

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC. ET AL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. LLC ET AL,

Defendants.

2:23-cv-00836-MRH

Chief Judge Mark R. Hornak

Oral Argument Requested

**PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY**  
**IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS**

Plaintiffs Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Mylan Specialty L.P., and Mylan Inc. (collectively “Mylan”) respectfully submit this Notice of Supplemental Authority to apprise the Court of three motion to dismiss decisions that bear on several issues in the case at bar—*Federal Trade Commission v. Syngenta Crop Protection AG*, 2024 WL 149552, at \*1, \*8-12, \*17-19 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2024) (Ex. A) (plaintiffs need not explain why certain products are excluded from the market definition, price-cost test does not apply where plaintiffs alleged sufficient non-price mechanisms of exclusion, and judicial notice is inappropriate where the referenced documents raise factual questions); *Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Vermont v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.*, 2024 WL 323775, at \*14-17, n.21, \*21-22, \*26-29 (D. Vt. Jan. 22, 2024) (Ex. B) (declining to apply *Noerr-Pennington* immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, withdrawal of a product is not the only means to be coercive, the absence of a litigation barrier to market entry does not defeat plaintiffs’ causation arguments, and a monopolization scheme may be upheld after only assessing part of an overall scheme claim); and *Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bionpharma Inc.*, 650 F. Supp. 3d 269, 277-79, 281-82 (D. Del. 2023) (Ex. C) (antitrust claim premised on sham petitioning may not accrue until the FDA approves the plaintiff’s drug, plaintiff’s allegations of delay must be taken as true at the pleading stage, and the serial petitioning rule for identifying sham litigation is applicable in the Hatch-Waxman context).

For the Court’s convenience, Plaintiffs submit all three opinions with highlighting to identify the passages that are particularly instructive to the issues raised by Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. D.I. 59.

Dated: February 13, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John A. Schwab

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, John A. Schwab, hereby certify that on February 13, 2024, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system. Notice of this filing will be sent to counsel of record by operation of the Court's CM/ECF automated filing system.

Dated: February 13, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

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**TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR EXHIBITS SUBMITTED WITH  
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<b>Exhibit</b>	<b>Document Description</b>
Exhibit A	<i>Federal Trade Commission v. Syngenta Crop Protection AG</i> , 2024 WL 149552 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 12, 2024)
Exhibit B	<i>Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Vermont v. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.</i> , 2024 WL 323775 (D. Vt. Jan. 22, 2024)
Exhibit C	<i>Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bionpharma Inc.</i> , 650 F. Supp. 3d 269 (D. Del. 2023)

# **EXHIBIT A**



2024 WL 149552

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.  
United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STATE OF COLORADO, STATE OF ILLINOIS, STATE OF INDIANA, STATE OF IOWA, STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE OF NEBRASKA, STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF TENNESSEE, STATE OF TEXAS, STATE OF WASHINGTON, and STATE OF WISCONSIN, Plaintiffs,

v.

SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION AG, SYNGENTA CORPORATION, SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, LLC, and CORTEVA, INC., Defendants.

1:22CV828

Filed 01/12/2024

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

Thomas D. Schroeder United States District Judge

\*1 In this action, the Federal Trade Commission and a dozen states allege that two major manufacturers of crop-protection products have employed anticompetitive loyalty discount programs. These programs allegedly exclude generic competition from the market even after the products’ patent and other federal exclusivity protections have expired, thereby leading to supracompetitive prices for farmers. Before the court are the motions of Defendants Syngenta Crop Protection AG, Syngenta Corporation, Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC, and Corteva, Inc., to dismiss all claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docs. 94, 99.) Plaintiffs have responded in opposition (Doc. 150), and Defendants have replied (Docs. 130, 133). The court held argument on the motions on December 1, 2023. (Doc. 157.) For the reasons set forth below, the motions will be denied.

**I. BACKGROUND**

**A. Factual Background**

The facts outlined in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint (the “complaint”) (Doc. 149),<sup>1</sup> which are taken as true for the purpose of the present motion, show the following:

**1. Crop-Protection Product Industry**

The Syngenta Group is a global company comprised of businesses including Defendants Syngenta Crop Protection AG, Syngenta Corporation, and Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC (collectively “Syngenta”). (Doc. 149 ¶ 30.) Syngenta Crop Protection AG oversees Syngenta’s global crop protection business. (Id. ¶ 31.) Syngenta Corporation is a corporate affiliate of Syngenta Crop Protection AG and is the top-level Syngenta business incorporated in the United States. (Id. ¶ 32.) Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC operates Syngenta’s U.S. crop-protection manufacturing, which is the second largest by revenue among crop-protection product manufacturers in the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 48.) Syngenta allegedly operates as a single enterprise. (Id. ¶ 35.)

Corteva, Inc. (“Corteva”) was established to operate as an independent agriscience business through the merger of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Dow Chemical Company. (Id. ¶ 38.)<sup>2</sup> Corteva is the third largest by revenue among crop-protection product manufacturers in the United States. (Id. ¶ 48.)

\*2 Defendants manufacture crop-protection products — commonly referred to by Plaintiffs as “pesticides” — to control diseases, weeds, insects, or other unwanted organisms that harm crops. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 39, 40.) These include herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides. (Id. ¶ 42.) Every crop-protection product contains at least one active ingredient (“AI”). (Id. ¶ 43.) Manufacturers may sell AIs in technical-grade form, which requires further processing before being sold in finished form, which is ready for use by farmers. (Id. ¶ 44.) AIs are distinguished by the pests they target, the effectiveness at controlling the target pest, and the crops upon which the AI is used and registered for use, among other characteristics. (Id. ¶ 45.) The AI’s “mode of action” is the chemical and biological manner in which the crop-protection product kills or controls the target pest. (Id. ¶ 46.) Farmers’ preferences for one AI over another may depend on variations in the mode of action. (Id.)

Developers of new AIs obtain exclusive use through two mechanisms. First, under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), 7 U.S.C. § 136 *et seq.*, a developer of crop-protection products must submit environmental impact data to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency prior to sale or distribution in the United States. Upon approval, the developer obtains 10-year exclusive protection from others citing the data the developer used to support its FIFRA submission. (*Id.* ¶¶ 51, 52.) Second, under patent law, a developer can obtain 20-year patent protection. (*Id.* ¶ 51.) The timing of the FIFRA application can effectively extend the exclusive-use period beyond the date the patent expires. (*Id.* ¶ 52.) When both exclusive-use protections expire, however, a generic manufacturer may enter the market. (*Id.* ¶ 54.)

Manufacturers of crop-protection products traditionally sell to distributors, who then sell to retailers, who then sell to farmers. (*Id.* ¶ 55.) Approximately 90% of crop-protection products reach farmers through this traditional supply chain, and about 90% of the traditional supply chain is managed by seven distributors. (*Id.*) In other words, these seven distributors account for approximately 80% of all sales of crop-protection products in the United States. (*Id.*) This traditional channel of distribution is allegedly the most efficient because it provides access to retail and logistics networks and economies of scale, among other factors. (*Id.* ¶ 56.)

## 2. Defendants’ Loyalty Programs

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants operate loyalty programs intended to limit the distribution of competing generic products. (*Id.* ¶ 59.) Under these programs, Defendants offer “substantial” payments as an end-of-year lump sum to distributors — allegedly up to millions of dollars — conditioned on the distributors limiting their purchases of generic crop-protection products containing specified post-patent AIs. (*Id.* ¶ 60.) The threshold to receive the loyalty payment is expressed as a percentage of the distributors’ total purchases of the AI, and the permissible amount of generic AI a distributor may sell is referred to as “open space” or “head space.” (*Id.* ¶ 61.) Typically, a distributor must source less than 15% of its total purchase of a certain AI from generic manufacturers to qualify to receive the loyalty payment. (*Id.*)

Syngenta implements its loyalty program, known as “Key AI,” through written marketing agreements with distributors.

(*Id.* ¶ 66.) Loyalty performance is calculated by dividing the amount of qualifying AI purchased or sold by the distributor in the year by the total of the AI purchased or sold by the distributor, including generics. (*Id.* ¶ 68.) If the distributor's percentage is above the threshold for the specific AI, it will reap a “special marketing bonus.” (*Id.* ¶ 69.) If not, the distributor will lose the entire loyalty payment. (*Id.*) Year-to-year, Syngenta can change the AIs included in distributor marketing agreements as well as the associated share thresholds and calculation methods. (*Id.* ¶ 70.) A similar program is offered for retailers as well, in which multiple top retailers nationally have participated. (*Id.* ¶¶ 71, 72; Doc. 81 ¶ 82.)

\*3 Under Corteva's program — the Crops, Range & Pasture and Industrial Vegetation Management (“CRPIVM”) Loyalty Program, a distributor generally receives an annual payment for sourcing a certain percentage of its purchases of an AI from Corteva. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 75, 77.) The percentage that Corteva pays varies but could run as high as 11%. (*Id.* ¶ 77.) Corteva offers a second, higher payment when a distributor reaches a higher threshold for the AI. (*Id.* ¶ 75.) Moreover, the CRPIVM usually links together multiple active ingredients within each offer, thus requiring a distributor to hit the loyalty threshold for every AI in the offer to receive the payment for any one AI. (Doc. 81 ¶ 75.) Additionally, Corteva typically permits a portion of any payment to be deferred into subsequent years, which would otherwise be forfeited if the distributor missed the loyalty threshold for any AI in the offer. (*Id.* ¶ 78.) Further, Corteva conditions its Corporate Offer — another annual payment offer that covers a broader range of Corteva products — on meeting the CRPIVM figure. (*Id.* ¶ 79.) If a distributor fails to qualify, it could forfeit certain loyalty-dependent payments under the Corporate Offer. (*Id.*)

“[S]ubstantially all leading distributors” enter into loyalty program agreements, and Defendants promote broad participation allegedly to assure distributors that others are not partnering with generic manufacturers to undercut prices. (Doc. 149 ¶ 84.) Moreover, the structure of the program is designed to make it less likely that distributors will lower prices in anticipation of a future loyalty payment because of its complexity, uncertainty, and timing. (*Id.* ¶ 85.) Defendants “regularly” audit distributors, which has allegedly led to withheld loyalty payments. (Doc. 81 ¶ 87.) Defendants also “rarely” grant exceptions for missing the threshold without good cause. (Doc. 149 ¶ 87.) Additionally, they have allegedly retaliated against distributors who fail to reach the loyalty thresholds by canceling distribution

contracts, delaying access to new products, and withholding product allocation during a supply shortage. (*Id.* ¶ 88.)

Plaintiffs focus on the following AIs:

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(See *id.* ¶ 89-150; Doc. 81 ¶ 89-150.) Plaintiffs allege that distributors of each of these AIs have strictly managed their purchases and sales to ensure that they stay above the respective threshold to receive the payments. (*Id.*)

Further, Plaintiffs allege, generic manufacturers have attempted to enter the market for each AI — with demand from farmers — but have had little to no success because distributors would not purchase the generic. (*Id.*) As to azoxystrobin, two generics have exited the market entirely, and one that attempted to mix azoxystrobin was “hindered in its attempt to market” because of the Key AI program. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 96-97.) As to mesotrione, two generics delayed or terminated entry, and a third that developed a mixture product dropped it due to the Key AI program. (*Id.* ¶ 105.) As to metolachlor, a generic manufacturer had considered bringing a mixture to market but chose not to do so because of the Key AI program. (*Id.* ¶ 120.) As to rimsulfuron, at least one generic canceled or deferred entry plans, despite apparent demand from farmers to bid on generics, because of the CRPIVM program. (*Id.* ¶ 132.) As to oxamyl, Corteva's production of oxamyl stopped for a span of roughly two years, generics entered the market with “relative[ ] success[ ],” but generic sales “plummeted” upon Corteva's re-entry into the market with the loyalty program applied to oxamyl. (*Id.* ¶¶ 136-38.) And as to acetochlor, the CRPIVM program has allegedly deterred generics from the market altogether, even though one generic firm has had success selling the AI overseas. (*Id.* ¶ 149.) For each AI, Plaintiffs allege that the presence of generics has imposed downward pricing pressure.

\*4 The complaint further alleges that Syngenta supplies Corteva with mesotrione and metolachlor. (*Id.* ¶¶ 109, 122.) Defendants allegedly struck this agreement as an incentive to keep Corteva from purchasing generics of these two AIs. In exchange, Syngenta does not penalize distributors in the Key AI program who buy Corteva products containing these two Syngenta AIs. (Doc. 81 ¶¶ 109, 122.)

### 3. Alleged Market and Competitive Harm

Plaintiffs allege that Syngenta has had monopoly and market power as to azoxystrobin, mesotrione, and metolachlor, and that Corteva has had monopoly and market power as to rimsulfuron and oxamyl and market power as to acetochlor. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 151, 152.) Plaintiffs claim two relevant product markets:

(a) A relevant product market exists that is no broader than the active ingredient, consisting of (1) active ingredient included as a component of an EPA-registered finished crop-protection product for sale in the United States, and (2) technical-grade or manufacturing-use active ingredient to be formulated into an EPA-registered finished crop-protection product for sale in the United States; and

(b) A relevant product market(s) also exists that is no broader than EPA-registered crop-protection products for sale in the United States that contain the active ingredient. (*Id.* ¶ 155.) Syngenta's market share for azoxystrobin, mesotrione, and metolachlor exceeded 70% from at least 2017 through 2020. (*Id.* ¶ 161.) Corteva's market share for rimsulfuron and oxamyl also exceeded 70% for those same years, while its market share for acetochlor exceeded 40% (with another roughly 50% attributable to Bayer, its joint venture partner for that AI). (*Id.* ¶¶ 162, 163.) In all, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have foreclosed generics from “approximately 70% or more” of the market. (Doc. 81 ¶ 171.)

Each AI has “particular characteristics and uses that differentiate it from other active ingredients.” (Doc. 149 ¶ 157.) Azoxystrobin “can be used across all major row crops [and] has growth-enhancing effects not proven in other active ingredients.” (*Id.*) Mesotrione has “superior efficacy and crop safety, and a low use rate.” (*Id.*) Metolachlor has “superior water solubility, and so tends to perform better in dry conditions[, and it] outperforms other active ingredients in warmer conditions, is more ‘crop friendly,’ and can be used on a broader spectrum of crops.” (*Id.*) Rimsulfuron “can be used on a broader range of crops, controls a wider spectrum of weeds, can be used on both pre- and post-emergence, and has more application methods, no dormancy restrictions, and a lower use rate.” (*Id.*) Oxamyl can be “sprayed directly onto crops, whereas other, similar insecticide active ingredients must be applied at the root level or mixed into the soil[, and] is also safer for crops and better for soil health[.]” (*Id.*) Acetochlor “tends to perform better in wetter and cooler

conditions, [and] tends to have better weed control early in the growing season and is more effective against certain weed species.” (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that other AIs are not close enough substitutes to prevent Defendants from maintaining supracompetitive prices of their crop-protection products containing these six AIs. (Id. ¶ 158.) Moreover, substantial barriers exist to enter the market for these AIs notwithstanding the loyalty programs. (Id. ¶ 160.) These capital, technical, regulatory, and legal barriers include “obtaining registration from the EPA, developing manufacturing processes and sourcing [the] active ingredient, and paying data compensation costs to the initial active ingredient registrant.” (Id.) The loyalty programs impose a substantial barrier by limiting generic manufacturers’ access to the traditional distribution channel. (Id.)

\*5 Plaintiffs contend that the loyalty programs cause anticompetitive harms. First, the programs “forclos[e] actual or potential competitors from access to distribution services,” or to “efficient distribution services” (i.e., the traditional distribution channel). (Id. ¶¶ 169, 170.) Although the programs are nominally voluntary, Plaintiffs allege that the mere prospect of receiving a payment is sufficient incentive to induce distributors to participate and to limit or forego purchases from generic competitors. (Id. ¶ 173.) Allegedly, one generic manufacturer represented that “this dynamic is so well established in the industry that it is futile to even approach a large distributor that is subject to loyalty requirements.” (Id. ¶ 178.) Absent the loyalty programs, Plaintiffs allege, sales of generics would be significantly higher and would exceed the open space presently allowed for each AI, thus decreasing prices overall for farmers. (Id. ¶ 180.)

Second, and relatedly, Plaintiffs charge that the loyalty programs have prevented, delayed, and diminished entry and expansion by generic manufacturers into, as well as caused the exit from, the market for products containing the AIs. (Id. ¶ 182; see also, e.g., id. ¶¶ 96-97 (demonstrating that generic manufacturer of azoxystrobin mixture was “hindered in its attempt to market”; id. ¶ 132 (alleging that at least one generic manufacturer of rimsulfuron canceled or deferred entry plans, despite apparent demand from farmers to bid on generics, because of the CRPVM program).) Third, these programs have reduced the ability and incentive for generic manufacturers to innovate crop-protection products containing the AIs. (Id. ¶ 186.) Finally, the programs have

resulted in supracompetitive prices for retailers and farmers for products containing the AIs. (Id. ¶ 190.) Plaintiffs point to Defendants’ internal studies that allegedly demonstrate that the loyalty programs have curtailed generic entry and sustained higher prices than would otherwise prevail. (Id. ¶¶ 195-99.)

## B. Procedural History

On September 29, 2022, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking declaratory, injunctive, equitable monetary relief, and civil penalties. (Doc. 1.) Defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint, after which Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 79; Doc. 149 (lesser-redacted complaint).) Now before the court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint. (Docs. 94, 99.) Following this court’s order granting the parties’ respective motions to seal (Doc. 148), the operative public complaint is at docket entry 149.<sup>5</sup>

Plaintiffs allege sixteen counts under state and federal law. Under federal law, Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) alleges violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), and all Plaintiffs allege violations of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 203-10.) The remaining claims arise under state law and are raised by the states of California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.<sup>6</sup> (Id. ¶¶ 212-76.)

\*6 Following oral argument on the motions to dismiss, they are ready for resolution.

## II. ANALYSIS

### A. Legal Background

#### 1. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is meant to “test[ ] the sufficiency of a complaint” and not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” [Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin](#), 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). To survive such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’ ” [Ashcroft v. Iqbal](#), 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting [Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly](#), 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” [Erickson v. Pardus](#), 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor, [Ibarra v. United States](#), 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in light of Rule 8's standard that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

## 2. Federal Antitrust Statutes

Plaintiffs allege violations of the Sherman Act ([sections 1 and 2](#)) and Clayton Act (section 3), and Plaintiff FTC alleges violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act (section 5). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” [15 U.S.C. § 1](#).

[Section 2](#) prohibits “monopoliz[ing], or attempt[ing] to monopolize, or combin[ing] or conspir[ing] with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States.” [15 U.S.C. § 2](#).

A violation of [Section 2](#) consists of two elements: (1) possession of monopoly power and (2) “maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” [Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.](#), 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992). Monopoly power is defined as the ability “to control prices or exclude competition.” [United States v. Grinnell Corp.](#), 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although evidence of such ability is “only rarely available,” courts turn to circumstantial evidence — such as a company's share of the market — to determine whether monopoly power exists.

[United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc.](#), 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting [United States v. Microsoft Corp.](#), 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). Maintenance of that power requires some illegal conduct that forecloses competition,

gains a competitive advantage, or destroys a competitor. [Eastman Kodak](#), 504 U.S. at 482-83.

Section 3 of the Clayton Act makes it unlawful for

any person engaged in commerce ... to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods ... for use, consumption, or resale within the United States ... or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.

\*7 [15 U.S.C. § 14](#).

Section 5 of the FTC Act makes illegal “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” [15 U.S.C. § 45\(a\)\(1\)](#). The act, while not solely focused on antitrust, is “nonetheless linked to the antitrust laws.” [Chuck's Feed & Seed Co., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.](#), 810 F.2d 1289, 1293 (4th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has stated that the act was “designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, [ ] — to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts.” [Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv. Co.](#), 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953) (internal citation omitted). The act “functions as a kind of penumbra around the federal antitrust statutes,” [Chuck's Feed](#), 810 F.2d at 1292-93, such that any practice that violates the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act also violates the FTC Act. See [Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists](#), 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986) (“The standard of ‘unfairness’ under the FTC Act is, by necessity, an elusive one, encompassing not only practices that violate the Sherman Act and the other antitrust laws, [ ] but also practices that the Commission determines are against public policy for other reasons.” (internal citations omitted)). The extent to which these four provisions impose varying requirements on a plaintiff is discussed in more detail below.

## 3. Exclusive Dealing

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ loyalty rebate programs are illegal exclusive dealing arrangements. An exclusive

dealing arrangement is one in which a buyer agrees to purchase certain goods or services only from a particular seller for a certain period of time. Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, *Antitrust Law* ¶ 1800a (4th & 5th ed. 2023). Neither absolute exclusivity nor an express agreement is necessary for an exclusive dealing arrangement to violate antitrust laws. *ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp.*, 696 F.3d 254, 270, 282 (3d Cir. 2012); *Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.*, 365 U.S. 320, 328 (1961) (“[T]he competition foreclosed by the contract must be found to constitute a substantial share of the relevant market.” (emphasis added)). Although not “per se” illegal, exclusive dealing arrangements may give rise to cognizable claims under all four statutory provisions alleged here. See, e.g., *Grinnell Corp.*, 384 U.S. at 576 (Sherman Act § 2); *ZF Meritor*, 696 F.3d at 281 (Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2, Clayton Act § 3); *LePage's Inc. v. 3M*, 324 F.3d 141, 157 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); *Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP*, 592 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2010) (Sherman Act § 1); *McWane, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n*, 783 F.3d 814, 827 (11th Cir. 2015) (FTC Act § 5).

Exclusive contracts serve many pro-competitive purposes. *ZF Meritor*, 696 F.3d at 270. On the demand side, they can assure supply, protect against rises in price, enable long-term planning based on known costs, and reduce the expense and risk of storing goods that have fluctuating demand. *Standard Oil Co. v. United States*, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). On the supply side, they can substantially reduce selling expenses, protect against price fluctuations, justify and enable capital expenditures, and shield against counterattacks by competitors. *Id.* at 306-07. Indeed, “virtually every contract to buy ‘forecloses’ or ‘excludes’ alternative sellers from some portion of the market, namely the portion consisting of what was bought.” *Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.*, 724 F.2d 227, 236 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.) (emphasis removed). Accordingly, whether a contract rises to illegal exclusivity, “rather than merely a form of vigorous competition, can be difficult to discern[.]” *Microsoft Corp.*, 253 F.3d at 58. “[T]he means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad,” posing a challenge for an antitrust court in “stating a general rule for distinguishing between exclusionary acts,

which reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, which increase it.” *Id.*

\*8 While exclusive dealing is formally a vertical restraint (e.g., as alleged here, a restraint between manufacturer and distributor), it has the potential to have adverse economic consequences on horizontal competition. *Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde*, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). More specifically, an exclusive dealing arrangement runs afoul of the antitrust laws when it unreasonably deprives other suppliers of a market for their goods or allows one buyer of goods unreasonably to deprive other buyers of a needed source of supply. *Id.* The potential collateral consequences of illegal exclusive dealing include higher prices, restricted output, reduced quality, or slower innovation. *McWane, Inc.*, 783 F.3d at 827.

### B. Defendants' Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Defendants argue two primary grounds to dismiss the complaint: first, they contend that Plaintiffs fail to allege a relevant product market; and second, they argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege anticompetitive conduct and injury. Syngenta further argues that the claims against Syngenta Crop Protection AG and Syngenta Corporation should be dismissed. Corteva argues that the FTC Act violates [Article II of the U.S. Constitution](#), thus requiring dismissal of the complaint. And finally, all Defendants argue that the state law claims should be dismissed on a range of grounds.

The court turns first to the threshold question of whether Plaintiffs allege a relevant product market.

#### 1. Relevant Product Market

Defendants contend that the complaint is defective because it fails to allege a cognizable product market. (Doc. 95 at 17; Doc. 100 at 37.) A relevant product market is defined by “the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.” *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). Courts begin with a preliminary inquiry into market definition because it serves as the frame through which the court analyzes monopoly power and substantial market foreclosure. *E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon*, 637 F.3d 435, 441 (4th Cir. 2011); *Ind. Fed'n of*

Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460 (“[T]he purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.” (emphasis in original)).

Plaintiffs allege two product markets in the United States. One is the AI itself, in both its finished and technical-grade form. (Doc. 149 ¶ 155.) The other is crop-protection products that contain the active ingredient. (Id.) Defendants do not contest the markets’ geographical scope or that Plaintiffs allege more than one market.

Corteva argues that Plaintiffs’ market definitions are only two sentences that vaguely describe general characteristics of the AIs that amount to “alleged advantages they have over other products.” (Doc. 95 at 19.) In Corteva’s view, Plaintiffs have an obligation to do more — namely, to explain why products without those characteristics are not reasonably interchangeable. (Id. at 18 (citing Bayer Schering Pharm AG v. Sandoz, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 2d 569, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 200 (2d. Cir. 2001)).) In support, Corteva points to several EPA label registrations outside of the record that, per Corteva, demonstrate that the alleged product markets are both too narrow and too broad. This follows, according to Corteva, because these EPA label registrations show that the EPA has registered crop-protection products that (1) contain AIs within Plaintiffs’ alleged markets but have different uses, and (2) are products outside of Plaintiffs’ alleged markets but share similar uses. (Id. at 19-20.) Syngenta argues that Plaintiffs’ market definition is unreasonably narrow because each market is only a single AI. (Doc. 100 at 38-40.) In support, Syngenta points to other antitrust proceedings outside of the record where the FTC and the U.S. Department of Justice have alleged broader crop-protection product markets with multiple AIs. (Id. at 41-42.) For example, Syngenta cites United States v. Bayer AG, 83 Fed. Reg. 27652, 27653 (DOJ June 13, 2018), as “analyzing alleged ‘foundational herbicides’ and ‘nematicidal seed treatment’ markets,” and Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 62 Fed. Reg. 409, 412 (FTC Jan. 3, 1997), as “analyzing alleged ‘corn herbicides for pre-emergent control of grasses’ market — including metolachlor — and ‘corn herbicides for post-emergent control of broadleaf weeds’ market.” (Id.) Syngenta contends that FTC’s effort to allege narrower product markets here is not based on “different facts, but instead on the evolving philosophy of the FTC’s Chair,” and demonstrates that “FTC is attempting to gerrymander its way to an antitrust victory.” (Id. at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

\*9 Plaintiffs respond that their product markets are supported by ample factual allegations. (Doc. 150 at 52.) Namely, Plaintiffs point to the conduct of Defendants, who design their loyalty programs around each individual AI. (Id.) Further, Plaintiffs allege “characteristics and uses” and “industry or public recognition” for each AI:

Azoxystrobin has “growth-enhancing effects not proven in other active ingredients.” Mesotrione has “superior efficacy and crop safety” “[c]ompared to other, similar herbicide active ingredients.” Metolachlor “has superior water solubility,” and “outperforms other active ingredients” in warmer and drier conditions. Rimsulfuron “has more application methods, no dormancy restrictions, and a lower use rate” than similar chemicals. Oxamyl, unlike “similar insecticide active ingredients,” “can be sprayed directly onto crops.” And acetochlor “tends to perform better” than similar herbicides “in wetter and cooler conditions,” and has “better weed control early in the growing season.”

(Id. (quoting Doc. 149 ¶ 157) (internal citations omitted).) Plaintiffs also allege that each AI is distinguishable enough that farmers “may prefer it over others.” (Id. at 54 (citing Doc. 149 ¶ 46).) Finally, Plaintiffs contest that the court should take judicial notice of the EPA label registrations and prior FTC and DOJ antitrust proceedings at this stage. (Doc. 150 at 58-59.)

A relevant product market must include all reasonably interchangeable products. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956). The reasonable interchangeability of products is generally determined according to the cross-elasticity of demand for the product and its alternatives. It’s My Party, Inc. v. Live Nation, Inc., 811 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2016). In other words, courts look to the degree to which a defendant would sacrifice sales to alternative products by raising the price of its goods. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 469. It is therefore more than simply technical interchangeability. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discussing functional substitutability as one factor among many as it relates to “the economic criteria that make one market distinct from another”).

Market definition is a question of fact. Kolon, 637 F.3d at 442 (collecting cases). “Because market definition is a

deeply fact-intensive inquiry, courts hesitate to grant motions to dismiss for failure to plead a relevant product market.”

*Id.* (quoting [Todd](#), 275 F.3d at 199-200). Nevertheless, there is “no absolute rule against the dismissal of antitrust claims for failure to allege a relevant product market.” *Id.* (quoting [Todd](#), 275 F.3d at 199-200). “No party can expect to gerrymander its way to an antitrust victory without due regard for market realities.” [It’s My Party, Inc.](#), 811 F.3d at 683. “Cases in which dismissal on the pleadings is appropriate frequently involve either (1) failed attempts to limit a product market to a single brand, franchise, institution, or comparable entity that competes with potential substitutes or (2) failure even to attempt a plausible explanation as to why a market should be limited in a particular way.” [Kolon](#), 637 F.3d at 442 (quoting [Todd](#), 275 F.3d at 199-200).

Under this fact-intensive inquiry, the scope of the relevant product market differs on a case-by-case basis. For example, in [Eastman Kodak](#), 504 U.S. at 481-82, the Supreme Court held that a properly constituted market may be comprised of a single product. In the pharmaceutical context, lower courts have ruled that a brand-name drug and its generic analogs can comprise a relevant product market. [In re Zetia \(Ezetimibe\) Antitrust Litig.](#), MDL No. 2:18-md-2836, 2021 WL 6689718, at \*18-20 (E.D. Va. Nov. 1, 2021), adopted in full by 587 F. Supp. 3d 356 (E.D. Va. 2022); [In re Nexium \(Esomeprazole\) Antitrust Litig.](#), 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 388 (D. Mass. 2013); [In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.](#), 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 680-81 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (accepting plaintiffs’ contention on motion to dismiss that branded and generic versions of heart medication constitute a single market), *aff’d*, [332 F.3d 896](#) (6th Cir. 2003). Whether a market is plausible when comprised of a single product — or many products — “can be determined only after a factual inquiry into the ‘commercial realities’ faced by consumers.” [Eastman Kodak](#), 504 U.S. at 482 (quoting [Grinnell Corp.](#), 384 U.S. at 572).

**\*10** Courts employ a variety of methods to determine if a product market is properly constituted. Plaintiffs urge the court to consider (1) the Defendants’ own conduct; (2) the “hypothetical monopolist test”; and (3) the factors set out in [Brown Shoe](#), 370 U.S. 294. (Doc. 150 at 49-52.) Courts generally consider Plaintiffs’ first proposed methodology

— the Defendants’ own conduct and recognition of the market — under the assumption that “economic actors usually have accurate perceptions of economic realities.” [Todd](#), 275 F.3d at 205 (collecting cases) (quoting [Rothery Storage](#), 792 F.2d at 218 n.4); [Kolon](#), 637 F.3d at 442-43 (considering the “area within which the defendant and its competitors view themselves as competing”).

Plaintiffs’ second proposed methodology is the hypothetical monopolist test (“HMT”). The HMT is an aid in determining if the relevant product is properly constituted. The court begins by hypothesizing that every good as alleged in the product market is under the control of a hypothetical monopolist. [United States v. Am. Express Co.](#), 838 F.3d 179, 198-99 (2d. Cir. 2016). Under such conditions, if the hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price (“SSNIP”), then the product market is properly defined. *Id.* By contrast, the product market is improperly defined when the hypothetical monopolist imposes the SSNIP unprofitably because the alleged market does not include reasonably interchangeable goods — i.e., goods that consumers will shift demand toward in light of the SSNIP. *Id.* While the Fourth Circuit has yet to endorse this test, other circuits have at least acknowledged it or outright embraced it as a viable methodology in the context of defining markets. *See, e.g.*, [Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr.](#), 838 F.3d 327, 339-41 (3d Cir. 2016) (adopting HMT as proper test to define market); [Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sanford Health](#), 926 F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding not clear error to define relevant market with HMT); [Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network](#), 841 F.3d 460, 473 (7th Cir. 2016) (endorsing HMT); [Am. Express Co.](#), 838 F.3d at 198-99 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]his Court often applies a ‘hypothetical monopolist test[.]’”).

Plaintiffs’ third proposed methodology is the [Brown Shoe](#) factors. In [Brown Shoe](#), the Court endorsed considering the following factors when defining a product market: “industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.” [370 U.S. at 325](#). Notably, the D.C. Circuit has observed that some of these factors are merely “evidentiary proxies



for direct proof of substitutability.” [Rothery Storage](#), 792 F.2d at 218. The [Rothery](#) court noted that while sensitivity to price changes, distinct prices, and unique production facilities “relate directly to the economic definition of the market,” the other factors require inferential reasoning to draw economic conclusions and “may be helpful where the other indicia are ambiguous.” [Id.](#) at 218 n.4.

Turning to Defendants’ arguments, the court finds unpersuasive Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs must explain in their complaint why certain AIs or crop-protection products are excluded from the markets. To the extent Defendants’ cases demonstrate a burden on antitrust plaintiffs to explain a negative, they are either anomalous or distinguishable. For example, in [Bayer-Schering](#), 813 F. Supp. 2d 569, the court appeared to apply enhanced scrutiny to the alleged product market because the counterclaimant amended its product market inconsistently with its original counterclaim. [Id.](#) at 516-11 (“Sandoz’s contradictory pleadings counsel that this Court closely scrutinize the amended counterclaims in ensuring that they meet Rule 12(b)(6) standards.”). Through this lens, the court analyzed particular alternatives outside of the alleged market, many of which, it appears, the counterclaimant introduced into the record itself. [Id.](#) Whatever caused the [Bayer-Schering](#) court to impose this burden and analyze particular products, the Fourth Circuit has suggested that such scrutiny is misguided on a motion to dismiss. [See, e.g., Kolon](#), 637 F.3d at 442 (“Because market definition is a deeply fact-intensive inquiry, courts hesitate to grant motions to dismiss for failure to plead a relevant product market.” (quoting [Todd](#), 275 F.3d at 199-200)).

\*11 Defendants’ other cases fare no better. For example, in [Therapearl, LLC v. Rapid Aid Limited](#), Civil No. 13-2792, 2014 WL 4794905 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2014), the court dismissed a Sherman Act claim for failure to plead a product market because the plaintiff did not even attempt an explanation of why the market was limited and “made no allegations concerning” reasonable interchangeability. In [Global Discount Travel Services, LLC v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.](#), 960 F. Supp. 702, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), the court found the product market was improperly pleaded because the plaintiff included only its brand in the product market and made no plausible explanation as to why other competitors did not supply interchangeable products. And in [Chapman v. New York State Division for Youth](#), 546

F.3d 230, 238 (2d Cir. 2008), the court found a product market too narrow where the plaintiff did not provide “any theoretically reasonable explanation for restricting the product market.” Here, Plaintiffs have included such an explanation and include in the market products beyond just those of Defendants (namely, the generics).

Moreover, the court is unpersuaded that taking judicial notice of the EPA label registrations and FTC and DOJ antitrust matters would materially alter the court’s analysis at this stage. While the court, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, may take judicial notice of facts that are “matters of public record,” [Justice 360 v. Stirling](#), 42 F.4th 450, 455 (4th Cir. 2022), Defendants ask the court to also accept their interpretation of facts within the cited public records. The EPA registrations may be probative of interchangeability, but they appear to speak to interchangeable function, not whether and how these crop-protection products are interchangeable in the marketplace — i.e., cross-elasticity of demand. In [re Nexium](#), 968 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (finding it “immaterial” on a motion to dismiss that other pharmaceuticals could be used to treat the same symptoms because function does not necessarily speak to cross-elasticity of demand among consumers). At a minimum, the EPA label registrations raise fact questions, which are ill-suited for determination at the pleading stage. And while the prior FTC and DOJ antitrust proceedings may suggest some inconsistency in how the government views the crop-protection product market, the court must consider each antitrust dispute on a case-by-case basis. [Eastman Kodak](#), 504 U.S. at 467 (demonstrating preference to resolve antitrust claims “on a case-by-case” basis); ([See Doc. 100 at 41-42](#) (citing [Ciba-Geigy Ltd.](#), 62 Fed. Reg. 409, 412 (FTC Jan. 3, 1997), because FTC alleged in merger action a broader product market of “corn herbicides”).) As a result, even if the court took judicial notice of these facts outside of the record, they would not materially impact the court’s analysis at this stage.

Defendants’ other arguments fall short as well. Plaintiffs have alleged plausible, albeit narrow, product markets. The reasoning applied in cases analyzing the relevant product market for pharmaceuticals, specifically that a plausible product market may consist of a brand chemical and its generic alternative, is instructive. [See In re Nexium](#), 968 F. Supp. 2d at 388-89; [In re Zetia](#), 2021 WL 6689718 at \*19 (finding proper a product market consisting of brand drug and generic on summary judgment). Additionally, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged facts that show that there is limited

cross-elasticity between the products inside and outside of Plaintiffs' alleged markets. For example, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' prices would fall significantly upon entry of a generic of the same AI. (See Doc. 149 ¶¶ 92, 121, 127, 144, 150, 158; Doc. 81 ¶¶ 101, 119 (demonstrating anticipated market devaluation upon generic entry).) The alleged effect on price resulting from generic entry plausibly suggests that the AI in each alleged product market does not already face substantial competition from products outside the alleged market. See *Areeda & Hovenkamp*, *supra* ¶ 561b2 (“[I]f the price of one incumbent product drops significantly in response to new entry, while the prices of other incumbents do not, then that first incumbent product, plus the new entrant, is very likely a market.”). Moreover, Defendants' own alleged conduct, namely that Defendants' own loyalty programs cover only individual AIs, plausibly suggests that Defendants view the market as including only one AI but not others. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 67, 76); *Todd*, 275 F.3d at 205 (crediting evidence of defendant's conduct as suggestive of scope of product market). Finally, Plaintiffs plausibly allege characteristics that make each AI unique in the marketplace, that alternatives are not considered by farmers as suitable, and that farmers prefer specific AIs. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 46, 157.)

\*12 In sum, Plaintiffs have alleged a plausible explanation as to why the market should be limited as alleged. *Cf.* *Kolon*, 637 F.3d at 442. Whether, as Defendants argue, they have the better of the argument after the facts develop, and the evidence is weighed, must await another day. As a result, Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to plausibly allege a product market will be denied.

## 2. Anticompetitive Conduct and Injury

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged anticompetitive conduct and injury. (Doc. 95 at 21; Doc. 100 at 25.) The parties dispute first which legal test the court should apply to Defendants' loyalty programs, and second, depending on the test applied, whether Plaintiffs have alleged anticompetitive conduct and injury. The court considers each in turn for the purposes of the instant motion.

### a. The Rule of Reason and Price-Cost Test

Defendants urge the court to apply the “price-cost” test, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts to survive this

measure of anticompetitive conduct. (Doc. 95 at 24; Doc. 100 at 22-23.) As suggested by its name, where the price-cost test is applied, alleged conduct may only be illegal if the price is set below the cost. *Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993). Plaintiffs appear to concede that the complaint does not allege prices below cost. (Doc. 150 at 43 (“Plaintiffs do not bring a predatory-pricing claim.”).) This concession would seemingly short-circuit Plaintiffs' antitrust claims if the price-cost test applies. Plaintiffs maintain, however, that the court would gravely err in applying the price-cost test, arguing instead that the court must apply the default “rule of reason.” (Doc. 150 at 39-40.) Under that test, an exclusive dealing arrangement is unlawful only if its “probable effect” is to substantially lessen competition in the relevant market. *Tampa Elec.*, 365 U.S. at 327-29.

As a matter of principle, antitrust law is not intended to prevent all price-cutting. *Brooke Grp.*, 509 U.S. at 223 (“Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.” (quoting *Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.*, 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990))). In fact, competitors should generally be enabled to cut prices to a certain extent — even to increase market share — without running afoul of the antitrust laws. *Id.* (“The antitrust laws require no such perverse result.” (quoting *Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.*, 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986))). Low prices that are still above-cost are generally procompetitive because “the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost [generally] reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits.” *Id.* at 222-24.

On the other hand, predatory pricing harms competition. Predatory pricing occurs where a company sets prices below cost to eliminate competitors in the short run and reduce competition in the long run. *Cargill*, 479 U.S. at 117. Such a pricing scheme is “rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.” *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). “For such a scheme to make economic sense, the firm must recoup the losses suffered during the below-cost phase in the supracompetitive phase.” *ZF Meritor*, 696 F.3d at 272 (citing *Weyerhaeuser Co.*

v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 318 (2007)).

\*13 To separate the competitive wheat from the predatory chaff, the Supreme Court devised the price-cost test: to succeed on a predatory pricing claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) “that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of [the defendant’s] costs”; and (2) that the defendant had “a dangerous probability ... of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.” Id. (quoting Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222-24). In fashioning this formalistic approach, the Court acknowledged that the price-cost test will miss some anticompetitive above-cost pricing, but that it “is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal” to ascertain whether above-cost pricing is anticompetitive “without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting.” Id. at 273.

Where the price-cost test does not apply, courts apply the rule of reason to exclusive dealing arrangements.<sup>7</sup>

Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 327. “[E]xclusive dealing arrangements violate the antitrust laws only if they are likely to foreclose the entry into a substantial part of the market of products that compete with the products benefitting from the exclusive dealing arrangement.” Chuck’s Feed, 810 F.2d at 1293 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949)). The Supreme Court set out the following considerations when analyzing an exclusive dealing arrangement:

[T]he probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition, taking into account the relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the probable immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the market might have on effective competition therein.

Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 32 9. The concern of the courts about exclusive dealing arrangements is “the possibility that a single manufacturer will control all or a substantial number” of the available options for a certain kind of product in a specified geographical area. Chuck’s Feed, 810 F.2d at 1293 (addressing concern in the context of retail markets).

To succeed on an exclusive dealing claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) the relevant product market; (2) the geographical area of competition for the product market; and (3) that

the arrangement at issue extends to a “substantial share of the relevant market.” Id. (citing Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. 327-28). If a court finds substantial foreclosure, it must still consider “whether an otherwise unacceptable level of market foreclosure is justified by procompetitive efficiencies.” Id. at 1294 (citing Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)). Substantial foreclosure has been found “even though the contracts foreclose[d] less than [a] roughly 40% or 50% share.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 70 (Sherman Act § 2 claim).

