
- *Moragne v. States Marine Lines*, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (right to rely on Supreme Court decisions as authoritative statements of the law).
- *Tumey v. Ohio*, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), *In re Murchison*, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), *Johnson v. Mississippi*, 403 U.S. 212, 215-216 (1971) (per curiam), *Ward v. Monroeville*, 409 U.S. 57, 58-62 (1972), *Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie*, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986), *Bracy v. Gramley*, 520 U.S. 899, 905 (1997), *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.*, No. 08-22, 556 U.S. ____ 17 (2009) (outlining scope of the due process right to fair and independent tribunal),
- *Carey v. Piphus*, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (violation of due process a stand-alone tort),
- *District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1983) (citizen’s right to challenge constitutionality of statute uniquely and directly affecting him),
- *Exxon-Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.*, 544 U.S. 280 (2005); *Skinner v. Switzer*, No. 09-9000, 562 U.S. ____ (2011) (limits on Rooker-Feldman doctrine),
- *Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 254 U.S. 348 (1920) (void judgment not entitled to full faith and credit),
- *Bradley v. Fisher*, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (a judge must possess jurisdiction over a dispute to claim immunity); *Cleavinger v. Saxner*, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); *Forrester v. White*, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (limits on immunity).
- *United States v. Bajakajian*, 524 U.S. 321, 338 (1998) (right to “equality before the law”),
- *Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t*, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (federal court may not take hypothetical jurisdiction over a matter),
- *United States v. Lee*, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (government agents are servants of the law, and accountable thereunder),
- *United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.*, 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940); *Haggard Co. v. Helvering*, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940) (courts must eschew irrational and unjust results unless there is no alternative),

²³ See fn. 13, *supra*.

- *James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia*, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991), *Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (precedent on precedent),
- *Perry v. Sindermann*, 408 U.S. 583, 597 (1972) (government may not deny any benefit on a basis that infringes upon a constitutionally protected interest),
- *Schwartz v. Board of Bar Examiners of N.M.*, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (bar applicants' entitlement to due process), *see also*, *Willner v. Cmte. on Character*, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); *Barry v. Barchi*, 433 U.S. 455 (1979) (general rights of applicants for professional licensure),
- *Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.*, 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (liberty and property interests indistinguishable for purposes of Fifth Amendment analysis),
- *Boyd v. United States*, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); *Schlagenhauf v. Holder*, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); *Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977) (re: contours of the right of privacy Justice Alito seems to have misplaced),
- *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); *Matthews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Fifth Amendment due process rights in general),
- *United States v. Wilson*, 32 U.S. 150 (1833) (any term of art borrowed from English law is defined with reference to that law),
- *Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.*, 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (citizen's absolute right of access to the courts), *cf.*, *Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); *Blyew v. United States*, 80 U.S. 581, 598-99 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
- *United States v. Will*, 449 U.S. 200, 214 (1980) (outlining constitutionally proper bounds of the Rule of Necessity),
- *Head Money Cases*, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); *Ware v. Hylton*, 3 U.S. 199 (1796) (treaty is a law of the land, enforceable by an aggrieved citizen),
- *Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy*, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (domestic law is to be interpreted in accord with treaty obligations, if at all possible); *United States v. Alvarez-Machain*, 504 U.S. 655, 665 (1992) (rules of treaty interpretation),
- *Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.*, 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949) ("where the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions"),
- *Clafin v. Houseman*, 93 U.S. 130 (1876), *Howlett v. Rose*, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (state court of general jurisdiction has a duty to decide federal claims properly brought before it),
- *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (no official "can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it").
- *Whitney v. Robertson*, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1888) ("last-in-time" rule),
- *Reid v. Covert*, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Constitution is paramount law, which even judges must obey),
- *Lake County v. Rollins*, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889); *Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain*, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (collecting cases); *Heiner v. Donnan*, 285 U.S. 312, 331 (1932); *Anderson v. Wilson*, 289 U.S. 20, 27 (1933); *Rubin v. United States*, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (plain meaning rule; rarity of permissible exceptions),
- *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (federal courts are permitted to intervene in state court proceedings where irreparable injury can be shown), *Kendall v. United States*, 37 U.S. 524, 624 (1838); *DeLima v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 1, 176-77 (1901); *Bell v. Hood*, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946), *State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire*, 386 U.S. 523 (1967); *Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents*, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (where a constitutional injury is suffered, remedial provisions are interpreted expansively and as necessary, the courts' remedial authority is implied [see *Marbury v. Madison*, *supra*]).