\*14 The Supreme Court’s price-cost line of cases demonstrates that the price-cost test applies at least where a pricing practice itself operates as the exclusionary tool, regardless of how the plaintiff styles its allegations. In Pacific Bell Telephone Company v. Linkline Communications, Incorporated, for example, the defendant, which sold inputs at wholesale and finished goods at retail, allegedly drove competitors out of the market by raising the wholesale price while simultaneously lowering the retail price. 555 U.S. 438, 457 (2009). The Supreme Court analyzed this “price-squeezing” claim under Brooke Group, holding that the scheme was permissible because “the defendant’s retail price remain[ed] above cost.” Id. at 451-52. In Cargill, Incorporated v. Monfort of Colorado, Incorporated, the Supreme Court rejected a plaintiff’s theory of antitrust injury where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s merger would lead to reduced prices that were still at or above cost. 479 U.S. at 114-16. And in Atlantic Richfield Company v. USA Petroleum Company, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a gasoline manufacturer, had engaged in price-fixing by offering its dealers discounts and rebates to stave off competition from independent dealers. 495 U.S. at 331-32. The Supreme Court held that where a firm or group of firms lowers prices through a vertical agreement, but maintains prices above cost, competitors’ losses are attributable to procompetitive forces, not anticompetitive predatory pricing. Id. at 337-38.

Lower courts have nevertheless grappled with the question of when to apply the price-cost test when it is not clear that a company engages merely in “price-cutting” — e.g., when a company offers discounts in exchange for purchasing a certain percentage of goods from that company. To be sure, courts have in some cases applied the test to above-

cost discounting in such instances. For example, in NicSand Incorporated v. 3M Company, two suppliers of automotive sandpaper competed for business with six large retailers that controlled 80% of the retail market. [507 F.3d 442, 447 \(6th Cir. 2007\)](#). Five out of the six retailers sold only one brand at a time, meaning each retailer sold only either NicSand or 3M, but not both. *Id.* In order to obtain that exclusive shelf-space, NicSand or 3M had to offer a favorable price and meet a number of additional terms, such as providing a full line of automotive sandpaper and providing the racks for the shelves. *Id.* at 448. For years, NicSand dominated the shelves in four of the five retailers that insisted on single-brand shelves. That is, until 3M offered retailers up-front payments worth hundreds of thousands of dollars in exchange for switching to 3M. *Id.* The Sixth Circuit applied the price-cost test in rejecting NicSand's claim. In doing so, the court reasoned that exclusivity was an essential feature of this specific retail market because the retailers (i.e., the buyers) required exclusivity, and that NicSand, as the market incumbent, could not now complain that 3M had knocked it from its perch using similar exclusive terms it had previously utilized. *Id.* at 456 (“When one exclusive dealer is replaced by another exclusive dealer, the victim of the competition does not state an antitrust injury.”). Ultimately, the court found that the up-front payments 3M offered were a pricing measure that the retailers “insisted on receiving” in order to switch suppliers. *Id.* at 453.

The Eighth Circuit, in Concord Boat Corporation v. Brunswick Corporation, 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000), applied the price-cost test to the plaintiffs’ Sherman [§ 2](#) claim and the rule of reason to the plaintiffs’ Sherman [§ 1](#) claim, albeit with little discussion as to why the court applied different tests to the different claims. The defendant, Brunswick, offered market-share discounts to boat builders and dealers in order to increase the sales of its engines. *Id.* at 1044. From 1995 to 1997, Brunswick offered a 3% discount if a buyer purchased 70% of its engines from the defendant, a 2% discount for 65% of its engines, and a 1% discount for 60% of its engines. *Id.* Brunswick also offered additional discounts to anyone who signed a multi-year market-share agreement and to those who purchased a higher volume of engines (i.e., a volume discount). *Id.* Analyzing the plaintiffs’ section 1 claim under the rule of reason because the plaintiffs did not allege activity that would “trigger a per se analysis,” the Eight Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that

Brunswick's discount program was anticompetitive exclusive dealing because boat builders were not required to commit for a specified time period and many had switched to other sellers when offered superior discounts. *Id.* at 1058-59. Moreover, the court held that the plaintiffs did not show that “significant barriers to entry existed” in the market because firms had little difficulty entering the market. *Id.* Then, applying the price-cost test to plaintiffs’ [section 2](#) claim, the court held that Brunswick's loyalty program was a “normal competitive tool” because its prices remained above variable cost. *Id.* at 1062. Though not apparently necessary to justify this holding, the court reiterated that the discount program was not exclusive dealing, that the boat builders could walk away at any time (and did so), and that there were low barriers to entry. *Id.* at 1063.

\*15 Equipped with these precedents, the Third Circuit in ZF Meritor dealt more explicitly with which of the two tests to apply when presented with another loyalty discount program. In that case, the defendant, Eaton, had about an 80% market share in the manufacture of heavy-duty truck transmissions and introduced loyalty contracts that provided both upfront payments and rebates to four major truck manufacturers that purchased truck transmissions. ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 265, 286 n.5. These contracts lasted for at least five years and would scale discounts based on the percentage of goods the manufacturers purchased from the defendant. *Id.* at 265. Generally, the market-share targets ranged from 85% to 95%. *Id.* Eaton included additional terms beyond the discounts. Notably, Eaton retained the right to terminate the agreements if the market share figures were not met, and if the manufacturers did not meet the market-share figure for one year, Eaton could require “repayment of all contractual savings.” *Id.* Moreover, direct-from-manufacturer truck buyers could customize certain equipment, including transmissions, and could browse options in the manufacturers’ catalogues. Eaton's agreements required that its transmissions be featured as the standard offering in the catalogues and even required the removal of competitors’ products in two of the four manufacturers’ catalogues. *Id.* Further, the manufacturers were contractually required to price competitors’ products above those of Eaton. *Id.* at 265-66.

The ZF Meritor court weighed whether to apply the price-cost test or the rule of reason to Eaton's agreements. *Id.* at 268.

The court noted that the price-cost test “would control if this case presented solely a challenge to Eaton's pricing practices.” [Id.](#) at 273-74. However, the court credited testimony that demonstrated that manufacturers were forced to meet the market-share targets, or else risk financial penalties, supply shortages, or severed ties with the market-dominant defendant entirely. [Id.](#) at 277. Because Eaton was a monopolist, the court reasoned, forgoing the rebates and “losing Eaton as a supplier was not an option.” [Id.](#) at 278.

The court stated that “this is not a case in which the defendant's low price was the clear driving force behind the customer's compliance with purchase targets, and the customers were free to walk away if a competitor offered a better price.” [Id.](#) (citing [Concord Boat](#), 207 F.3d at 1063 as a counter-analogy). Put another way, Eaton's de facto exclusive dealing arrangements drove out other firms “not because they cannot compete on a price basis, but because they are never given an opportunity to compete, despite their ability to offer products with significant customer demand.” [Id.](#) at 281. The court held that when price itself is not the “clearly predominant mechanism of exclusion,” the price-cost test does not apply. [Id.](#) at 277.<sup>8</sup>

A few years later, the Third Circuit revisited [ZF Meritor](#) in the pharmaceutical context. [Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC](#), 821 F.3d 394 (3d Cir. 2016). In that case, Eisai alleged that Sanofi Aventis engaged in three modes of anticompetitive conduct in the market for anticoagulant drugs in U.S. hospitals: “(1) market-share and volume discounts, (2) a restrictive formulary access clause, and (3) aggressive sales tactics used to market the program.” [Id.](#) at 400. Specifically, Sanofi offered a baseline 1% discount for a market-share below 75% and a scaled discount from 9% to 30% for market-shares above 75%. [Id.](#) The court ultimately held that Sanofi's program was distinguishable from that in [ZF Meritor](#) because the discounts were not de facto mandatory, did not threaten repayment of contractual savings, and did not threaten refusal to deal in the future. [Id.](#) at 406. The court nevertheless refrained from commenting on whether the price-cost test applied because, even under the rule of reason test applied in [ZF Meritor](#), the plaintiff's claims failed due to insufficient evidence of market foreclosure. [Id.](#) at 408-09.

\*16 The Third Circuit's approach suggests that loyalty discount arrangements may be pure (or nearly pure) pricing

schema, and in such situations, the price-cost test applies neatly. *See, e.g.,* [NicSand](#), 507 F.3d at 453. However, an arrangement may include other allegedly coercive mechanisms that impose costs on competitors to enter the market such that price is not “clearly” doing the work of exclusion. Following the Third Circuit's formulation, other circuits have since relied upon and cited [ZF Meritor](#) where the defendant offers loyalty discounts. *See, e.g.,* [In re EpiPen \(Epinephrine Injection, USP\) Antitrust Litig.](#), 545 F. Supp. 3d 922, 1016-17 (D. Kan. 2021) (explicitly applying the “clearly predominant mechanism of exclusion” analysis), *aff'd*, 44 F.4th 959 (10th Cir. 2022) (observing that [ZF Meritor](#) and other Third Circuit precedent “merit close consideration in this case”); [McWane](#), 783 F.3d at 835 (citing [ZF Meritor](#) to justify a rule of reason approach to exclusive dealing cases); [Aerotec Int'l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc.](#), 836 F.3d 1171, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing [ZF Meritor](#) as a counter-analogy for situation with “extra-contractual conditions, or preferential treatment terms”); *see also* [Dial Corp. v. News Corp.](#), 165 F. Supp. 3d 25, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing and applying [ZF Meritor](#)'s “clearly predominant method of exclusion” test in non-loyalty discount exclusive dealing case).

[ZF Meritor](#) appears to balance the important concerns the Supreme Court has identified in over-regulating price-cutting schema, *see* [Matsushita](#), 475 U.S. at 594 (“[M]istaken inferences in [pricing cases] cases ... are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”), and under-regulating exclusive dealing, *see* [Jefferson Par.](#), 466 U.S. at 45 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (“Exclusive dealing can have adverse economic consequences by allowing one supplier of goods or services unreasonably to deprive other suppliers of a market for their goods[.]”). The [ZF Meritor](#) approach counsels applying the price-cost test where a pricing practice is clearly doing the work of exclusion and the rule of reason where there are mechanisms beyond price-cutting that exclude competition by imposing unilateral costs on competitors.

The parties do not appear to disagree with the above analysis. (Doc. 100 at 25; Doc. 95 at 24-25; Doc. 150 at 41.) Rather, they depart on whether price clearly predominates over other mechanisms of exclusion in this case. Syngenta argues that Plaintiffs do not plead “any of the non-price coercive features that courts have required” before finding a market-share rebate program anticompetitive. (Doc. 100 at 27.) Further,

Syngenta argues, the single-year and single-product scope of the rebates undermines Plaintiffs’ claim that price clearly predominates. (*Id.* at 29.) Syngenta dismisses Plaintiffs’ allegation that it terminated a distributor as an “isolated allegation” that is “simply not probative of the program itself.” (*Id.* at 30 (emphasis removed).) Finally, Syngenta characterizes Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Defendants’ agreement whereby Syngenta supplies mesotrione and s-metolachlor for Corteva’s use as an “effort to muddy the waters.” (*Id.* at 32.)

Corteva first argues that “Plaintiffs’ allegations make clear that price is the primary means of exclusion, but do not allege that Corteva’s programs fail the price-cost test.” (Doc. 95 at 25.) Corteva specifically contends that Plaintiffs do not allege long-term contract terms or exclusions from supply based on noncompliance, which are recognized non-price conditions that would trigger the default rule of reason. (*Id.* at 26.) Second, Corteva claims that its term that defers a certain percentage of rebates into subsequent years and retracts unpaid rebates for noncompliance is “no more than a ‘threat of a lost discount’ ” that is, in its view, not anticompetitive. (Doc. 98 at 26.)

Third, Corteva claims that conditioning the Corporate Offer on compliance with the CRPVM is not anticompetitive “bundling.” (*Id.* at 27-28.) Bundling occurs “when a firm sells a bundle of goods ... for a lower price than the seller charges for the goods ... purchased individually.” *Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth*, 515 F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 2008). In Corteva’s view, the Corporate Offer “just offers an additional discount to Corteva’s customers who do buy products covered by the [Corporate Offer].” (Doc. 95 at 28.) Fourth, Corteva contends that the court “should not credit [P]laintiffs’ unsupported, conclusory and nonspecific allegations that ‘Defendants have retaliated and threatened to retaliate’ against distributors that have failed to satisfy loyalty by cancelling distribution contracts or withholding access to supply.” (*Id.*)<sup>9</sup>

\*17 Plaintiffs argue in response that Defendants mischaracterize their own discount program as a pricing scheme. (Doc. 150 at 35.) Plaintiffs point to the complaint’s allegations that “Defendants have ‘threatened to retaliate ... against [disloyal] distributors ... by canceling distribution contracts, delaying access to new products, or withholding product allocation during a supply shortage.” (*Id.* at 36 (citing

Doc. 149 ¶ 88).) Plaintiffs further maintain that they allege that each Defendant “follow[ed] through” on their threats by refusing to sell pesticides or limiting sales of an insecticide to two distributors. (Doc. 112 at 36 (citing Doc. 81 ¶ 88).) Plaintiffs respond to Defendants’ argument — that these are isolated incidents that do not exemplify the program — by arguing that the reasonable inference which must be drawn in Plaintiffs’ favor at this stage is that limited instances of retaliation are evidence of the loyalty program working as intended. (*Id.* at 37-38.) Plaintiffs also contend that the one-year length of the agreements triggers no presumption that the contracts are lawful and that looking to the practical effect of agreements demonstrates “long-term foreclosure.” (*Id.* at 38-39.) Plaintiffs finally argue that even if the price-cost test applies to the Sherman Act and Clayton Act claims, it does not apply to the FTC Act claim. (*Id.* at 45-47.)

In other loyalty discount cases, courts have observed a number of non-price mechanisms of exclusion, such as provisions aggravating existing barriers to enter the market, *McWane, Inc.*, 783 F.3d at 836; *In re Surescripts Antitrust Litig.*, 608 F. Supp. 3d 629, 645 (N.D. Ill. 2022); whether the buyer insists on exclusive dealing, *NicSand*, 507 F.3d at 456; contractual obligations to purchase a set percentage of products from the defendant, *Allied Orthopedic*, 592 F.3d at 997 n.2; discounts involving tying or bundling, *Eisai*, 821 F.3d at 405; *LePage’s*, 324 F.3d at 157-58; threats to retract unpaid rebates or claw back discounts from prior years, *McWane*, 783 F.3d at 820-21; threats to cut off supply from a monopolist, *ZF Meritor*, 696 F.3d at 278; requirements to exclude competitors from marketing materials, *id.*; and the length of time of the discounting agreements, *McWane*, 783 F.3d at 820-21. While these cases are instructive, each antitrust case “must be determined upon the particular facts disclosed by the record, and ... the opinions in those cases must be read in the light of their facts and of a clear recognition of the essential differences in the facts of those cases, and in the facts of any new case to which the rule of earlier decisions is to be applied.” *Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n v. United States*, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925).

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient non-price mechanisms of exclusion to foreclose application of the price-cost test as a matter of law at this pleading stage. First, the complaint plausibly alleges that the loyalty programs leverage the

Defendants’ monopolist status and the market’s substantial barriers to entry to exclude competition for the AIs. (Doc. 149 ¶ 160.) Among the alleged “capital, technical, regulatory and legal barriers” are “obtaining registration from the EPA, developing manufacturing processes and sourcing active ingredient, and paying data compensation costs to the initial active ingredient registrant.” (*Id.*) While high entry barriers alone may not trigger the rule of reason, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ use of the loyalty discounts — as alleged monopolists relating to production of the AIs — exacerbates the already high costs to enter the market by locking up access to the most efficient channel of distribution. See *McWane*, 783 F.3d at 836; *ZF Meritor*, 696 F.3d at 284-85 (applying rule of reason where high barriers existed in high-concentration market); *Eastman Kodak*, 504 U.S. at 488 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws ... can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a monopolist.”)

Second, the complaint alleges not only that Defendants threatened to cut off supply, but that each Defendant followed through on that threat, albeit in limited instances. (Doc. 149 ¶ 88.) While Defendants contend that these do not exemplify the program, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor at this stage. Such instances plausibly support the claim that Defendants’ threats to restrict supply are effective deterrence against non-compliance. (See *id.* ¶ 84 (alleging that Defendants communicate adherence to loyalty thresholds to distributors).) The complaint plausibly alleges that the threats to restrict supply factors into distributors’ purchasing decisions.

\*18 Third, while the length of the agreements is facially one year, the alleged yearly renewals and threat of retaliation are claimed to have a longer-term effect. (*Id.* ¶¶ 164, 172.) Further, Corteva’s agreements allegedly contain terms that defer payments into subsequent years and require forfeiture of unpaid discounts for non-compliance. (Doc. 81 ¶ 78.)

Fourth, Corteva’s agreements allegedly share some features with bundling because Corteva offers terms that link discounts for any one AI to compliance with the loyalty threshold for all AIs in a distributor’s offer and that link discounts under the Corporate Offer to compliance with the CPRIVM offer. (*Id.* ¶ 79.)

Finally, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the Syngenta-Corteva supply agreement for mesotrione and metolachlor allegedly

enhances the exclusive effect of the loyalty programs. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 109, 122.)

Whether these non-price mechanisms have the alleged exclusive effect vis-à-vis price will depend on the development of the record. In light of these plausible allegations, Defendants have not demonstrated at this stage that price clearly predominates over non-price mechanisms of exclusion.

Defendants’ other arguments do not alter this analysis. First, that the loyalty discounts cover a single product (i.e., each individual AI) does not necessarily mean that price clearly predominates. While Defendants cite to *ZF Meritor* and *Eisai* for this proposition, neither supports it. In *ZF Meritor*, the Third Circuit did state, “we join our sister circuits in holding that the price-cost test applies to market-share or volume rebates offered by suppliers within a single-product market.”

*ZF Meritor*, 696 F.3d at 274 n.11 (citing *NicSand*, 507 F.3d at 452; *Concord Boat*, 207 F.3d at 1061; *Barry Wright*, 724 F.2d at 236). In making this observation, the Third Circuit was distinguishing *LePage’s v. 3M*, 324 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2003), where the court did not apply the price-cost test because the alleged conduct involved “bundling” across multiple products. *Id.* The court reasoned that *LePage’s* should not extend to the facts of *ZF Meritor*, where “only one product is at issue and the plaintiffs have not made

any allegations of bundling.” *ZF Meritor*, 696 F.3d at 274 n.11. Though the court stated that the price-cost test “applies” to a single-product discount, the *ZF Meritor* court itself applied the rule of reason — not the price-cost test — to a single-product discount. This indicates that the price-cost test can apply where there is a single-product market, not that it must. Defendants’ reliance on *Eisai* fares no better, as the Third Circuit stated that pricing “usually” predominates over other means of exclusivity when “a firm uses a single-product loyalty discount or rebate to compete with similar

products.” *Eisai*, 821 F.3d at 409. However, the court ultimately refrained from applying the price-cost test because the plaintiff’s claim failed under *Tampa Electric* as well. *Id.* at 409 (“Because we have concluded that *Eisai*’s claims are not substantiated and that they fail a rule of reason analysis, we will not opine on when, if ever, the price-cost test applies to this type of claim.”). Notably, neither *ZF Meritor* nor *Eisai* was decided at the pleadings stage but after the development of a factual record. *ZF Meritor* was decided on post-trial motion, and *Eisai* was decided on motion for summary

judgment. Though the price-cost test may apply to certain loyalty discount programs, the Supreme Court admonishes that “[l]egal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities” are “generally disfavored” and that courts should resolve antitrust cases on a case-by-case basis, “focusing on the ‘particular facts disclosed by the record.’ ” <sup>19</sup> *Eastman Kodak*, 504 U.S. at 466-67 (quoting <sup>20</sup> *Maple Flooring*, 268 U.S. at 579).

\*19 Second, at least at this early stage, it is not clear that the single-year term of the loyalty discount agreements mandates application of the price-cost test as a matter of law. Defendants contend that the single-year term of their agreements in this case “are presumptively incapable of harming competition.” (Doc. 100 at 29.) While long-term exclusive dealing has been found to factor in favor of finding anticompetitive injury, <sup>21</sup> *ZF Meritor*, 696 F.3d at 286-87, Defendants have not demonstrated that any such presumption exists. Rather, the cases Defendants cite for this position show that courts have weighed short duration in determining anticompetitive effects, not presumed a lack of anticompetitive effects. See <sup>22</sup> *R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc.*, 199 F. Supp. 2d 362, 391-93 (M.D.N.C. 2002), *aff’d sub nom. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.*, 67 F. App’x 810 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (considering contract length along with percentage of foreclosure and costs of switching to other vendors); see also *In re EpiPen Mktg.*, 44 F.4th at 988 (“It is axiomatic that short, easily terminable exclusive agreements are of little antitrust concern; a competitor can simply wait for the contracts to expire or make alluring offers to initiate termination.” (collecting cases)); <sup>23</sup> *Allied Orthopedic*, 592 F.3d at 997 (“The ‘easy terminability’ of an exclusive dealing arrangement ‘negate[s] substantially [its] potential to foreclose competition.’ ” (quoting <sup>24</sup> *Omega Env’t, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc.*, 127 F.3d 1157, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1997))). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ renewable single-year contracts create long-term competitive harms, including cutting off supply and, in Corteva’s case, deferring rebates into subsequent years conditioned on further compliance with meeting market-share. See <sup>25</sup> *Dentsply*, 399 F.3d at 193-94 (finding “strong economic incentive to continue” compliance with market-share agreement despite “legal ease with which the relationship can be terminated”); <sup>26</sup> *McWane*, 783 F.3d at 833-34 (finding anticompetitive injury even though exclusive dealing was “short-term and voluntary”). Moreover, each

of the AIs has been in a loyalty program for at least four years, and one has been included for almost two decades. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 93, 102, 115, 127, 137, 146.) While the annual length of the agreements is generally a factor that favors Defendants, the court must draw all reasonable inferences from the complaint’s allegations in Plaintiffs’ favor at this early stage. As such, the court cannot say that the length of the agreements requires a finding at this time that price clearly predominates over other alleged non-price mechanisms of exclusion.

In sum, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged sufficient facts, if believed, for the court to conclude that price is not the clearly predominant mechanism of exclusion. The complaint alleges that Defendants are dominant suppliers who have entered into de facto exclusive dealing arrangements that include plausibly significant mechanisms of exclusion beyond price-cutting. Accordingly, the court cannot conclude at this stage that the price-cost test must apply as a matter of law. Indeed, Defendants’ cited cases demonstrate that courts have reached, or even closely considered, such a conclusion before discovery in only rare circumstances. <sup>27</sup> *NicSand*, 507 F.3d 442 (price-cost applied on motion to dismiss where plaintiff did not have antitrust standing); <sup>28</sup> *Concord Boat*, 207 F.3d 1039 (price-cost partially applied post-trial); <sup>29</sup> *ZF Meritor*, 696 F.3d 254 (rule of reason applied post-trial after extensive discussion); <sup>30</sup> *Pac. Bell*, 555 U.S. 438 (dismissing price-squeezing claim, not exclusive dealing claim). Depending on the facts adduced at a later stage, it remains to be seen whether the price-cost test or *Tampa Electric*’s rule of reason and its progeny will ultimately be the proper test for Plaintiffs’ claims. For purposes of the pending motions, therefore, the court turns to Defendants’ contention that the complaint fails under the rule of reason.

#### b. Allegations of Anticompetitive Conduct and Injury

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege anticompetitive conduct and injury. Corteva contends that it is “entirely dispositive” that Plaintiffs have not pled any actual exclusivity because the loyalty programs are voluntary, do not cover all distributors in the market, and do not require 100% exclusivity. (Doc. 95 at 22-23.) Syngenta principally argues that any market foreclosure is the result of “lawful price competition,” that Syngenta incentivized customers to “buy more of its products by lowering its prices,” and that



there is an absence of non-price mechanisms of exclusion present in other cases like ZF Meritor and Dentsply. (Doc. 100 at 33-35.) Syngenta further argues that Plaintiffs failed to explain why generic competitors do not lower their prices to make their products more profitable to distributors. (Id. at 35.) Finally, Syngenta claims that its exclusive dealing arrangement with Corteva is evidence of legal competitive conduct. (Id. at 36-37.)

Plaintiffs respond that they have plausibly alleged both indirect and direct evidence of harm to competition. (Doc. 150 at 26.) On the indirect side, Plaintiffs contend that they have alleged foreclosure of a “substantial part of the market.” (Id. (citing Chuck’s Feed, 810 F.2d at 1293-95).) Specifically, they contend that Defendants have foreclosed generics from “approximately 70% or more” of the market. (Doc. 112 at 27 (citing Doc. 81 ¶ 171).) Plaintiffs further argue that this estimate is likely conservative because it relies on the lowest market-share threshold available and conservatively assumes that distributors only narrowly hit the market-share threshold. (Doc. 150 at 27.) On the direct side, Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged three competitive harms: reduced choices for farmers, higher prices for farmers, and less innovation. (Id. at 28.) Plaintiffs further contend that Defendants’ discounts may benefit participating distributors but do not get passed on to farmers. (Id. at 35.)

\*20 As an initial matter, Defendants ask the court to apply the same mode of inquiry, i.e., the rule of reason or price-cost test — regardless of the antitrust statute at issue. (Doc. 157 at 33:7-13.) Indeed, courts have conducted the exclusive dealing inquiry in such a manner. See, e.g., ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 269 n.9 (stating that the rule of reason is applicable to the plaintiff’s claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (applying rule of reason to Sherman Sections 1 and 2); Chuck’s Feed, 810 F.3d at 1294 (applying rule of reason to exclusive dealing under the FTC Act and Clayton Section 3).

Moreover, Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs’ claims may survive under some antitrust statutes but not others, at least at this stage. Here, the relevant threshold requirements specific to the statutes are Sherman Section 1’s contract requirement, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract ...”), Sherman Section 2’s monopoly power requirement, 15 U.S.C.

§ 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize ...”), and Clayton Section 3’s conditional discount or rebate requirement, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (“... discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition ...”). Defendants do not appear to contest that these requirements are alleged, so the court will treat them as uncontested for the purpose of these motions. Boles v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 3d 491, 507 n.10 (M.D.N.C. 2014). In any event, it appears that Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded these elements. Kolon, 637 F.3d at 450 (“[T]his Court has previously noted that when monopolization has been found the defendant controlled seventy to one hundred per cent of the relevant market.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); (Doc. 150 ¶¶ 81, 84, 161-63 (alleging agreements with substantially all leading distributors; market share in excess of 70% during relevant time period for five of six AIs and 40% for Corteva’s acetochlor (based on its joint venture partner having approximately 50%); and conditional payments).)

To prevail, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that Defendants’ loyalty agreements constitute anticompetitive conduct and caused antitrust injury. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59. As to the first issue, there is no set formula to demonstrate anticompetitive conduct under the rule of reason. ZF Meritor 696 F.3d at 271. Courts have considered

a showing of significant market power by the defendant, substantial foreclosure, contracts of sufficient duration to prevent meaningful competition by rivals, [ ] an analysis of likely or actual anticompetitive effects considered in light of any procompetitive effects[, ] whether there is evidence that the dominant firm engaged in coercive behavior, [ ] the ability of customers to terminate the agreements[, and t]he use of exclusive dealing by competitors of the defendant[.] ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 271-72 (internal citations omitted) (collecting cases). An allegation of a percentage of market foreclosure is not required. Kolon, 637 F.3d at 452 n.12. As to the second issue, an antitrust injury is “of the type that the statute was intended to forestall” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n a case brought by the Government, it must demonstrate that the monopolist’s conduct harmed competition, not just a competitor.” Id.

Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act require different degrees of substantiality. The Supreme Court has implied in dicta that Section 3 of the Clayton Act requires a lesser showing than the Sherman Act does: “[I]f [the contract] does not fall within the broader proscription of § 3 of the Clayton Act it follows that it is not forbidden by those of the [Sherman Act].” [Tampa Elec.](#), 365 U.S. at 335 (summarily rejecting Sherman claims after rejecting Clayton claim). The majority of courts have since followed [Tampa Electric’s](#) dicta. See, e.g., [Microsoft Corp.](#), 253 F.3d at 69; see also [Areeda & Hovenkamp](#), *supra* ¶ 1800c4 n.67 (collecting cases). As between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, [Section 2](#) may require less foreclosure to be substantial than [Section 1](#). [Microsoft Corp.](#), 253 F.3d at 70 (“[A] monopolist’s use of exclusive contracts, in certain circumstances, may give rise to a [§ 2](#) violation even though the contracts foreclose less than the roughly 40% or 50% share usually required in order to establish a [§ 1](#) violation.”).

\*21 [Corteva](#) lodges several arguments that it contends establish per se legality, namely that the agreements are voluntary and cover neither 100% of the distributors nor 100% of participating distributors’ goods. It is true that courts have factored in whether customers were “free to walk away from the discounts at any time.” [Concord Boat](#), 207 F.3d at 1059; see also [Allied Orthopedic](#), 592 F.3d at 995 (affirming district court that found that agreements were “voluntary and [could] be ended at any time, and hospitals [were] thus free to switch to more competitively priced generics”); [Omega Env’t](#), 127 F.3d at 1163 (“[T]he short duration and easy terminability of these agreements negate substantially their potential to foreclose competition.”). However, these cases do not treat this fact as “entirely dispositive,” as [Corteva](#) suggests. By contrast, courts are admonished to look to “the practical effect” of exclusive dealing agreements. [Tampa Elec.](#), 365 U.S. at 326. By doing so, courts have found de facto partial exclusive dealing arrangements to be cognizable violations under antitrust law. [ZF Meritor](#), 696 F.3d at 282; [Concord Boat](#), 207 F.3d at 1059 (“[C]laims that allege only de facto exclusive dealing may be viable.”).

Assuming Defendants’ agreements are formally voluntary, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Defendants’ market-

share targets combined with the schedule of payments and threat of non-price retaliation create de facto exclusivity. For example, the complaint alleges that the “complexity, uncertainty, and timing” of payments “make it less likely that a distributor will lower its prices” and that the threat of “canceling distribution contracts, delaying access to new products, or withholding product allocation during a supply shortage” instills strict compliance. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 85-88.) The complaint also alleges that the loyalty discounts create an incentive for distributors to “strictly manage” their generic purchases and “steer” customers toward loyalty discount-qualifying products despite consumer demand for generics. (*Id.* ¶¶ 95, 104, 117, 147.) In other words, it is plausible that Defendants’ loyalty discount programs are “as effective as express purchase requirements.” See [ZF Meritor](#), 696 F.3d at 283 (recognizing voluntary agreement as de facto exclusive dealing because “no risk averse business would jeopardize its relationship with the largest manufacturer of transmissions in the market” (internal quotation marks omitted)); [Dentsply](#), 399 F.3d at 194 (“[I]n spite of the legal ease with which the relationship can be terminated, the dealers have a strong economic incentive to continue carrying [the defendant’s product.]”); [McWane](#), 783 F.3d at 833-34 (rejecting argument that short-term and voluntary exclusive dealing agreements are “presumptively legal”).

Moreover, the lack of complete exclusivity is not fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims, as [Corteva](#) argues. It contends that the ability of distributors to purchase some generics and the fact that some distributors (approximately 20%) do not participate creates a presumption of legality. This position appears at odds with [Tampa Electric](#), which requires that Plaintiffs demonstrate the exclusive contract’s probable effect is to “foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected.” [365 U.S. at 327](#) (emphasis added); see also [15 U.S.C. § 14](#) (“... where the effect of ... such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition[.]” (emphasis added)). “[J]ust as ‘total foreclosure’ is not required for an exclusive dealing arrangement to be unlawful, nor is complete exclusivity required with each customer.” [ZF Meritor](#), 696 F.3d at 283 (analyzing claim under the Sherman Act). Rather than treating lack of true exclusivity or voluntariness as legally dispositive, the court may weigh the relevance of these facts at a later stage. See, e.g., [Concord Boat](#), 207 F.3d at 1060 (weighing lack of true exclusivity on review of summary judgment order).

Syngenta's argument that dismissal is warranted because Plaintiffs did not explain why generic competitors do not lower their price to make their products more profitable to distributors is similarly unpersuasive at this stage. (Doc. 100 at 35.) Even assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiffs bear this burden at this stage, they have plausibly alleged that generic manufacturers' attempts to lower their prices would be futile in the presence of the loyalty programs. This follows from the allegation that distributors would not be willing to accept the risk of losing all supply from Defendants and because Defendants' foreclosure of the most efficient distribution channel imposes costs on generic manufacturers that has "harmed the[ir] effectiveness." (Doc. 149 ¶ 170, 173.)

\*22 This contention is supported by Plaintiffs' specific allegations regarding manufacturers of generics that have attempted to enter the market. Manufacturers of generics of Syngenta's azoxystrobin and metolachlor allegedly exited the market because of "constraints imposed by Syngenta's loyalty program." (*Id.* ¶¶ 96-97, 118, 120.) One generic manufacturer of azoxystrobin that sought to mix azoxystrobin with a fungicide failed because the distributor feared it could impact its ability to meet the market-share target. (*Id.* ¶¶ 96-97.) Manufacturers of generics of mesotrione were also hindered from entering the market, an issue Plaintiffs allege was exacerbated by Syngenta's agreement to supply Corteva with mesotrione under the condition that Corteva's products containing mesotrione be treated neutrally under Syngenta's Key AI program. (*Id.* ¶ 105; Doc. 81 ¶ 109.)

Plaintiffs allege that a generic manufacturer of Corteva's rimsulfuron "canceled or deferred entry plans," despite farmer demand for lower-priced generics of rimsulfuron. (Doc. 149 ¶ 132.) According to the complaint, generics of oxamyl found some success in the market during a "plant outage" at Corteva from 2015 to 2017, but thereafter under Corteva's loyalty program, "generic sales plummeted, particularly at large distributors, and generic manufacturers could not retain distributor business even by lowering prices." (*Id.* ¶ 136-38.) One Corteva manager allegedly said of this pattern, "[O]ur team truly has done an A+ job blocking generics." (*Id.* ¶ 138.) Finally, a generic manufacturer of acetochlor that was priced "substantially below Corteva's prices" allegedly made "little headway" because major distributors declined to purchase the generic due to Corteva's loyalty program. (*Id.* ¶ 148.) At this preliminary stage, the court must accept these plausible factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs'

favor. Through this lens, Defendants have not demonstrated that the widespread failure of generics to enter the market is due to competition on the merits rather than plausibly anticompetitive conduct by Defendants.

Finally, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged anticompetitive conduct and injury. In *Kolon*, the Fourth Circuit, in reviewing a Sherman Act § 2 claim on motion to dismiss, held that an allegation of dominant market share and exclusionary conduct was sufficient at the pleading stage. 637 F.3d at 452 (citing *Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp.*, 910 F.2d 139, 147 (4th Cir. 1990)). While the court also held that pleading a percentage of market foreclosure is not necessary, Plaintiffs have pleaded a foreclosure of "approximately 7 0% or more of each applicable market." (Doc. 81 ¶ 171); see *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 70 (finding substantial 40-50% of market foreclosure under Sherman Act § 2 claim). Under all of the antitrust statutes, Plaintiffs' allegations of substantial foreclosure are plausible and, at a minimum, "turn[ ] on a factual dispute ill suited for the pleadings stage." *F.T.C. v. Surescripts, LLC*, 424 F. Supp. 3d 92, 104 (D.D.C. 2020). Moreover, for the reasons noted above, Syngenta's argument — that Plaintiffs have not alleged anticompetitive conduct because they have not alleged predatory pricing — likewise fails. To the extent these arguments apply under the rule of reason, they appear to speak to "whether an otherwise unacceptable level of market foreclosure is justified by procompetitive efficiencies." *Chuck's Feed*, 810 F.2d at 1294; (Doc. 100 at 34 (framing price reductions as procompetitive).) Simply put, the court is not equipped at this stage and on this record to weigh the merits of this procompetitive justification against the plausible allegations of market foreclosure.

Plaintiffs have also sufficiently alleged antitrust injury. They claim harm to farmers, growers, and generic manufacturers, and that Defendants' conduct "may substantially lessen competition or tend to create or maintain monopolies in the [r]elevant [m]arkets." (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 164-66.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that generic manufacturers have been substantially foreclosed from the most efficient channel of distribution (*id.* ¶¶ 170-71); that the structure of the payments over an extended period of time, and across multiple crop-protection products containing the same AI, make it less likely that discounts will pass on to end-consumers (*id.* ¶¶ 173-75); that distributors have "omitted generic products from their price lists, refused customer requests for generics, declined

generic companies' offers to supply, and systematically steered retailers and farmers toward branded products" (*id.* ¶ 177); that the loyalty programs have caused generics to exit or never enter the market (*id.* ¶¶ 182-85); and that the loyalty programs have stunted innovation (*id.* ¶¶ St 186-89). The complaint also alleges that Defendants' internal analyses acknowledge that the loyalty programs lead to supracompetitive prices for end-consumers. (*Id.* ¶¶ 194-200.)

\*23 In sum, Defendants' contention that their loyalty programs neither are anticompetitive nor cause anticompetitive injury depends on further factual development. At this stage, the complaint plausibly alleges both.<sup>10</sup>

### 3. Claims Against Syngenta Corporation and Syngenta Crop Protection AG

Syngenta argues that "Plaintiffs' allegations do not cognizably connect Syngenta Corporation or Syngenta Crop Protection AG to the challenged rebate program." (Doc. 100 at 44.) Consequently, Syngenta contends, the claims against those two entities should be dismissed. (*Id.*) As to Syngenta Corporation, Syngenta maintains that more is required than an allegation that Syngenta is a "single enterprise" and that one person is the president of both Syngenta Corporation and Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC. (*Id.* at 44-45.) And as to Syngenta Crop Protection AG, Syngenta argues that Plaintiffs' "vague allegations of high-level oversight and strategic guidance" are insufficient in light of Plaintiffs' "conce[ssion] that the global parent is not responsible for 'implementation' of post-patent strategies in individual countries." (*Id.* at 45.)

Plaintiffs respond that their allegations of Syngenta Corporation's shared senior leadership with Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC, and management of contacts with Corteva regarding the mesotrione and metolachlor supply agreements suffice to state claims against Syngenta Corporation. (Doc. 150 at 65-66; Doc. 112 at 65-66.) Further, Plaintiffs contend that they have stated a claim against Syngenta Crop Protection AG because it "directs and oversees" the LLC's post-patent strategy, "reviews, modifies, and approves Syngenta's U.S. budget, which includes sales targets based on Syngenta's loyalty program," and was "directly involved in the negotiation of" the mesotrione supply agreement with Corteva. (Doc. 150 at 66.)

To be sure, Plaintiffs do not allege a conspiracy between the Syngenta entities. Parents and subsidiaries, as well as sister subsidiaries, are "incapable" of conspiring with one another under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act. [Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.](#), 467 U.S. 752, 768, 777 (1984) (parent-subsidiary under Sherman [Section 1](#)); [Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc.](#), 847 F.3d 1221, 1234 (10th Cir. 2017) ("[S]ubsidiaries are incapable of conspiring under § 1 of the Sherman Act.... [W]e also conclude that [Copperweld's](#) reasoning with respect to [§ 1](#) applies equally to [§ 2](#)."); [Advanced Health-Care Servs.](#), 910 F.2d at 146, 152 (extending [Copperweld](#) to sister subsidiaries under Sherman [Section 1](#) and Clayton Section 3). Instead, "[t]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise[.]" [Copperweld](#), 467 U.S. at 771.

\*24 In [Lenox MacLaren](#), the Tenth Circuit affirmed on other grounds but wrote at length on the district court's error in treating each corporate affiliate as a separate entity rather than a "single enterprise." [847 F.3d at 1230-39](#). The court observed that requiring each corporate affiliate to independently satisfy every element of an antitrust violation "would be difficult to justify" because the Supreme Court and other courts have sealed off access to the claim of conspiracy between corporate affiliates. [Id.](#) at 1236 (citing [Copperweld](#), 467 U.S. at 776-77). Moreover, the court reasoned that [Copperweld](#) must foreclose sophisticated corporations from "spread[ing] its anticompetitive scheme over multiple subsidiaries, such that no one entity met all the requirements for individual antitrust liability." [Id.](#) But the [Lenox MacLaren](#) court was careful to cabin the reach of the single-enterprise theory by emphasizing [Copperweld's](#) restriction of intra-enterprise liability only to "coordinated activity" of affiliates. [Id.](#) at 1237 (emphasis in original).

Indeed, "[a]ntitrust law doesn't recognize guilt by mere association, imputing corporate liability to any affiliated company unlucky enough to be a bystander to its sister company's alleged misdeeds." [SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker \(U.S.\) Inc.](#), 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015). "[I]n the antitrust context, courts have held that absent allegations of anticompetitive conduct by the parent, there is no basis for holding a parent liable for the alleged antitrust violation of

its subsidiary.” Arnold Chevrolet LLC v. Tribune Co., 418 F. Supp. 2d 172, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Invamed, Inc. v. Barr. Lab'ys, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 210, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (“It is a general principle of corporate law deeply ingrained in our economic and legal systems that a parent corporation ... is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, claims may properly be dismissed against parent corporations where “at least as to them, the ‘complaint was vague, never explained its case, and lumped [them] together without sufficient detail.’

” Black & Decker, 801 F.3d at 423 (quoting Bates v. City of Chicago, 726 F.3d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 2013)). Here, the complaint defines “Syngenta” as “Syngenta Crop Protection AG, Syngenta Corporation, and Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC.” (Doc. 149 ¶ 1.) Notwithstanding this definition, Plaintiffs still must allege sufficient independent but coordinated activity for each named corporate affiliate.

Black & Decker, 801 F.3d at 422.

While the Lenox MacLaren court ultimately refrained from adopting either party's proposed definition of “coordinated activity,” the court considered as tests (1) “[w]hen the parent controls, dictates or encourages the subsidiary's anticompetitive conduct”; and (2) “that each defendant must have played a ‘role’ — or ‘participated’ — in the anticompetitive conduct of the enterprise as a whole.”

Id. at 1237-38 (quoting Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Molychem, L.L.C., 414 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (D. Colo. 2005)). Plaintiffs appear to endorse the “controls, dictates, or encourages” test. (Doc. 150 at 65-66 (citing Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., Case No. 14-111, 2016 WL 160263, at \*5 (D. Md. 2015); Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1068-70 (D. Colo. 2004)).) Syngenta does not take a position on the proper articulation of the standard and relied on its briefs when questioned about it at the hearing. (See Doc. 100 at 44-45; Doc. 130 at 23; Doc. 157 at 98:18-23.)

At least at the time of the complaint, the same individual served as the president of both Syngenta Corporation and Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC. (Doc. 149 ¶ 35.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that Syngenta Crop Protection AG has “directed, overseen, and approved Syngenta's sales and marketing strategy, including its loyalty program.” (Id. ¶ 36.) Moreover, Syngenta Crop Protection AG allegedly has “reviewed, modified, and approved” Syngenta's U.S. budget,

which includes the sales targets associated with Key AI, and provides “generic defense” strategy to be “tailored for implementation in each country.” (Doc. 81 ¶ 36 (quoting Syngenta Crop Protection AG's global post-patent strategy handbook).) Finally, Plaintiffs allege that executives of Syngenta Crop Protection AG were “directly involved in the negotiation” of the Syngenta-Corteva mesotrione supply agreement, that Syngenta Crop Protection AG is the Syngenta entity that signed the agreement, and that a Syngenta Corporation executive “manages Syngenta's contacts with Corteva regarding the agreement.” (Doc. 149 ¶ 111.)

\*25 Based on these allegations, Syngenta has not demonstrated that the complaint fails to plausibly allege “coordinated activity.” As a result, the motion to dismiss Syngenta Crop Protection AG and Syngenta Corporation will be denied.

#### 4. Article II Challenge to FTC Authority

Defendant Corteva argues that the “FTC's claims must be dismissed because the FTC lacks the constitutional authority to bring these claims.” (Doc. 95 at 30.) Plaintiff FTC's alleged authority to bring this lawsuit arises under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). (Doc. 149 ¶ 2.) Corteva contends that Congress' grant of authority to the FTC to pursue relief under these provisions amounts to a grant of executive law-enforcement power that is unconstitutional because its “members are not removable at will by the President.” (Id. (citing Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020)).) Corteva maintains that because executive agencies must be subject to the President's removal power, the suit before this court cannot go forward. (Id. at 32.) The FTC responds that Corteva's Article II challenge is untimely because it was not raised in its motion to dismiss the original complaint. (Doc. 150 at 61.) Moreover, in the FTC's view, Corteva “grossly misinterpret[s] binding Supreme Court precedent” by misstating the FTC's historical powers and ignoring features of the FTC that distinguish it from other agencies. (Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Roomster Corp., No. 22 Civ. 7389, 2023 WL 1438718, at \*8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2023)).) Finally, the FTC contends that even if Corteva were correct, dismissal of the action would be the improper remedy. (Id.) In reply, Corteva contends that its claim is not waivable because

it is akin to a subject matter jurisdiction challenge. (Doc. 133 at 17-18.)

As to timeliness, the FTC cites to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12\(g\)\(1\)](#). (Doc. 150 at 61.) But this rule does not support the FTC's position that Corteva waived its argument by omitting it in an earlier motion to dismiss. [Rule 12\(g\)\(1\)](#) applies to joinder of motions and is thus inapplicable here. In any event, the Federal Rules do not otherwise support the FTC's position. [Rule 12\(h\)\(1\)](#) provides that a party waives any defense available under [Rules 12\(b\)\(2\) through \(5\)](#) if the defense was available to the party at the time of an earlier motion. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12\(h\)\(1\)](#) (providing for waiver through omission as described in [Rule 12\(g\)\(2\)](#)<sup>11</sup>). Notably, these include motions to challenge personal jurisdiction, venue, and service of process, not a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ([Rule 12\(b\)\(6\)](#)) or lack of subject matter jurisdiction ([Rule 12\(b\)\(1\)](#)). [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12\(h\)\(1\) and \(3\)](#). In fact, the 1966 Advisory Committee note to [Rule 12\(h\)](#) states that, “while the defenses specified in subdivision (h)(1) are subject to waiver as there provided, the more substantial defense[ ] of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ... [is] expressly preserved against waiver by amended subdivision (h)(2) and (3).” [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12\(h\) advisory comm. note \(1966 amend.\)](#) (emphasis added).

\*26 Similarly, the FTC's citation to [Rowley v. McMillan](#), 502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1974) is misguided. In [Rowley](#), the court interpreted [Rule 12\(g\)](#) to mean that “an amendment to the pleadings permits the responding pleader to assert only such of those defenses which may be presented in a motion under [Rule 12](#) as were not available at the time of his response to the initial pleading.” [Id.](#) at 1333. Despite this broad language covering “defenses,” the issue before the court was a waiver of a personal jurisdiction defense pursuant to [Rule 12\(b\)\(2\)](#), which is covered by [Rule 12\(h\)\(1\)](#)'s strict waiver rules. [Id.](#) at 1333. Cases that approvingly cite [Rowley](#) deal similarly with the 12(b)(2) through (5) defenses that [Rule 12\(h\)\(1\)](#) covers. See, e.g., [Hand Held Prods., Inc. v. Code Corp.](#), 265 F. Supp. 3d 640, 643 (D.S.C. 2017) (challenging venue); [Maxtena, Inc. v. Marks](#), Civ. No. 11-0945, 2012 WL 113386 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2012) (same); [Lederman v. United States](#), 131 F. Supp. 2d 46, 58 (D.D.C. 2001) (challenging service of process). Moreover, [Rule 12\(h\)\(2\)](#) clearly authorizes Corteva to raise this same constitutional argument in its answer, so “little would be gained by preventing a defense under Rule[ ] 12(b)(6).”

Wright and Miller, [Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1388 \(2023\)](#) (“[E]arly determination of [12(b)(6) arguments] is to be encouraged.”). While Corteva argues that its constitutional challenge is akin to non-waivable subject matter jurisdiction, such an analogy is both unnecessary to save its argument and appears to be an improper characterization in any event. See [Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood Inc.](#), 669 F.3d 448, 453 (4th Cir. 2012) (“If a plaintiff invoking § 1331 pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or laws of the United States, he invokes federal subject matter jurisdiction, and deficiencies of the claim should be addressed by the other mechanisms provided by the federal rules.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). This is a long way of explaining that the court must turn to the merits of Corteva's constitutional challenge.

The power to enforce the law is vested in the President of the United States. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. “Because no single person could fulfill that responsibility alone, the Framers expected that the President would rely on subordinate officers for assistance.” [Seila Law](#), 140 S. Ct. at 2191. “[A]s a general matter,” the Constitution gives the President the power to remove subordinate officers so that the President can be held “fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities.” [Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.](#), 561 U.S. 477, 514 (2010). There are “only two exceptions” to the President's otherwise unrestricted removal power. [Seila Law](#), 140 S. Ct. at 2192. First, Congress may create “expert agencies led by a group of principal officers removable by the President only for good cause.” [Id.](#) (citing [Humphrey's Executor](#), 295 U.S. 602) (emphasis in original). Second, Congress may provide “tenure protections to certain inferior officers with narrowly defined duties.” [Id.](#) (citing [United States v. Perkins](#), 116 U.S. 483 (1886); [Morrison v. Olson](#), 487 U.S. 654 (1988)) (emphasis in original). The parties agree that this case implicates only the first exception. (Doc. 95 at 31; Doc. 150 at 61.)

Under the FTC Act, commissioners are removable only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” [15 U.S.C. § 41](#). Five members sit on the Commission and are appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. [Id.](#) The FTC Act includes a “separability clause” that states that the other provisions of the FTC Act “shall not be affected”

by a court's holding that finds any provision invalid. 15 U.S.C. § 57.

The constitutionality of the FTC commissioner's for-cause protection was first addressed in [Humphrey's Executor](#), 295 U.S. 602 (1935). In 1933, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought the removal of Commissioner William E. Humphrey, who was appointed by President Herbert Hoover. [Id.](#) at 618. After Humphrey rebuffed his resignation request, President Roosevelt wrote him: “Effective as of this date you are hereby removed from the office of Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission.” [Id.](#) at 619. Reviewing the constitutionality of the President's action, the Supreme Court observed that the FTC is “charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law,” adding that “[i]ts duties are neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi judicial and quasi legislative.” [Id.](#) at 624. The court reasoned that the authority of Congress to create quasi legislative or quasi judicial agencies “cannot well be doubted” and includes the power to “forbid their removal except for cause.” [Id.](#) at 629. In supporting Congress’ authority to restrict removal, the Court observed that its holding would not offend the separation of powers because the FTC was created by Congress “as a means of carrying into operation legislative and judicial powers” and was “wholly disconnected from the executive department.” [Id.](#) at 630.

\*27 The Supreme Court has since questioned the holding of [Humphrey's Executor](#). See, e.g., [Seila Law](#), 140 S. Ct. at 2198 n.2 (“The Court's conclusion [in [Humphrey's Executor](#)] that the FTC did not exercise executive power has not withstood the test of time.”); [Morrison](#), 487 U.S. at 690 n.28 (“[I]t is hard to dispute that the powers of the FTC at the time of [Humphrey's Executor](#) would at the present time be considered ‘executive,’ at least to some degree.”). Nevertheless, the Court has declined to overrule this “entrenched Supreme Court precedent, protected by stare decisis.” [In re Aiken Cnty.](#), 645 F.3d 428, 446 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also [Collins v. Yellen](#), 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1786-87 (2021) (citing [Humphrey's Executor](#) as a counter-analogy and striking down removal restriction as violation of separation of powers).

Congress added the FTC's authority to file suit under section 13(b) in 1973 — decades after the Court decided [Humphrey's Executor](#) in 1935. See [Pub. L. No. 93-153](#), § 408, 87

Stat. 592 (1973). While [Corteva](#) is correct that the FTC's authority under section 13(b) is executive in nature, that is about where the merit of its constitutional challenge ends. First, [Corteva](#) effectively asks this court to overrule Supreme Court precedent. But the role of a lower court is clear: “If a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [lower court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”

[Agostini v. Felton](#), 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (quoting [Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.](#), 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989)). [Humphrey's Executor](#) directly addresses whether Congress may restrict the removal power of FTC commissioners, so the court could stop its analysis here.<sup>12</sup>

Second, even were the court to accept [Corteva's](#) position that the FTC commissioners must be removable, [Corteva's](#) requested relief — dismissal of the suit — would be inappropriate. [Corteva](#) contends that the FTC cannot “both enjoy its removal protections as upheld in [Humphrey's Executor](#) and exercise the ‘quintessentially executive’ powers granted to it by Congress in 1973.” (Doc. 95 at 32 (citing [Seila Law](#), 140 S. Ct. at 2200).) But no case cited by [Corteva](#) suggests that the appropriate remedy would be to excise the FTC's executive power. To the contrary, the Supreme Court's cases on removal suggest the exact opposite. In [Seila Law](#), the Court held the CFPB director must be removable, severed the provision restricting removal, and declined to strike down the [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's enforcement authority](#). 140 S. Ct. at 2199. In [Free Enterprise Fund](#), the Court held that the removal restrictions of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board violated the separation of powers, but it explicitly upheld the board's regulatory authority. 561 U.S. at 508-09. And in [Collins](#), the Court struck down the removal protections for the Federal Housing Finance Agency director, but it nevertheless stated that “there is no basis for concluding that any head of the FHFA lacked the authority to carry out the functions of the office.” 141 S. Ct. at 1788. Thus, even if Congress oversteps its authority to restrict the President's removal power, a principal officer may still “undertake the [ ] responsibilities of his office.” [Id.](#) at 1788 n.23.

\*28 In sum, Corteva's position that section 13(b) was void when enacted is unpersuasive, and even if it were not, dismissal would not be the proper remedy. As a result, Corteva's motion to dismiss based on its constitutional challenge will be denied.

## 5. State Law Claims

Defendants argue that all of the state Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed. (Doc. 95 at 34; Doc. 100 at 43.) First, Defendants contend that each state's (except Tennessee's and Wisconsin's) antitrust laws are "harmonized — by statute or by common law — with the federal antitrust laws." (Doc. 95 at 34; Doc. 100 at 43.) Consequently, Defendants maintain that the state Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed on the same grounds as the federal claims. (Doc. 95 at 34; Doc. 100 at 43.) With respect to Tennessee and Wisconsin, Corteva argues that the complaint fails to allege "substantial effects that were felt in each respective state." (Doc. 95 at 35.) Second, Corteva contends that Texas and Indiana cannot recover civil damages under state antitrust laws because those states are "prevent[ed] ... from bringing damages claims on behalf of end-consumers." (Doc. 95 at 34-35.) Third, Defendants argue that California, Indiana, and Iowa fail to adequately allege violations of their state unfair competition and consumer fraud laws. (Doc. 95 at 36; Doc. 100 at 43-44.)

In response, Plaintiffs first argue that state and federal laws are not "automatically harmonized, and vary from state to state." (Doc. 150 at 68.) As to Tennessee and Wisconsin, Plaintiffs contend, they have met the substantial effects burden, which they characterize as "low." (Doc. 150 at 71-72.) Second, Plaintiffs argue that Texas and Indiana are not seeking damages on behalf of "end-consumers," and, in any event, these states are not barred from recovering civil penalties. Third, Plaintiffs contend that the California unfair competition claim and Indiana and Iowa consumer protection claims are sufficiently pleaded.

As to the state antitrust laws that Defendants contend are harmonized with federal law, in light of the court's rulings on the federal antitrust claims, Defendants have not demonstrated that these claims should be dismissed. As to Tennessee and Wisconsin, Defendants' arguments similarly fail. Tennessee and Wisconsin courts require plaintiffs to allege that a defendant's anticompetitive conduct had a "substantial effect" on intrastate commerce." See [Meyers v. Bayer AG, Bayer Corp.](#), 735 N.W.2d 448, 461

(Wis. 2007) ("[A] complaint under the Wisconsin Antitrust Act ... is sufficient if it alleges [anticompetitive conduct] that substantially affected the people of Wisconsin and had impacts in [Wisconsin]."); [Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co.](#), 172 S.W.3d 512, 523 (Tenn. 2005) ("[C]ourts must decide whether the alleged anticompetitive conduct affects Tennessee trade or commerce to a substantial degree."). "The [substantial effects] test is pragmatic, turning on the particular facts of the case." [Freeman Indus.](#), 172 S.W.3d at 523. Under Wisconsin law, a plaintiff need not allege that the impact of the conduct is "distinguishable from or disproportionate to its impacts on other states." [Meyers](#), 735 N.W.2d at 320.<sup>13</sup> Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff need not allege that the anticompetitive conduct "threaten[s] the demise of Tennessee business or affect[s] market price to substantially affect intrastate commerce," but a plaintiff must show more than a "bare allegation" of substantial effects. [Freeman Indus.](#), 172 S.W.3d at 524 (finding allegation insufficient where lone plaintiff with ties to Tennessee did not allege that he purchased goods from defendant).

\*29 Corteva claims that these Plaintiffs did no more than recite each state's legal requirement regarding substantial effects. (Doc. 95 at 35-36.) But Tennessee's and Wisconsin's claims incorporated, by re-alleging, every preceding allegation in the complaint, Tennessee alleged that Defendants sold the crop-protection products at issue to Tennessee businesses and individual customers, and Wisconsin alleged "substantial foreclosure of generic competitors" within the state and that "many hundreds of farmers" in the state have purchased crop-protection products at supracompetitive prices due to the loyalty programs. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 253-54, 272, 274-75.) Accepting these facts as true, as the court must at this stage, Tennessee and Wisconsin plausibly allege substantial effects.

As to Texas's and Indiana's claims, Corteva argues that the indirect purchaser rule bars Texas and Indiana from recovering on behalf of end-consumers. The indirect purchaser rule restricts indirect purchasers from recovering compensatory damages, except in limited circumstances not relevant here. See [Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.](#), 309 F.3d 193, 214 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing [Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois](#), 431 U.S. 720, 730-33 (1977)). However, Defendants have not demonstrated that [Illinois Brick](#) extends to a state seeking civil penalties. See, e.g., [Fed. Trade Comm'n v.](#)



Mylan Lab'ys, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 46 (D.D.C. 1999) (dismissing state claims for actual damages under Illinois Brick but maintaining claims for civil penalties); Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 n.1 (“Illinois Brick held that the direct-purchaser requirement applies to claims for damages.” (emphasis added)). Additionally, the cases that Corteva cites to support Texas's and Indiana's prohibitions on *parens patriae* suits do not support extending Illinois Brick to those state's civil penalties provisions. See Berghausen v. Microsoft Corp., 765 N.E.2d 592, 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (acknowledging application of Illinois Brick to Indiana antitrust law but not discussing civil penalties or suits brought by the state); Abbott Lab'ys, Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503, 503-04 (Tex. 1995) (barring *parens patriae* suit under state DTPA to recover damages, but not civil penalties, on behalf of consumers). Moreover, while all Plaintiffs identify harm to end-consumers, (Doc. 149 ¶ 166), the claims for civil penalties are not damages compensation for consumers. (Doc. 149 ¶¶ 228, 264.) Accordingly, on this record Texas's and Indiana's requests for civil penalties survive the motion to dismiss.

As to California's unfair competition claim, Corteva argues that because Plaintiffs' antitrust claim should fail, so should the California unfair competition claim. The California Unfair Competition Law covers conduct that “violates the policy or spirit” of the antitrust laws “or otherwise significantly threatens or harms competition.” Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180-87 (1999). Because California re-alleged and incorporated by reference all allegations in the complaint, (Doc. 149 ¶ 212), the court will deny the motion to dismiss on the same bases that it has denied Defendants' motions with respect to the federal antitrust claims.

As to Indiana's consumer protection claim, Defendants argue that Indiana did not specify an “incurable deceptive act” which, in Corteva's view, must be alleged with particularity “as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead.” (Doc. 95 at 36 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Thunander v. Uponor, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 850, 873 (D. Minn. 2012); Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(8).) Syngenta also argues that the theory of wrongdoing is not illegal for the same reasons it offered to dismiss the federal antitrust claims, which the court has now rejected at this stage. (Doc. 100 at 43.) Indiana responds that reliance on Thunander

is improper because the case predates an amendment to Indiana's consumer protection law that expanded the scope of the statute covering “deceptive” acts to also preclude “unfair” acts. (Doc. 150 at 70.) In Indiana's view, this amendment likens its law to the California unfair competition law. (Id.) Lastly, Indiana maintains that it does not need to show an “incurable deceptive act” because only private plaintiffs are subject to this requirement, not the state attorney general. (Id.)

\*30 In 2014, Indiana amended its consumer protection statute to prohibit “an unfair, abusive, or deceptive act, omission, or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.” 2014 Ind. Acts 736, Ind. P.L. 65-2014, § 7 (codified as amended at Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-3(a)). Under section 4(a), “a person” may file suit to recover damages for an “uncured or incurable deceptive act.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(a). An “incurable deceptive act” is one that is “done by a supplier as part of a scheme, artifice, or device with intent to defraud or mislead.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(8). Under sections 4(c) and (g), the state attorney general may file suit for an injunction and civil penalties against “a deceptive act.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(c), 4(g).

First, Corteva has not provided any authority to support the contention that “unfair” or “abusive” should be read more narrowly than under the FTC Act, so the court will not read it so at this time. Second, it appears that Indiana is correct that section 4(c), which grants authority to the state attorney general to enjoin “a deceptive act,” does not impose a requirement to show that the deceptive act is “uncured” or “incurable.” By contrast, the private party provision does. Compare Ind. Code. § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (“A person relying upon an uncured or incurable deceptive act may bring an action ...” (emphasis added)), with id. § 24-5-0.5-4(c) (“The attorney general may bring an action to enjoin a deceptive act ...” (emphasis added)). If this additional requirement were read into section 4(c), the claim would apparently sound in fraud and require pleading with particularity. See Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(8) (“act done ... with intent to defraud or mislead.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). While it appears that Indiana has the better of the argument, this question of statutory interpretation is inadequately briefed to facilitate a definitive resolution at this stage, so the court will simply hold that Defendants have not demonstrated for the purposes of this motion that Indiana has not stated a claim for relief.

Finally, as to Iowa's consumer protection claim, Corteva argues that Iowa did not allege a "misrepresentation of material fact." (Doc. 95 at 37 (citing [Cota v. Ralph Lauren Corp.](#), No. 21-C-1089, 2022 WL 1597631, at \*3 (E.D. Wis. May 19, 2022).) Syngenta agrees and adds that Iowa also did not allege an "unfair practic[e]." (Doc. 100 at 44 (citing [Iowa Code § 714.16](#).) Iowa argues that the Iowa consumer protection law covers both deceptive and unfair practices, and that Iowa has alleged an unfair practice. (Doc. 150 at 70-71.)

The Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, [Iowa Code § 714.16](#), makes it unlawful for a person to "act, use or employ[ ]" an "unfair practice." [Iowa Code § 714.16\(2\)\(a\)](#). For the same

reasons stated above, Defendants have not demonstrated that the court should read "unfair" any more narrowly than under the FTC Act. As a result, Defendants' motion to dismiss the Iowa consumer protection claim will be denied.

### III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' motions to dismiss (Docs. 94, 99) are DENIED.

### All Citations

Slip Copy, 2024 WL 149552


### Footnotes

- 1 Limited portions of the complaint and briefs remain under seal. (See Doc. 148 (granting parties' motions to seal).) Citations are to the unsealed versions, except where the court references sealed and redacted material. While the court preliminarily granted motions to seal portions of the complaint in this case, the court discloses here those portions of the pleadings necessary for a full understanding of the allegations and legal issues raised. [Courthouse News Serv. v. Schaefer](#), 2 F.4th 318, 327 (4th Cir. 2021) ("[A]ccess to [allegations in] complaints ... is crucial to 'not only the public's interest in monitoring the functioning of the courts but also the integrity of the judiciary.'" (quoting [Doe v. Pub. Citizen](#), 749 F.3d 246, 266 (4th Cir. 2014)); [Doe](#), 749 F.3d at 271 ("When parties call on the courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by public (and publicly accountable) officials." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
- 2 To the extent the complaint includes allegations involving Corteva's predecessor corporations, the court will simply refer to all such entities as "Corteva."
- 3 Syngenta produces "s-metolachlor," which was phased in by 2001 over the original metolachlor. (Doc. 149 ¶ 114.) However, Syngenta allegedly includes sales of generic original metolachlor in the denominator of its calculation of a distributor's loyalty figure. (*Id.* ¶ 115.)
- 4 Acetochlor is manufactured by a joint venture of Corteva and Bayer. (Doc. 149 ¶ 142.) Corteva apparently treats the sale or purchase of Bayer acetochlor as it would a sale or purchase of Corteva acetochlor. (Doc. 81 ¶ 146.)
- 5 Separate similar actions brought by farmers have been consolidated by the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and transferred to this court for pretrial proceedings. (See Doc. 78 in 1:23-md-3062 (amended consolidated complaint); [In re Crop Protection Prods. Loyalty Program Antitrust Litig.](#), 655 F. Supp. 3d 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2023).
- 6 Specifically, the state law claims arise under California's Cartwright Act, [California Business and Professions Code § 16700 et seq.](#), and California's Unfair Competition Law, [California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.](#); the Colorado Antitrust Act, [C.R.S. § 6-4-104](#) and [C.R.S. § 6-4-105](#); Section 7 of the Illinois Antitrust Act, [740 ILCS 10/1 et seq.](#); the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, [Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-1 et seq.](#) and the Indiana Antitrust Act, [Ind. Code § 24-1-2-1](#); the Iowa Competition Law, Iowa Code Chapter 553, and the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, [Iowa Code § 714.16](#); the Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, [Minnesota Statutes Sections 325D.49-.66](#); the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act, [Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 59-1602 et seq.](#), and [Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-212](#); the Oregon Antitrust Law,

Oregon Revised Statutes 646.705 to 646.836; the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, [Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-25-101 et seq.](#); Sections 15.20(a) and 15.20(b) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code and Section 402.006 of the Texas Government Code; the Washington Consumer Protection Act, [RCW 19.86.030 et seq.](#); and the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, Wis. Stat. Ch. § 133.03 [et seq.](#)

- 7 The [ZF Meritor](#) court indicated that the price-cost test is a “specific application of the rule of reason” when applied in the context of exclusive dealing. [ZF Meritor](#), 696 F.3d at 273; see also [In re EpiPen \(Epinephrine Injection, USP\) Antitrust Litig.](#), 44 F.4th 959, 983 n.7 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting [ZF Meritor](#)’s “specific application” language and referring to the [Tampa Electric](#) analysis as the “full rule of reason analysis”); [UniStrip Techs., LLC v. LifeScan, Inc.](#), 153 F. Supp. 3d 728, 736 (determining whether to apply the “ ‘price cost test’ or the ‘rule of reason’ ”); [In re Surescripts Antitrust Litig.](#), 608 F. Supp. 2d 629, 636 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (describing the “apt test” as the “rule of reason,” as opposed to the “price-cost test”); cf. [Atl. Richfield](#), 495 U.S. at 342 (“Per se and rule-of-reason analysis are but two methods of determining whether a restraint is “unreasonable,” *i.e.*, whether its anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive effects.”).
- 8 In dissent, Judge Greenberg disagreed with the majority’s view that the agreements were exclusive dealing and instead would have applied the price-cost test. [ZF Meritor](#), 696 F.3d at 349 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). He principally disagreed with the majority’s characterization of Eaton’s conduct as coercive, as he viewed the agreements as neither exclusive nor mandatory and contended that there was no evidence “that Eaton would have refused to supply transmissions to the [manufacturers]” if they failed to meet the market share targets. [Id.](#) at 312. Moreover, Judge Greenberg took the position that the price-cost test should apply in a situation such as this because the agreements themselves — with or without non-price features — would not exist “without the reduced prices that Eaton offered” as an incentive to enter the agreement in the first place. [Id.](#) at 321.
- 9 Corteva argues that this litigation was filed well over four years after the loyalty programs were allegedly put in place, outside the four-year statute of limitations provided for in the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. (Doc. 95 at 29-30.) In its briefing on its motion to dismiss the original complaint, Corteva argued that those claims therefore “long ago expired.” (Doc. 70 at 23-24.) Though Corteva does not claim that now, and while Plaintiffs responded to Corteva’s suggestion by noting, among other bases, the continuing violation doctrine, (Doc. 150 at 67-68), the court concludes that the issue is not fairly raised in Corteva’s brief and therefore does not consider it.
- 10 Plaintiff FTC argues that its section 5 claim is a “standalone” claim. (Doc. 150 at 45.) In particular, the FTC argues that the price-cost test should not apply to its section 5 claim, regardless of how the court rules on the Sherman Act and Clayton Act claims. ([Id.](#) at 47.) Because Plaintiffs plausibly allege violations of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, the court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff FTC’s section 5 claim for the same reasons as for the Sherman Act and Clayton Act claims. Therefore, whether or not the court may find it necessary to parse distinctions between the statutes at a later stage in this action, it need not do so now.
- 11 Rule 12(g) (2) provides:
 

Except as provided in Rule 12(h) (2) or (3), a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.
- 12 Even so, there is hardly a consensus, as Corteva contends, that [Humphrey’s Executor](#) is wrong in light of the FTC’s greater scope of authority since the case was decided. See, e.g., [Seila Law](#), 140 S. Ct. at 2198 (“Rightly or wrongly, the Court viewed the FTC (as it existed in 1935) as exercising ‘no part of the executive power.’” (quoting [Humphrey’s Executor](#), 295 U.S. at 628)); [id.](#) at 2200 n.4 (“Perhaps the FTC possessed broader rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory powers than the [Humphrey’s](#) Court appreciated. Perhaps not. Either way, what matters is the set of powers the Court considered as the basis for its decision, not any latent powers that the agency may have had not alluded to by the Court.”); [id.](#) at 2239 n. 10 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in part)

(describing the FTC's authority in 1935 as including the power to "run investigations, bring administrative charges, and conduct adjudications"). Simply put, this court is not at liberty to "read the tea leaves" of the Supreme Court with respect to settled precedent.  [Stewart v. Justice](#), 518 F. Supp. 3d 911, 917 (S.D.W. Va. 2021).

- 13 While the [Meyers](#) court announced this rule in light of its self-described "liberal pleadings standard," [Meyers](#), 735 N.W.3d at 320, Defendants have not provided any authority to suggest that a different result should obtain under the federal rules.

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# **EXHIBIT B**

2024 WL 323775

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.  
United States District Court, D. Vermont.

BLUE CROSS AND BLUE  
SHIELD OF VERMONT and the  
Vermont Health Plan, Plaintiffs,  
v.  
TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES,  
LTD., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,  
Inc., Teva Sales & Marketing, Inc., and  
Teva Neuroscience, Inc., Defendants.

Case No. 5:22-cv-159  
|  
Signed January 22, 2024

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**OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS**

Geoffrey W. Crawford, Chief Judge

\*1 In this putative class action, plaintiffs Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Vermont (“BCBSVT”), a Vermont nonprofit hospital service corporation and nonprofit medical service corporation, and The Vermont Health Plan (“TVHP”), a health maintenance organization and for-profit subsidiary of BCBSVT, sue the four above-captioned defendants alleging a “decade-long anticompetitive scheme to thwart competition to induce health insurers and health plans in the United States to pay billions for its excessively priced multiple sclerosis drug” Copaxone. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 4, 24–25.) Plaintiffs assert the following six counts: (1) violation of state antitrust statutes: monopolization; (2) violation of state antitrust laws: attempted monopolization; (3) violation of state antitrust statutes: contract, combination, or conspiracy to restrain

trade; (4) violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 or 2; (5) violations of state consumer protection acts; and (6) unjust enrichment.

The court denied Defendants’ motion to change venue or stay the case in November 2022. (Doc. 45.) Two motions are currently pending, both filed in December 2022. First, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.—an Israeli corporation—has filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). (Doc. 48.) Second, all Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 49.) Briefing is now complete.<sup>1</sup> The court heard argument on the motions on July 14, 2023, and took them under advisement on that date.

**Background**

Plaintiffs’ 386-paragraph complaint refers to all four defendants collectively as “Teva” (Doc. 1 ¶ 31) and includes the following allegations.<sup>2</sup> Additional details are set forth in the analysis as necessary below.

**I. Therapeutic Drug Regulation and Marketing<sup>3</sup>**

Because this case involves therapeutic drugs for human use, it is necessary to briefly outline some of the relevant regulatory backdrop and market structures. The 1938 federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (“FDCA”), established “a system of premarket approval for drugs.” *Kellogg v. Wyeth*, 612 F. Supp. 2d 421, 424 (D. Vt. 2008) (citing *Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc.*, 412 U.S. 609, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2469, 37 L.Ed.2d 207 (1973)). Under the FDCA, “a new drug could not be marketed unless it was shown to be safe for its intended use.” *Id.* “The Drug Amendments of 1962 amended the FDCA to require that new drugs be both safe and effective for their intended use.” *Id.* The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is charged with “protect[ing] the public health by ensuring that,” among other things, “human ... drugs are safe and effective.” 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B).

\*2 “In order to market a new drug one must file a New Drug Application (‘NDA’) with the FDA ....” *Kellogg*, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 424. Federal law requires detailed documentation in

each NDA. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). As Plaintiffs put it: “The process to obtain FDA approval for an NDA is lengthy and very expensive.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 76.) The FDA maintains a public list of drugs that have been approved for safety and effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7).

When such a publicly listed drug loses patent protection, companies “may seek permission from the FDA to market a generic version of the drug.” *Kellogg*, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 425. “The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (‘Hatch-Waxman Amendments’) amended the FDCA to authorize an abbreviated new drug application (‘ANDA’) process for generic drugs that are bioequivalent to approved new drugs.” *Id.*; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). “The ANDA applicant is not required to conduct its own safety and effectiveness testing, but is permitted to rely upon the safety and effectiveness evidence presented in the NDA for the listed drug.” *Kellogg*, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 425. In addition to the ANDA pathway under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j), a second abbreviated pathway to approval for a drug is available under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2).

Although these two pathways simplify the regulatory hurdles for generic drug approval, generics are still “prohibited from infringing the brand’s patents”; thus “when a generic competitor submits an ANDA, it must provide a ‘certification’ with respect to each unexpired patent related to the brand drug’s production.” *United Food & Com. Workers Local 1776 & Participating Emps. Health & Welfare Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co.*, 11 F.4th 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2021). “The certification alerts the FDA to the relevant patent and explains why the proposed generic would not infringe it.” *Id.* Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a “Paragraph IV” certification states that the patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).<sup>4</sup>

Paragraph IV certifications “activate powerful rights and restrictions on behalf of the patent-holding company.” *United Food & Com. Workers Local 1776*, 11 F.4th at 125. Such certifications trigger a “‘highly artificial act of infringement,’ permitting the brand manufacturer to sue the ANDA applicant.” *Id.* (quoting *Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.*, 496 U.S. 661, 678, 110 S.Ct. 2683, 110 L.Ed.2d 605 (1990)). “If the brand chooses to sue, the FDA

is automatically prevented from approving the ANDA for the earlier of thirty months or the outcome of the litigation.” *Id.*

## II. Multiple Sclerosis; Copaxone

Multiple sclerosis (“MS”) is a disease that causes the body’s immune system to attack the central nervous system, resulting in a range of symptoms. (Doc. 1 ¶ 2.) The most common form of MS—relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis (“RRMS”)—is characterized by “clearly defined attacks of new or increasing symptoms followed by periods of remission, during which symptoms partially or completely subside.” (*Id.*); see also *Multiple Sclerosis (MS)*, *Stedman’s Medical Dictionary* 802480, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2014) (MS is a “common demyelinating disorder of the central nervous system, causing patches of sclerosis (plaques) in the brain and spinal cord; occurs primarily in young adults, and has protean clinical manifestations, depending on the location and size of the plaque”). There is no known cure for MS. (Doc. 1 ¶ 3.)

\*3 Glatiramer acetate (“GA”) is a “chemically synthesized protein that simulates myelin,” the protective protein that surrounds nerve fibers. (*Id.* ¶¶ 3, 51.) The precise mechanism that makes GA useful as an MS “disease-modifying therapy” (*id.* ¶ 51) is not relevant here<sup>5</sup> but, generally, GA “blocks or otherwise interrupts the immune system attacks associated with RRMS,” thereby helping to alleviate MS symptoms. (*Id.* ¶¶ 3, 51.) The drug must be administered by injection. (*Id.* ¶ 3.)

Teva has licensed the rights to GA since 1987 and claims to hold all patents on the drug. (*Id.* ¶ 4; see *id.* ¶ 53.) GA is the active ingredient in Teva’s brand-name drug Copaxone. (*Id.* ¶¶ 4, 51.) The FDA approved Copaxone for treatment of RRMS in 1996. (*Id.* ¶ 55.) Teva began selling Copaxone in March 1997. (*Id.* ¶¶ 5, 56.) At that time, Teva set the price for a monthly course of Copaxone treatment at \$769.15. (*Id.* ¶ 5.)

The original version of Copaxone came in a 20 mg dose that was to be taken once daily. (*Id.* ¶ 166.) Patent exclusivity on 20 mg Copaxone was set to expire in 2015. (*Id.* ¶¶ 157, 166.) Well before then, senior Teva executives began holding meetings on Copaxone “Life Cycle Management” (“LCM”) in 2002. (*Id.* ¶ 176.) Plaintiffs allege that LCM is “an industry term for the use of incremental research to extend a profitable drug’s market monopoly.” (*Id.*) One objective of Teva’s LCM initiative was to “[m]inimize the risk of generic competition.” (*Id.* (alteration in original).)

### III. Teva's Alleged Anticompetitive Conduct

Plaintiffs allege that, in the following years, Teva engaged in “an anticompetitive scheme that caused health care payors, like Plaintiffs, in the United States to substantially overpay for glatiramer acetate.” (*Id.* ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs allege that Teva “began by abusing patent litigation and the FDA's citizen petition process, to artificially prolong Copaxone's patent exclusivity and block lower-cost generics from entering the market.” (*Id.* ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs further allege that after generics entered the market, Teva used “myriad” practices to suppress generic competition. (*Id.* ¶ 9.) Those alleged practices include a “product-hop scheme” to induce patients and doctors to switch to a new 40 mg, three-times-per-week GA formulation. (*Id.* ¶ 12.)

#### A. Alleged Anticompetitive Conduct to Delay Generic Entry

Generic pharmaceutical manufacturer Sandoz, Inc. (“Sandoz”) submitted an ANDA to the FDA in December 2007 for Glatopa (Glatiramer Acetate) 20 mg. (*See* Doc. 1 ¶ 92 & n.51.)<sup>6</sup> Generic pharmaceutical manufacturer Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Mylan”) filed an ANDA for a 20 mg GA product in June 2009. (*See* Doc. 1 ¶ 198 (noting that Mylan is a manufacturer of a generic version of GA)); *see also* [Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.](#), 876 F. Supp. 2d 295, 307–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that Mylan submitted an ANDA for its GA product on June 29, 2009), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded*, [723 F.3d 1363](#) (Fed. Cir. 2013), *vacated and remanded*, [574 U.S. 318, 135 S.Ct. 831, 190 L.Ed.2d 719](#) (2015). The generic competition that Teva executives contemplated in 2002 was beginning to materialize. Plaintiffs allege that Teva sought to delay generic entry by filing citizen petitions and by engaging in patent litigation. Plaintiffs contend that the citizen petitions and the patent lawsuits were all “objectively baseless.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 94.) The court reviews that alleged conduct below.

#### 1. Citizen Petitions

\*4 Federal regulations permit any “interested person”<sup>7</sup> to “petition” the FDA Commissioner to “issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order, or to take or refrain from taking any other form of administrative action.” 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(a). As relevant here, such petitions may be “in the form for a citizen

petition in § 10.30.” *Id.* § 10.25(a)(2). Plaintiffs observe that, “[i]n theory, citizen petitions could raise concerns that a drug is unsafe.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 87.) But such petitions can also delay the approval of drug applications.<sup>8</sup> Recognizing the possibility of delay resulting from the citizen petition process, Congress has required that, where a written citizen petition under § 10.30 is submitted after September 27, 2007, the FDA must not delay the approval of drug applications unless the petition is “necessary to protect the public health.” [21 U.S.C. § 355\(q\)\(1\)\(A\)\(ii\)](#); *see also* [21 C.F.R. § 10.31](#).

Within 12 months of Sandoz's December 2007 ANDA, Teva filed the first of eight citizen petitions regarding GA products. (*See* Doc. 1 ¶ 89 & n.47.) In that first petition, Teva requested that the FDA Commissioner not approve or accept for filing any ANDA or 505(b)(2) application<sup>9</sup> “for a purported generic version or other pharmaceutical alternative to Copaxone” because “the clinically active polypeptide sequences in Copaxone® (glatiramer acetate injection) have not been sufficiently well defined to enable an ANDA or 505(b)(2) applicant to conclusively demonstrate that the clinically active polypeptide sequences in its purported generic product are qualitatively and quantitatively ‘the same as’ those in Copaxone®.” Teva Neuroscience, Inc., Citizen Petition at 1–2, No. FDA-2008-P-0529 (Sept. 26, 2008), <https://www.regulations.gov/document/FDA-2008-P-0529-0001>. Teva further requested that, if the FDA did accept an ANDA that cites Copaxone as the reference listed drug, the ANDA should be converted to a 505(b)(2) application and the FDA should “not approve any such application for a follow-on glatiramoid product, including glatiramer acetate, unless the applicant conducts clinical safety and efficacy studies” and “[n]o such product may be assigned an ‘AB’ therapeutic equivalence rating.” *Id.* at 2.

In March 2009—with Sandoz's and Mylan's ANDAs still pending—the FDA denied Teva's 2008 citizen petition “without comment on the requirements for approval of any ANDA or NDA for a glatiramer acetate injection drug product.” FDA Petition Denial at 4, No. FDA-2008-P-0529 (Mar. 25, 2009), <https://www.regulations.gov/document/FDA-2008-P-0529-0007>. The agency reasoned that “it would be premature and inappropriate” to express any position on whether to approve any ANDA or NDA for any GA injection product. *Id.* at 3. “Such an action could, in effect, render a decision on a specific aspect of an ANDA or NDA before the Agency has had an opportunity either to fully consider



specific data and information in such an application or to provide the procedural rights that accompany FDA actions or applications.” *Id.* The FDA declined to permit a citizen petition to “short-circuit” the application review process. *Id.* at 4.

\*5 Teva filed seven additional citizen petitions regarding GA products between November 2009 and March 2015. One of those additional petitions—discussed below—was filed on December 5, 2013. (*See* Doc. 1 ¶ 89 n.47.) In each petition, Teva made arguments similar to the arguments in the 2008 citizen petition. (*Id.* ¶ 90.) Teva withdrew the citizen petition that it filed in September 2013, and the FDA denied five of the citizen petitions without commenting on the specific requirements for approval of any ANDA for a GA injection drug product. (*See id.* ¶ 91 & n.49.) The FDA denied the last filed citizen petition (the eighth) on the merits on April 16, 2015—the same date that it approved Sandoz’s ANDA for 20 mg Glatopa. (*Id.* ¶ 92.)

## 2. Patent Litigation

Teva also filed numerous patent-infringement lawsuits in the years before the FDA approved the relevant generic GA products. (*Id.* ¶¶ 22(C), 85.) Acting on its rights under Paragraph IV certifications, Teva sued Sandoz in 2008 and then sued Mylan in 2009 alleging infringement of Teva’s patents for improved compositions of “copolymer-1,” the active ingredient in *Copaxone*.<sup>10</sup> Those Hatch-Waxman Act lawsuits triggered statutory 30-month stays of FDA approval of Sandoz and Mylan’s ANDAs; the stays expired in January 2011 and March 2012, respectively. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (5)(B)(iii).

After consolidating the 2008 and 2009 Hatch-Waxman cases, the district court ruled in June 2012 that Mylan’s and Sandoz’s ANDAs were infringing and that none of Teva’s asserted claims were invalid or unenforceable. *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.*, 876 F. Supp. 2d 295, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Jones, J.). The district court then entered an order that, among other things, enjoined Sandoz and Mylan from marketing their generic GA products until September 1, 2015. Final Judgment Order ¶¶ 11–12, *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.*, No. 08-CV-7611 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2012), ECF No. 338 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283).

Following an appeal to the Federal Circuit, 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), the district court on remand entered a modified final judgment shortening the injunction and permitting generic launch in May 2014. *See* Modified Final Judgment Order, *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.*, No. 08-CV-7611 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013), ECF No. 355. After further appeal to the Supreme Court, 574 U.S. 318, 135 S.Ct. 831, 190 L.Ed.2d 719 (2015), the litigation resulted with conclusions that some of Teva’s claims were valid and infringed and that other claims were invalid for indefiniteness. *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.*, 789 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Judge Mayer dissented, reasoning that the case should be remanded for factual findings on indefiniteness. *Id.* at 1349 (Mayer, J., dissenting).

Teva filed multiple other suits against generic manufacturers. One suit that Teva filed against Mylan in 2009 was dismissed for failure to prosecute. *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc.*, No. 09-cv-152 (N.D.W. Va. July 2, 2010), ECF No. 24. Lawsuits that Teva filed against Sandoz in 2009 and Mylan in 2010 were dismissed at the Rule 12 stage. *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.*, Nos. 09 Civ. 10112, 10 Civ. 7246, 2013 WL 3732867 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2013), *appeal voluntarily dismissed*, No. 13-1572 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2013). A pair of lawsuits that Teva filed against another generic manufacturer in 2012 were voluntarily dismissed. *See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Synthon Pharms., Inc.*, No. 12-2556 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2014), ECF No. 53; *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Synthon Pharms., Inc.*, No. 12-cv-179 (E.D.N.C. June 1, 2012), ECF No. 12. Another pair of patent lawsuits that Teva filed in the District of New Jersey in 2015 also ended with dismissals. *See* Pls.’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Lab’s, Ltd.*, No. 15-cv-471 (D.N.J. June 26, 2015), ECF No. 39; Stipulation of Dismissal and Order, *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Synthon Pharms., Inc.*, No. 15-472 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2015), ECF No. 10.

\*6 Meanwhile, in June 2009, Teva executives prepared a presentation that described “a need to develop a low frequency formulation of GA to ensure the competitiveness of *Copaxone* in the future.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 177.) The presentation suggested studying a regimen of 40 mg GA doses injected two to three times per week. (*See id.* ¶ 177–178.) The FDA granted approval for Teva to market a three-times-weekly 40 mg dose on January 28, 2014. (*Id.* ¶ 167.) Teva released 40 mg *Copaxone* the following day. (*Id.*) Teva simultaneously issued a press release billing the 40 mg product as “a significant

advancement for patients.” (*Id.* ¶ 182.) Patent litigation related to the 40 mg GA product followed.

Teva sued Sandoz and another generic manufacturer in September 2014, alleging patent infringement based on an ANDA that Sandoz filed seeking approval for a 40 mg product purporting to be generic to [Copaxone](#). Compl. ¶ 1, *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.*, No. 14-cv-1171 (D. Del. Sept. 10, 2014). As with the 2008 and 2009 Hatch-Waxman Act suits, Teva's 2014 suit triggered a statutory 30-month stay of FDA approval of Sandoz's 40 mg product. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). The 2014 suit became the lead case in a consolidated group of cases filed in the District of Delaware, including *Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Synthron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, No. 14-cv-1419; *Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.*, No. 14-cv-1278; and *Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC*, No. 15-cv-124. That litigation proceeded to a seven-day bench trial in 2016 before Judge Gregory M. Sleet, who issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and determined—by clear and convincing evidence—that all of the asserted claims of the patents-in-suit were invalid as obvious. *In re Copaxone Consol. Cases*, No. 14-1171, 2017 WL 401943 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2017).

The consolidated cases concluded with the Federal Circuit's unanimous 2018 decision affirming the district court's holding that Teva's asserted claims of patents directed to Copaxone 40 mg were “invalid as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” *In re: Copaxone Consol. Cases*, 906 F.3d 1013, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2018). On the same day that the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court, that court also affirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board's (“PTAB”) decisions finding Copaxone 40 mg unpatentable as “obvious.” *Yeda Rsch. v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.*, 906 F.3d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

Teva filed a substantively identical case in the Northern District of West Virginia in 2014; that case was stayed for much of its duration and was ultimately dismissed after the District of Delaware's 2016 bench trial and judgment against Teva. Stipulation & Order Dismissing Case with Prejudice, *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms.*, No. 14-cv-167 (N.D.W. Va. June 27, 2017), ECF No. 67. Teva also voluntarily dismissed a similar case that it filed in 2014 in the Middle District of North Carolina. Pls.' Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, *Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Synthron Pharms., Inc.*, No. 14-cv-975 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 12, 2015), ECF No. 9.

### 3. Lawsuits Against the FDA

In addition to the citizen petitions and patent litigation cited above, Plaintiffs note two instances in which Teva sued the FDA. (Doc. 1 ¶ 22(C).) Teva sued the FDA on May 9, 2014 challenging the FDA's denial of the December 5, 2013 citizen petition. Complaint, *Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Sebelius*, No. 14-cv-786 (D.D.C. May 9, 2014). Judge Huvelle dismissed that case on May 14, 2014 after finding that “the case is not ripe and therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction.” *Sebelius*, No. 14-cv-786 (D.D.C. May 14, 2014), ECF No. 36. Teva sued the FDA again in March 2020 for alleged “refusal to treat [Copaxone](#) as a biologic.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 22(C)); see also Complaint, *Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. FDA*, No. 20-cv-808 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2020). Chief Judge Howell granted summary judgment against Teva in December 2020. *Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. FDA*, 514 F. Supp. 3d 66 (D.D.C. 2020).

#### B. Alleged Anticompetitive Conduct to Stifle Competition from Generics

\*7 As noted above, the FDA approved the first generic GA medication—Sandoz's 20 mg Glatopa—on April 16, 2015. (Doc. 1 ¶ 92.) Mylan introduced a generic version of [Copaxone](#) 40 mg in October 2017. (*Id.* ¶ 186.) Plaintiffs allege that, before and after these generics entered the market, Teva used “myriad anticompetitive, unfair, and deceptive practices” to stifle competition from the generics. (*Id.* ¶ 9.) The court reviews the allegations of each of these alleged practices below.

#### 1. Copay Assistance

Plaintiffs note that patient cost-sharing obligations (or “copays”) serve as a check on drug costs by making plan members sensitive to price. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 107–109.) Plaintiffs assert that Teva “conspired with a specialty pharmacy, non-profit foundations, and other entities to implement an anticompetitive scheme to undermine and circumvent” those health plan cost-sharing provisions. (*Id.* ¶ 106.) As described in more detail below, this alleged scheme involved patient assistance programs (“PAPs”) directed to members of private health plans and to Medicare recipients and members of other federal health plans.

**a. Assistance to Members of Private Health Plans**

Plaintiffs allege that “Teva knew that if members of private health plans were exposed to high cost-sharing obligations, substantially fewer patients would have purchased Copaxone and Teva would have been forced to lower prices or lose sales.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 110.) Plaintiffs further allege that “[i]nstead of lowering the price to make Copaxone more affordable, Teva instead devised a scheme to bypass these price controls by paying the cost-sharing obligations on behalf of health plan members.” (*Id.* ¶ 111.) The alleged scheme came in the form of a “coupon” service—known as “Copaxone Co-Pay Solutions”—as part of Teva’s “Shared Solutions” patient-services program. (*Id.* ¶ 113.)

According to Plaintiffs, Teva provided “coupon” cards directly to private health plan members. (*Id.* ¶ 111.) “When a member went to a pharmacy to fill a Copaxone prescription, the pharmacy would accept the coupon from the participant in lieu of collecting the participant’s cost-sharing obligation, and Teva would pay the pharmacy for the value of the coupon.” (*Id.*) The health plan member thus paid little or nothing out of pocket for Copaxone and would pay less for Copaxone than they would have paid for the generic GA drug. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs allege that Teva thereby “shielded the decisionmakers (i.e., plan members) from the impact of Copaxone’s excessive price, thereby inducing further sales, all while exposing the health plan payors, who pay the majority of any drug’s costs, to the ever-increasing list price.” (*Id.* ¶ 112.)

**b. Assistance to Medicare Recipients and Other Federal Plans**

The federal Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”) imposes criminal liability upon anyone who “knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person”:

(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, or

(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service,

or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program.


42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2). Teva therefore could not lawfully subsidize the co-insurance or other cost-sharing obligations of federal health plan members. *See* Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,623, 70,625 (Nov. 22, 2005) (stating that the AKS “squarely prohibit[s]” cost-sharing subsidies provided by pharmaceutical manufacturer patient assistance programs “because the manufacturer would be giving something of value (i.e., the subsidy) to beneficiaries to use its product”). The bulletin explains:

\*8 Where a manufacturer PAP offers subsidies tied to the use of the manufacturer’s products (often expensive drugs used by patients with chronic illnesses), the subsidies present all of the usual risks of fraud and abuse associated with kickbacks, including steering beneficiaries to particular drugs; increasing costs to Medicare; providing a financial advantage over competing drugs; and reducing beneficiaries’ incentives to locate and use less expensive, equally effective drugs.

*Id.* Teva knew about the AKS provisions and that it could not pursue its “coupon” strategy with respect to Medicare recipients and other federal health plan members. (Doc. 1 ¶ 118.)

Instead, Teva allegedly devised a way to “cheat the system.” (*Id.* ¶ 121.) As the Special Advisory Bulletin notes, “pharmaceutical manufacturers can effectively contribute to the pharmaceutical safety net by making cash donations to independent, bona fide charitable assistance programs.” Special Advisory Bulletin, 70 Fed. Reg. at 70,626. The AKS does not prohibit such donations provided that “appropriate safeguards” are in place. *Id.* at 70,625; *see also id.* at 70,626 (listing five requirements and summarizing: “Simply put, the independent charity PAP must not function as a conduit for payments by the pharmaceutical manufacturer to patients and must not impermissibly influence beneficiaries’ drug choices.”). Plaintiffs assert that Teva knew about the prohibition on using charity as a conduit for payments to Medicare patients, but nevertheless used charitable organizations as “pass-through vehicles” in violation of the AKS. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 125, 145.)


In particular, Plaintiffs allege that, between 2006 and 2018, Teva “knowingly and willfully” violated the AKS “by paying over \$300 million to two third-party foundations, Chronic Disease Fund and The Assistance Fund, to cover the Medicare

co-pay obligations of Copaxone patients.” (*Id.* ¶¶ 125, 149.) In 2020, the United States sued Teva in a civil action under the False Claims Act based on that alleged conduct in violation of the AKS.  *United States v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.*, 560 F. Supp. 3d 412, 416 (D. Mass. 2021) (the “AKS lawsuit”). Litigation in that lawsuit is ongoing.<sup>11</sup>

Plaintiffs further allege that Teva conspired with multiple entities to facilitate the kickback scheme. Plaintiffs allege that Teva referred Medicare-eligible Copaxone patients to Advanced Care Scripts, Inc. (“Advanced Care”)—a specialty pharmacy<sup>12</sup>—which would then arrange for the patients to obtain co-pay assistance from Chronic Disease Fund and The Assistance Fund. (Doc. 1 ¶ 127.) The amounts of Teva’s donations each year were based on its calculation of the amounts that those funds would need “to specifically fund Copaxone co-pay assistance for Medicare recipients.” (*Id.* ¶ 128.) And Teva would use information that it received from Advanced Care on new patients awaiting copay assistance and would make supplemental “donations” to the assistance funds that were “earmarked to fund assistance for these new patients.” (*Id.* ¶ 129.) Teva “took steps to ensure its ‘donations’ would be used exclusively for Copaxone and not for other MS medications.” (*Id.* ¶ 134.) Teva also “raised the amounts of its ‘donations’ in lockstep with its increases to the price of Copaxone to ensure that Medicare recipients remained insulated from their price hikes.” (*Id.* ¶ 140.)

\*9 Advanced Care’s cofounders, Edward Hensley and Jeff Spafford, left that company in 2009 and founded The Assistance Found as a foundation modeled after Chronic Disease Fund. (*Id.* ¶ 131.) In February 2015, Hensley and Spafford founded a for-profit business called AssistRx. (*Id.* ¶ 132.) AssistRx “assumed Advanced Care’s role of arranging Medicare co-pay assistance for Copaxone patients referred by Teva.” (*Id.*) Advanced Care and AssistRx obtained millions of dollars in service fees that Teva paid. (*Id.* ¶ 133.) Advanced Care also profited from additional Copaxone sales to Medicare patients. (*Id.*)

## 2. Alleged Product-Hopping

“Product hopping” is “conduct by a monopolist to perpetuate patent exclusivity through successive products.”  *New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC*, 787 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs allege that Teva engaged in such conduct by “coerc[ing] and induc[ing] doctors, pharmacies,

and patients to switch from 20 mg Copaxone to 40 mg Copaxone before Glatopa or other 20 mg generics became available for purchase.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 168.) Plaintiffs allege that this was a “multi-pronged campaign” (*id.*) that involved the conduct described below. Plaintiffs further allege that the “product hop” was the result of “more than a decade of planning,” including the 2002 LCM meetings and the 2009 presentation regarding the need to develop a low-frequency formulation of GA. (*Id.* ¶¶ 176, 177.) According to Plaintiffs, by December 2015, Teva converted 76.9% of Copaxone patients to 40 mg and limited generic 20 mg market share to 19.3%. (*Id.* ¶ 174.) The alleged product hop ultimately allowed Teva to avoid generic competition “until at least 2017,” when Mylan introduced a generic version of Copaxone 40 mg. (*Id.* ¶¶ 183, 186.)

### a. Price Manipulation

Plaintiffs allege that Teva “manipulated the pricing of both versions of Copaxone to induce patients to switch to 40 mg Copaxone.” (*Id.* ¶ 169.) After the FDA approved Copaxone 40 mg in 2014, Teva initially priced that version as “slightly less expensive per week of treatment than Copaxone 20 mg.” (*Id.*) “Shortly thereafter, Teva increased the price of 20 mg Copaxone by 9.8%.” (*Id.*)

### b. Pressure on PBMs

Teva allegedly pressured pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs)<sup>13</sup> to make 40 mg Copaxone available to participants of health plans and “threatened PBMs that it would stop paying the PBMs rebates on 20 mg Copaxone unless the PBMs made 40 mg Copaxone available on their formularies.”<sup>14</sup> (Doc. 1 ¶ 170.) Teva followed through on that threat “[o]n at least one occasion” by “eliminating Copaxone rebates for at least one PBM that failed to add 40 mg Copaxone to its formulary.” (*Id.*) That PBM added 40 mg Copaxone to its formulary the next year. (*Id.*)

### c. “Copaxone Conversion Initiative”

Teva also allegedly “colluded with PBMs to implement a so-called ‘Copaxone conversion initiative.’ ” (*Id.* ¶ 171.) According to Plaintiffs, Teva contracted with one or more PBMs under which the PBMs committed to convert

Copaxone 20 mg patients to Copaxone 40 mg. (*Id.*) Under this program, the PBMs would contact the prescribers to make them aware of which patients were still on Copaxone 20 mg and encourage them to switch those patients to the 40 mg version. (*Id.*)

**d. Outreach to Physicians**

\*10 A fourth alleged category of conduct in the alleged product hop was Teva's effort to “directly target[ ] physicians with an intense outreach campaign.” (*Id.* ¶ 172.) Members of Teva's sales force allegedly contacted physicians to tell them to:

- (i) “initiate and upgrade any remaining patients to TIW [three times weekly] Copaxone 40 mg”;
- (ii) “switch patients to TIW Copaxone 40 mg if payers force to generic GA for daily dose”;
- (iii) “Prescribe Copaxone DAW [Dispense as Written] for new and existing patients”; and
- (iv) “Encourage their patients to accept only branded Copaxone.”

(*Id.* (alterations in original) (quoting House Report at 32).) Plaintiffs further allege that Teva “created financial incentives for its sales force to execute this plan, making their bonuses dependent entirely on the sales of 40 mg Copaxone.” (*Id.*)

**e. Plan to Discontinue Copay Assistance for 20 mg Copaxone**

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Teva “explored” a plan to switch patients to 40 mg Copaxone “by discontinuing copay assistance programs for the 20 mg dosage.” (*Id.* ¶ 173.)

**3. Additional Conduct After Mylan Introduced Generic GA in 2017**

Plaintiffs allege that Teva engaged in three additional categories of anticompetitive tactics after Mylan introduced a lower-priced generic version of Copaxone 40 mg in October 2017. (Doc. 1 ¶ 186.)

**a. “House Brand” Strategy**

According to Plaintiffs, Teva implemented a “House Brand” strategy that involved “contracting with PBMs and specialty

pharmacies to make Copaxone 40 mg the drug that was dispensed to health plan members.” (*Id.* ¶ 187.) The strategy with respect to certain PBMs was to sign contracts “that restricted generic access at the formulary level.” (*Id.* ¶ 189.) As to certain specialty pharmacies, Teva contracted “so that prescriptions for glatiramer acetate would be filled with brand, regardless of whether a generic was prescribed.” (*Id.* ¶ 190.)

**b. Dispense as Written (“DAW”)**

A provider can prohibit generic substitution for a medication that she prescribes by including a “Dispense as Written” (“DAW”) notation. (*Id.* ¶ 195.) Teva campaigned to persuade doctors to write prescriptions for Copaxone as DAW by “misleadingly represent[ing] that patients would benefit from remaining on brand Copaxone.” (*Id.* ¶ 197.) According to Plaintiffs, Teva and its sales representatives falsely told prescribers or misled them to believe that the generic GA products were only 80–85% as effective as Copaxone, and that Copaxone and generic GA were not interchangeable. (*Id.* ¶¶ 198–199.) By February 2018, 77% of Copaxone prescriptions were written with the DAW notation. (*Id.* ¶ 201.)

**c. “Shared Solutions”**

The “Copaxone Co-Pay Solutions” program discussed above is part of Teva's “Shared Solutions” patient-services program. (*Id.* ¶ 113.) The “Shared Solutions” program offers “a variety of services to Copaxone users, including providing free injection devices, free injection training, and assistance with obtaining insurance coverage.” (*Id.* ¶ 205.) When physicians prescribed Copaxone, they would typically also submit enrollment forms to Shared Solutions on behalf of each new Copaxone patient. (*Id.* ¶ 206.)

Analysis

**I. Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss**

The court begins with Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See *Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo*, 667 F.3d 232, 246 n.17 (2d Cir. 2012) (courts generally address challenges to personal jurisdiction before reaching the merits, but “with multiple defendants—over some of whom the court indisputably has personal jurisdiction—in which all defendants collectively

challenge the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action, we may address first the facial challenge to the underlying cause of action and, if we dismiss the claim in its entirety, decline to address the personal jurisdiction claims made by some defendants”).

\*11 To survive Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Plaintiffs’ complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Eastman Kodak Co. v. Henry Bath LLC*, 936 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). In evaluating Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[s].” *Biocad JSC v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche*, 942 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2019). “Dismissal is appropriate when ‘it is clear from the face of the complaint ... that the plaintiff's claims are barred as a matter of law.’ ” *Id.* (alteration in original) (quoting *Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE*, 763 F.3d 198, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2014)).

**A. Sherman Act Claims (Count IV)**

Plaintiffs’ only claims under federal law are their claims in Count IV alleging violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 or 2. “In the Sherman Act, Congress tasked courts with enforcing a policy of competition on the belief that market forces yield the best allocation of the Nation's resources.” *Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston*, — U.S. —, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2147, 210 L.Ed.2d 314 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 1 of the Sherman Act “applies only to concerted action” while Section 2 “covers both concerted and independent action, but only if that action monopolizes or threatens actual monopolization.” *Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League*, 560 U.S. 183, 190, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 176 L.Ed.2d 947 (2010) (cleaned up; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Concerted activity subject to § 1 is judged more sternly than unilateral activity under § 2.” *Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp.*, 467 U.S. 752, 768, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984). To survive a motion to dismiss, a Sherman Act claim must “(1) define the relevant [ ] market, (2) allege an antitrust injury, and (3) allege conduct in violation of antitrust laws.” *Concord Assocs., L.P. v. Ent. Props. Tr.*, 817 F.3d 46, 52

(2d Cir. 2016) (quoting *NY. Medscan LLC v. N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Med.*, 430 F. Supp. 2d 140, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). This applies to claims under both Sections 1 and 2. *Id.*

Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims are based on alleged anticompetitive conduct that Plaintiffs claim either delayed generic market entry or limited generic uptake. Defendants assert that neither theory supports a claim. (Doc. 49 at 26.) Plaintiffs maintain that “each element of Teva's scheme was independently anticompetitive” and that all of the elements of the alleged scheme also had a “combined, synergistic impact.” (Doc. 58 at 26.) The court considers both of the categories of alleged anticompetitive conduct below.

The complaint does not distinguish between the alleged violations of section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act. Four of the five counts concern alleged violations of state law, both antitrust and consumer protection statutes. The federal antitrust claim (Count IV) incorporates by reference the state law antitrust allegations: “For the reasons set forth in the above Counts, Defendants have violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 295.) In considering the arguments for and against dismissal of the Sherman Act claims, it is not necessary to distinguish between the section 1 claims of concerted action and the section 2 claims of monopolization. As it relates to allegations of delay in the availability of generic alternatives, the bases for the motion are the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine, insufficient allegations of causation and time bar. These apply equally to both section 1 and section 2 claims. The effort to dismiss the claims on grounds related to delay in “uptake” or acceptance of the generic alternatives concerns measures taken by the Teva companies alone and are analyzed under section 2. In the end, these distinctions are not critical either to the motion to dismiss and the response or to the court's decision because the proposed defenses to the Sherman Act claim apply generally to both sections.

**1. Alleged Conduct to Delay Generic Entry—Citizen Petitions and Lawsuits**

\*12 Regarding the alleged conduct to delay market entry, Defendants argue that the citizen petitions and patent lawsuits are immune from antitrust liability under the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine. (Doc. 49 at 40.) Defendants also argue

that the petitions and lawsuits did not delay FDA approval of generic GA products, and that any claim premised on Teva's lawsuits or petitions is time-barred. (*Id.* at 44, 46.) The court examines each of these three arguments below.

**a. *Noerr-Pennington***

The court begins by reviewing the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine, the applicable exceptions, and the procedural considerations that are relevant at this stage of the case. “Generally, under the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine, citizen petitions are immune from antitrust liability in light of the First Amendment.” *In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig.*, 585 F.3d 677, 685–86 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing *E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.*, 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961), and *United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington*, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965)); *see also* *Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat'l Broad. Co.*, 219 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the First Amendment right to petition the government generally shields “concerted actions before courts and administrative agencies” from liability under the Sherman Act). The same general immunity applies to patent lawsuits. *See, e.g., In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litig.*, 417 F. Supp. 3d 352, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (recognizing that “[a] patentee who seeks to enforce its patent through litigation” generally enjoys *Noerr-Pennington* immunity).

But *Noerr-Pennington* protection “is not absolute.” *DDAVP*, 585 F.3d at 686. “When petitioning activity ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action is a sham to cover what is nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor, then the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.” *Id.* (cleaned up; quoting *Noerr*, 365 U.S. at 144, 81 S.Ct. 523).<sup>15</sup> The “sham” exception applies where a single petition or litigation was “(i) ‘objectively baseless,’ and (ii) ‘an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor through the use of the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.’” *Primetime 24*, 219 F.3d at 100–01 (quoting *Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.*, 508 U.S. 49, 60, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993) [hereinafter *PRE*]).

However, “[i]n cases in which the defendant is accused of bringing a whole series of legal proceedings, the test is not retrospective but prospective.” *Id.* at 101 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). Where the plaintiff alleges such “serial” sham litigation, it is irrelevant that some of the claims might have merit “as a matter of chance.” *Id.* (quoting *USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO*, 31 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994)). Instead, the court asks: “Were the legal filings made, not out of a genuine interest in redressing grievances, but as part of a pattern or practice of successive filings undertaken essentially for purposes of harassment?” *Id.* (quoting *USS-POSCO*, 31 F.3d at 811).

\*13 As to procedural considerations, the court observes that “[t]he *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine is generally raised as an affirmative defense.” *360 Mortg. Grp., LLC v. Fortress Inv. Grp. LLC*, No. 19 Civ. 8760, 2020 WL 5259283, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2020). As such, dismissal based on the *Noerr-Pennington* defense “is warranted only if ‘it is clear from the face of the complaint, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice, that the plaintiff’s claims are barred as a matter of law.’” *Id.* (quoting *Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc.*, 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008)). Dismissal of the claims at issue under *Noerr-Pennington* is appropriate only if “it is apparent from the face of the [complaint] that this defense necessarily applies.” *Id.* Thus, Plaintiffs have “no affirmative obligation to plead facts to show that the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine does not apply, i.e., that the sham exception applies.”<sup>16</sup>*Id.*

With the above principles in mind, the court proceeds to consider the application of the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine in this case. Here, Plaintiffs allege both varieties of the “sham” exception. They allege serial sham citizen petitions and patent litigation. (*See* Doc. 1 ¶¶ 89, 93; *see also* Doc. 58 at 31 (arguing that “Teva engaged in a pattern of successive litigation and citizen petitioning without regard to the merits and for the purpose of delaying competition”).) Plaintiffs also invoke the two-step subjective-objective inquiry that applies to a single petition or litigation. (*See* Doc. 1 ¶¶ 91, 94, 96; *see also* Doc. 58 at 29–31 (arguing that Teva’s patent litigation regarding *Copaxone* 40 mg was objectively and subjectively baseless).) The court begins with the more “exacting” standard that applies for a single petition or

litigation. See *Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm. Co.*, 762 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2014).<sup>17</sup>

**i. Single Petition Variety of the Sham Exception**

\*14 “A single lawsuit can violate antitrust law as long as it is both an objective and subjective sham.” *DDAVP*, 585 F.3d at 686. A lawsuit is “objectively baseless” for purposes of the “sham” exception if “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.” *PRE*, 508 U.S. at 60, 113 S.Ct. 1920. The subjective prong asks whether the litigation was “an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor through the use of the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.” *Id.* at 60–61, 113 S.Ct. 1920 (cleaned up). This is an “exacting” standard, particularly in light of the presumption of patent validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). See *Tyco Healthcare*, 762 F.3d at 1345–46; *In re Elysium Health-Chromadex Litig.*, 354 F. Supp. 3d 330, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The sham exception should be construed narrowly ....”).

Plaintiffs allege that Teva's Hatch-Waxman lawsuits seeking to enforce its patents on *Copaxone* 40 mg were objectively baseless.<sup>18</sup> (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 93–94.) Teva responds that Plaintiffs’ contention on that point is “conclusory,” unsupported, and “contrary to the public record.” (Doc. 49 at 42.) Teva maintains that its *Copaxone* 40 mg infringement suit was not a sham because it was “vigorously litigated, resulting in a seven-day bench trial, a detailed district court opinion, and a published opinion from the Federal Circuit”—i.e., *In re: Copaxone Consolidated Cases.*, 906 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2018). (*Id.*) Plaintiffs do not dispute that procedural history but argue that it is not a basis for dismissal. (Doc. 58 at 30.) Plaintiffs assert that “[p]atent infringement lawsuits, even baseless ones, are typically fact-based and notoriously expensive to litigate; courts are reluctant to dismiss them at early stages.” (*Id.* (footnote omitted).) In reply, Teva notes that patents on dosage changes have survived challenges and that the fact-based nature of patent cases proves that Teva had a good-faith basis to assert that its patent was valid. (Doc. 66 at 16 & n.3.)

For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes that the circumstances weigh against conferring *Noerr-Pennington*

immunity at this early stage of the case. Teva brought the *Copaxone* 40 mg infringement suits at issue after the defendants in those cases filed ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications. See *In re Copaxone Consol. Cases*, No. 14-1171, 2017 WL 401943, at \*6–10 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2017). That conduct raises two competing considerations. On one hand, because the submission of an ANDA is by statutory definition an infringing act, “an infringement suit filed in response to an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification could only be objectively baseless if no reasonable person could disagree with the assertions of noninfringement or invalidity in the certification.” *FTC v. AbbVie Inc.*, 976 F.3d 327, 361 (3d Cir. 2020).

On the other hand, Teva's Hatch-Waxman suits triggered the automatic 30-month stay, preventing the FDA from approving the ANDAs. And, as the Third Circuit has observed:

The automatic, 30-month stay is a collateral injury the defendant's mere use of legal process invariably inflicts. And though the stay ends if a court holds the defendant's patent is invalid or has not been infringed, it does not otherwise depend on a suit's outcome. Thus, a plaintiff may be able to show a defendant was indifferent to the outcome of its infringement suit, and the automatic, 30-month stay was an anticompetitive weapon the defendant tried to wield.

\*15 *Id.* In other words, “[s]imply by suing, a patentee can delay the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market and impede competition in the pharmaceutical industry.” *Id.* at 340. Determining whether such anticompetitive conduct occurred is therefore a “delicate task” in the ANDA context. *Id.* at 361. The *AbbVie* court undertook that task with the benefit of a summary-judgment record. But this case is in a very different procedural posture.

Significant authority suggests that the applicability of the “sham” exception is “a question of fact for the jury.” *Elysium*, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 336 (citing *In re Flonase Antitrust Litig.*, 795 F. Supp. 2d 300, 310 (E.D. Pa. 2011)); see also *Truck-Lite Co. v. Grote Indus., Inc.*, No. 18-CV-599, 2021 WL 8322467, at \*12 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2021) (“Determinations of whether a party's conduct is a genuine attempt to avail itself of the judicial process or is merely a sham is a question of fact that is inappropriate for a motion to dismiss.”); *In re Outlaw Lab'y, LP Litig.*, No. 18-cv-840, 2019 WL 1205004, at \*5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2019) (noting that the “sham”



determination is a question of fact and that, as a result, “courts rarely award *Noerr-Pennington* immunity at the motion to dismiss stage” (quoting *Sonus Networks, Inc. v. Inventergy, Inc.*, No. C-15-0322, 2015 WL 4539814, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2015)); *Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Zydus Pharms. (USA) Inc.*, 358 F. Supp. 3d 389, 394 (D.N.J. 2018) (“[D]istrict courts within this Circuit have routinely prohibited parties from invoking the protections of *Noerr-Pennington* at the dismissal stage of a case in the context of patent suits, at which time the factual record remains undeveloped and insufficient for the purpose of determining whether a ‘sham litigation’ has been filed.”).<sup>19</sup>

Teva asserts that courts can decide *Noerr-Pennington* issues on a motion to dismiss when immunity does not depend on disputed facts. (Doc. 49 at 41.) Teva cites several cases in which courts dismissed antitrust claims at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage after determining that the defendant's action was not objectively baseless. (*Id.* at 41 n.11.) But each of those cases is distinguishable.

The plaintiff in *Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc.* claimed that the defendant filed a sham citizen petition in violation of the Sherman Act. 823 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 2016). In support of its claim, the plaintiff alleged that the FDA approved the generic drug on the same day that it rejected the plaintiff's citizen petition. Taking notice of the FDA's recently issued “Guidance for Industry” that favored contemporaneous adjudications,<sup>20</sup> the Second Circuit ruled that the guidance undermined the inference “that when a citizen petition is denied simultaneously with the grant of an ANDA petition, the citizen petition was a sham and an anticompetitive weapon.” *Id.* at 60. Absent any other facts from which a “sham” could plausibly be inferred, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the antitrust claim. *Id.* at 61–62. In contrast to *Apotex*, the allegedly anticompetitive conduct at issue for purposes of this analysis is not a citizen petition but a set of lawsuits regarding the 40 mg product. Determining whether the lawsuits were a sham is a “delicate task” that would be inappropriate on this relatively undeveloped record.

\*16 In *Bath Petroleum Storage, Inc. v. Market Hub Partners, L.P.*, the Second Circuit affirmed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of antitrust claims under *Noerr-Pennington*, agreeing with the district court's findings that the defendants’

interventions in a series of administrative proceedings were not objectively baseless. 229 F.3d 1135 (2d Cir. 2000) (summary order). But *Bath Petroleum* did not involve any claim of patent infringement. Moreover, the district court was able to rely on documents from the administrative proceedings to determine that none of the defendants’ statements in those proceedings were misrepresentations.

Ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court in *AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.* found that the underlying patent litigation was not objectively baseless and concluded that the sham litigation exception did not apply. No. M-21-81, 2010 WL 2079722, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010). The *AstraZeneca* court was able to make that determination, however, because it had previously ruled on summary judgment that there were genuine issues of fact as to whether the patents were infringed and because it had ruled after a bench trial that the patent-holder had proven two of three contested limitations of its claims were found in the competitor's product. *Id.* Here, in contrast, Teva's 40 mg infringement claims were not tested on summary judgment, and Teva did not prevail on any issues in the 40 mg litigation.

Finally, in *Marchon Eyewear, Inc. v. Tura LP*, No. 98 CV 1932, 2002 WL 31253199 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002), the court dismissed a sham-litigation counterclaim that alleged a series of patent-infringement suits brought for anti-competitive purposes because the counterclaim rested on only two suits: the infringement claim in *Marchon* itself, plus a prior unsuccessful infringement claim in *CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP*, 905 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). The court reasoned that two lawsuits did not add up to a “series” or “pattern” of suits sufficient to overcome the *Noerr-Pennington* defense. The court did not analyze the “objectively baseless” prong that applies when the theory is that a single action was a sham.

In short, while it might be possible in some cases to confer *Noerr-Pennington* immunity at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, this is not such a case. And at this stage of the litigation—given the “delicate task” of applying the sham-litigation standard in a case like this one—the court is not evaluating whether the parties have identified disputed facts. On this undeveloped record, the court cannot determine whether the 40 mg litigation was an objective “sham.”

Teva suggests that the court should award *Noerr-Pennington* immunity at this stage of the case because the 40 mg infringement suit was vigorously litigated and included a seven-day bench trial. (Doc. 66 at 16.) The court rejects that suggestion. Some courts have indeed declined to find underlying patent litigation to be a “sham” where that litigation was “hard-fought and close.” *AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Lab'ys, Inc.*, No. M-21-81, 2010 WL 2079722, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion). Here, the court has no difficulty finding that the 40 mg infringement suit was hard-fought.

But none of the adjudicators in that litigation suggested that it was a close case. In fact, each of the adjudicators who considered the issue—the PTAB,<sup>21</sup> Judge Sleet, and a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit—concluded that the claims were invalid as obvious. Judge Sleet made his findings by “clear and convincing evidence.” Of course, whether a lawsuit was objectively baseless is different than whether the litigant's suit was ultimately successful. See *PRE*, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5, 113 S.Ct. 1920 (“[W]hen the antitrust defendant has lost the underlying litigation, a court must resist the understandable temptation to engage in *post hoc* reasoning by concluding that an ultimately unsuccessful action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But the outcomes in all of the 40 mg litigations make *AstraZeneca* distinguishable.

**ii. Serial-Petitioning Exception**

\*17 In addition to the single-petition exception discussed above, the court also considers the serial-petitioning exception here. Regarding that variety of the sham exception, the court notes that the Third Circuit has, on at least one occasion, “declined to apply” the serial-petitioning exception “in the Hatch-Waxman context.” *FTC v. AbbVie Inc.*, 976 F.3d 327, 361 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing *In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig. Indirect Purchaser Class*, 868 F.3d 132, 157–58 (3d Cir. 2017)). That is because the Hatch-Waxman Act “incentivizes brand-name drug manufacturers to promptly file patent infringement suits by rewarding them with a stay of up to 30 months if they do so.” *Wellbutrin*, 868 F.3d at 157–58 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)). Courts are disinclined “to penalize a brand-name manufacturer whose

‘litigiousness was a product of Hatch-Waxman.’ ” *Id.* at 158 (quoting *Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Lab'ys, Inc.*, 552 F.3d 1033, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009)). Adopting that logic, Teva argues that the serial-petitioning exception does not apply to Teva's Hatch-Waxman lawsuits on the 20 mg or 40 mg products.<sup>22</sup> (Doc. 49 at 43.)

To the extent that Teva argues that Hatch-Waxman lawsuits are categorically exempt from the serial-petitioning exception, the court rejects that contention. The court does not read *AbbVie* as adopting such a sweeping proposition.

To the contrary, the *AbbVie* court remarked only that it had declined to apply the exception in a particular Hatch-Waxman case: *In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig. Indirect Purchaser Class*. And the *Wellbutrin* decision analyzed the serial-petitioning exception at the summary judgment stage—not on a motion to dismiss, as here. Moreover, the *Wellbutrin* court affirmed the district court's rejection of the serial-petitioning exception by reasoning that there was no “serial” or “pattern” of petitioning at all, and then further reasoning that the design and intent of Hatch-Waxman made the serial-petitioning charge “particularly inapt.” 868 F.3d at 157.

This court interprets that analysis to mean that the design and intent of Hatch-Waxman bolstered the conclusion that the serial-petitioning exception did not apply *in that case*, not that Hatch-Waxman lawsuits are categorically exempt from the serial-petitioning exception.<sup>23</sup> And even if the Third Circuit has adopted a categorical exemption from the serial-petitioning exception for Hatch-Waxman cases, this court would respectfully decline to adopt that theory. The court has found no case from within the Second Circuit that endorses such a categorical exemption.

Although Hatch-Waxman lawsuits are not categorically exempt from the serial-petitioning exception, several other issues concerning that exception remain. Defendants argue that there is no meaningful “series” of legal proceedings; that the non-Hatch-Waxman suits do not support the exception because they did not trigger a stay on the approval of any generic application; and that the serial-petitioning exception does not apply to Teva's citizen petitions “because the number of petitions is a byproduct of the FDA's procedures.” (Doc. 49

at 43–44.) The court rejects those arguments for the reasons discussed next.

\*18 Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ “sham” argument is not directed to Teva’s patent litigation regarding Copaxone 20 mg. Indeed, Teva achieved an entirely favorable result in the district court—[Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.](#), 876 F. Supp. 2d 295, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)—and preserved much of that victory on appeal. See [Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.](#), 789 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015). That patent litigation would not support the single-petition variety of the sham exception. See [PRE](#), 508 U.S. at 60 n.5, 113 S.Ct. 1920 (“A winning lawsuit is by definition a reasonable effort at petitioning for redress and therefore not a sham.”). Plaintiffs do contend, however, that Teva’s lawsuits regarding Copaxone 20 mg “bolsters the case for application of the serial litigation exception.” (Doc. 58 at 34.)

The court agrees that it can consider the Copaxone 20 mg litigation as part of the “flexible” and “holistic” review that applies for the serial-petitioning exception. [Wellbutrin](#), 868 F.3d at 157. The 20 mg litigation should be considered as part of the review of Defendants’ “filing success—i.e., win-loss percentage.” [Id.](#) The 20 mg litigation fits largely within the “win” column for Teva. But it must also be considered alongside Teva’s undisputed losses in the district court and in the Federal Circuit in the consolidated Copaxone 40 mg cases. See [In re Copaxone Consol. Cases](#), No. 14-1171, 2017 WL 401943 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2017), [aff’d](#), 906 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

Defendants argue that the non-Hatch-Waxman patent lawsuits cited in the complaint do not support the serial-petitioning exception because, according to Defendants, the complaint lacks any allegations that those suits were brought under a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits. (Doc. 49 at 43.) Defendants correctly recite the applicable standard for the serial-petitioning exception; as noted above, the inquiry is “whether the legal challenges ‘are brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and for the purpose of injuring a market rival.’ ” [Primetime 24](#), 219 F.3d at 101 (quoting [USS-POSCO](#), 31 F.3d at 811). And Defendants may be correct that the non-Hatch-Waxman lawsuits did not trigger a stay on the approval of any generic application. But under the holistic review that applies here, these other

lawsuits could plausibly constitute “circumstantial evidence of [Defendants’] subjective motivations.” [Wellbutrin](#), 868 F.3d at 157.

This is true notwithstanding the fact that the non-Hatch-Waxman suits were filed against different defendants and, in Teva’s words, were “temporally and topically dispersed.” (Doc. 49 at 44.) The court agrees that, where—as here—drug manufacturers face multiple generic-drug applications, it would be unreasonable to expect the manufacturers “to initiate litigation against only some of the generic-drug applications they claim are infringing their patents.” [Twin City Bakery Workers & Welfare Fund v. Astra Aktiebolag](#), 207 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Still, the non-Hatch-Waxman suits all involved GA patents, and even if they are effectively a single litigation, they can be considered together with the Hatch-Waxman lawsuits discussed above and with the citizen petitions, which the court considers next.

In addition to the patent litigation, the court considers Teva’s citizen petitions. Defendants do not dispute that, between February 2008 and March 2015, Teva filed the eight unsuccessful citizen petitions described above. But Teva asserts that the serial-petitioning exception does not apply to those petitions “because the number of petitions filed is a byproduct of the FDA’s procedures” and that “[a]s a matter of substance, Teva filed essentially one petition, which the FDA ruled on once.” (Doc. 49 at 44.)

\*19 Plaintiffs oppose Teva’s argument on this point, arguing that: (1) “Teva recycled essentially the same petition repeatedly”; (2) “although the FDA told Teva that it would not review its citizen petitions prior to ruling on the ANDA, Teva waited until May 2014, just before its patents ran out, to file suit and enjoin ANDA approval based on the issues raised in its petitions”; and (3) “when (as promised) the FDA addressed the issues raised by Teva in a denial issued concurrent with its approval of Sandoz’s ANDA for 20 mg GA, Teva did not appeal.” (Doc. 58 at 33.) Plaintiffs adopt the view expressed in one law review article that Teva’s multiple petitions constitute “a particularly glaring example of a company’s aggressive use of the citizen petition process.” Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, [Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last Denied](#), 66 Am. U. L. Rev. 305, 345 (2016).

Teva replies that “Plaintiffs never explain what Teva should have done differently to protect its rights before the

FDA.” (Doc. 66 at 18.) Teva asserts that Plaintiffs’ other points are “self-contradictory.” (*Id.*) Regarding Plaintiffs’ claim that Teva waited until May 2014 to file suit against the FDA, Teva asserts that the court in that suit dismissed the action on ripeness grounds because the suit was filed before generic approval. *See Sebelius*, No. 14-cv-786 (D.D.C. May 14, 2014), ECF No. 36. Regarding Plaintiffs’ note that Teva did not appeal the FDA’s April 2015 approval of Sandoz’s ANDA for 20 mg Glatopa, Teva observes that any appeal would have been subject to a highly deferential standard of review<sup>24</sup> and that, if Teva had challenged the approval, “Plaintiffs would object to that too.” (Doc. 66 at 18.)

The general rule regarding the applicability of the single-petition sham exception applies with similar force to citizen petitions analyzed under the serial-petition variety. *See In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust Litig.*, 333 F. Supp. 3d 135, 154–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[W]hether a citizen petition is a sham is generally a question of fact for the jury.”). Whether a petition was a “sham” is an issue “independent of patent law.” *DDAVP*, 585 F.3d at 686. “Administrative petitions, while less susceptible than lawsuits to the sham exception, still carry the potential for antitrust liability.” *Id.*

The parties dispute whether Teva needed to file multiple citizen petitions to protect its rights. Plaintiffs assert that Teva “does not identify any FDA rule” requiring multiple petitions. (Doc. 58 at 33.) But Teva does not rely on an administrative rule; instead, Teva asserts that “the multiplicity of petitions was an artifact of FDA *policy and procedures*” (Doc. 66 at 18 (emphasis added))—namely, the policy appearing in the FDA guidance document cited above: *Citizen Petitions and Petitions for Stay of Action Subject to Section 505(q) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act*, 2011 WL 2836582 (June 2011) [hereinafter “FDA 505(q) Guidance”].

In that guidance document, the FDA acknowledged its legal obligation to respond to citizen petitions within 180 days of submission<sup>25</sup> and its simultaneous obligation to review applications such as ANDAs. The agency reasoned:

If we were to respond substantively to a petitioner’s request regarding the approvability of a certain aspect of a pending application before we have taken a final action on the approvability of the application as a whole, such response could interfere with the statutory and regulatory scheme governing the review of applications and related procedural rights of applicants.

FDA 505(q) *Guidance*, 2011 WL 2836582, at \*12. The agency concluded that no “substantive final Agency decision” on a citizen petition was required within 180 days “when a final decision on the approvability of the [ANDA] as a whole has not yet been made and when to render such a decision could deprive an applicant of procedural rights established by statute and regulations.” *Id.* The FDA stated that “[i]n such a situation, we would expect to deny a petition without comment on the substantive approval issue.” *Id.* The FDA did just that for each of the relevant citizen petitions that Teva filed between February 2008 and July 2014 (with the exception of the petition that Teva withdrew).

\*20 The court understands from the argument at the July 14, 2023 hearing that the right Teva sought to protect by filing serial citizen petitions was the right to challenge the agency decision in court. In Teva’s view, it needed to have a “live citizen petition” pending before the FDA at the time the FDA ruled on Sandoz’s ANDA in order to ensure that Teva had exhausted its administrative remedies—a requirement for any subsequent court challenge. (Doc. 75 at 34–35.) But as Teva observes in its reply brief, Teva had no way to know when the FDA would rule on the pending ANDA. (Doc. 66 at 18.) Thus, according to Teva, it refiled its citizen petitions to ensure that it satisfied the exhaustion requirement and that it had an avenue available to challenge the agency decision.

But Teva cites no authority for the proposition that a “live” citizen petition is required to satisfy any exhaustion requirement that might apply to an effort to challenge the FDA’s decision. In any case, if Teva sought to maintain a “live” citizen petition at all times until the FDA’s ruling on Sandoz’s ANDA, the record indicates that Teva’s serial petitions failed to do so. There were large gaps of time during which Sandoz’s ANDA was pending but during which Teva had no “live” citizen petition:

Petition No.	Filed	Days Since Denial of Prior Petition	Denied (or Withdrawn)
1	09/26/2008	--	03/25/2009

2	11/13/2009	233	05/11/2010
3	12/10/2010	213	06/08/2011
4	06/04/2012	362	11/12/2012
5	09/12/2013	304	01/03/2014 (withdrawn)
6	12/05/2013	--	05/02/2014
7	07/02/2014	61	11/26/2014
8	03/31/2015	125	04/16/2015

(See Doc. 1 ¶ 89 n.47 (filing dates); *id.* ¶ 91 n.49 (denial/withdrawal dates).) Of course, Teva required some time to prepare and file each petition. But if Teva's motivation was to preserve an avenue to judicial review by having a “live” petition, it presumably could have prepared each subsequent petition in advance, rather than risk the possibility that the FDA might rule on the ANDA during one of the hundreds of days that Teva had no pending citizen petition. Teva may have other explanations, but at the present stage of this case, the court cannot conclude that the serial-petition exception is inapplicable.

**b. Causation**

Having concluded that Teva is not entitled to *Noerr-Pennington* immunity at this stage of the case, the court turns to Teva's causation argument—i.e., Teva's contention that its petitions and lawsuits did not delay FDA approval of Sandoz's or Mylan's ANDAs. (Doc. 49 at 44.) “Causation in fact is ... a necessary element of any claim for relief ...” *In re Actos End-Payor Antitrust Litig.*, 848 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting *Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 801 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1986)). “An antitrust plaintiff must show that a defendant's anticompetitive act was a ‘material’ and ‘but-for’ cause of plaintiff's injury, although not necessarily the sole cause.” *Id.* “[A] plaintiff need not exhaust all possible alternative sources of injury in fulfilling his burden of proving compensable injury.” *Id.* (quoting *Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc.*, 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969)).

As noted above, Plaintiffs allege that Teva abused patent litigation and the FDA's citizen petition process “to artificially prolong Copaxone's patent exclusivity and block lower-cost generics from entering the market.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 8.) Teva asserts

that by the time that Sandoz's 20 mg ANDA was approved in April 2015, “there had been no litigation-based barrier to FDA approval for nearly a year.” (Doc. 49 at 45.) Teva further contends that, at most, the Complaint alleges that the FDA rejected Teva's final citizen petition on the same day that it approved Sandoz's ANDA, but that the Second Circuit has held that the FDA 505(q) Guidance document undermines any inference of anticompetitive delay that might be asserted “when a citizen petition is denied simultaneously with the grant of an ANDA petition.” *Apotex*, 823 F.3d at 60. And Teva maintains that 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(A) prohibits the FDA from delaying generic approval due to a pending citizen petition.

\*21 Similarly, Teva argues that the Complaint fails to plausibly allege that Teva's lawsuits or petitions delayed approval of Mylan's 20 mg and 40 mg ANDAs or Sandoz's 40 mg ANDA. (Doc. 49 at 46.) According to Teva, its citizen petitions could not have caused any delay because the last petition was submitted and denied in 2015 and thus “had no conceivable bearing on the timing of FDA approval of Mylan's ANDAs in October 2017.” (*Id.* at 46.) Teva further asserts that the lawsuit on the 20 mg product ended long before Mylan's approval, and that Teva's lawsuit on the 40 mg product could not have delayed FDA approval “because Teva's 40 mg product was entitled to three years of marketing exclusivity, which barred the FDA from approving generic 40 mg until January 28, 2017.” (*Id.*) Teva notes that the 30-month litigation stay for the 40 mg lawsuit ended on January 30, 2017 and that the FDA did not approve Mylan's 20 mg or 40 mg ANDAs for another eight months. (*Id.*)

Plaintiffs contend that Teva's conduct did delay generic competition and that Teva's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Plaintiffs assert that Teva's alleged sham litigation “is only part of its broader anticompetitive

scheme.” (Doc. 58 at 36.) Plaintiffs also argue that “Teva improperly asks the Court to draw inferences in its favor and assume that delays in FDA approvals and the lack of robust generic competition had nothing to do with its repeated lawsuits and administrative filings.” (*Id.*) Plaintiffs maintain that the court cannot decide at this stage of the case that Teva’s conduct did not delay generic entry; according to Plaintiffs, it is plausible that:

- Other generic manufacturers were deterred from entering the market earlier or at all because of the costs of defending against Teva’s abusive litigation tactics.
- Approval of Sandoz’s 20mg ANDA was delayed because the district court, at Teva’s urging, mistakenly enjoined FDA approval until September 2015. As Teva concedes, the injunction was not shortened (to allow generic launch in May 2014) until late December 2013, Mot. 10, at which point it may have been too late for an overburdened FDA to adjust its timetable to decide the 20mg ANDA earlier.
- Teva’s eight citizen petitions and related litigation consumed FDA resources, and the FDA’s evaluation of Sandoz’s 20mg ANDA was slowed by its evaluation of the multitude of purported “public health” issues raised in those petitions. Indeed, the FDA expressly stated that “it intended to consider the issues that [Teva] had raised [in its various petitions] *if and when FDA approved a generic version of Copaxone.*”
- Mylan’s pursuit of ANDAs was delayed by fending off four different lawsuits by Teva, including suits related to 40mg patents that Teva never should have obtained or asserted.

(Doc. 58 at 36–37 (alterations in original; footnote omitted).) In reply, Teva argues that Plaintiffs’ reliance on the alleged “anticompetitive scheme” is misplaced because “no other aspect of the purported ‘scheme’ is *even alleged to* have impacted the timing of FDA approval.” (Doc. 66 at 19.) Teva further argues that Plaintiffs’ other arguments are mere speculation.

**i. FDA Approval of Sandoz’s 20 mg ANDA**

Teva correctly observes that the district court in the consolidated 20 mg Hatch-Waxman cases permitted generic launch in May 2014. Almost a full year passed from that time until the FDA approved Sandoz’s 20 mg product in April

2015. Teva asserts that there was no “litigation-based barrier to FDA approval” during that time. (Doc. 49 at 45.) Plaintiffs interpret that as a concession that there was a one-year delay. (Doc. 58 at 36.) Plaintiffs further assert that the district court’s July 2012 injunction—for which Teva advocated—was not modified to shorten the injunction period until December 2013, by which time, Plaintiffs argue, “it may have been too late for an overburdened FDA to adjust its timetable to decide the 20mg ANDA earlier.” (*Id.*)

Teva’s arguments do not persuade the court that Plaintiffs’ allegations are implausible. It is true, of course, that there was no litigation-based barrier to FDA approval between May 2014 and April 2015. But it is reasonable to infer “that the stay resulting from the patent infringement litigation led the FDA to divert its resources away from” Sandoz’s 20 mg ANDA. *Restasis*, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 159.

\*22 The FDA may have prioritized reviewing applications for other generic drugs, because, even if tentative approval were granted to the ANDAs, a drug subject to a stay would not be able to enter the market for some time (possibly over a decade if the patent infringement suit were successful and the ANDA applicant had to wait until the patent expired).

*Id.* Such a diversion of resources could plausibly have occurred well before May 2014.

The court also rejects Teva’s suggestion that the “only potentially relevant allegation” in the complaint regarding the citizen petitions is that the FDA rejected the final petition on the same day that it approved Sandoz’s 20 mg product. (Doc. 49 at 45.) Plaintiffs are not required to plead “a response to every potential argument” that Teva has raised. *Restasis*, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 159 n.14. In their briefing, Plaintiffs assert that the citizen petitions consumed FDA resources and slowed the FDA’s evaluation of Sandoz’s 20 mg ANDA. (Doc. 58 at 37.) As other courts have recognized, it is plausible to infer that the FDA “in practice does delay approval of generics while responding to citizen petitions” because “(1) [FDA] fears litigation if it grants an ANDA without fully addressing the citizen petition; and (2) [FDA] has limited resources, and responding to a citizen petition takes time away from the approval process.” *Restasis*, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 158.

That inference is plausible notwithstanding the requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(A). See *id.* (citing cases); see also *Apotex*, 823 F.3d at 60 n.4 (“[I]t is not evident that

[§ 355(q)(1)(A)] has curbed all abuses of the citizen petition process.”). And the inference remains plausible even though the FDA had Teva's arguments “years in advance” of the ultimate approval (Doc. 66 at 20). *Cf. Restasis*, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 159 (“The FDA may have slowed or halted its review of ANDAs to address the citizen petitions and to account for the stay so that, even if the review is now moving along unobstructed, the ANDAs would have been approved months or even years ago had the petitions not been filed.”).

**ii. Mylan's ANDAs; Sandoz's 40 mg ANDA**

The FDA did not approve Mylan's 20 mg ANDA (submitted in June 2009) until October 2017. FDA, ANDA 091646 Approval (Oct. 3, 2017), [https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda\\_docs/applletter/2017/091646Orig1s000ltr.pdf](https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/applletter/2017/091646Orig1s000ltr.pdf) [https://perma.cc/7MAN-AWJ6]. Teva notes that the October 2017 approval was more than two years after the April 2015 denial of Teva's last citizen petition, and even farther removed from the May 2014 expiration of the district court's injunction. (Doc. 49 at 46.) Thus, Teva asserts that its lawsuits and petitions could not have delayed approval of Mylan's 20 mg product. The court disagrees; for the reasons explained above, it is plausible to infer that the ANDA would have been approved earlier if Teva had not filed the petitions and lawsuits.

The FDA did not approve Mylan's 40 mg ANDA (submitted in February 2014) until October 2017. FDA, ANDA 206936 Approval (Oct. 3, 2017), [https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda\\_docs/applletter/2017/206936Orig1s000ltr.pdf](https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/applletter/2017/206936Orig1s000ltr.pdf) [https://perma.cc/MG85-XHV4]. The FDA also did not approve Sandoz's 40 mg ANDA (submitted in February 2014) until February 2018. FDA, ANDA 206921 Approval (Feb. 12, 2018), [https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda\\_docs/applletter/2018/206921Orig1s000ltr.pdf](https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/applletter/2018/206921Orig1s000ltr.pdf) [https://perma.cc/4A84-66LQ]. Plaintiffs do not dispute Teva's observation that, as of January 2017, “no exclusivity or litigation stay blocked the FDA from approving” those 40 mg ANDAs. (Doc. 49 at 35.) But again, for the reasons explained above, it is plausible to infer that the ANDA would have been approved earlier if Teva had not filed the lawsuits alleging infringement of the patents for Copaxone 40 mg.

**c. Time Bar**

\*23 Teva's third argument regarding the effect of its petitions and lawsuits is based on the statute of limitations. (See Doc. 49 at 46.) Teva notes that the relevant lawsuits and citizen petitions were all filed more than seven years before Plaintiffs filed this federal suit in August 2022 and that any claim premised on Teva's litigation or petitioning conduct is time-barred under the Clayton Act's four-year limitations period at 15 U.S.C. § 15b and under the various state laws, which have limitations periods of six years or fewer. (*Id.* at 46–47.)

The court discusses the state statutes of limitations below. For purposes of the discussion here regarding the timeliness of the federal claim in Count IV, the court observes that Plaintiffs have argued that Count IV seeks “only equitable relief pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 26, to which the Clayton Act's statute of limitations does not apply.” (Doc. 58 at 79 n.46.) Teva's reply memorandum does not respond to that point. The court agrees with Plaintiffs that the limitations provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 15b do not apply to claims brought under 15 U.S.C. § 26. See *Rite Aid Corp. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co.*, 708 F. Supp. 2d 257, 272 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“By its terms, the Clayton Act's four-year statute of limitations, 15 U.S.C. § 15b, does not apply to claims for equitable relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.”), *abrogated on other grounds by* *U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp.*, 938 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2019); *see also Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 552 F. Supp. 589, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“The relevant statute of limitations set forth at section 4B of the Clayton Act does not by its terms apply to claims for equitable relief pursuant to section 16 of the Clayton Act.”).

Even though § 15b's limitations period does not apply to the § 26 claim in Count IV, courts in this circuit have held that a four-year period of laches applies to such claims. *Rite Aid*, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 272; *Argus*, 552 F. Supp. at 600 (“[T]he equitable claims pursuant to section 16 of the Clayton Act are not time-barred unless plaintiffs are guilty of laches under the standard set forth above.”). But Teva has offered no argument or analysis of the applicable laches doctrine. The court therefore declines to reach that issue insofar as it might apply to the claims in Count IV.

## 2. Alleged Conduct to Limit Generic Uptake

The second category of alleged anticompetitive conduct in this case is Teva's alleged conduct to limit generic uptake. Teva asserts that Plaintiffs' allegations under this category "suffer from numerous flaws." (Doc. 49 at 27.) Teva argues that its introduction and promotion of **Copaxone** 40 mg was not anticompetitive. (*Id.* at 47.) Teva further argues that its efforts to compete with generic GA products do not support antitrust liability. (*Id.* at 52.)

### a. Introduction and Promotion of **Copaxone** 40 mg

Teva's introduction and promotion of **Copaxone** 40 mg is analyzed under § 2 of the Sherman Act. *See* Herbert Hovenkamp et al., *An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law* § 15.03[B][1] ("Because product changes by pharmaceutical patent owners represent unilateral conduct, they are evaluated under section 2 of the Sherman Act."). To state a § 2 claim, Plaintiffs must establish: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." *PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-ColaCo.*, 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting *United States v. Grinnell Corp.*, 384 U.S. 563, 570–71, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966)). For present purposes, Teva does not challenge Plaintiffs' contention that Teva maintained monopoly power before entry of generic 20 mg and 40 mg GA. (Doc. 49 at 52 n.18.)

\*24 The court therefore focuses here on the second essential element of a § 2 claim: willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power. To determine whether a product change violates § 2 based on the rule-of-reason test articulated in *Standard Oil Co. v. United States*, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911), the Second Circuit has endorsed the framework set forth in *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam). *See* *New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC*, 787 F.3d 638, 652 (2d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter *Namenda*]. Under that framework: "once a plaintiff establishes that a monopolist's conduct is anticompetitive

or exclusionary, the monopolist may proffer 'nonpretextual' procompetitive justifications for its conduct. The plaintiff may then either rebut those justifications or demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm outweighs the procompetitive benefit." *Namenda*, 787 F.3d at 652 (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs allege that Teva sought to acquire or maintain monopoly power by means of a "product hop" from **Copaxone** 20 mg to **Copaxone** 40 mg. (*See* Doc. 1 ¶ 157.) In the Hatch-Waxman context, product-hopping can be anticompetitive. *See* Alan Devlin, *Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context*, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 631, 658 (2007) ("Product hopping would have little competitive significance as an exclusionary strategy outside the regulatory process. However, the unique framework put in place by the Hatch-Waxman Act—and in particular the FDA-approval process—facilitates a potentially powerful form of exclusion.").

Teva contends that its introduction and promotion of the 40 mg product was not anticompetitive for three reasons. First, Teva asserts that the complaint fails to allege a "hard switch." Second, Teva maintains that the complaint fails to allege any coercion absent such a "hard switch." Third, Teva argues that Plaintiffs' product-hop claim is untimely. (Doc. 49 at 48–52.) The court considers these arguments in turn.

### i. "Hard Switch"

As noted above, "product hopping" is "conduct by a monopolist to perpetuate patent exclusivity through successive products." *Namenda*, 787 F.3d at 643. Plaintiffs allege that Teva engaged in a product hop via a multi-pronged campaign that included "coerc[ing] and induc[ing] doctors, pharmacies, and patients to switch from 20 mg **Copaxone** to 40 mg **Copaxone** before Glatopa or other 20 mg generics became available for purchase." (Doc. 1 ¶ 168.) Teva argues that Plaintiffs "cannot state an antitrust claim based on Teva's alleged market-shifting strategy because they do not allege that Teva engaged in a 'hard switch.'" (Doc. 49 at 48.)

The parties have different definitions of the phrase "hard switch." Teva adopts the view in *In re Asacol Antitrust Litigation* that a "hard switch" means "removing the original drug from the market entirely right before patent expiration to deprive potential generic manufacturers a prescription base for their generic version of the now-removed drug." 233



F. Supp. 3d 247, 256 (D. Mass. 2017) (citing *Namenda*). And Teva argues that the complaint fails to allege a “hard switch” because the original product—Copaxone 20 mg—“remains on the market and continues to be prescribed to this day.” (Doc. 49 at 49.)

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Teva never withdrew the 20 mg product from the market. But Plaintiffs assert that the alleged product hop in this case harmed competition even though the original product was never withdrawn. (See Doc. 58 at 39.) Plaintiffs contend that a “hard switch” is the label that is applied when a company “coerces” patients to switch products, whereas a “soft switch” applies when a company permissibly “persuades” patients to switch. (See *id.*) And Plaintiffs maintain that the complaint plausibly alleges coercive conduct (and thus a “hard switch” as Plaintiffs define it). (*Id.*)

\*25 The *Namenda* case involved an Alzheimer's disease medication. The defendants’ patents on one version of the drug, “*Namenda IR*,” prohibited generic competitors from marketing a generic version until July 2015. *Namenda*, 787 F.3d at 647. The defendants brought “*Namenda XR*” to market in July 2013; the patent exclusivity period for that version does not expire until 2029. *Id.* The two *Namenda* versions have different strengths and dosage regimens: “*Namenda IR* involves two immediate-release tablets of 10mg each and *Namenda XR* involves one 28mg extended-release capsule.” *Id.* Generic versions of *Namenda IR* were poised to enter the market in July 2015, but those generics were not “therapeutically equivalent” to *Namenda XR* under FDA regulations; thus pharmacists generally could not substitute generic *IR* for *Namenda XR*. *Id.*

When the defendants brought *Namenda XR* to market in 2013, they adopted certain “product extension” strategies to convert patients from *IR* to *XR*. (*Id.* at 647–48.)

Initially, Defendants sold both *Namenda IR* and *XR* but stopped actively marketing *IR*. During that time, they spent substantial sums of money promoting *XR* to doctors, caregivers, patients, and pharmacists. They also sold *XR* at a discounted rate, making it considerably less expensive than *Namenda IR* tablets, and issued rebates to health plans to ensure that patients did not have to pay higher co-payments for *XR* than for *IR*.

*Id.* at 648 (footnotes omitted). The parties and the Second Circuit described those product-extension strategies—implemented while *IR* was still on the market—as the “soft switch.” *Id.*

But in early 2014 the defendants were “concerned that they would be unable to convert a significant percentage of Alzheimer's patients ... from *IR* to *XR* prior to the entry of generic *IR*.” *Id.* In February 2014, the defendants announced plans to discontinue the *IR* product. A disruption in *XR* production delayed the planned discontinuance, and then a September 2014 antitrust suit resulted in an agreement under which defendants provided “limited access” to the *IR* product via a mail-order-only pharmacy in cases where a doctor found that the *IR* product was “medically necessary.”

*Id.* The defendants estimated internally that less than 3% of current *IR* users would be able to obtain *IR* through the mail-order pharmacy; thus the defendants’ actions “effectively withdrew *Namenda IR* from the market.” *Id.* The parties and the Second Circuit described the defendants’ efforts to withdraw *Namenda IR* from the market as the “hard switch.”

*Id.*

On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that “[a]s a general rule, courts are properly very skeptical about claims that competition has been harmed by a dominant firm's product design changes.” *Id.* at 652 (quoting *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 65). But “product redesign is anticompetitive when it coerces consumers and impedes competition.” *Id.* The court recognized that “neither product withdrawal nor product improvement alone is anticompetitive.” *Id.* at 653–54.

But under [*Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979)], when a monopolist combines product withdrawal with some other conduct, the overall effect of which is to coerce consumers rather than persuade them on the merits, and to impede competition, its actions are anticompetitive under the Sherman Act.

*Id.* (citations omitted). The court concluded that “Defendants’ hard switch—the combination of introducing *Namenda XR* into the market and effectively withdrawing *Namenda IR*—forced Alzheimer's patients who depend on memantine therapy to switch to *XR* (to which generic *IR* is not therapeutically equivalent)” and that the “hard switch” would “likely impede generic competition by precluding generic

substitution through state drug substitution laws.” *Id.* at 654. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from restricting access to the IR product before generic IR entry. *Id.* at 644.

\*26 The court concludes that a “product hop” by definition involves withdrawal of an “old” or “legacy” product. See Alan Devlin, *Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context*, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 631, 657 (2007) (defining a product hop as involving “a patentee switching the formulation of its patented drug as soon as a generic potential competitor's ANDA is approved” and “withdraw[al] of the previous brand-name drug and replacement with the “improved” product); see also Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, *Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application* § 708f (defining product hopping as the situation where “[a] firm terminates its sale of a patented pioneer pharmaceutical drug prior to patent expiry, switching its promotion and market efforts to a newer version of the drug that is typically under one or more secondary patents” (emphasis added)).

The *Asacol* decision illustrates this point. The plaintiffs in *Asacol* brought three counts, alleging that the defendants (1) “engaged in an anticompetitive scheme that included product hopping that constituted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act”; (2) “attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act”; and (3) engaged in a “product hop monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.” *Asacol*, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 253. The *Asacol* court ruled that the product-hop claim based on an alleged “hard switch” to *Asacol* HD was not plausible “because *Asacol* and *Asacol* HD were sold side-by-side.” *Id.* at 267. The court went on to state that product withdrawal “undergirds a product-hopping claim” and held that the lack of a “hard switch” was “insufficient pleading as to *Asacol* HD for the product hop claim in Count III.” *Id.* at 270. Thus the absence of any allegation in this case that Teva withdrew *Copaxone* 20 mg from the market means that Plaintiffs cannot have plausibly alleged a “product hop” as that term is defined.<sup>26</sup>

But this does not end the inquiry because a “hard switch” or “product hop” is not essential to Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims. Indeed, the *Asacol* court specifically stated that “the lack of a hard switch does not preclude the use of the *Asacol* HD marketing strategy in considering whether the Defendants engaged in an overall anticompetitive scheme

in Counts I and II.” *Id.* at 270. Whereas the complaint in *Asacol* included a specific Sherman Act “product hop” claim that was vulnerable to dismissal, the Sherman Act count in this case is more like Count I in *Asacol*: an alleged anticompetitive scheme that allegedly included a “product hop.” The decisions of other courts are in accord:

\*27 Although *Namenda* did involve withdrawal of *Namenda* IR in order to drive consumers over to *Namenda* XR, that does not mean the free choice of consumers can be constrained only where the old product is withdrawn from the market.... This is not to say that withdrawal of an old product, or the continued availability of such, is of no relevance in a switching/product hopping case. The Court is simply noting here that withdrawal of an old product is not the only means of coercion.

*In re HIV Antitrust Litig.*, 656 F.Supp.3d 963, 977 (N.D. Cal. 2023). The continued availability of *Copaxone* in the 20 mg formulation is not fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim. The parties also disagree about whether Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged coercion. The court turns to that issue next.

## ii. Coercion

Teva argues that the complaint in this case fails to plausibly allege coercion. (Doc. 49 at 50.) Plaintiffs maintain that the complaint includes allegations of coercion that are “more than sufficient at the pleading stage.” (Doc. 58 at 41.) Although Plaintiffs do not allege that Teva ever withdrew its 20 mg product, Plaintiffs do allege—as described above—that Teva: (a) manipulated the prices of its *Copaxone* products; (b) pressured PBMs by withholding rebates on *Copaxone* 20 mg unless the PBMs made the 40 mg product available on their formularies; (c) colluded with PBMs on the “*Copaxone* conversion initiative”; (d) launched an “intense outreach campaign” targeting prescribing physicians; and (e) explored a plan to discontinue copay assistance for the 20 mg product. (*See id.* at 40–41.)

As noted above, “product redesign is anticompetitive when it coerces consumers and impedes competition.”

*Namenda*, 787 F.3d at 652. The Second Circuit puts “emphasis on consumer coercion in evaluating a monopolist’s product redesign.” *Id.* at 652 n.23. And the *Namenda* court’s interpretation of coercion is “in accord” with other circuit court decisions, including *Microsoft*. *Id.* The


*Microsoft* court recognized the factually intensive nature of the coercion analysis:

Whether any particular act of a monopolist is exclusionary, rather than merely a form of vigorous competition, can be difficult to discern: the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad. The challenge for an antitrust court lies in stating a general rule for distinguishing between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competitive acts, which increase it.

*Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 58. The *Namenda* case examines one set of circumstances but “*Namenda*-style coercion is not necessarily required.” *In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig.*, 433 F. Supp. 3d 274, 331 (D.R.I. 2019). Whether Teva’s alleged conduct “crosses the line from persuasion to coercion” requires careful consideration of all the circumstances. *Namenda*, 787 F.3d at 654.

Teva seeks to discount each of the five categories of alleged coercion upon which Plaintiffs rely. (See Doc. 49 at 50–52.) Regarding the alleged price manipulation (see Doc. 1 ¶ 169), Teva asserts that there is nothing inappropriate about offering discounts in an effort to win consumers over to a new product, and that Plaintiffs cannot prove coercion by arguing that the introductory price for Copaxone 40 mg was too low. (Doc. 49 at 50.) Plaintiffs insist that Teva manipulated pricing to coerce a change by “irrationally pricing its 40mg product lower than 20mg and then significantly increasing the price of 20mg.” (Doc. 58 at 40.)

\*28 Plaintiffs concede that in *Namenda* the defendants’ sale of the XR product at a discounted rate was part of the permissible “soft switch” in that case. (Doc. 58 at 40 n.20.) But Plaintiffs argue that, by increasing the price of the legacy product, Teva went beyond simply discounting the new product. Teva maintains that the complaint lacks any allegations that the price increase for Copaxone 20 mg was out of step with “normal price increases” for that product. (Doc. 49 at 51.) Teva contends that the pricing data—as alleged in the complaint—suggest the opposite:



(Doc. 1 ¶ 59.)

One possible inference that could be drawn from inspection of this pricing timeline is that the price increases for Teva’s 20 mg product after introduction of the 40 mg product are consistent with the prior price increases for Copaxone 20 mg. But at this stage of the case, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. Here, the complaint alleges that Teva pitched the 40 mg product as an “upgrade” from the legacy product (*id.* ¶ 172) and as a “significant advancement” (*id.* ¶ 182), at least in part because the three-times weekly dosage was “more convenient to patients” (*id.* ¶ 179). Another reasonable inference, therefore, might be that the price for the “legacy” product should have dropped (or at least risen less steeply) once the “superior” product was available.

Regarding the alleged pressure on PBMs (Doc. 1 ¶ 170), Teva asserts that “Plaintiffs conflate improper coercion with legitimate (and successful) efforts to use price incentives to increase customer choice by encouraging PBMs to offer both the 20 mg and 40 mg products in their formularies.” (Doc. 49 at 51.) Plaintiffs argue that Teva did not just offer price discounts, but instead “threatened to and did withhold rebates on a different product for which it had monopoly power to force PBMs to add its new product to their formularies.” (Doc. 58 at 40.)

On this issue, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Teva’s conduct was designed to ensure that both the 20 mg and 40 mg products would be included in the PBMs’ formularies. The presence of both products on the formularies arguably increased consumer choice as between Teva’s Copaxone products. But the inquiry is whether Teva’s conduct was exclusionary with respect to generic GA products. Plaintiffs’ allegations on this issue support the inference that Teva used its monopoly power on its 20 mg product as one part of its alleged “multi-pronged campaign” (Doc. 1 ¶ 168) to switch patients to Copaxone 40 mg before widespread uptake of generic 20 mg GA products.

Although the court in *Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC*, 821 F.3d 394, 406 (3d Cir. 2016), stated that “the threat of a lost discount is a far cry from the anticompetitive conduct” that was held coercive in other cases, *Eisai* did not involve any attempt by the brand-name manufacturer to introduce a “new” version of its product. Here, the court considers Teva’s alleged threat to withhold rebates in the overall context of Plaintiffs’ switching theory.

Regarding the alleged “Copaxone conversion initiative” (Doc. 1 ¶ 171), Teva argues that “there is nothing anticompetitive about Teva promoting its product, or with specialty pharmacies doing the same.” (Doc. 49 at 52.) Teva notes that the antitrust laws do not “prohibit[ ] market switching through sales persuasion short of false representations or fraud.” *Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P.*, 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (D.D.C. 2008). And Teva maintains that Plaintiffs have not alleged that Teva made false representations to promote Copaxone 40 mg. (Doc. 49 at 52 n.17.)

\*29 Plaintiffs do not quarrel with the proposition that “sales persuasion” is permissible. But Plaintiffs do allege that Teva made false or misleading statements about Copaxone 40 mg, including Teva’s statements at the launch in January 2014 that the new three-times-a-week product represented “a significant advancement for patients” and that it was an “innovation” that would address patient needs and ease patient burdens. (Doc. 1 ¶ 182.) According to the complaint, Teva made those assertions despite the fact that Teva’s own personnel had stated that Copaxone 40 mg was not “a significant improvement in convenience” (Doc. 1 ¶ 179); that it had “no scientific rationale/value” (*id.*); and that it provided “[n]o major advantage on GA 20mg” (*id.* ¶ 181).

Teva maintains that there is an “obvious consumer benefit from substantially reducing the number of injections.” (Doc. 49 at 50 n.16.) Judge Sleet made a similar finding in his 2017 decision. *See In re Copaxone Consolidated Cases*, 2017 WL 401943, at \*23–24 (finding that Copaxone 40 mg “exhibits an advantage over the 20mg daily form” because the less frequent dosing is more tolerable for patients). Although Plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences at this stage of the case, the court is not persuaded that Teva’s statements at the 2014 product launch were false representations or fraudulent.

Plaintiffs also allege that Teva “directly targeted physicians with an intense outreach campaign through its sales force.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 172.) Its salespeople contacted physicians to urge them to switch patients to the 40 mg formulation and to prescribe and recommend the Copaxone brand in place of a generic product. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs also allege that Teva considered a plan to discontinue copay assistance for the 20 mg dosage, thus coercing patients to switch to the 40 mg dosage. (*Id.* ¶ 173.)

The court is satisfied that considered together, the allegations about Teva’s bare-knuckled defense of its monopoly position may be sufficient to support a factual determination at trial that patients were subjected to coercion in choosing between the brand and the generic versions of the drug. The combination of pricing the new 40 mg drug below the legacy 20 mg version, threatening to withhold rebates for the 20 mg version, and pressing prescribers to exclude new generic entrants from their orders is sufficient to constitute a claim of coercive conduct.

**iii. Timeliness**

Finally, Teva argues that Plaintiffs “cannot rely on Teva’s alleged market-shifting efforts to support their federal or state antitrust claims that are subject to limitations periods of four years or fewer.” (Doc. 49 at 52.) As noted above, the limitations provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 15b do not apply to claims brought under 15 U.S.C. § 26. Teva has offered no argument or analysis on the potential laches issue, and the court does not reach that issue here.

**b. Efforts to Compete with Generic GA Products**

Because the court concludes that the allegations concerning anti-competitive conduct in connection with the development and release of generic products provides a sufficient basis for denial of the motion to dismiss, the court does not reach the second claim that Teva’s actions after Sandoz and Mylan entered the generic market also provide a basis for denial.

**B. State-Law Claims**

In addition to its challenge to Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims, Teva challenges Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.<sup>27</sup> Teva brings four categories of challenges to the state-law claims: (1) a set of challenges to the state antitrust claims; (2) a set of

challenges to the state consumer-protection claims; (3) a set of challenges to the state unjust-enrichment claims; and (4) a statute-of-limitations challenge.<sup>28</sup> The court considers each category of challenges in turn.

### 1. State Antitrust Claims (Counts I–III)

\*30 Teva argues that Plaintiffs’ state antitrust claims “are premised on the same allegations and suffer from the same deficiencies as their Sherman Act claims.” (Doc. 49 at 68.) It is true that courts have dismissed state antitrust claims that are “premised on the identical actions that form the basis of the [dismissed] Sherman Act claims.” *In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust Litig.*, No. 13-MD-2445, 2017 WL 4642285, at \*12 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2017). But for the reasons discussed above, the court concludes that Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims survive Teva’s Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. The court therefore turns to Teva’s contention that Plaintiffs’ claims “suffer from numerous state-law specific deficiencies.” (Doc. 49 at 68.)<sup>29</sup>

#### a. *Illinois Brick*

As Teva observes, the “indirect purchaser” rule for federal antitrust cases “bars those who do not directly purchase a product from recovering antitrust damages.” *New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC*, 787 F.3d 638, 662 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing *Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois*, 431 U.S. 720, 745–46, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977)); *see also* *Ne. Farm Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Krone NA, Inc.*, No. 17-cv-72, 2018 WL 11469704, at \*4 (D. Vt. Mar. 9, 2018) (recognizing that *Illinois Brick* “ruled out federal antitrust claims by indirect purchasers”). State legislatures retain the right to permit such recoveries under state antitrust laws. *Krone*, 2018 WL 11469704, at \*4 (citing *California v. ARC Am. Corp.*, 490 U.S. 93, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989)). But a state that “has not expressly passed *Illinois Brick* repealer legislation or interpreted its law in such a way as to override the rule of *Illinois Brick* is presumed to have decided to follow federal law, including the *Illinois Brick* limitation on indirect purchaser claims.” *Miami Prods. & Chem. Co. v. Olin Corp.*, 546 F. Supp. 3d 223, 236 (W.D.N.Y. 2021)

(quoting *In re Digit.Music Antitrust Litig.*, 812 F. Supp. 2d 390, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).

Teva contends that the *Illinois Brick* doctrine partly bars Plaintiffs’ claims under Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Utah law. (Doc. 49 at 69.) Plaintiffs concede that they cannot recover antitrust damages under Connecticut law before October 1, 2017; under Rhode Island law before July 15, 2013; or under Utah law before May 1, 2006—the effective dates of those states’ *Illinois Brick* repealer statutes. (Doc. 58 at 59 n.38.) The court will accordingly limit Plaintiffs’ antitrust damages claims under those states’ laws; those claims are barred prior to the respective dates listed above.

Teva also argues that Plaintiffs’ claims for damages under Illinois and Puerto Rico antitrust law should be dismissed because those jurisdictions follow *Illinois Brick*. (Doc. 49 at 68.) Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that Illinois and Puerto Rico allow claims by indirect purchasers. (Doc. 58 at 59.) The court considers each jurisdiction in turn.

*Illinois*. The Illinois Antitrust Act (“IAA”) states in pertinent part: “[N]o person shall be authorized to maintain a class action in any court of this State for indirect purchasers asserting claims under this Act, with the sole exception of this State’s Attorney General, who may maintain an action *parens patriae* as provided in this subsection.” 740 ILCS § 10/7(2).

Teva asserts that this statute adopts *Illinois Brick* and that the IAA’s prohibition on indirect-purchaser class actions applies in federal court. (Doc. 49 at 69.) Plaintiffs maintain that the plain language of the Illinois statute limits the class-action prohibition to Illinois state courts, not federal courts.

(Doc. 58 at 59–60.) Plaintiffs further argue that *Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.*, 559 U.S. 393, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010), requires the same result. (*Id.* at 60.)

\*31 There appears to be no judicial consensus as to whether the IAA’s prohibition on indirect-purchaser class actions applies in federal court.<sup>30</sup> Teva cites a number of cases—most from outside the Second Circuit—holding that the IAA bars indirect-purchaser actions in federal court.<sup>31</sup> Plaintiffs cite cases that reach the opposite conclusion.<sup>32</sup> The courts in the former category conclude that the IAA is “substantive” under *Shady Grove*, reasoning that Justice Stevens’ concurrence in that case is controlling. Courts in the latter category

conclude that the IAA is “procedural” under [Shady Grove](#), and thus [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23](#) imposes the only relevant class action requirements.

Before considering the [Shady Grove](#) issue, the court examines the “court of this State” language of [740 ILCS § 10/7\(2\)](#). As it is worded, the statute’s bar on class actions by indirect purchasers can be read as limited only to actions “in any court of this State”—i.e., any Illinois state court. Some courts have held or suggested that this is the correct interpretation of the IAA. See [Merck](#), 2023 WL 8018980, at \*14 (“[T]he plain language of the statute itself does not suggest a legislative intent to foreclose all private class actions, but merely those in Illinois state courts.”); [Contant](#), 2018 WL 5292126, at \*12 (“[T]he statute, by its terms, does not apply in federal court ...”); [Propranolol](#), 249 F. Supp. 3d at 728 (“It is not obvious that the formulaic expression ‘in any court of this State’ appearing in an Illinois statute applies to a federal court in [New York] ....” (alteration in original; quoting [Aggrenox](#), 2016 WL 4204478, at \*5)).

Teva’s reply brief does not address this issue, and thus Teva has “arguably conceded the point.” [State St. Glob. Advisors Tr. Co. v. Visbal](#), No. 19-cv-1719, — F.Supp.3d —, —, n.17, 2023 WL 4053170, at \*29 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2023). Moreover, this court has given effect to statutory provisions that, by their terms, apply only to actions in state court. See [Wakefield v. Scott](#), No. 17-cv-115, 2017 WL 11724172, at \*3 (D. Vt. Aug. 15, 2017) (recognizing that [9 V.S.A. § 4506\(a\)](#), which authorizes actions in Vermont Superior Court, constitutes consent to suit in state court but not federal court). The court adheres to that logic in this case and holds that the limitation in [740 ILCS § 10/7\(2\)](#), by its own terms, does not apply to the federal court in Vermont.

\*32 The court is also not persuaded that [Shady Grove](#) requires dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Illinois antitrust claims. The question in [Shady Grove](#) was whether [N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901\(b\)](#)—which prohibits class actions in suits seeking penalties or statutory minimum damages—“precludes a federal district court sitting in diversity from entertaining a class action under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23](#).” [Shady Grove](#), 559 U.S. at 396, 130 S.Ct. 1431. As summarized by Judge Underhill in [Aggrenox](#), the [Shady](#)

[Grove](#) Court answered “no” and held “that [Rule 23](#) applied in federal court to claims brought under New York law despite New York’s general class action bar.” [In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig.](#), 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 253 (D. Conn. 2015).

But as Judge Underhill observes: “It is difficult to isolate a holding in [Shady Grove](#) that is much broader than that, because the holding was announced by Justice Scalia in an opinion that garnered a majority only in part and a plurality in part. The fifth vote for the judgment was provided by Justice Stevens, who wrote a separate concurrence.” [Id.](#) at 253–54. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens concluded that [N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901\(b\)](#) is a procedural rule and “not part of New York’s substantive law.” [Shady Grove](#), 559 U.S. at 416, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). At the same time, Justice Stevens wrote that “there are some state procedural rules that federal courts must apply in diversity cases because they function as a part of the State’s definition of substantive rights and remedies.” [Id.](#) at 416–17, 130 S.Ct. 1431. Justice Stevens explained that in his view, a federal rule like [Rule 23](#) “cannot govern a particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right.” [Id.](#) at 423, 130 S.Ct. 1431.

Federal courts considering the applicability of the IAA’s prohibition on indirect-purchaser class actions differ over whether Justice Stevens’ concurrence controls. The courts holding that the IAA bars indirect-purchaser actions in federal court rely on the [Marks](#) doctrine:

When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.

[United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.](#), 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting [Marks v. United States](#), 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977)). Reasoning that Justice Stevens’ concurrence represents the “narrowest grounds” for the [Shady Grove](#) decision, courts such as those that Teva cites have held that the IAA’s restrictions on indirect purchaser actions are intertwined with Illinois

substantive rights and remedies, and thus not governed by Rule 23. E.g., *Staley v. Gilead Scis., Inc.*, 446 F. Supp. 3d 578, 624–25 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting *United Food & Com. Workers Loc. 1776 & Participating Emps. Health & Welfare Fund v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc.*, 74 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).

That reasoning is unpersuasive. Initially, it is not at all clear that Justice Stevens’ concurrence is controlling. The *Marks* doctrine applies only where “one opinion can meaningfully be regarded as ‘narrower’ than another—only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions.” *Alcan*, 315 F.3d at 189 (quoting *King v. Palmer*, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)). This court agrees with the observation in *Aggrenox* that Justice Stevens’ *Shady Grove* concurrence “is ‘narrower’ than the position of the other Justices who made up the *Shady Grove* majority only in the sense that it would reject state procedural rules in fewer cases.” *Aggrenox*, 2016 WL 4204478, at \*5.

\*33 It is not *logically* narrower, however, because it is not a logical subset of the opinion of the other Justices in the majority. Those Justices do not implicitly approve of its rationale for sometimes allowing state procedural rules to control—on the contrary, they explicitly reject that rationale—and it therefore does not represent the common denominator of the Court’s reasoning.

*Id.* (emphasis added). Justice Stevens’ *Shady Grove* concurrence, therefore, “is, in effect, *Marks*-doctrine dicta rather than *Marks*-doctrine holding.” *Id.* at \*6.

Teva has not provided any significant analysis on this particular issue, except to note that, even if not controlling, Justice Stevens’ concurrence may be “the most persuasive guide.” (Doc. 66 at 34 n.22 (quoting *Aggrenox*, 2016 WL 4204478, at \*6).) But even applying the *Shady Grove* concurrence, the court finds that 740 ILCS § 10/7(2)—like N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b)—is procedural, not substantive or “intertwined” with Illinois rights and remedies, and thus not applicable in federal court. As the *Contant* court observed, if N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) did not “‘abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’ then the IAA, which

applies exclusively to antitrust class actions, must also be procedural.” *Contant*, 2018 WL 5292126, at \*12 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)); see also *Merck*, 2023 WL 8018980, at \*14 (“[A]t its core, this provision does not appear to be motivated by a desire to close off relief, or dramatically alter private plaintiffs’ rights to bring claims under the state antitrust law.”); *Aggrenox*, 2016 WL 4204478, at \*6 (“[I]f New York’s state-law bar is not a procedural rule that alters the scope of a substantive right or remedy, then the narrower scope of Illinois’s state-law bar does not make it one that does.”). The court recognizes that other district courts have come to a different conclusion but respectfully declines to follow those decisions here.

Puerto Rico. What *Aggrenox* grants as to Illinois law, it takes away as to Puerto Rico law. The court adopts the entirety of the *Aggrenox* court’s analysis as to Puerto Rico antitrust law, where the parties in that case made essentially the same arguments that Plaintiffs and Teva make here:

Puerto Rico has not passed an *Illinois Brick* repealer, and its territorial courts have apparently not directly addressed the issue, but its antitrust law is generally construed as essentially embodying the jurisprudence relevant to the parallel federal law. The defendants therefore urge the interpretation that *Illinois Brick* applies and bars indirect-purchaser actions, citing the persuasive authority of other district courts that have come to that conclusion. The indirect purchasers cite *Rivera–Muñiz v. Horizon Lines Inc.*, 737 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.P.R. 2010), a federal district court case that came to the contrary conclusion on the basis that Puerto Rico liberally construes its antitrust laws, and citing for that proposition *Pressure Vessels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Empire Gas de Puerto Rico*, 137 D.P.R. 497, 1994 P.R.-Eng. 909547 (P.R. 1994). As the defendants point out, however, *Pressure Vessels* did not address indirect-purchaser standing or the rule of *Illinois Brick*. And though I agree with the indirect purchasers’ contention that the courts of a particular jurisdiction can authoritatively interpret their laws as allowing antitrust recovery by indirect purchasers even in the absence of an express *Illinois Brick* repealer by the legislature, I cannot conclude that *Pressure Vessels* is such an authoritative statement. In the absence of a clear decision—by either

the legislature or by the jurisdiction's own courts—to allow indirect-purchaser recovery, the antitrust laws of a state (or territory) are interpreted as presumptively consistent with federal law. I therefore conclude that Puerto Rico follows the rule of [Illinois Brick](#) and all indirect-purchaser claims under its antitrust law are dismissed.

\*34 [Aggrenox](#), 94 F. Supp. 3d at 252 (cleaned up).

Plaintiffs cite a handful of cases that come to the opposite conclusion, including *In re Xyrem (Sodium Oxybate) Antitrust Litig.*, 555 F. Supp. 3d 829 (N.D. Cal. 2021). These cases appear to be the minority view, and the court respectfully declines to follow them. The *Xyrem* court found that [Pressure Vessels](#) “did address [Illinois Brick](#)” because “it did cite and criticize four United States Supreme Court cases that explicitly applied [Illinois Brick](#).” *Id.* at 886. This court is not persuaded that the [Pressure Vessels](#) court's citation to those Supreme Court cases is sufficient to make [Pressure Vessels](#) an authoritative statement on indirect-purchaser standing.

#### b. Intrastate Conduct or Effects

Teva contends that the antitrust laws of eight jurisdictions—Washington, D.C., Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin—“require the challenged conduct or effects to have occurred solely (or primarily) within the jurisdiction.” (Doc. 49 at 71.) Teva further argues that the complaint refers to alleged “intrastate effects” in “conclusory, boilerplate allegations” that are insufficient to allege the requisite jurisdiction-specific conduct or effects. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs maintain that their allegations “depict how Teva's nationwide conduct traverses state lines and affects purchasers and prescribers in each state.” (Doc. 58 at 63.) In reply, Teva insists that “several jurisdictions reject such generalized allegations as inadequate.” (Doc. 66 at 37.)

The court agrees with the [Loestrin](#) court and concludes that Plaintiffs “have sufficiently pled intrastate activity where they allege nationwide antitrust violations, the antitrust impact of which was felt within each state.” [Loestrin](#), 410 F. Supp. 3d at 375. This appears to be the “majority” view, [id.](#), and this court concurs with the point made in [Aggrenox](#): “[I]t

is not obvious why the *intra* state effect of anticompetitive conduct would not be reached by the cited statutes merely because *inter* state conduct predominates.” [Aggrenox](#), 94 F. Supp. 3d at 253; *see also* [Merck](#), 2023 WL 8018980, at \*13 (concluding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged anticompetitive conduct occurring in intrastate commerce even though the alleged conduct primarily impacted interstate commerce). The court has considered the cases that Teva cites but finds them distinguishable or unpersuasive.

#### c. Citizenship (Utah Claim)

Teva argues that the Utah antitrust claim must be dismissed because none of the named plaintiffs are citizens or residents of Utah, as required for a claim under the Utah Antitrust Act. *See* Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-3109(1)(a) (“A person who is a citizen of this state or a resident of this state ... may bring an action ....”). Plaintiffs maintain that the complaint alleges that “class members overpaid for [Copaxone](#) in every relevant jurisdiction.” (Doc. 58 at 67.) Plaintiffs cite several cases in support, including [In re Generic Pharmaceuticals Pricing Antitrust Litigation](#), 368 F. Supp. 3d 814 (E.D. Pa. 2019). The court in that case reasoned that “[a]llegations that members of the putative class presumably include Utah ... citizens and residents are sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.” [Id.](#) at 838 (quoting *Hosp. Auth. of Metro. Gov't of Nashville v. Momenta Pharms., Inc.*, 353 F. Supp. 3d 678, 696 (M.D. Tenn. 2018)).<sup>33</sup>

\*35 The cases that Plaintiffs cite appear to be the minority position, however. *See* [In re Effexor Antitrust Litig.](#), 357 F. Supp. 3d 363, 393 (D.N.J. 2018) (“The majority of courts that have been presented with this statute require at least one Utah citizen or resident to be a named plaintiff.”); *see also* [Miami Products](#), 546 F. Supp. 3d at 247 (citing [Effexor](#) and adopting majority approach). This court finds the majority view persuasive. The court will dismiss the Utah antitrust claims that remain<sup>34</sup> without prejudice to repleading that includes a Utah citizen or resident as a named plaintiff.

#### d. Unilateral Conduct (California and Kansas Claims)

Teva notes that the relevant antitrust laws in California and Kansas prohibit concerted action but do not apply to unilateral



conduct. *See* Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-101 *et seq.* Teva asserts that the claims in Counts I and II under those states’ antitrust laws must be dismissed to the extent that they rely upon or are premised on unilateral conduct. (Doc. 49 at 74.) Plaintiffs concede that “courts have dismissed allegations of sham litigation or misuse of the citizen petition process as unilateral under California and Kansas law.” (Doc. 58 at 67.) But Plaintiffs request that the court “refrain from doing so at this juncture, as discovery may reveal evidence of concerted action with respect to this conduct.” (*Id.* at 67–68.)

The court’s role at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage is to evaluate the allegations in the pleadings. The plausibility of the claims in the pleadings does not depend on what might or might not be revealed in the discovery process. Here, the allegations in Counts I and II include some conduct that can—at present—be viewed only as “unilateral,” including Teva’s alleged sham litigation and alleged misuse of the citizen petition process. The court will grant Teva’s request to dismiss the portions of Counts I and II that seek relief under California and Kansas antitrust law insofar as those claims are based on unilateral conduct. This ruling does not affect any claims under Counts I and II that seek relief under California and Kansas antitrust law for concerted action, and the court’s conclusion here is without prejudice to an amended pleading if discovery reveals evidence of concerted action with respect to the alleged sham litigation or citizen petition process.

**e. Vermont Antitrust Claims**

Teva argues that Plaintiffs’ Vermont antitrust claims should be dismissed for the same reasons that Teva asserts Plaintiffs’ consumer-protection claims should be dismissed. (Doc. 49 at 76 n.31.) The court rejects Teva’s arguments against the Vermont consumer-protection claims for the reasons discussed below.

**2. State Consumer-Protection Claims (Count V)**

Teva argues that there are “multiple flaws” with Plaintiffs’ claims under the consumer-protection laws in California, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont. (Doc. 49 at 74.) Plaintiffs maintain that Teva has offered only a “hodgepodge of state-specific arguments” that are all “unfounded.” (Doc. 58 at 68.) The court considers Teva’s arguments in turn.

**a. *Illinois Brick* Bars the Massachusetts § 11 Claim**

Count V includes a claim for violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”). In particular, Count V invokes Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 11, which supplies a cause of action to “[a]ny person who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” (*See* Doc. 1 ¶¶ 334, 338.) Teva argues that the § 11 claim must be dismissed because the *Illinois Brick* rule applies to such claims. (Doc. 49 at 75.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that *Illinois Brick* applies to § 11 claims but argue instead that their Massachusetts claim in Count V should be allowed to proceed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93 A, § 9, which supplies a cause of action to “[a]ny person” other than a person entitled to bring a § 11 claim. (*See* Doc. 58 at 70–71.)

\*36 The court will grant dismissal of Count V insofar as it is based upon Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 11 because *Illinois Brick* bars that claim. *See Loestrin*, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (*Illinois Brick* applies to § 11 claims). Regarding the possibility of a claim under § 9, the court recognizes that the federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” *Johnson v. City of Shelby*, 574 U.S. 10, 11, 135 S.Ct. 346, 190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014); *see also Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn*, 629 F.2d 705, 712 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Generally a complaint that gives full notice of the circumstances giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim for relief need not also correctly plead the legal theory or theories and statutory basis supporting the claim.”). Teva does not dispute those principles but urges the court to dismiss any potential § 9 claim because, notwithstanding BCBSVT’s status as a nonprofit, BCBSVT is in Teva’s view “motivated by business considerations.” (Doc. 66 at 36 (quoting *Loestrin*, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 373).)

Plaintiffs do not address the *Loestrin* court’s holding that the third-party payors in that case—even if some or all of which are non-profits—failed to plead a § 9 claim because they are “motivated by business considerations.” *Loestrin*, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 373. Instead, Plaintiffs rely

upon [In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation](#), 491 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D. Mass. 2007). The court in that case remarked that “[t]he dividing line between a claim under § 9 and a business claim under § 11 is as clear as mud” and went on to conclude that third-party payor Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Massachusetts “is a non-profit organization acting pursuant to its legislative mandate,” that “the reimbursement for prescription drugs is a key part of its core mission,” and that “[t]here is no evidence that BCBSMA profited from its reimbursement for those over-priced drugs during the non-time-barred portion of the class period.” [491 F. Supp. 2d at 82](#) (footnotes omitted). Plaintiffs also cite [In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation](#), where the court held that BCBSMA was “not engaged in ‘trade or commerce’ for the purposes of barring it from bringing a Section 9 claim, as it is a charitable institution not engaged in trade or commerce when it undertakes activities in furtherance of its core mission.” [295 F. Supp. 2d 30, 45](#) (D.D.C. 2003).

The court concludes that the best course on this issue is to decline to attempt to determine at this time whether BCBSVT is engaged in “trade or commerce” (and thus disqualified from bringing a § 9 claim). Making that determination is “fact intensive.” [Lorazepam](#), 295 F. Supp. 2d at 45. The court will undertake that inquiry if Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint to assert a § 9 claim. At present, however, the court notes that Plaintiffs cannot properly amend their complaint via an opposition to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See [Cole v. Foxmar Inc.](#), 387 F. Supp. 3d 370, 383 n.5 (D. Vt. 2019) (citing cases holding that a plaintiff cannot use its opposition to a dispositive motion to amend the complaint). The court will dismiss Count V insofar as it is based upon [Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 11](#), and will consider the fate of any § 9 claim at a later time.

#### b. “Consumer” Requirements (Vermont and New York Claims)

New York. The New York claim in Count V is brought under [N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349](#) (Deceptive Acts and Practices Unlawful) and 350 (False Advertising Unlawful). (Doc. 1 ¶ 324.) “To successfully assert a claim under either section, ‘a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading

and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.’ ” [Orlander v. Staples, Inc.](#), 802 F.3d 289, 300 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting [Koch v. Acker, Merrall & Condit Co.](#), 18 N.Y.3d 940, 944 N.Y.S.2d 452, 452, 967 N.E.2d 675 (2012)). Teva argues that the complaint in this case fails to plausibly allege the requisite “consumer-oriented conduct.” (Doc. 49 at 75.)

\*37 The complaint includes an allegation that “[a]s payors, Plaintiffs are consumers in the relevant markets as purchasers of Copaxone.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 268.) This allegation is incorporated into Count V. (*Id.* ¶ 297.) It is true that there is no allegation that Plaintiffs purchase Copaxone for their “personal, family or household use.” [Sheth v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.](#), 273 A.D.2d 72, 709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1st Dep’t 2000). But [sections 349](#) and [350](#) do not require the plaintiff to be a “consumer.” See [Securitron Magnalock Corp. v. Schnabolk](#), 65 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The critical question ... is whether the matter affects the public interest in New York, not whether the suit is brought by a consumer or a competitor.”); [Himmelstein, McConnell, Gribben, Donoghue & Joseph, LLP v. Matthew Bender & Co.](#), 37 N.Y.3d 169, 150 N.Y.S.3d 79, 171 N.E.3d 1192, 1197 (2021) (error to hold that allegedly deceptive conduct was not “consumer oriented” just because the product was “not directed at consumers at large for personal, family, or household use”).

What is required for claims under [§§ 349](#) and [350](#) is “consumer-oriented conduct.” “A defendant engages in ‘consumer-oriented’ activity if [the company’s] actions cause any ‘consumer injury or harm to the public interest.’ ” [Anderson v. Unilever United States, Inc.](#), 607 F. Supp. 3d 441, 451 (S.D.N. Y. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting [New York v. Feldman](#), 210 F. Supp. 2d 294, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). “This requirement is liberally construed, and may be satisfied by showing that the conduct at issue potentially affects similarly situated consumers.” *Id.* (cleaned up).

According to the complaint, Teva’s alleged “acts and practices were consumer-oriented in that they exerted an impact broadly on purchasers of prescription drugs.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 325.) The court concludes that Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient for present purposes. See, e.g., [In re Effexor Antitrust Litig.](#), 337 F. Supp. 3d 435, 466 (D.N.J. 2018) (rejecting argument that [§ 349](#) claims brought by end-

payor purchasers of antidepressant drug should be dismissed for failure to allege consumer-oriented conduct).

The cases that Teva cites are distinguishable or unpersuasive. The court in [Black Radio Network, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp.](#) dismissed a [§ 349](#) claim, reasoning in part that “the fact that consumers were the ultimate end-users [does not] convert the transaction into a consumer transaction.” [44 F. Supp. 2d 565, 583 \(S.D.N.Y. 1999\)](#). That may be so, but the complaint in [Black Radio Network](#) lacked “any reference to harm to the public at large.” [Id.](#) Plaintiffs’ complaint in this case explicitly alleges harm to purchasers of prescription drugs. (Doc. 1 ¶ 325.)

The court in [In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation](#) stated that “when the alleged deceptive act occurs in a transaction between two companies, even when the result of the deception impacts on a consumer, it is not actionable under [§ 349.](#)” [515 F. Supp. 2d 544, 552 \(E.D. Pa. 2007\)](#). The court agrees that an alleged deceptive act in a business-to-business transaction is *not necessarily* consumer-oriented, even if the result has some impact on a consumer. See [Himmelstein](#), 150 N.Y.S.3d 79, 171 N.E.3d at 1198 (consumer-oriented element would not be satisfied where a claim is based on “[p]rivate contract disputes, unique to the parties” (quoting [Oswego Laborers’ Loc. 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank](#), 85 N.Y.2d 20, 623 N.Y.S.2d 529, 647 N.E.2d 741, 744 (1995))). But to the extent that [Automotive Refinishing Paint](#) suggests that deceptive acts in transactions between two companies can never be consumer-oriented, the court respectfully disagrees because that would be an overly narrow interpretation of New York law. The focus remains on whether the conduct at issue has “a broader impact on consumers at large.” [Himmelstein](#), 150 N.Y.S.3d 79, 171 N.E.3d at 1197 (quoting [Oswego](#), 623 N.Y.S.2d 529, 647 N.E.2d at 744).

\*38 Finally, Teva relies on [In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation](#), 260 F.R.D. 143 (E.D. Pa. 2009), for the proposition that “courts have held that third-party payors like Plaintiff cannot pursue relief under [§ 349.](#)” (Doc. 49 at 76.) But the [Wellbutrin](#) court did not analyze whether the conduct in that case was consumer-oriented. Instead, the court

addressed the defense argument that indirect purchasers of an antidepressant lacked standing because the claims were “too remote from any allegedly illegal act.” [260 F.R.D. at 164](#). Teva attempts to raise that separate issue in its reply brief. (Doc. 66 at 35–36 & n.25.) The court concludes that Teva’s citation to [Wellbutrin](#) in its opening brief did not squarely raise the issue, and the court declines to consider it here. See [Conn. Invs. LLC v. KDP, LLC](#), No. 20-cv-179, 2023 WL 6600000, at \*12 (D. Vt. Mar. 13, 2023) (“Courts in the Second Circuit generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).

Vermont. The Vermont Consumer Protection Act (“VCPA”) claim in Count V is brought under 9 V.S.A. § 2453(a) and seeks remedies under 9 V.S.A. § 2461. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 301, 309.) Plaintiffs assert that they “and the Vermont Members of the CPA Subclass are ‘consumers’ within the meaning of Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2451a(1).” (Doc. 1 ¶ 299.)<sup>35</sup> Teva notes that only a “consumer” may bring suit under 9 V.S.A. § 2461(b) and argues that Plaintiffs are not “consumers” because “the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs purchased Copaxone or its generic equivalent for *their* use.” (Doc. 49 at 76.) Plaintiffs maintain that they are “consumers” as defined by 9 V.S.A. § 2451a(1) and that federal courts that have barred insurers from recovering under the VCPA have “[m]isread[ ] Vermont Supreme Court precedent.” (Doc. 58 at 68.)

The Second Circuit has recently stated that the definition of “consumer” under the VCPA is “a threshold issue that controls whether a plaintiff is entitled to protection under the Act in the first place.” [RSD Leasing, Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Corp.](#), 81 F.4th 153, 158 (2d Cir. 2023). The VCPA defines “consumer” as follows:

“Consumer” means any person who purchases, leases, contracts for, or otherwise agrees to pay consideration for goods or services not for resale in the ordinary course of the person’s trade or business but for the person’s use or benefit or the use or benefit of a member of the person’s household, or in connection with the operation of the person’s household or a farm whether or not the farm is conducted as a trade or business, or a person who purchases, leases, contracts for, or otherwise agrees to pay consideration for goods or services not for resale in the ordinary course of the person’s trade or business but for the use or benefit of the person’s business or in connection with the operation of the person’s business.

9 V.S.A. § 2451a(1). Unfortunately for courts attempting to address this threshold issue, “several terms featured in that definition are not defined in the statute and are subject to multiple plausible and divergent interpretations” and there is “little guidance” from Vermont courts on the matter. *RSD Leasing*, 81 F.4th at 156.

Here, as in *RSD*, the relevant portion of § 2451a(1) provides that a “consumer” is a person who purchases goods “not for resale in the ordinary course of the person's trade or business but for the use or benefit of the person's business or in connection with the operation of the person's business.”

Within that passage is one clause (the “use/benefit/operation” clause) that charts three different paths to “consumer” status based on whether a person purchases goods and services: (1) “for the use” of a business; (2) “for the ... benefit” of a business; and (3) “in connection with the operation of” a business. The same passage also charts a separate route for a purchaser to be *disqualified* from “consumer” status: a person who purchases goods or services “for resale in the ordinary course” of the purchaser's “trade or business.”

\*39 *RSD Leasing*, 81 F.4th at 160 (citations omitted). Teva argues that the complaint fails to allege Plaintiffs’ qualification as “consumers” (Doc. 49 at 76) and that Plaintiffs are disqualified under the “not for resale in the ordinary course” clause (Doc. 66 at 35).

The court begins with whether the complaint plausibly supports a conclusion that Plaintiffs qualify as consumers under any of the three statutory paths to “consumer” status. According to the complaint:

BCBSVT purchases, pays for, and/or provides reimbursement for some or all of the purchase price of prescription drugs dispensed to members of its health plans. BCBSVT purchased, paid for, and/or provided reimbursement for some or all of the purchase price of *Copaxone* prescriptions dispensed to members of its plans. BCBSVT continues to purchase, pay for, and/or provide reimbursement for some or all of the purchase price for *Copaxone* prescriptions dispensed to members of its plans. (Doc. 1 ¶ 24.) The complaint includes similar allegations as to TVHP. (*Id.* ¶ 25.)

Plaintiffs argue that they “contracted or otherwise agreed to pay for consideration for *Copaxone* needed by their members” and that “[t]his occurred ‘in connection with the operation’ of Plaintiffs’ business” because “paying for

their members’ health care *is* their core function.” (Doc. 58 at 68.)<sup>36</sup> The court agrees and concludes that, at this stage of the case, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they purchased *Copaxone* “in connection with the operation of” Plaintiffs’ businesses. The August 2016 *Aggrenox* decision stated that the VCPA's definition of “consumer” only “allows businesses to sue as consumers with respect to the products that they *use* as consumers.” *Aggrenox*, 2016 WL 4204478, at \*9. But that analysis does not appear to address the alternative path to consumer status for businesses that purchase products “in connection with the operation” of the business.<sup>37</sup> Nor is it consistent with this court's holding that the VCPA “reaches all violators, not just those who are direct sellers to the ultimate user of the product.” *MyWebGrocer, Inc. v. Adlife Mktg. & Commc'ns Co.*, 383 F. Supp. 3d 307, 313 (D. Vt. 2019).

The decision in *Sergeants Benevolent Association Health & Welfare Fund v. Actavis, PLC* suggests a different rationale for concluding that the indirect pharmaceutical purchaser in that case was not a “consumer” under 9 V.S.A. § 2451a(1). The analysis in that case emphasized § 2451a(1)'s “not for resale in the ordinary course” clause. *No. 15 Civ. 6549*, 2018 WL 7197233, at \*52 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2018). That decision arguably indicates that indirect purchasers like Plaintiffs might be subject to the separate VCPA's statutory *disqualification* mechanism. But according to the complaint, at least some of Plaintiffs’ *Copaxone* transactions were not purchases of *Copaxone* for “resale” but were reimbursements for the drug. The court cannot conclude at this early stage of the case that the statutory disqualification mechanism applies.

**c. “Deception,” “Reliance,” and Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)**

\*40 Teva asserts that the complaint “fails to plausibly allege that Teva engaged in deception, as required by several states’ consumer-protection laws”; fails to include “the factual detail required by [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] Rule 9(b)”; and also fails to “allege with factual specificity that anyone relied on Teva's alleged misrepresentations.” (Doc. 49 at 77–78.) Teva contends that these defects require dismissal of Plaintiffs’ consumer-protection claims under the laws of California, Delaware, Florida, New Hampshire, New York, Massachusetts, and Vermont. (*Id.* at 78–80.)

Plaintiffs maintain that Teva's arguments fail for three reasons. First, Plaintiffs assert that [Rule 9\(b\)](#) does not apply to their consumer-protection claims because fraud is not a required element under any of the state consumer-protection acts and Plaintiffs' consumer-protection claims are based "on Teva's unfair and anticompetitive conduct, not on common-law fraud or fraud-based statutory claims like RICO." (Doc. 58 at 71.) On that point, Teva maintains that Plaintiffs cannot so simply distinguish "unfair and anticompetitive" conduct from "deception." (Doc. 66 at 37.) In Teva's view, "Plaintiffs base their state-law claims on alleged false statements and material misrepresentations to which [Rule 9\(b\)](#) applies." (*Id.*) Second, Plaintiffs argue that even if [Rule 9\(b\)](#) did apply, the complaint satisfies that rule's requirements. (Doc. 58 at 71.) Third, Plaintiffs contend that "Teva's state-specific arguments do not hold water." (*Id.* at 72.)

The court begins with the following observations regarding the requirements of [Rule 9\(b\)](#). The rule states in pertinent part: "In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." [Fed. R. Civ. P. 9\(b\)](#). "Under [Rule 9\(b\)](#)'s particularity requirement, the plaintiff must '(1) detail the statements (or omissions) that the plaintiff contends are fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements (or omissions) were made, and (4) explain why the statements (or omissions) are fraudulent.'" *Olson v. Major League Baseball*, 29 F.4th 59, 71 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting [Eternity Glob. Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y.](#), 375 F.3d 168, 187 (2d Cir. 2004)).

[Rule 9\(b\)](#) "is not limited to allegations styled or denominated as fraud or expressed in terms of the constituent elements of a fraud cause of action." [Rombach v. Chang](#), 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004). Thus, even where fraud is not an element of a particular cause of action—as Plaintiffs claim is so for every state consumer-protection act—[Rule 9\(b\)](#) might still apply to that cause of action where the claim is "predicated on fraud." *Id.*; see also *Olson*, 29 F.4th at 71 ("Claims sounding in fraud must satisfy the heightened pleading standards of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9\(b\)](#)"). Here, the parties disagree as to whether Plaintiffs' state consumer-protection claims are predicated on fraud.

The court agrees that the complaint includes multiple allegations that are expressed in terms evocative of fraud. (*See, e.g.*, Doc. 1 ¶ 9 (alleging "deceptive practices to manipulate the individuals and entities that selected products"); *id.* ¶¶ 13, 249, 267, 277, 307, 319, 331, 341, 352 (alleging "false statements" or "material misrepresentations"); *id.* ¶¶ 234, 243, 303, 306, 308, 314, 318, 320, 326, 337, 340, 347, 360, 372 (misrepresentations, omissions, or concealment); *id.* ¶ 239 (alleging "false or misleading representations").) The complaint also specifically describes some of Teva's alleged conduct as fraudulent. (*See, e.g.*, Doc. 1 ¶¶ 234, 239, 246, 247, 250, 303, 304, 338, 374.) But the use of those terms does not necessarily mean that Plaintiffs' state consumer-protection claims are predicated on fraud. *See In re Pork Antitrust Litig.*, 495 F. Supp. 3d 753, 780 (D. Minn. 2020) (concluding that consumer-protection claims primarily involved anticompetitive behavior and were not subject to [Rule 9\(b\)](#) despite the complaint's use of the terms "deceptive," "fraudulent," "omissions," and "misrepresentations"); *In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig.*, 368 F. Supp. 3d 814, 827, 846 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (concluding that, although plaintiffs alleged that defendants engaged in "unfair competition or unfair, unconscionable, deceptive or fraudulent acts or practices," the consumer-protection claims "rest[ed] on Defendants' alleged unconscionable or deceptive conduct, not on fraud").

\*41 Here, as in *In re Pork Antitrust Litigation*, Plaintiffs' state consumer-protection claims are "not intertwined with any explicit claims of fraud." *In re Pork Antitrust Litig.*, 495 F. Supp. 3d at 780. In the court's view, the central allegations in the complaint are of unfair or anticompetitive conduct, not fraud. (*See, e.g.*, Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 7 (alleging an "anticompetitive scheme"); *id.* ¶¶ 9, 11, 16 (alleging "anticompetitive" and "unfair" practices); see also *id.* at 120 (seeking injunction against Teva's alleged "anticompetitive," "unfair," and "unconscionable" business practices).) The complaint in this case does not allege fraud as the underlying basis for the alleged antitrust and consumer-protection claims.

*Cf. Lum v. Bank of Am.*, 361 F.3d 217, 228–29 (3d Cir. 2004) (complaint alleged antitrust conspiracy to fix the prime rate and identified "how the rate fixing was accomplished—through fraud"), *abrogation on other grounds recognized by In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig.*, 618 F.3d 300, 323 n.22

(3d Cir. 2010); *In re Potash Antitrust Litig.*, 667 F. Supp. 2d 907, 947 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (pleading that asserted consumer-protection claims was “peppered with references to fraud” such that the claims were “premised on fraudulent conduct”), *aff’d sub nom.* *Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc.*, 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

For the reasons stated above, the court rejects Teva's blanket assertion that all of Plaintiffs' state consumer-protection claims should be dismissed for failure to comply with [Rule 9\(b\)](#)'s pleading requirements. The court therefore proceeds to consider the remaining issues as to each relevant jurisdiction.

California. Teva argues that Plaintiffs' complaint fails to plead “actual reliance” on any allegedly deceptive or misleading statements as required by California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), [Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200](#). (Doc. 49 at 78.) Plaintiffs maintain that reliance is only required for claims grounded in fraud or deception and that Plaintiffs' claims are based on Teva's alleged “broad unfair and anticompetitive scheme, not from specific misrepresentations or deception alone.” (Doc. 58 at 73.) Teva's reply does not respond to that point, and the court agrees with Plaintiffs that “[t]he unlawful-business-practices prong of the UCL has no reliance requirement.” *In re Pork Antitrust Litig.*, 495 F. Supp. at 781. And as discussed above, Plaintiffs' UCL claim is premised on alleged unlawful or unfair business practices, not on fraudulent practices.

Teva also argues that Plaintiffs' claims under [§ 17200](#) should be dismissed “to the extent they are premised on flawed Cartwright Act or federal claims.” (Doc. 49 at 74 n.28.) It is true that the court in *Jones v. Micron Technology Inc.* dismissed a [§ 17200](#) claim because “[a] UCL claim for unlawful behavior is predicated on a violation of a separate statute or common law regime” and because the court found that the plaintiffs' [Sherman Act and Cartwright Act](#) claims were insufficiently pled. 400 F. Supp. 3d 897, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Here, however, the court concludes that Plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims are plausible. The court will not dismiss the [§ 17200](#) claims for lack of a plausible predicate violation.

Delaware. Teva's sole argument for dismissal of the claim under the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act is that the claim

sounds in fraud and should be dismissed for failure to satisfy [Rule 9\(b\)](#). (Doc. 49 at 78.) The court rejects that argument for the reasons stated above.

Florida. Teva's sole argument for dismissal of the claim under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act is that the claim sounds in fraud and should be dismissed for failure to satisfy [Rule 9\(b\)](#). (*Id.* at 78–79.) The court rejects that argument for the reasons stated above. *See also Merck*, 2023 WL 8018980, at \*20 (“Here, Plaintiff alleges that Merck's bundling practices and discounts constitute anticompetitive conduct but does not allege that Merck engaged in fraud. I therefore find that Plaintiff's claim under the Florida consumer law does not implicate [Rule 9\(b\)](#) and I will not dismiss its FDUTPA claim on this basis.”).

\*42 New Hampshire. Teva's sole argument for dismissal of the claim under the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act is that the claim sounds in fraud and should be dismissed for failure to satisfy [Rule 9\(b\)](#). (*Id.* at 79.) The court rejects that argument for the reasons stated above.

New York. Teva argues that [N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349](#) and [350](#) require allegations of a “deceptive” act or practice “that is actually deceptive.” (Doc. 49 at 79.) Teva cites *In re Lamictal Indirect Purchaser & Antitrust Consumer Litigation* for the proposition that “mere anticompetitive conduct alone will not suffice.” 172 F. Supp. 3d 724, 752 (D.N.J. 2016) (quoting *Leider v. Ralfe*, 387 F. Supp. 2d 283, 295–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). According to Teva, Plaintiffs' claims under [§§ 349](#) and [350](#) are based on alleged misleading statements and deceptive conduct that is not alleged with the required particularity. (Doc. 49 at 80.)

Plaintiffs concede that [§ 349](#) outlaws only “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce.” [N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349\(a\)](#). The statute lacks any explicit language targeting “unfair” methods of competition or “unlawful” business practices. But Plaintiffs maintain that “courts routinely deny motions to dismiss [§ 349](#) claims based on anticompetitive schemes.” (Doc. 58 at 73 (citing cases).) Plaintiffs do not explain whether the courts in the cited cases denied the motions because the courts in those cases disagreed with the proposition that deception is required

or because the alleged anticompetitive conduct in those cases was “deceptive in nature.” See [Lamictal](#), 172 F. Supp. 3d at 752 (“[A]nticompetitive conduct *can* violate [§ 349](#) if it is deceptive in nature.”).

In any case, the court concludes that the complaint in this case plausibly alleges anticompetitive conduct that—while not *predicated* on fraud, *see supra*—is sufficiently “deceptive in nature” for purposes of a [§ 349](#) claim. As the [Lamictal](#) court explained, a claim of anticompetitive conduct under [§ 349](#) can be “deceptive in nature” if, for example, it includes allegations that the defendants made efforts to conceal their anticompetitive agreement, secretly agreed to raise prices, or entered into “secret” anticompetitive agreements. [Lamictal](#), 172 F. Supp. 3d at 752–53 (citing cases). The complaint in this case includes allegations that, at all relevant times, “Teva took active steps to conceal its unlawful activities.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 234.) The court accordingly rejects Teva's request to dismiss the New York consumer-protection claims for lack of “deception.”

Massachusetts. Teva's sole argument for dismissal of the claim under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act is that the claim sounds in fraud and should be dismissed for failure to satisfy [Rule 9\(b\)](#). (Doc. 49 at 80.) The court rejects that argument for the reasons stated above.

Vermont. Finally, Teva notes that the VCPA prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce,” 9 V.S.A. § 2453(a), and argues that the complaint does not plausibly allege deception because there are no allegations that any of Teva's alleged misleading statements were targeted at Plaintiffs or affected their conduct. (Doc. 49 at 80.) Plaintiffs maintain that they do not need to allege reliance on any deceptive acts or practices because their VCPA claim is based on Teva's alleged “unfair” conduct. (Doc. 58 at 73.) That clarification moots the portion of Teva's motion that seeks dismissal of the VCPA claims “to the extent they rely on deception.” (Doc. 49 at 80.)

**d. Intrastate Nexus**

\*43 Finally, Teva argues that Plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims under the laws of six states fail “because those states’ laws require intrastate conduct or, at least, a significant nexus

to the state, which the Complaint fails to plead.” (Doc. 49 at 81.) Plaintiffs maintain that Teva's argument fails “for the same basic reason as in the antitrust context: conduct (especially related to pharmaceutical pricing) that by its nature forces illegally inflated prices on purchasers everywhere, irrespective of state lines, creates sufficient impacts in and connections to any state in which it is reasonable to infer sales occurred.” (Doc. 58 at 74.)

The court agrees with Plaintiffs on this point. The court's conclusions above regarding the required intrastate conduct or effects for purposes of the antitrust claims apply equally to the consumer-protection claims. Plaintiffs have pleaded nationwide conduct, the consumer-protection impact of which reaches every state. The court has considered the cases that Teva cites but finds them distinguishable or unpersuasive.

**3. State Unjust-Enrichment Claims (Count VI)**

Finally, Count VI of the complaint is a claim for unjust enrichment brought “under the common law of all U.S. states and territories.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 380.) Teva argues that Count VI should be dismissed for two reasons. First, Teva argues that Count VI fails to provide fair notice under each jurisdiction's particular law. (Doc. 49 at 84.) Second, Teva maintains that the unjust-enrichment claims are an improper attempt to “end-run” flaws in Plaintiffs’ other state claims. (*Id.* at 85.) The court considers these arguments in turn.

**a. Rule 8's Requirements**

Teva argues that Count VI should be dismissed as inadequate under [Fed. R. Civ. P. 8](#) because it fails to “plead the elements of unjust enrichment on a jurisdiction-specific basis.” (Doc. 49 at 84.) Teva asserts that jurisdiction-specific pleading is necessary because the requirements for the cause of action are different depending on the jurisdiction, and some jurisdictions do not recognize an unjust-enrichment cause of action at all. (*Id.* at 84–85.) Plaintiffs maintain that unjust-enrichment claims have “essentially” the same elements in every jurisdiction and that the complaint includes sufficient factual content as to each element to state a plausible claim. (Doc. 58 at 76; *see also* Pls.’ App’x A, Doc. 58-1 (compilation of unjust-enrichment elements for each of the 50 states).) Teva insists that Plaintiffs wrongly “oversimplif[y]” state laws and omit state-specific requirements. (Doc. 66 at 37.)

“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Rule 8 does not require dismissal of a complaint “for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” *Quinones v. City of Binghamton*, 997 F.3d 461, 468 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting *Johnson v. City of Shelby*, 574 U.S. 10, 11–12, 135 S.Ct. 346, 190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014)); see also *Hatmaker v. Mem'l Med. Ctr.*, 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.) (“[P]laintiffs in federal courts are not required to plead legal theories.”); *Jones v. Westchester County*, 182 F. Supp. 3d 134, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[T]he Rules do not require a plaintiff to plead the legal theory ... underlying his claim ....” (quoting *Phillips v. Girdich*, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2005))). “To stave off threshold dismissal for want of an adequate statement of their claim, plaintiffs are required to do no more than state simply, concisely, and directly events that, they allege, entitle them to damages.” *Quinones*, 997 F.3d at 468 (cleaned up). That requirement differs from an inquiry under Rule 12 as to whether the complaint crosses the “plausibility” threshold. See *Quinones*, 997 F.3d at 469.

\*44 Here, Teva faults Count VI for including “a scant eight paragraphs.” (Doc. 49 at 84.) But the facts alleged in Count VI include all of the allegations in the preceding 378 paragraphs of the complaint. (See Doc. 1 ¶ 379.) In the court's view, the extensive allegations in the complaint are sufficient for Rule 8 purposes as a statement of the events that Plaintiffs allege entitle them to damages, at least on a generic unjust-enrichment theory. See *Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment* § 1 cmt. a (“Liability in restitution derives from the receipt of a benefit whose retention without payment would result in the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the claimant.”); see also *In re Flonase Antitrust Litig.*, 692 F. Supp. 2d 524, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“[A]lmost all states at minimum require plaintiffs to allege that they conferred a benefit or enrichment upon defendant and that it would be inequitable or unjust for defendant to accept and retain the benefit.”).

Assessing the *plausibility* of the unjust-enrichment claim in each U.S. state and territory may require more granular analysis. As other courts have observed, “[s]tate law requirements under unjust enrichment law vary widely.”

*Miami Products*, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 247 (quoting *In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig.*, 779 F. Supp. 2d 642, 667 (E.D. Mich. 2011)); see also *Digital Music*, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 411 (“[T]he requirements to plead unjust enrichment vary by state ....”). But the court respectfully declines to follow *Miami Products* insofar as that case held that the indirect-purchaser plaintiffs’ unjust-enrichment claims under various state laws failed to comply with Rule 8. In this court's view, pinning such a dismissal on Rule 8 would effectively require the plaintiffs to plead legal theories.

Moreover, as a practical matter, dismissal on Rule 8 grounds would do little in this case. When the *Miami Products* court dismissed the unjust-enrichment claims, it also granted leave to file a motion to amend those claims, *id.* at 250, and the plaintiffs proceeded to file an amended complaint with over 100 additional paragraphs of largely rote or repetitive allegations with state-by-state point headings. See Am. Consolidated Class Action Compl., *In re Caustic Soda Antitrust Litig.*, No. 19-cv-385 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2021), ECF No. 335. It does not appear to this court that those changes to the pleadings in that case made any difference to the defendants’ ability to defend against the claims or to the plausibility analysis that the district court ultimately performed. See *Miami Prods. & Chem. Co. v. Olin Corp.*, No. 19-CV-00385, 2022 WL 3701159 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2022).

The court therefore rejects Teva's invitation to dismiss all of the unjust-enrichment claims on Rule 8 grounds. Teva's list of “[e]xamples” of a handful of requirements in selected jurisdictions (Doc. 49 at 85) demonstrates that Teva is fully capable of discerning the nature of the claims in Count VI and defending against those claims. If Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that might be essential to a particular jurisdiction's law of unjust enrichment—or if that cause of action is unavailable in some jurisdictions—such shortcomings should be evaluated directly as a challenge to the legal cognizability of the claims, not as a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading. See generally *Lopez v. Wright*, No. 05-CV-1568, 2007 WL 388919, at \*2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2007) (noting that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion can be based either on “(1) a challenge to the ‘sufficiency of the pleading’ under Rule 8(a)(2); or (2) a challenge to the legal cognizability of the claim” (footnote omitted)).

**b. *Illinois Brick* (Redux) and Adequate Remedy at Law**



Teva's second argument against the claims in Count VI can be divided into two components. First, Teva asserts that “[f]or jurisdictions that follow *Illinois Brick*, dismissal of Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims is required because allowing such claims to go forward ‘would circumvent the policy of choice’ of the jurisdiction.” (Doc. 49 at 86 (footnote omitted) (quoting *Flonase*, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 542).) Second, Teva contends that “[i]n the remaining jurisdictions, unjust enrichment is still an inappropriate remedy because Plaintiffs can proceed under state antitrust and consumer-protection laws” and thus Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. (*Id.*)

\*45 Plaintiffs assert that Teva's *Illinois Brick* argument miscasts Plaintiffs’ claims. (Doc. 58 at 78.) They concede that they cannot bring “parasitic” unjust-enrichment claims premised on the laws of states that follow *Illinois Brick*. (*See id.*) Other courts have so held. *See Digital Music*, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 413 (dismissing “all parasitic claims premised on the state laws of states that follow *Illinois Brick*”). Plaintiffs maintain, however, that their unjust-enrichment claims are not “parasitic” but are instead “independent claims for Teva's price-gouging for critical medication necessary to a debilitating illness through a host of schemes that are not limited to conduct within the scope of what is traditionally viewed as ‘anticompetitive’ conduct.” (Doc. 58 at 78.)

The court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs’ characterization is correct. “‘In contemporary United States common law, restitution based upon unjust enrichment takes at least two forms’; it may be ‘autonomous’ or ‘parasitic.’” *Digital Music*, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 411 (quoting *In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig.*, 350 F. Supp. 2d 160, 207–08 (D. Me. 2004)). “Parasitic claims are ‘[w]here the unjust enrichment is based upon a predicate wrong, such as a tort, breach of contract or other wrongful conduct such as an antitrust violation.’” *Id.* (alteration in original) (quoting *Flonase*, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 542 n.13). “Conversely, unjust enrichment may provide an independent ground for restitution, and this is known as ‘autonomous’ restitution.” *Id.* (quoting *Flonase*, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 542 n.13).

Here, all of the facts underlying Count VI are the same facts underlying the other claims, including the antitrust claims. (*See* Doc. 1 ¶ 379.) And even assuming that the allegations

relevant to Count VI could somehow be disentangled from the claims based on the other alleged wrongs, Plaintiffs’ purported “independent” claim for price gouging is, in effect, a claim that Plaintiffs “overpaid for the product for which they bargained.” *Digital Music*, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 412.

Such a claim is unavailing in cases like these. *See id.* (“Because autonomous restitution only exists in the absence of a violation of law, the Court will not inquire into the terms of the sale where, as here, a relatively comprehensive state and federal statutory and common-law scheme exists to proscribe the conduct of which Plaintiffs complain.”) The court concludes that Teva is entitled to dismissal of Count VI insofar as it is brought under the laws of jurisdictions that apply *Illinois Brick*.<sup>38</sup>

This brings the court to Teva's second argument: that an “adequate remedy at law” precludes Count VI insofar as it is brought under the laws of the jurisdictions that do not apply *Illinois Brick*. Plaintiffs assert that Teva's argument on this point is “premature because there is as of yet no damage award, much less one threatening duplicative or inefficient liability” and because federal law authorizes pleading in the alternative. (Doc. 58 at 77–78.) Citing *Tomasella v. Nestle USA, Inc.*, 962 F.3d 60, 69 (1st Cir. 2020), Teva insists that “[t]he availability of a legal remedy bars Plaintiffs’ claims; viability is irrelevant.” (Doc. 66 at 38 n.31.)

Initially, a blanket dismissal of the balance of Count VI would be inappropriate because the absence of an adequate remedy at law is not an element of the prima facie unjust-enrichment claim in at least some of the remaining jurisdictions. *See Miami Products*, 2022 WL 3701159, at \*5. More generally, the court agrees with Plaintiffs that it would be premature to dismiss the remaining unjust-enrichment claims because those claims are pled in the alternative as authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). *Cf. Mooers v. Middlebury Coll.*, No. 20-cv-00144, 2021 WL 4225659, at \*8 (D. Vt. Sept. 16, 2021) (holding that it would be premature to dismiss plausible unjust-enrichment claim that was pled in the alternative to a breach-of-contract claim); *Conn. Invs. LLC v. KDP, LLC*, No. 20-cv-179, 2021 WL 3519709, at \*8 (D. Vt. Apr. 29, 2021) (declining to dismiss unjust-enrichment claim before resolution of breach-of-contract claim because Rule 8(d) authorizes pleading in the alternative).

\*46 Teva's reliance on *Tomasella* is misplaced. The court in that case did state that “[i]t is the availability of a remedy at

law, not the viability of that remedy, that prohibits a claim for unjust enrichment.” 962 F.3d at 82–83 (quoting *Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc.*, 865 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2017)). But this court finds it unclear whether that statement is limited only to Massachusetts law. If it is so limited, then it does not affect any issue in this case because the court has already ruled that *Illinois Brick* bars the Massachusetts unjust-enrichment claim. If the *Tomasella* court intended its statement to apply more broadly, the court respectfully declines to follow it in light of this court's holdings that an unjust-enrichment claim can be pled in the alternative.

#### 4. State Statute of Limitations Issues

The court concluded above that the limitations provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 15b do not apply to claims brought under 15 U.S.C. § 26 and thus that statute of limitations is not an impediment to the claims in Count IV. The analysis is different, however, for the claims brought under state law.

As noted above, the relevant lawsuits and citizen petitions were all filed more than seven years before Plaintiffs filed this federal suit in August 2022. Teva asserts that Plaintiffs' state-law claims challenge conduct dating to 2006, and that those claims are barred under the applicable four- to six-year state statutes of limitations. (Doc. 49 at 87; *see also* Doc. 49-3 (Teva's summary of statutes of limitations for state-law claims).) Plaintiffs maintain that their claims are timely for three reasons. First, they assert that Teva engaged in fraudulent concealment, thereby tolling all statutes of limitations until 2020, when the United States government brought the AKS lawsuit and when Congress issued the House Report. (*See* Doc. 58 at 79.) Second, Plaintiffs argue that their claims did not accrue until the House Report was released in 2020. (*Id.* at 85.) Third, Plaintiffs invoke the continuing-violations doctrine on the grounds that Teva's alleged scheme and Plaintiffs' alleged damages continued until at least 2019. (*Id.* at 86.)

The parties' respective appendices labeled “B” include their summaries of the positions on each of Plaintiffs' three arguments against dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds. (*See* Doc. 49-2; Doc. 58-2.) In its reply memorandum, Teva maintains that “Plaintiffs have no valid justification for presenting such untimely challenges.” (Doc. 66 at 39.) And according to Teva, “at a minimum, Plaintiffs should be precluded from reaching outside the limitations

period to prop up their claims.” (*Id.*) Teva further offers arguments against Plaintiffs' tolling, accrual, and continuing-violations theories. (*Id.* at 39–42.)

The court notes at the outset that it “may dismiss a claim on statute-of-limitations grounds at the pleadings stage ‘if [the] complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time.’ ” *Whiteside v. Hover-Davis, Inc.*, 995 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2021) (alteration in original; quoting *Harris v. City of New York*, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999)). The court is mindful that “[b]ecause a statute of limitations defense can be highly fact dependent, a motion to dismiss is often not the appropriate stage to raise affirmative defenses like the statute of limitations.” *Russo v. Navient Sols., LLC*, No. 16-cv-00316, 2018 WL 1474354, at \*13 (D. Vt. Mar. 23, 2018) (quoting *Canon U.S.A., Inc. v. Cavin's Bus. Sols., Inc.*, 208 F. Supp. 3d 494, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)). Teva bears the burden of “demonstrating the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff[s]' claims.” *Id.*

##### a. Accrual and the Discovery Rule

Anticipating a statute-of-limitations argument, the complaint invokes the “discovery rule” and asserts that:

\*47 Plaintiffs and the members of the Class had no knowledge of the combination or conspiracy alleged herein, or of facts sufficient to place them on inquiry notice of the claims set forth herein, until August and September of 2020, when the government filed its complaint related to Teva's scheme to defraud Medicare [the AKS lawsuit] and the House Committee released its report [the House Report]. (Doc. 1 ¶ 235.) Teva asserts that under the law of 15 jurisdictions, antitrust claims accrue when a defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff's business, not when the plaintiff discovers the injury. (*See* Doc. 49 at 94.) Teva further asserts that, where it is applied, the discovery rule “requires a plaintiff to inquire into the existence of a cause of action when the plaintiff has access to information that would prompt a reasonable party to do so.” (*Id.* (quoting *Hightower v. Celestron Acquisition, LLC*, No. 20-cv-03639, 2021 WL 2224148, at \*9 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2021)).)

Although it might be natural to start with the questions of accrual and the discovery rule, the court concludes that the analysis below makes it unnecessary to resolve the parties'

disputes on those issues. The court proceeds to the question of fraudulent concealment.

**b. Fraudulent Concealment**

The court begins with the question of fraudulent concealment as a basis for tolling the limitations periods. The court is mindful that “[r]esolution of a claim of fraudulent concealment so as to toll the statute of limitations is ‘intimately bound up with the facts of the case’ ” and is generally not proper on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. *Hinds County v. Wachovia Bank N.A.*, 700 F. Supp. 2d 378, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting *In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust Litig.*, 157 F. Supp. 2d 355, 374 (D.N.J. 2001)); see also *Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc.*, No. 09-cv-230, 2014 WL 2610613, at \*23 (D. Vt. June 11, 2014) (“[W]hether a plaintiff has shown fraudulent concealment is generally a question of fact for the jury.”).

The parties both cite the following passage from *State of New York v. Hendrickson Bros.* regarding the elements required to toll the limitations provision of 15 U.S.C. § 15b due to fraudulent concealment:

[A]n antitrust plaintiff may prove fraudulent concealment sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations if he establishes (1) that the defendant concealed from him the existence of his cause of action, (2) that he remained in ignorance of that cause of action until some point within four years of the commencement of his action, and (3) that his continuing ignorance was not attributable to lack of diligence on his part.

840 F.2d 1065, 1083 (2d Cir. 1988). Teva challenges the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ allegations as to the elements of tolling on a fraudulent-concealment theory.<sup>39</sup> The court considers Teva’s arguments in turn.<sup>40</sup>

**i. Concealment**

\*48 Teva asserts “[t]he overwhelming majority of states require an affirmative act of concealment before the doctrine can apply; mere passive nondisclosure is insufficient.” (Doc. 49 at 89–90 & n.38.) And according to Teva, the complaint lacks any plausible allegations of affirmative concealment. (*Id.* at 91.) Plaintiffs contend, however, that Teva’s conduct is

“self-concealing” and thus Plaintiffs are not required to show that Teva took independent affirmative steps to conceal it. (Doc. 58 at 80; see also Doc. 1 ¶ 240.) In reply, Teva maintains that “there is no automatic extension for conduct that is supposedly ‘self-concealing’ ” and that “Plaintiffs’ authority to the contrary is limited to *federal* claims—it provides no basis to extend the limitations period for any of their state-law claims.” (Doc. 66 at 40.)

Although the court’s focus is on the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ allegations of concealment for purposes of state law, the court finds it helpful to begin by reviewing some of the observations from federal court decisions. As the Fourth Circuit has stated: “[F]ederal courts have developed different standards for determining whether antitrust plaintiffs have satisfied” the concealment element of the three-part test for fraudulent concealment tolling. *Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc.*, 71 F.3d 119, 122 (4th Cir. 1995). The standards developed in the federal courts “are denominated the ‘self-concealing’ standard, the ‘separate and apart’ standard, and the intermediate, ‘affirmative acts’ standard.” *Id.*

The *Meadow Gold* court described the self-concealing standard as the standard that the Second Circuit adopted in *Hendrickson*:

As indicated in *Bailey v. Glover* [88 U.S. 342, 21 Wall. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1874)], the plaintiff may prove the concealment element by showing either that the defendant took affirmative steps to prevent the plaintiff’s discovery of his claim or injury or that the wrong itself was of such a nature as to be self-concealing.

*Hendrickson*, 840 F.2d at 1083. Under this standard, according to *Meadow Gold*, “a plaintiff satisfies the first element merely by proving that a self-concealing antitrust violation has occurred.” *Meadow Gold*, 71 F.3d at 122. Plaintiffs argue that this standard applies to their state-law claims. (See Doc. 58 at 80.)

“At the opposite end of the spectrum,” according to *Meadow Gold*, “is the separate and apart standard in which a plaintiff is required to provide evidence, separate and apart from the acts of concealment involved in the defendants’ antitrust violation, that the defendants affirmatively acted

to conceal the plaintiff's claim.” 71 F.3d at 122. Citing *Langer v. Simpson*, 533 N.W.2d 511, 522 (Iowa 1995), Teva contends that Iowa has adopted this restrictive standard. (Doc. 49 at 90.) Plaintiffs concede that Iowa requires acts of concealment to be supported with “evidence of affirmative steps independent of and in addition to the original wrongdoing.” *Langner v. Simpson*, 533 N.W.2d 511, 522 (Iowa 1995). Although Plaintiffs contend that they have plausibly alleged affirmative acts of concealment (Doc. 58 at 82), none of those alleged acts appear to be independent of the alleged wrongdoing. The court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to toll Iowa’s four-year antitrust statute of limitations on a fraudulent-concealment theory. (See Doc. 49-3.)

The third category of standards for determining the “concealment” element is the “intermediate” so-called “affirmative acts” standard under which “a plaintiff must prove that the defendants affirmatively acted to conceal their antitrust violations, but the plaintiff’s proof may include acts of concealment involved in the antitrust violation itself.”

*Meadow Gold*, 71 F.3d at 122. Teva cites cases from eleven jurisdictions stating that an “affirmative” act or conduct is required to establish tolling on a fraudulent-concealment theory. (See Doc. 49 at 90 n.38.) But Teva has not shown that the courts in those jurisdictions would decline to consider “acts of concealment involved in the antitrust violation itself.”

*Meadow Gold*, 71 F.3d at 122.<sup>41</sup>

\*49 Teva asserts that the allegations in the complaint “boil down to an objection that Teva did not publicize its alleged conduct—not that Teva engaged in concealment, active or otherwise.” (Doc. 49 at 91.) But according to the complaint, Teva:

- “[A]ctively concealed its illegal payments to Medicare recipients by funneling them through CDF [Chronic Disease Fund] and TAF [The Assistance Fund]” (Doc. 1 ¶ 241);
- “[C]onced its efforts to induce payors to pay for Copaxone by paying pharmacies to not collect cost-sharing obligations from private health plan members and by causing pharmacies to report the full, undisclosed drug price when submitting claims to PBMs and private health plans” (*id.* ¶ 242);

- “[M]isrepresented why it introduced 40mg Copaxone and otherwise concealed its true motive of avoiding generic substitution” (*id.* ¶ 243); and
- “[C]onced its efforts to conspire with PBMs and specialty pharmacies to have generic prescriptions filled with Copaxone” (*id.* ¶ 244).

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the court concludes that the complaint alleges more than nondisclosure of internal “budgeting figures, documents, or communications revealing its donations or contracting strategy.” (Doc. 49 at 91.)

## ii. Reliance

Citing *In re Magnesium Oxide Antitrust Litigation*, No. 10-5943, 2011 WL 5008090 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2011), Teva contends that the complaint lacks any allegation that Plaintiffs “relied on” any “act of concealment.” (Doc. 49 at 92.) Plaintiffs argue that the *Magnesium Oxide* court was applying the Third Circuit’s test for fraudulent concealment and that Teva’s citation to the elements listed in *Hendrickson* means that Teva has conceded that “reliance” is not a required element. (Doc. 58 at 82.) Plaintiffs further assert that “[i]n any event, plaintiffs in *Magnesium Oxide* were ultimately found to have satisfied the Third Circuit’s more stringent requirement based on similar allegations to those here.” (*Id.* at 83 n.49 (citing *In re Magnesium Oxide*, No. 10-5943, 2012 WL 1150123, at \*7–8 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2012)).) Teva maintains that Plaintiffs have made no attempt to show reliance and that “this is a state-law issue, and several states that require affirmative conduct likewise require reliance.” (Doc. 66 at 41 & n.35.)

The court is not persuaded that Teva’s citation to *Hendrickson* is equivalent to a concession that “reliance” is not required under the laws of the applicable state jurisdictions. Teva cited *Hendrickson* to introduce the elements of fraudulent concealment “generally.” (Doc. 49 at 89.) But Teva’s motion proceeds to specifically assert that “reliance” is required and that Plaintiffs have not satisfied that element. (*Id.* at 92.) Teva’s specific argument governs over its earlier general citation to *Hendrickson* and there was no concession on this issue.

Teva lists six jurisdictions—Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, and South Dakota—that require “reliance” as an element of tolling based on fraudulent concealment. (Doc. 66 at 41 n.35.) But Teva has not supplied any analysis indicating that the “reliance” required in those jurisdictions is any different than the “reliance” required in the 2011 *Magnesium Oxide* decision. The court therefore concludes that, as to the six jurisdictions that Teva has identified, the result in this case would be the same as in *Magnesium Oxide*: dismissal without prejudice as time-barred but with leave to amend to adequately allege “reliance.” *Magnesium Oxide*, 2011 WL 5008090, at \*23. Nonetheless, the court is unpersuaded that dismissal is required for any of the claims in these jurisdictions for the separate reasons discussed below.

### iii. Ignorance and Diligence

\*50 Teva further argues that “Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that they exercised due diligence in investigating their claims.” (Doc. 49 at 92.) Teva asserts that the complaint includes allegations that “generic uptake in this market was substantially slower than typical” and that this, “if true, should have placed Plaintiffs on inquiry notice of their claims.” (*Id.*) Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that: (1) “Plaintiffs alleged due diligence in how they monitor and respond to high drug prices”; and (2) “Plaintiffs could not possibly have investigated ‘their claims’ prior to August and September 2020, when the government disclosed previously non-public information” via the AKS lawsuit and the House Report. (Doc. 58 at 83.) Teva maintains that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they took any steps to investigate the alleged Copaxone price increases, and that the conduct targeted in Plaintiffs’ complaint was public at the time that it occurred. (Doc. 66 at 41.)

The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs had “inquiry notice” of their claims. The complaint asserts that:

Plaintiffs and the members of the Class had no knowledge of the combination or conspiracy alleged herein, or of facts sufficient to place them on inquiry notice of the claims set forth herein, until August and September of 2020, when the government filed its complaint related to Teva's scheme to defraud Medicare [the AKS lawsuit] and the House Committee released its report [the House Report].

(Doc. 1 ¶ 235.) As noted above, Teva maintains that slow generic uptake for GA products put Plaintiffs on inquiry notice. (Doc. 49 at 92.) On this dispute, the court observes that “whether a plaintiff had sufficient facts to place it on inquiry notice is ‘often inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).’ ” *LC Cap. Partners, LP v. Frontier Ins. Grp.*, 318 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting *Marks v. CDW Comput. Ctrs., Inc.*, 122 F.3d 363, 367 (7th Cir. 1997)). But the court does not need to decide whether making that determination is proper at this stage of this case.

According to *In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation*—a case on which Teva relies—a showing of inquiry notice<sup>42</sup> triggers an obligation on the party resisting a statute-of-limitations defense to allege “due diligence in order to invoke the fraudulent concealment doctrine.” No. 08-md-2002, 2013 WL 4504768, at \*4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2013); *see also* *id.* at \*5 n.6 (“[A] defendant must show that storm warnings existed before a plaintiff must prove that it exercised due diligence.”). Decisions from within the Second Circuit are in accord. *See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc.*, 113 F. Supp. 2d 345, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“A defense of fraudulent concealment fails if the plaintiff had either actual or inquiry notice of its claims *and did not diligently and thoroughly investigate.*” (emphasis added)); *Griffin v. McNiff*, 744 F. Supp. 1237, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“Inasmuch as plaintiffs were put on inquiry notice from the withdrawals, they may not rely on allegations of fraudulent concealment to avoid the limitations bar *unless they exercised due diligence in attempting to ascertain the facts related to the alleged fraud, but were nevertheless unable or prevented from discovering the nature of their claim.*” (emphasis added)).

Anticipating this issue, the complaint explicitly asserts that “Plaintiffs exercised appropriate due diligence under the circumstances.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 246.) That alleged diligence included monitoring drug prices. (*Id.*) But even assuming that Plaintiffs’ efforts to monitor drug prices supports a finding of inquiry notice, the additional allegations in the complaint plausibly indicate that Plaintiffs diligently attempted to ascertain facts that might support claims against Teva but were unable to do so. Noting that Plaintiffs lacked subpoena power or other mechanisms to review Teva's internal records, the complaint alleges that “Plaintiffs lacked the ability to discover that the drug prices they were paying were *higher than they should have been* because of anticompetitive, fraudulent, or other deceptive conduct.” (*Id.*)

\*51 The defense argues that “many aspects of Teva's purported ‘scheme’ were public facing, such as its launch of Copaxone 40 mg and its DAW messaging.” (Doc. 49 at 91.) Nothing in the complaint contradicts Teva's suggestion that Plaintiffs monitored the available public information about Teva's activities related to Copaxone. But significant information in the AKS lawsuit and the House Report was not available to Plaintiffs before 2020. The inclusion of that information in those proceedings plausibly indicates that it is material—if not essential—to the claims in the AKS lawsuit and the findings in the House Report. It is likewise plausible that, despite Plaintiffs’ efforts to monitor Teva's public activities, Plaintiffs lacked a sufficient basis to bring the claims in their complaint until the AKS lawsuit and the House Report revealed the previously non-public information.

Teva faults Plaintiffs for failing to file their lawsuit until August 2022—two years after the AKS lawsuit and the House Report became public, and a year after Mylan sued Teva on antitrust theories.<sup>43</sup> (Doc. 49 at 93–94.) Teva's argument on this point is not trivial; as other courts have held, “a plaintiff who invokes equitable tolling to suspend the statute of limitations must bring suit within a reasonable time after he has obtained, or by due diligence could have obtained, the necessary information.” *Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.*, 920 F.2d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.). But given the complexity of the factual and procedural history underlying Plaintiffs’ allegations, the court finds no basis at this time to rule that Plaintiffs waited too long after the 2020 revelations to file this suit.

For all of the above reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded fraudulent concealment for all of the relevant jurisdictions except those specifically identified above.

**c. Continuing-Violations Doctrine**

The court considers the continuing-violations doctrine for the jurisdictions where, for the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ fraudulent-concealment allegations are insufficient to toll the statutes of limitations. Teva recognizes that, under the continuing-violations doctrine, “a new cause of action accrues each time the plaintiff is injured by an act of the defendant.” *Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc.*,

No. 09-cv-230, 2014 WL 2610613, at \*24 (D. Vt. June 11, 2014) (quoting *In re Buspirone Patent Litig.*, 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).<sup>44</sup> But Teva argues that some jurisdictions do not recognize the continuing-violations doctrine, and further argues that “even where the doctrine does apply, it would provide no basis to recover damages on purchases made outside the limitations period.” (Doc. 49 at 87.)

As to Teva's latter point, the court agrees with Plaintiffs that it is unnecessary at this stage to determine the scope of any potential recovery under any of the relevant state laws. As courts in other antitrust cases involving statute-of-limitations issues have held: “What the applicable period for the calculation of damages may be does not need to be decided on this motion to dismiss.” *In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig.*, 338 F. Supp. 2d 517, 551 (D.N.J. 2004). Teva has not offered any analysis on this issue or any attempt to distinguish *K-Dur*. It therefore remains to consider the availability of the continuing-violations doctrine in the relevant jurisdictions where the complaint does not adequately plead tolling based on fraudulent concealment: Iowa (because of Iowa's “separate and apart” standard) and the six jurisdictions that require “reliance”— Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, and South Dakota.

\*52 Iowa. Teva does not argue that the continuing-violations doctrine is unavailable in Iowa. (See Doc. 49 at 88–89.) The court's own research reveals no Iowa authority that definitively rejects the continuing-violations doctrine. *Cf. Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church*, 913 N.W.2d 19, 46 (Iowa 2018) (“Although the parties dispute whether we have in fact adopted the continuing-violations theory, we need not resolve that issue ....”).

Delaware. Teva does not argue that the continuing-violations doctrine is unavailable in Delaware. (See Doc. 49 at 88–89.) The court's own research reveals no Delaware authority that definitively rejects the continuing-violations doctrine.

*Cf. GI Assocs. of Del., P.A. v. Anderson*, 247 A.3d 674, 680 (Del. 2021) (under “continuous negligent medical treatment doctrine,” a plaintiff can bring “a single cause of action for the entire continuum of negligent medical care if any part of it occurs within the time required by the statute of limitations”);

*Kerns v. Dukes*, No. Civ.A.1999-S, 2004 WL 766529, at \*4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 2004) (“If there is a continuing wrong,

the cause of action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing wrong falls within the limitations period.”).

Hawaii. Teva does not argue that the continuing-violations doctrine is unavailable in Hawaii. (See Doc. 49 at 88–89.) The court's own research reveals no Hawaii authority that definitively rejects the continuing-violations doctrine.

Cf. *Garner v. State*, 122 Hawai'i 150, 223 P.3d 215, 233 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009) (“Hawai'i has long recognized that a continuing wrong may, in effect, toll the statute of limitations with respect to tortious conduct that is ongoing.”).

Illinois. Teva relies on *Feltmeier v. Feltmeier*, 207 Ill.2d 263, 278 Ill.Dec. 228, 798 N.E.2d 75 (2003), reasoning that the court in that case “declin[ed] to apply the doctrine to Illinois claims.” (Doc. 49 at 88.) But the *Feltmeier* court actually applied the doctrine in that case. See *Feltmeier*, 278 Ill.Dec. 228, 798 N.E.2d at 89 (“[I]n the case of a continuing tort, such as the one at bar, a plaintiff's cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time the last injurious act occurs or the conduct is abated.” (emphasis added)). At most, *Feltmeier* recognizes that a case of “continual ill effects from an initial violation” does not constitute a continuing tort. *Id.*, 278 Ill.Dec. 228, 798 N.E.2d at 85. Teva has not argued that this distinction applies to Plaintiffs’ claims under Illinois law.

Michigan. Teva cites two cases regarding the continuing-violations theory in Michigan. First, Teva relies on the *Lamictal* case, cited above. But that decision does not reject the availability of the “continuing-wrongful-acts” doctrine in Michigan. *Lamictal*, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 747. Instead, like *Feltmeier*, *Lamictal* recognizes that “[a] continuing wrong is established by continual tortious acts, not by continual harmful effects from the original, completed act.” *Id.* (quoting *Horvath v. Delida*, 213 Mich.App. 620, 540 N.W.2d 760, 763 (1995)). Teva has not argued that this distinction applies to Plaintiffs’ claims under Michigan law.

Second, Teva cites *In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litigation*, in which the federal court recognized that “[t]he Michigan Supreme Court has not determined if the continuing violations doctrine applies to claims brought under its antitrust laws” but predicted that the Michigan Supreme Court

would adopt the doctrine. No. 14-02567, 2019 WL 4796528, at \*10 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 21, 2019). Teva therefore appears to cite *Pre-Filled Propane* for the narrower proposition that damages on the Michigan claims are unavailable for purchases made outside of Michigan's four-year statute of limitations. See *id.* at \*4 n.4. However, as noted above, it is unnecessary for the court to determine the applicable period for the calculation of damages at this stage of the case. *K-Dur*, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 551.

\*53 Mississippi. The *Pre-Filled Propane* decision states that “the Court is not aware of a Mississippi decision that discusses the continuing violation doctrine in any context” and that “[g]iven the uncertainty in Mississippi caselaw, the Court is unable to find that current precedent foreshadows the Mississippi Supreme Court adopting the continuing violation doctrine under the Mississippi Antitrust Act.” 2019 WL 4796528, at \*13. Similarly, the court in *In re Opana ER Antitrust Litigation* stated that it could not find any case from Mississippi adopting the “continuing violation” doctrine in the antitrust context and concluded that “[i]n light of the unsettled nature of this doctrine ... the Court declines to toll the statute of limitations ... under ... Mississippi law.” 162 F. Supp. 3d 704, 725 (N.D. Ill. 2016).

The court respectfully declines to follow *Pre-Filled Propane* and *Opana* on this issue. Like the district courts in those cases, this court has found no Mississippi cases discussing a “continuing violations” doctrine. But the same doctrine goes by a few different names. See, e.g., *Malek v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co.*, No. 20-CV-04885, 2023 WL 2682408, at \*6 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2023) (“New York courts sometimes refer to the continuing violation doctrine as the continuing wrong doctrine.”), *appeal docketed*, No. 23-992 (2d Cir. June 30, 2023). And Mississippi does recognize a “continuing wrong” or “continuing tort” doctrine. See, e.g., *Cooley v. Pine Belt Oil Co.*, 334 So.3d 118, 127 (Miss. 2022) (en banc). At present, this court sees no reason why that doctrine would not be available in a Mississippi antitrust case.

South Dakota. Teva does not argue that the continuing-violations doctrine is unavailable in South Dakota. (See Doc. 49 at 88–89.) The court's own research reveals no South Dakota authority that definitively rejects the continuing-violations doctrine. Cf. *Robinson-Podoll v. Harmelink, Fox & Ravensborg L. Off.*, 939 N.W.2d 32, 47 (S.D. 2020) (“Generally, when a tort involves a continuing injury,

the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations commences when the wrong terminates.” (quoting [Alberts v. Giebink](#), 299 N.W.2d 454, 456 (S.D. 1980)).

For all of the above reasons, the court concludes that Teva has not shown that any of the relevant statutes of limitations bar Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. It remains to consider the [Rule 12\(b\)\(2\)](#) motion that Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. has filed.

**II. Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.’s [Rule 12\(b\)\(2\)](#) Motion to Dismiss**

Plaintiffs have the burden to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. (“Teva Israel”).<sup>45</sup> [Gater Assets Ltd. v. AO Moldovagaz](#), 2 F.4th 42, 52-53 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing [In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig.](#), 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam)). Because no evidentiary hearing has been held in this case, “Plaintiffs need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” [Lelchook v. Société G n rate de Banque au Liban SAL](#), 67 F.4th 69, 75 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting [Chlo e v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC](#), 616 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2010)). The court may consider Plaintiffs’ pleadings and affidavits, which must be construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and with all doubts resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor. [In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001](#), 714 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2013).

There are three requirements for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant: “(1) the plaintiff’s service of process upon the defendant must have been procedurally proper; (2) there must be a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction that renders such service of process effective; and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with constitutional due process principles.” [Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org.](#), 82 F.4th 74, 85 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). Teva Israel does not assert any procedural fault with service of process. But the parties dispute issues relating to the second and third requirements for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The court begins with the question of the adequacy of a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction.

**A. Statutory Basis for Personal Jurisdiction**

\*54 As discussed above, the complaint seeks relief under the Clayton Act. (Doc. 1 ¶ 296 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 26).) Section 12 of the Clayton Act includes the following provision:

Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.

15 U.S.C. § 22. The Second Circuit has recognized that § 22 contains two parts:

The part before the semicolon addresses venue, permitting antitrust actions against corporations to be maintained “not only in the judicial district whereof [the corporate defendant] is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business.” The part after the semicolon provides for worldwide service of process and, therefore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction “in such cases.”

[Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med.](#), 428 F.3d 408, 422 (2d Cir. 2005) (alteration in original). The Second Circuit has acknowledged a circuit split on the relationship between venue and service of process in § 12 and has joined the circuits holding that “the plain language of Section 12 indicates that its service of process provision applies (and, therefore, establishes personal jurisdiction) only in cases in which its venue provision is satisfied.” [Id.](#) at 423.

Teva Israel argues that Plaintiffs have not established venue under § 22. (Doc. 48 at 18.) Teva Israel first raises a procedural argument, asserting that the complaint relies upon the general venue statute, [28 U.S.C. § 1391](#), without any reference to the Clayton Act. (See Doc. 48 at 19.) Plaintiffs maintain that the federal rules do not require complaints to specifically plead the legal basis for venue. (Doc. 57 at 12 n.2.) The court agrees with Plaintiffs on this point and rejects Teva Israel’s suggestion that Plaintiffs might be barred from establishing venue under § 22 merely because the complaint does not cite that statute. See [Rocket Jewelry Box, Inc. v. Noble Gift Packaging, Inc.](#), 869 F. Supp. 152, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“The plaintiff need not include in his complaint an allegation showing proper venue.”); cf. [Fox v. Paterson](#), No. 10-CV-6240, 2010 WL 11545717, at \*6 (W.D.N.Y. May 13, 2010) (“Although plaintiffs did not plead § 1391(b)(1) in the complaint, that does not bar the Court from considering it as an alternative basis for venue.”); see also [Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1206](#)



(4th ed.) (complaint need not state the grounds for personal jurisdiction).

As to the substantive application of § 22 in this case, Teva Israel asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Teva Israel is an “inhabitant” of Vermont or that it can be “found” here, or that Teva Israel “transacts business” in Vermont. (Doc. 48 at 20.) Plaintiffs disagree with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of § 22 (*see* Doc. 57 at 13 n.3) but recognize that *Daniel* is the law in this circuit and is binding on the district court. Consistent with their position in the complaint (*see* Doc. 1 ¶¶ 20–22), Plaintiffs argue that even under *Daniel*, venue is proper in the District of Vermont for purposes of the Clayton Act “because Teva Israel ‘transacts business’ in this forum through its subsidiaries,” with the subsidiaries acting as Teva Israel’s “agents and/or alter egos.” (Doc. 57 at 8.) Teva Israel maintains that the contacts of its United States affiliates do not establish personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 67 at 13.)

\*55 The phrase “transacts business” as it appears in § 22 refers to “the practical, everyday business or commercial concept of doing business or carrying on business of any substantial character.” *Daniel*, 428 F.3d at 428 (quoting *United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am.*, 333 U.S. 795, 807, 68 S.Ct. 855, 92 L.Ed. 1091 (1948)). “A parent-subsidary relationship may form a basis for the exercise of Clayton Act jurisdiction.” *All Star Carts & Vehicles, Inc. v. BFI Canada Income Fund*, 596 F. Supp. 2d 630, 637 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing *Scophony*, 333 U.S. at 808, 68 S.Ct. 855); *see also Reynolds Metals Co. v. Columbia Gas Sys., Inc.*, 669 F. Supp. 744, 748 (E.D. Va. 1987) (“Under certain circumstances, the parent company of a wholly-owned subsidiary may be subject to jurisdiction and venue under § 12 of the Clayton Act for the adjudication of antitrust claims in the state in which the subsidiary transacts business.”). But the corporate parent of a subsidiary that transacts business in a forum does not itself necessarily “transact business” in the forum. *See Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.*, 343 F. Supp. 3d 122, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Allegations that certain of these defendants are parent companies of subsidiaries that transact business in New York do not suffice to show that the parent companies transact business in New York.”).

To assess whether Teva Israel “transacts business” in Vermont through its subsidiaries, one consideration is whether the subsidiaries required Teva Israel’s “constant supervision and

intervention.” *Scophony*, 333 U.S. at 815, 68 S.Ct. 855. Notably, the analysis does not require Plaintiffs to prove that Teva Israel exercised “[p]ervasive control” over its subsidiaries as in a veil-piercing context. *In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig.*, No. 06-MD-1738, 2012 WL 2930109, at \*7 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012) (citing *All Star Carts & Vehicles*, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 637). The corporate parent’s control over its subsidiary is a relevant consideration, but the court respectfully declines to follow *Reynolds Metals* insofar as that case equates the “transacts business” inquiry under § 22 with a veil-piercing analysis. *See Reynolds Metals*, 669 F. Supp. at 748 (citing *King v. Johnson Wax Assocs.*, 565 F. Supp. 711, 718 (D. Md. 1983)).

Teva Israel correctly observes that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding its conduct in this case differ from the conduct of the corporate parent in *Scophony*. The British parent company in that case signed contracts that gave it controls “which taken in conjunction with the stock controls called for continuing exercise of supervision over and intervention in” the affairs of its American subsidiary. *Scophony*, 333 U.S. at 814, 68 S.Ct. 855. The complaint in this case does not allege similar contracts or stock controls. But just because the facts of this case differ from those of *Scophony* does not necessarily mean that the outcome of the “transacts business” analysis must be different.

Consistent with *Scophony*, the court examines the “practical reality” of the business relationship and inquires “whether the subsidiary’s business transactions are ones that the parent ‘would have to undertake directly if the subsidiary did not exist to perform them.’ ” *In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig.*, 2012 WL 2930109, at \*5–6 (quoting *In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.*, 262 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). A variety of factors are relevant to this pragmatic inquiry, including “a high rate of crossover of directors”; whether corporate formalities at the subsidiary are “scarce”; and whether the parent “directly funded” the subsidiary’s day-to-day activities. *Id.* at \*6. Teva asserts that none of those factors are present here. (Doc. 67 at 12.)

The complaint does not itself speak directly to those three particular factors. But no single factor is dispositive. *See id.* (“[T]he Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have made clear that none of these individual factors should control the analysis.”). And other factors weigh in favor of venue

under § 22. The complaint alleges that Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (“Teva USA”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Teva Israel; that Teva Neuroscience, Inc. (“Teva Neuro”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Teva USA; and that Teva Sales & Marketing (“Teva Sales”) is a subsidiary of Teva Israel. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 28–30; *see also id.* ¶ 32.) Of course, that alone is not dispositive, but the complaint also cites multiple allegations (*see id.* ¶¶ 34–35) regarding Teva Israel's relationships with its subsidiaries, including Teva USA, as discussed in *City & County of San Francisco v. Purdue Pharma L.P.*, 491 F. Supp. 3d 610 (N.D. Cal. 2020).

\*56 Teva Israel asserts that *Purdue Pharma* is “inapplicable.” (Doc. 48 at 22; *see also id.* at 25 n.8.) The *Purdue Pharma* court was indeed analyzing a veil-piercing theory under California's alter-ego doctrine—*not* under the venue provision of 15 U.S.C. § 22. *See Purdue Pharma*, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 635–36. But Plaintiffs maintain that “even if a different legal standard were applied, the underlying *factual findings* remain trenchant here: that is, the control, supervision, and direction by Teva Israel of its subsidiaries.” (Doc. 57 at 28.) Teva Israel asserts that the different legal standard in *Purdue Pharma* means that “the factual allegations that were deemed sufficient there ... do not support disregarding the corporate form here.” (Doc. 67 at 14 n.7.)

Although the complaint includes an alter-ego theory (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 32–42), the court is not examining that theory here. As noted above, the transaction-of-business inquiry is not the same as an alter-ego/veil-piercing analysis. At this stage, the court is not considering the factual allegations in *Purdue Pharma* as a basis to disregard Teva Israel's corporate form. More importantly, Teva Israel does not dispute that the *Purdue Pharma* court relied on multiple factual allegations regarding Teva Israel's relationships with its subsidiaries.

The court is mindful that Teva Israel disputed many of the relevant allegations in *Purdue Pharma*. 491 F. Supp. 3d at 636. And the defense has supplied an affidavit from Teva USA Vice President and Deputy General Counsel Brian Shanahan that asserts, among other things, that Teva Israel “does not dominate, control, direct, or supervise the day-to-day operations” of Teva USA, Teva Neuro, Teva Sales, or their employees. (Doc. 48-1 ¶ 16.) But for purposes

of Plaintiffs’ prima facie case, this court notes that the allegations in *Purdue Pharma* supported determinations that:

- Teva Israel's “corporate history, structure, management, and officers demonstrates that it sought to fully integrate and control its subsidiaries”;
- Teva Israel's control “encompasses its subsidiaries’ day-to-day activities”; and
- Teva Israel's “shared financial structure demonstrates that it completely controlled its subsidiaries’ finances.”

*Purdue Pharma*, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 636–37. For present purposes, there are sufficient allegations to support the inference that Teva Israel would have to directly undertake the business activities of the relevant subsidiaries if the subsidiaries did not exist and that the “practical reality” of the business operations is that Teva Israel “transacts business” in Vermont sufficient to establish a basis for jurisdiction here under 15 U.S.C. § 22.

This conclusion makes it unnecessary to reach Plaintiffs’ alternative arguments regarding Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) and Vermont's long-arm statute. The court proceeds to the constitutional due process considerations.

**B. Due Process Analysis**

“To establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant, due process requires a plaintiff to allege (1) that a defendant has ‘certain minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum, and (2) that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in the circumstances.” *In re Terrorist Attacks*, 714 F.3d at 673. The court considers the parties’ positions on both of these elements of the due process analysis.

**1. Minimum Contacts**

Because 15 U.S.C. § 22 provides for national service of process, “[t]he appropriate forum for purposes of determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with due process is the United States, rather than [Vermont].” *Dennis*, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 202. Considering the United States as the relevant forum, the court examines Plaintiffs’ argument that “specific” personal jurisdiction is present in this case.<sup>46</sup>

\*57 “Specific personal jurisdiction exists in suits ‘arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’” *Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc.*, 74 F.4th 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting *Porina v. Marward Shipping Co.*, 521 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 2008)), *cert. denied sub nom. UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc. v. Eva Airways Corp.*, No. 23-420, — U.S. —, — S.Ct. —, — L.Ed.2d —, 2024 WL 71971 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2024). Here, the complaint includes sufficient allegations of Teva Israel’s minimum contacts with the United States. (See Doc. 1 ¶ 22.) These alleged contacts include intentionally accessing United States markets, marketing Copaxone in this country, and accessing the United States court system and administrative agencies. (*Id.*) The court concludes that Plaintiffs have made an adequate prima facie showing of minimum contacts between Teva Israel and the United States.

**2. Reasonableness**

Finally, Teva Israel argues that exercising personal jurisdiction over it would not be reasonable under the circumstances. (Doc. 48 at 16.) “The reasonableness inquiry requires the court to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ under the circumstances of the particular case.” *Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org.*, 835 F.3d 317, 331 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting *Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 571 U.S. 117, 126, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014)). Because the court has already concluded that Plaintiffs have met their prima facie burden to show that minimum contacts are present, Teva Israel can defeat jurisdiction only by presenting “a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” *Eades v. Kennedy, PC L. Offs.*, 799 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting *Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL*, 732 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2013)). Considerations relevant to this analysis include:

- (1) the burden that the exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant;
- (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the case;
- (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;
- (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution

of the controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.

*Id.* (quoting *Chloé*, 616 F.3d at 164).

The court concludes that Teva Israel has failed to present a compelling case of unreasonableness here. Litigating in Vermont would impose some burden on Teva Israel, but the court is unpersuaded that the burden would be unreasonable. Teva is one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world; it has a significant presence worldwide and in the United States. The court is not persuaded that litigating in Vermont would impose an excessive burden on Teva Israel. The United States has a more than “minimal” interest in adjudicating this case, and Plaintiffs have a strong interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief. The parties dispute whether Teva Israel was “involved” in any of the alleged unlawful conduct, but Plaintiffs are entitled to all reasonable inferences and dismissing Teva Israel at this stage of the case might deny Plaintiffs effective relief. Teva Israel offers no argument on any of the remaining “reasonableness” factors. The court concludes that Teva Israel has not made a sufficient showing that exercising jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

**Conclusion**

Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 49) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as follows:

- \*58 • The court dismisses Plaintiffs’ antitrust damages claims under Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Utah state law arising before October 1, 2017, July 15, 2013, and May 1, 2006, respectively;
- The Puerto Rico antitrust claims are dismissed;
- The Utah antitrust claims are dismissed without prejudice to repleading that includes a Utah citizen or resident as a named plaintiff;
- The portions of Counts I and II that seek relief under California and Kansas antitrust law are dismissed insofar as those claims are based on unilateral conduct. This ruling does not affect any claims under Counts I and II that seek relief under California and Kansas antitrust law for concerted action, and the court’s conclusion here is without prejudice to an amended pleading if discovery

reveals evidence of concerted action with respect to the alleged sham litigation or citizen petition process;

- Count V is dismissed insofar as it is based upon Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93 A, § 11;
- Count VI is dismissed insofar as it is brought under the laws of jurisdictions that apply *Illinois Brick*.

Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion is DENIED insofar as it seeks dismissal of the Sherman Act claims in Count IV and is further DENIED in all other respects.

Teva Israel's Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 48) is DENIED.

#### All Citations

--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2024 WL 323775

#### Footnotes

- 1 And extensive—in briefing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the parties have used every page of the overlength memoranda that the court authorized in a prior order (Doc. 43).
- 2 Many of the allegations in the complaint draw on a September 2020 report from the United States House Committee on Oversight and Reform. See Staff of H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong., Rep. on Drug Pricing Investigation: Teva—Copaxone (Sept. 2020), <https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Teva%20Staff%20Report%2009-30-2020.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/N5BJ-HGXX>] [hereinafter “House Report”]. The parties agreed at the July 2023 hearing that the House Report is incorporated into the complaint by reference and that the court can consider statements and allegations in the House Report and draw inferences from that report for purposes of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
- 3 Although the complaint includes allegations on this topic (see Doc. 1 ¶¶ 76–80), the court cites legal authorities below for background on these undisputed points regarding the relevant regulatory framework.
- 4 There are also “section viii” certifications, see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii), but that type of certification is not at issue in this case.
- 5 Defendants assert that “the way it works to treat MS is not fully understood.” (Doc. 49 at 25.)
- 6 See also, e.g., Letter from Acting Deputy Director, FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Offices of Regulatory Operations and Generic Drugs, to Sandoz, Inc. regarding ANDA 090218 (Apr. 16, 2015) (referencing December 27, 2007 filing date), available at [https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda\\_docs/applletter/2015/090218Orig1s000/tr.pdf](https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/applletter/2015/090218Orig1s000/tr.pdf) [<https://perma.cc/2NFY-NG6Q>].
- 7 “Person” is defined to include “an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity.” 21 C.F.R. § 10.3(a).
- 8 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, *Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last Denied*, 66 Am. U. L. Rev. 305, 314 (2016) (asserting that “[b]rand firms’ use of citizen petitions could be a valuable addition” to a strategy of delaying generic entry); see also Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, *Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study*, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 249, 251 (2012) (citizen petitions are a “potentially delaying activity”).
- 9 A “505(b)(2) application” is an application under the second abbreviated pathway mentioned above: 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2).
- 10 GA is also known as “copolymer 1.” *In re: Copaxone Consol. Cases.*, 906 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
- 11 Teva filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. 560 F. Supp. 3d at 416. The district court denied Teva's motion for summary judgment on July 14, 2023. *United States v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.*,

- No. 20-11548, — F.Supp.3d —, 2023 WL 4565105 (D. Mass. July 14, 2023). The First Circuit granted permission to appeal the summary judgment ruling in November 2023. *United States v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.*, No. 23-8028 (1st Cir. Nov. 17, 2023).
- 12 See generally *High Mountain Corp. v. MVP Health Care, Inc.*, 592 F. Supp. 3d 325, 338–39 (D. Vt. 2022) (discussing specialty pharmacies).
  - 13 PBMs “manage[ ] and administer[ ] prescription drug benefits on behalf of” health benefit plans. (Doc. 1 ¶ 71); see also, e.g., 8 V.S.A. § 4089j(a)(2) (defining PBM for purposes of Vermont law regarding prescription drug purchasing).
  - 14 PBMs design “formularies,” which are essentially “lists of drugs that are available to members of a health plan.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 73.) “Formularies are typically ‘tiered,’ meaning that certain drugs are preferred over others for various medical conditions.” (*Id.*)
  - 15 In addition to the “sham” exception, there is also a “corruption” exception to the *Noerr-Pennington* doctrine. See *360 Mortg. Grp., LLC v. Fortress Inv. Grp. LLC*, No. 19 Civ. 8760, 2020 WL 5259283, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2020). Plaintiffs do not rely on that exception.
  - 16 Courts have arrived at various conclusions on this point. See 3 Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 50.05[4][a] (2d ed.) (recognizing that some courts have held “that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the defense does not apply, although the scope of the burden has varied”); see also *Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Zydus Pharms. (USA) Inc.*, No. 21-2608, 2022 WL 17546949, at \*2 n.3 (3d Cir. Dec. 9, 2022) (“Zydus had the burden of proving that Takeda is not entitled to *Noerr-Pennington* immunity ....”). This court finds that *360 Mortgage Group* is persuasive on the issue. Ultimately, however, the court’s conclusion would be the same in this case regardless of the applicable burden.
  - 17 For the *Noerr-Pennington* discussion below, the court analyzes authorities from within the Second Circuit, the Federal Circuit, and elsewhere. The court recognizes that some authorities hold that “whether conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of Federal Circuit law.” *Applera Corp. v. MJ Res. Inc.*, 303 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133 n.11 (D. Conn. 2004) (quoting *Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.*, 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc in relevant part)); see also *Xerox Corp. v. Media Sciences Int’l, Inc.*, 511 F. Supp. 2d 372, 387 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (parties agreed that “Federal Circuit law is controlling on substantive issues of patent law implicated in the antitrust counterclaim”; citing *Nobelpharma*). It does not appear that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled on this choice-of-law question, and it is possible that the Second Circuit might decline to follow *Nobelpharma* and apply its own precedent. Cf. *Amphastar Pharms. Inc. v. Momenta Pharms., Inc.*, 850 F.3d 52, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2017) (noting that “*Nobelpharma* is not binding on us” and applying First Circuit precedent). In any case, the parties have not articulated any material difference between Federal Circuit and Second Circuit law on the issues discussed below.
  - 18 As relevant to the subjective prong, Plaintiffs allege that “Teva misused patent litigation to interfere with competitors’ business relationships and stifle competition.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 96.) Defendants do not challenge the plausibility of Plaintiffs’ allegations on the subjective prong.
  - 19 See also Esther H. Steinhauser, *Is Noerr-Pennington Immunity Still a Viable Defense Against Antitrust Claims Arising from Hatch-Waxman Litigation?*, 61 Food & Drug L. J. 679, 693 (2006) (asserting that recent decisions in Hatch-Waxman litigation show that “courts are less willing to allow antitrust charges to be dismissed on a defense of *Noerr-Pennington* protection”).
  - 20 *Citizen Petitions and Petitions for Stay of Action Subject to Section 505(q) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act*, 2011 WL 2836582 (June 2011).
  - 21 Teva argues that the PTAB’s unfavorable decision carries no weight, in part because the PTAB applies a standard “far less favorable to patentees than governs civil litigation.” (Doc. 66 at 16.) But courts evaluating the applicability of the

Noerr-Pennington defense consider PTAB action as part of their analysis. See, e.g., *In re Xyrem (Sodium Oxybate) Antitrust Litig.*, 555 F. Supp. 3d 829, 881 (N.D. Cal. 2021).

- 22 Those Hatch-Waxman lawsuits are: the consolidated GA 20 mg patent-infringement cases filed against Sandoz in 2008 and against Mylan in 2009 that ended with the Federal Circuit's decision in *Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.*, 789 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and the consolidated GA 40 mg cases that were at issue in *In re: Copaxone Consolidated Cases.*, 906 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
- 23 The court recognizes that at least one district court within the Third Circuit has interpreted *AbbVie* as holding that the serial-petitioning exception categorically “does not apply in the Hatch-Waxman context.” *Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc.*, No. 19-cv-14146, 2021 WL 4988523, at \*8 n.20 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2021).
- 24 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
- 25 The deadline has since been shortened to 150 days. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F).
- 26 The court recognizes that some definitions of product-hopping might not require withdrawal of the legacy product. See, e.g., *In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig.*, 433 F. Supp. 3d 274, 328 (D.R.I. 2019) (describing a “hard switch” as only “[o]ne example” of conduct constituting a product hop); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, *Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontents*, 11 *Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev.* 235, 253 (2017) (“To ensure that the product hop is successful, some branded drug makers have even withdrawn the old version from the market ....”). The *Namenda* decision itself does not state whether withdrawal of the old product is essential to “product hopping” and instead defines that phrase generally as “conduct by a monopolist to perpetuate patent exclusivity through successive products.” *Namenda*, 787 F.3d at 643. The court applies the narrower definition of a “product hop” in this case but notes that the conclusion about potential Sherman Act liability in connection with Teva's introduction and promotion of its 40 mg product turns on the particular allegations in the complaint, not on the precise definition of the phrase “product hop.”
- 27 Some of the jurisdictions discussed below are not states but are United States districts or territories. For simplicity, the court refers to the claims in Counts I–III and V–VI as “state” law claims.
- 28 Teva has provided a summary of the grounds upon which it relies for dismissal of Plaintiffs' state-law claims. (Doc. 49-2.)
- 29 In a Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 76), Plaintiffs cite *Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.* for the proposition that “state antitrust laws are generally interpreted ‘in parallel, if not identically’ to the federal antitrust law.” No. 23-828, 2023 WL 8018980, at \*11 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2023) (quoting *In re Suboxone*, 2017 WL 4642285, at \* 11). But nothing about that general observation supports a simplistic conclusion that all of Plaintiffs' state-law antitrust claims are plausible merely because the Sherman Act claim is plausible.
- 30 See *Merck*, 2023 WL 8018980, at \*13 (“No federal circuit has squarely addressed whether this rule bars class actions in federal court, and district courts are divided over the issue.”); *In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig.*, No. 18 C 864, — F.Supp.3d —, —, 2023 WL 4305901, at \*47 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2023) (noting “conflicting district court opinions”); *In re Effexor Antitrust Litig.*, 357 F. Supp. 3d 363, 391 (D.N.J. 2018) (“District courts are divided on whether the [IAA] precludes indirect purchasers from filing class actions.”); *Contant v. Bank of Am. Corp.*, No. 17 Civ. 3139, 2018 WL 5292126, at \*11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2018) (same).
- 31 See, e.g., *Staley v. Gilead Scis., Inc.*, 446 F. Supp. 3d 578, 626 (N.D. Cal. 2020); *In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig.*, 336 F. Supp. 3d 395, 418 (D.N.J. 2018); *In re Opana ER Antitrust Litig.*, 162 F. Supp. 3d 704, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2016); *In re Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride) Antitrust Litig.*, No. 14-md-02503, 2015 WL 5458570, at \*17 (D. Mass. Sept. 16,

2015); [In re Nexium \(Esomeprazole\) Antitrust Litig](#), 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 408–09 (D. Mass. 2013); [In re Digit.Music Antitrust Litig](#), 812 F. Supp. 2d 390, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Illinois’ restrictions on indirect purchaser actions must be applied in federal court.” (quoting [In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig](#), 756 F. Supp. 2d 670, 677 (E.D. Pa. 2010))).

32 See, e.g., [Contant v. Bank of Am. Corp.](#), No. 17 Civ. 3139, 2018 WL 5292126, at \*12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2018) (“[T]he IAA allows for class actions in federal court.”); [In re Propranolol Antitrust Litig.](#), 249 F. Supp. 3d 712, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); [In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig](#), No. 14-md-2516, 2016 WL 4204478, at \*5 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2016). In their Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 76), Plaintiffs also cite [Merck](#), 2023 WL 8018980, at \*13–14.

33 The court in [Merck](#) cited [Momenta](#) to conclude that class certification is “a more appropriate stage” to resolve the question of whether a Utah resident or citizen must be among the named plaintiffs when a class action includes claims under the Utah Antitrust Act. [Merck](#), 2023 WL 8018980, at \*14. This court elects to address the issue now.

34 As noted above, Plaintiffs concede that they cannot recover antitrust damages under Utah law before May 1, 2006.

35 The complaint includes a specific definition of the “CPA Subclass.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 251.)

36 Plaintiffs do not appear to rely on the other two statutory pathways for qualification as a “consumer.” The court concludes that it is unnecessary at this time to decide whether Plaintiffs purchased [Copaxone](#) for the “use” or “benefit” of their business.

37 Other courts have adopted the [Aggrenox](#) analysis on this point but have also not supplied any rationale for finding the “in connection with the operation” clause inapplicable. See [In re Restasis \(Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion\) Antitrust Litig](#), 355 F. Supp. 3d 145, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); see also [Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund v. Actavis, PLC](#), No. 15 Civ. 6549, 2018 WL 7197233, at \*52 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2018) (citing [Restasis](#)).


38 These are the jurisdictions listed in footnote 35 of Teva’s motion (Doc. 49 at 86 n.35), except for Illinois, which—as the court concludes above—does not apply the [Illinois Brick](#) rule.

39 Citing [Bonin v. Vannaman](#), 261 Kan. 199, 929 P.2d 754 (1996), Teva also asserts that Kansas does not recognize the doctrine of fraudulent concealment at all with respect to statutory violations. (Doc. 49 at 90.) The court agrees with Plaintiffs, however, that Teva overreads [Bonin](#). The [Bonin](#) court relied on the statement in [McCoy v. Wesley Hospital & Nurse Training School](#) that the fraudulent concealment doctrine applied “only when relief is sought on the ground of fraud.” [188 Kan. 325, 362 P.2d 841, 847 \(1961\)](#). But as the Tenth Circuit observed, “that statement of the law no longer appears to be true.” [Baker v. Bd. of Regents](#), 991 F.2d 628, 633 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing [Friends Univ. v. W.R. Grace & Co.](#), 227 Kan. 559, 608 P.2d 936, 941 (1980)). The [Bonin](#) decision postdates both [Baker](#) and [Friends](#), but the holding in [Bonin](#) appears to be limited to causes of action for fraud, which is not present in this case. See [Bonin](#), 929 P.2d at 762 (stating that the fraudulent-concealment doctrine “only tolls the time in which a *fraud action* may be filed if the plaintiff’s claim for relief is validly grounded in fraud on its face” (emphasis added)).

40 Although the test set forth in [Hendrickson](#) applies to antitrust claims, Teva does not argue that any different test applies to Plaintiffs’ consumer-protection and unjust-enrichment claims.

41 At least one of the listed jurisdictions explicitly demonstrates that the “affirmative act” requirement can coexist with the recognition that certain forms of conduct are inherently self-concealing. See [Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V.](#), 85 A.3d 725, 789 & n.399, 797 & n.436 (Del. Ch. 2014) (recognizing the rule that an “affirmative act” is required as stated

in  *In re Tyson Foods, Inc.*, 919 A.2d 563, 585 (Del. Ch. 2007), and simultaneously stating that “price fixing schemes are inherently self-concealing”).

- 42 Inquiry notice is “often called ‘storm warnings’ in the securities context.”  *Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co.*, 396 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2005).
- 43 As the court noted in its 2022 Order on Teva’s Motion to Transfer or Stay (Doc. 45), Mylan sued Teva in June 2021. See Complaint, *Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Teva Pharms. Indus. Ltd.*, No. 21-cv-13087 (D.N.J. June 29, 2021), ECF No. 1.
- 44 Plaintiffs assert that there is a second, distinct form of the continuing-violations doctrine that is also applicable in antitrust cases. (See Doc. 58 at 86 & n.54.)
- 45 Also referred to as “Teva Ltd.” in the complaint. (Doc. 1 ¶ 21.)
- 46 Courts also recognize a doctrine of “general” jurisdiction, but that is not at issue in this case. (See Doc. 57 at 23 (asserting that the question of general jurisdiction is “inapposite”).)

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# EXHIBIT

**AZURITY PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. BIONPHARMA INC.****269**

Cite as 650 F.Supp.3d 269 (D.Del. 2023)

nificantly lower costs to the Plan for the exact same investments”). Instead, the plaintiffs allege only that the funds offered to them by the 401(k) Plan were more expensive than other funds. Without pleading facts indicating additional indicia of imprudence, the plaintiffs have not alleged plausibly that the plan fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim of fiduciary breach is **granted**.

**IV.**

The plaintiffs also bring a claim for a failure to monitor. Both parties agree that this claim is derivative of the plaintiffs’ claim of a breach of fiduciary duty. Because the plaintiffs have insufficiently pleaded their claim for a breach of fiduciary duty, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the derivative claim for failure to monitor is likewise **granted**. See *Coulter v. Morgan Stanley & Co.*, 753 F.3d 361, 368 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that failure to monitor claims “cannot survive absent a viable claim for breach of a duty of prudence”).

**CONCLUSION**

The Court has considered all of the arguments of the parties. To the extent not specifically addressed above, the arguments are either moot or without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is **granted**. The complaint is dismissed without prejudice to the ability of the plaintiffs to move to file an amended complaint. Any such motion must be filed within thirty days of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order and explain how any proposed amended complaint would resolve the defects in the current complaint.

**SO ORDERED.**

**AZURITY PHARMACEUTICALS,  
INC., Plaintiff,**

v.

**BIONPHARMA INC., Defendant.**

**Civil Action Nos. 21-cv-1286, 21-cv-1455**

United States District Court,  
D. Delaware.

Filed January 11, 2023

**Background:** Drug maker that held patents on, and sold branded version of, a liquid formulation of enalapril, a blood-pressure medication, brought infringement action against generic competitor that had filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for a formulation of enalapril. Competitor brought sham-litigation counterclaims under the Sherman Act, alleging that drug maker’s suit and a series of similar prior suits were brought in bad faith to stifle competition. Drug maker moved to dismiss competitor’s antitrust counterclaims for failure to state a claim.

**Holdings:** The District Court, Mitchell S. Goldberg, visiting District Judge, held that:

- (1) competitor’s antitrust counterclaims were not compulsory counterclaims in prior infringement actions between drug maker and competitor;
- (2) competitor’s litigation costs in defending prior infringement suits constituted an antitrust injury;
- (3) competitor’s allegation that prior infringement suits delayed its entry into the market by 30 months because of the automatic Hatch-Waxman Act stay was sufficient to allege the causation element of competitor’s antitrust counterclaims;
- (4) competitor sufficiently alleged, for purposes of defeating patentee’s assertion

at the pleading stage of *Noerr-Pennington* immunity from antitrust liability arising from its lawsuits, that patentee's lawsuits were objectively baseless; and

- (5) competitor sufficiently alleged, for purposes of defeating patentee's assertion at the pleading stage of *Noerr-Pennington* immunity from antitrust liability arising from its lawsuits, that patentee's lawsuits were subjectively brought in bad faith, with the intent of suppressing competition.

Motion denied.

#### 1. Federal Civil Procedure 1772, 1835

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must (1) take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify the allegations that are not entitled to the assumption of truth because they are no more than conclusions; and (3) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

#### 2. Federal Civil Procedure 1832

When deciding a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.

#### 3. Federal Civil Procedure 776

A counterclaim is compulsory if it bears a logical relationship to the primary claim; a logical relationship, in turn, depends on whether the two claims involve many of the same factual issues, or the same factual and legal issues, or where they are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties.

#### 4. Federal Civil Procedure 777

Malicious-prosecution claims are generally not considered compulsory counterclaims.

#### 5. Antitrust and Trade Regulation 983

Future antitrust damages that might arise from the conduct sued on are unrecoverable if the fact of their accrual is speculative or their amount and nature unprovable; in these instances, the cause of action for future damages, if they ever occur, will accrue only on the date they are suffered.

#### 6. Patents 1791

Antitrust counterclaims brought by defendant, a generic drug maker, in infringement suit by patentee, a competing branded drug maker with patents on a liquid formulation of enalapril, a blood-pressure medication, alleging that patentee's suit and prior suits were brought in bad faith to stifle competition were not compulsory counterclaims in prior infringement suits between patentee and defendant, and defendant's failure to bring its antitrust counterclaims in those prior suits thus was not a basis for dismissing those counterclaims, where at the time of those suits there was no guarantee defendant's generic drug would be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or that defendant would suffer an antitrust injury. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2; Clayton Act §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15, 26.

#### 7. Antitrust and Trade Regulation 963(3)

Litigation costs incurred by defendant, a generic drug maker, in defending prior infringement suits by patentee, a competing branded drug maker with patents on a liquid formulation of enalapril, a blood-pressure medication, constituted an antitrust injury for purposes of defendant's antitrust counterclaims, in later

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infringement suit by patentee against defendant, asserting that patentee's infringement suits were brought in bad faith to suppress competition, even though patentee had lost in prior suits and had failed to keep generic drug maker's product off the market. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2; Clayton Act §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15, 26.

**8. Antitrust and Trade Regulation  
905(3)**

Allegation by defendant, a generic drug maker, that prior infringement suits against it by patentee, a competing branded drug maker with patents on a liquid formulation of enalapril, a blood-pressure medication, delayed defendant's entry into the market by 30 months because of the automatic stay that applied in Hatch-Waxman Act litigation was sufficient, in subsequent infringement action by patentee against defendant, to allege the causation element of defendant's antitrust counterclaims asserting that patentee's prior suits amounted to sham litigation intended to suppress competition. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2; Clayton Act §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15, 26.

**9. Antitrust and Trade Regulation  
905(3)**

**Constitutional Law 1437(2)**

To overcome *Noerr-Pennington* immunity, an antitrust plaintiff whose claim is based on a lawsuit that was allegedly brought for anticompetitive purposes must show that: (1) the lawsuit was objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could have realistically expected success on the merits; and (2) the baseless lawsuit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor through the use of the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon. U.S. Const. Amend. 1.

**10. Antitrust and Trade Regulation  
905(3)**

**Constitutional Law 1437(2)**

Defendant, a generic drug maker, sufficiently alleged that patentee, a competing branded drug maker with patents on a liquid formulation of enalapril, a blood-pressure medication, had no basis to believe it could prevail in patentee's prior infringement suits, and that the suits were thus objectively baseless, and defendant's allegations supporting its antitrust counterclaims against patentee asserting that the prior suits were anticompetitive sham litigation were thus sufficient at the pleading stage to satisfy the objective-baselessness element required for defendant to defeat patentee's assertion of *Noerr-Pennington* immunity as a basis to dismiss the counterclaims, where defendant alleged that patentee knew that it could not overcome prosecution-history estoppel and an invalidity defense. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2; Clayton Act §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15, 26.

**11. Antitrust and Trade Regulation  
905(3)**

**Constitutional Law 1437(2)**

Defendant, a generic drug maker, sufficiently alleged that patentee, a competing branded drug maker with patents on a liquid formulation of enalapril, a blood-pressure medication, brought prior infringement suits against defendant in bad faith, to suppress competition, and defendant's allegations supporting its antitrust counterclaims against patentee asserting that the prior suits were anticompetitive sham litigation were thus sufficient at the pleading stage to satisfy the subjective-motivation element required for defendant to defeat patentee's assertion of *Noerr-Pennington* immunity as a basis to dismiss the counterclaims, where defendant alleged that before bringing suit, patentee turned down information relevant to the merits, and patentee had brought seven

lawsuits in three courts. U.S. Const. Amend. 1; Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2; Clayton Act §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15, 26.

## 12. Antitrust and Trade Regulation 905(3)

### Constitutional Law 1437(2)

Under the subjective-motivation prong for overcoming *Noerr-Pennington* immunity, an antitrust plaintiff whose claim is based on a lawsuit that was allegedly brought for anticompetitive purposes must show the defendant brought baseless claims in an attempt to thwart competition (i.e., in bad faith). U.S. Const. Amend. 1.

### Patents 2091

9,669,008, 9,808,442, 10,039,745, 10,154,987, 10,772,868, 10,786,482, 10,918,621, 11,040,023, 11,141,405. Cited.

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## MEMORANDUM OPINION

Goldberg, District Judge<sup>1</sup>

These cases comprise what the parties refer to as the “Third Wave” in an ongoing

1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(b), I have been designated to serve as a visiting judge for the District of Delaware to handle this matter and other District of Delaware cases.

patent infringement dispute between Plaintiff Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Azurity”) and Defendant Bionpharma Inc. (“Bionpharma”). The parties’ dispute revolves around Bionpharma’s generic enalapril oral liquid. Bionpharma’s counterclaims assert antitrust “sham litigation” claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 15, and 26, alleging that Azurity brought these and other lawsuits in bad faith to stifle competition. Bionpharma claims that these lawsuits were objectively baseless and brought only to force Bionpharma to incur litigation costs and delay market entry for the duration of the 30-month stay applicable to Hatch-Waxman litigation.

Before me is Azurity’s motion to dismiss the antitrust counterclaims. For the reasons that follow, Azurity’s motion will be denied.

## I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Bionpharma’s Answer and Counterclaims, and, where appropriate, matters of public record regarding the litigation history between Azurity and Bionpharma. These facts will be viewed in the light most favorable to Bionpharma. See *Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc.*, 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011).

### A. Azurity’s EPANED Product and Related Patents

Azurity’s brand product EPANED is an oral liquid formulation of the blood pressure medicine enalapril. (Answer<sup>2</sup> ¶ 9;

2. Paragraph citations to “Answer” refer to Docket Entry 26 in 21-cv-1455. Paragraph citations to “Counterclaims” refer to paragraphs beginning on page 10 of that document.

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Counterclaims ¶¶ 13, 34-35.) EPANED “is the only ready-to-use oral solution of enalapril, which caters to specific populations of patients that have trouble swallowing solid oral dosage forms.” (Counterclaims ¶ 38.)

From March 2016 to April 2021, Azurity filed nine patent applications for enalapril liquids, each a continuation of a prior application, and each with a priority date of March 18, 2016.<sup>3</sup> The precise claim limitations differ from patent to patent, but the essence of each is a stable mixture of water, enalapril, and other ingredients such as buffers, preservatives, and sweeteners. The following claims from two of those patents are illustrative:

A stable oral liquid formulation, comprising:

- (i) about 1 mg/ml enalapril maleate;
- (ii) a buffer comprising about 1.82 mg/ml citric acid and about 0.15 mg/mL sodium citrate dihydrate;
- (iii) about 1 mg/ml of a preservative that is sodium benzoate; and
- (iv) water;

wherein the pH of the formulation is less than about 3.5;

wherein the formulation is stable at about 5 " 3 C. for at least 12 months; [and]

wherein the stable oral liquid formulation has about 95% or greater of the initial enalapril amount and about 5% w/w or less total impurities or related substances at the end of the given storage period.

(Claim 1 of the '008 patent.)

A stable oral liquid formulation, comprising:

3. These applications issued as U.S. Patent Nos. 9,669,008 (the '008 patent), 11,040,023 (the '023 patent), 11,141,405 (the '405 patent), 9,808,442 (the '442 patent), 10,786,482 (the '482 patent), 10,918,621 (the '621 patent), 10,039,745 (the '745 patent), 10,772,868

- (i) about 0.6 to about 1.2 mg/ml enalapril or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt or solvate thereof;
- (ii) a buffer comprising about 0.8 to about 3.5 mg/ml citric acid and about 0.1 to about 0.8 mg/ml sodium citrate;
- (iii) about 0.7 to about 1.2 mg/ml sodium benzoate; and
- (iv) water;

wherein the formulation is stable at about 5 " 3 C. for at least 12 months; and

wherein the stable oral liquid formulation has about 95% w/w or greater of the initial enalapril amount and about 5% w/w or less total impurity or related substances at the end of the given storage period.

(Claim 1 of the '745 patent.)

#### B. Bionpharma's ANDA

In August 2018, Bionpharma filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for a generic oral enalapril liquid. (Counterclaims ¶¶ 14, 63.) Bionpharma alleges that its ANDA differs from Azurity's EPANED product in that it does not contain a buffer and uses a preservative consisting of parabens rather than sodium benzoate. (Counterclaims ¶ 61.) Bionpharma alleges it made these alterations to “design around” Azurity's patents. (Id.)

To date, Azurity has filed seven lawsuits in three separate courts regarding Bionpharma's generic enalapril liquid—five against Bionpharma and two against Bionpharma's contract manufacturer, CoreRx.<sup>4</sup>

(the '868 patent), and 10,154,987 (the '987 patent).

4. For reference, Azurity's seven lawsuits over Bionpharma's ANDA are summarized in the table below:

### C. Bionpharma’s Paragraph IV Notice to Azurity

When a generic manufacturer files an ANDA, it must send a notice (a “Paragraph IV Notice”) to patentholders listed for the brand drug in the FDA’s “Orange Book.” See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B). In October 2018, Bionpharma sent a Paragraph IV Notice to Azurity regarding the ’008, ’442, and ’745 patents. (Counterclaims ¶ 64.)

Bionpharma’s Paragraph IV Notice offered to provide Azurity with confidential access to Bionpharma’s ANDA, under terms similar to those used in prior litigation between Azurity and Bionpharma. (Counterclaims ¶ 65.) Bionpharma requested that Azurity agree not to share information with its patent prosecution counsel (an agreement called a “patent prosecution bar”) because Azurity had patent prosecution open for enalapril liquids and Bionpharma was concerned that Azurity could file new applications targeted to Bionpharma’s ANDA. (Counterclaims ¶ 68.) Azurity declined the offer of confidential access, and Bionpharma alleges that Azurity did so because Azurity was indifferent to the merits of its infringement position. (Counterclaims ¶¶ 65, 70-71.)

### D. Azurity’s Lawsuits Against Bionpharma

From December 12, 2018 to October 15, 2021, Azurity filed five lawsuits against Bionpharma only over Bionpharma’s generic enalapril liquid. Collectively, these

lawsuits involve all nine of Azurity’s patents for enalapril liquids. The parties refer to groups of these lawsuits as the “First Wave,” “Second Wave,” and “Third Wave.”

The First Wave (Nos. 18-cv-1962 and 19-cv-1067) involved the ’008, ’442, ’745, and ’987 patents. In February 2021, the Honorable Leonard Stark held a bench trial on these patents and on April 27, 2021 entered judgment for Bionpharma, finding that:

- (1) Prosecution history estoppel precluded Azurity from claiming that the active ingredient in Bionpharma’s ANDA, enalapril maleate, was equivalent to the citrate buffer limitation in the asserted claims;
- (2) Azurity failed to prove that enalapril maleate acted as a buffer; and
- (3) Azurity could not claim parabens as equivalent to the claimed preservative sodium benzoate because parabens were disclosed in the specification but not claimed.

(See No. 19-1067, Docket Entry 244.) The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed Judge Stark’s findings without an opinion. See *Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bionpharma Inc.*, No. 2021-1926, 2022 WL 703903 (Fed. Cir. March 9, 2022).

The Second Wave lawsuit (No. 20-cv-1256) involved the ’868, ’482, and ’621 patents. After the Federal Circuit’s affirmation became final in the First Wave suits, Azurity stipulated to dismissal of the Second Wave lawsuit.

Docket No.	Defendant	Filed In	Filed On	Patents
D. Del. 18-1962	Bionpharma	D. Del.	12/12/2018	’008, ’442, ’745
D. Del. 19-1067	Bionpharma	D. Del.	6/7/2019	’987
D. Del. 20-1256	Bionpharma	D. Del.	9/18/2020	’868, ’482, ’621
D. Del. 21-1286	Bionpharma	D.N.J.	6/22/2021	’023
D. Del. 21-1455	Bionpharma	D. Del.	10/15/2021	’405
M.D. Fla. 21-2515	CoreRx	M.D. Fla.	10/26/2021	’023, ’405
D. Del. 21-1522	CoreRx	D. Del.	10/27/2021	’023, ’405

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The Third Wave lawsuits (Nos. 21-cv-1286 and 21-cv-1455), which are ongoing, involve the '023 and '405 patents. One of these lawsuits (No. 21-cv-1286) was originally filed in the District of New Jersey and transferred to this Court on Bionpharma's motion.

All of these lawsuits were reassigned to me on March 2, 2022.

**E. Azurity's Acquisition of and Lawsuits Against CoreRx**

Bionpharma contracted with a third party, CoreRx, Inc. ("CoreRx") to develop and manufacture the enalapril oral liquid that became Bionpharma's ANDA. (Counterclaims ¶ 13.) In January 2021, Azurity's corporate parent, NovaQuest Capital Management ("NovaQuest") acquired a controlling interest in CoreRx. (Counterclaims ¶ 17.) As of February 2022, Azurity and CoreRx had several directors in common on their respective corporate boards. (Counterclaims ¶¶ 19-22.)

After NovaQuest acquired CoreRx, Azurity sued its new corporate sister twice, in two different courts, for infringing Azurity's patents by manufacturing Bionpharma's ANDA. See Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. CoreRx, Inc., No. 21-cv-2515 (M.D. Fla. filed October 26, 2021); Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. CoreRx, Inc., No. 21-cv-1522 (D. Del. filed October 27, 2021). Bionpharma alleges that Azurity and CoreRx were not genuinely adverse parties in these law-suits because their common parent, NovaQuest, could have simply "direct[ed] CoreRx to cease manufacturing for Bionpharma without involving the courts." (Counterclaims ¶ 157.) Bionpharma moved to intervene in the Florida CoreRx lawsuit, allegedly "in order to protect itself against the feigned threat of an injunction against CoreRx's performance of its contractual obligation to supply Bionpharma with Bionpharma's ANDA product." (Counterclaims ¶ 162.)

Azurity then settled with CoreRx, wherein CoreRx agreed to stop supplying the generic enalapril oral liquid to Bionpharma. (Counterclaims ¶ 164.)

Based on all the allegations set forth above, Bionpharma claims that Azurity sought to improperly maintain a monopoly in enalapril liquids by punishing generic competition through burdensome and costly litigation. Bionpharma also contends that Azurity brought the First Wave suits solely to obtain the Hatch-Waxman 30-month stay even though Azurity had no expectation of succeeding on the merits. Azurity has moved to dismiss these anti-trust counterclaims.

**II. LEGAL STANDARD**

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Id. Twombly and Iqbal's plausibility standard requires more than a "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. Plausibility requires "enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements of a claim." Phillips v. County. Of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008).

[1] To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court must (1) "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim"; (2) identify the allegations that are not entitled to the assumption of truth because they are no more than conclusions; and (3) "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly



give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). Courts must construe the allegations in a complaint “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. at 220.

[2] When deciding a motion to dismiss, “courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014).

### III. DISCUSSION

Azurity contends that Bionpharma’s antitrust claims should be dismissed for six separate reasons, each of which is addressed below.

#### A. Compulsory Counterclaims

Azurity first argues that Bionpharma’s antitrust claims should be barred because they were compulsory counterclaims that Bionpharma should have asserted when the First Wave suits were filed.

[3] A counterclaim is compulsory if it “bears a logical relationship” to the primary claim. Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp., 576 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir. 1978). A logical relationship, in turn, depends on whether the two claims “involve many of the same factual issues, or the same factual and legal issues, or where they are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties.” Id. Under this standard, Azurity argues that the First Wave suits were for patent infringement and that Bionpharma’s antitrust claims in the present lawsuit include allegations that bear a logical relationship to the First Wave suits.

“Whether a Sherman Act antitrust claim is a compulsory counterclaim in a patent infringement action is a question of considerable debate.” P & M Services, Inc. v. Gubb, No. 07-cv-12816, 2008 WL 4185903, at \*3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 8, 2008). The clos-

est binding precedent on this issue is the Supreme Court’s decision in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct. 268, 88 L.Ed. 376 (1944). There, with little discussion regarding the compulsory counterclaim test, the Supreme Court appeared to assume that an antitrust claim alleging that the patentee had attempted to expand its patent to cover an unpatented component of the invention by suing a user of such a component was not a compulsory counterclaim to the infringement suit. See id. at 671, 64 S.Ct. 268. In a clearer pronouncement, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Mercoid as holding that a claim of “predatory patent litigation” is not a compulsory counterclaim to a claim of infringement. Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 70 F.3d 533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Mercoid leaves open the possibility of raising antitrust claims in a separate and subsequent action.”).

The Second Circuit, by contrast, views Mercoid as an “exception” to the compulsory counterclaim rule that has been “subject to serious criticism” and has opined that Mercoid should be “limited to [its] facts.” Critical-Vac Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman International, Inc., 233 F.3d 697, 701, 702 n.6 (2d Cir. 2000). However, for claims alleging patent misuse (as opposed to misconduct before the Patent and Trademark Office), the Second Circuit acknowledged that Mercoid is binding and thus permits such claims to be raised in a subsequent litigation. Id. at 704; see also Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 770 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D. Del. 1991) (recognizing a similar distinction).

The Second and Ninth Circuits also agree that it is relevant that, when antitrust claims are brought as counterclaims in an infringement action, courts often bifurcate the antitrust claims. This common practice weighs against viewing the antitrust claims as compulsory counterclaims:

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If patent infringement claims are frequently bifurcated from antitrust counter-claims and tried separately under Rule 42(b), it would seem that the same underlying logic would apply equally to Rule 13(a). In other words, if judicial economy is promoted by severing two claims and trying them separately, it would seem inappropriate and illogical to regard either claim as a compulsory counter-claim to the other and require consolidation.

Critical-Vac, 233 F.3d at 703 (quoting Teague I. Donahey, Antitrust Counter-claims in Patent Infringement Litigation: Clarifying the Supreme Court’s Enigmatic Mercoid Decision, 39 IDEA: J.L. & Tech. 225, 249-50 (1999)); Hydranautics, 70 F.3d at 536.

[4] An additional reason for not treating antitrust counterclaims as compulsory is that they resemble traditional malicious prosecution claims, which are generally not considered compulsory. Hydranautics, 70 F.3d at 536-37; see also T.C.R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 372 A.2d 721, 728 (1977). A malicious prosecution claim, like a sham litigation claim, “arises from the [allegedly wrongful] legal proceeding, not from the same transactions or occurrences from which [that proceeding] arose.” T.C.R. Realty, 372 A.2d at 728.

[5] Also instructive is the accrual rule for antitrust damages. “[F]uture damages that might arise from the conduct sued on are unrecoverable if the fact of their accrual is speculative or their amount and nature unprovable.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 339, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971). “In these instances, the cause of action for future damages, if they ever occur, will accrue only on the date they are suffered[.]” Id.

[6] At this juncture, it is unnecessary for me to resolve the disagreement between Azurity and Bionpharma over

whether Bionpharma’s antitrust counter-claims actually accrued when the First Wave suits were filed. The possibility that antitrust claims might not accrue until sometime after Hatch-Waxman infringement litigation plays out suggests that they do not “bear[ ] a logical relationship” to that infringement suit. Xerox Corp., 576 F.2d at 1059. When Bionpharma filed its answer to the First Wave suits, there was no guarantee that the FDA would ever approve Bionpharma’s ANDA. It was thus arguably unknown at the time whether the First Wave lawsuits would ever suppress competition, even if they were brought in bad faith. Cf. AstraZeneca AB v. Glenmark Generics, Ltd., No. 14-cv-665, 2014 WL 5366050, at \*1 n.1 (D. Del. Oct. 9, 2014) (finding no antitrust claim where generic was unable to enter the market). And, if Azurity had prevailed in the First or Second Wave suits, Bionpharma could not allege it suffered an antitrust injury because Azurity would have lawfully kept Bionpharma off the market. It would not serve “fairness and considerations of convenience and of economy” to require Bionpharma to plead, speculatively, upon being sued in the First Wave, that it would someday have a viable, noninfringing product. Xerox Corp., 576 F.2d at 1059.

Azurity relies on U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 55 F.3d 592 (Fed. Cir. 1995), for the proposition that “the place to challenge litigation as sham is in the asserted sham litigation,” but Philips involved highly unusual facts that are distinguishable from the case before me. In Philips, the antitrust claimant (Izumi) was a defendant in two simultaneous infringement suits in two different courts. See id. at 593. In the first suit, a codefendant raised antitrust counterclaims, which were tried together with the patent claims at Izumi’s insistence. Id. When Izumi attempted to assert similar antitrust counterclaims in the second lawsuit, the court

denied that request but invited Izumi to assert those claims in the first lawsuit. *Id.* The Federal Circuit affirmed the refusal to let Izumi litigate its antitrust counterclaims in the second lawsuit, reasoning that because Izumi had successfully argued in the first lawsuit that the antitrust and infringement claims must be tried together, it was judicially estopped from splitting those claims in the second lawsuit. *Id.* at 596-97. In short, Philips dealt with parallel, simultaneous lawsuits and judicial estoppel. That case is thus inapplicable to the situation before me, and, moreover, the Federal Circuit expressly disavowed holding that a sham litigation claim was “‘compulsory’ in the technical definition of this term.” *Id.* at 595.

Given all of the above, I find the Ninth’s Circuit’s reasoning in Hydranautics persuasive, and conclude that in viewing the present allegations as true, Bionpharma’s antitrust claims were not compulsory counterclaims in the First Wave suits.

### B. Antitrust Injury

[7] Azurity next argues that Bionpharma cannot show antitrust injury because Azurity’s law-suits failed to keep Bionpharma’s generic product off the market. In Azurity’s view, even if those lawsuits harmed Bionpharma by forcing Bionpharma to incur litigation costs, the antitrust laws only protect competition, not individual competitors. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990). Therefore, Azurity reasons, Bionpharma cannot show that there was harm to competition in the enalapril liquid market, and Bionpharma’s antitrust claims should be dismissed.

The Federal Circuit addressed this situation in TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Properties Co., 812 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In that patent infringement lawsuit, the alleged infringer brought an antitrust

counterclaim alleging that the patent was fraudulently obtained (a so-called “Walker Process claim”). *Id.* at 1306. The infringement suit was unsuccessful but the antitrust claim succeeded, with the district court awarding attorneys’ fees as antitrust damages. *Id.* In affirming the damages award, the Federal Circuit held that those attorneys’ fees constituted “an antitrust injury” even though “[the patentee] fail[ed] to prevail in [its] lawsuit” and thus failed to keep the accused product off the market. *Id.* at 1308-12. TransWeb therefore directly addressed and rejected the argument Azurity makes here.

Azurity relies on Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. v. Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited, 187 F. Supp. 3d 483 (D.N.J. 2016), which distinguished TransWeb on the ground that “TransWeb, LLC addressed itself to the issue of recoverable antitrust damages” as opposed to whether there had been an antitrust injury at all. Otsuka, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 486 n.6 (emphasis in original). Aside from the fact that I am not bound by Otsuka, TransWeb did in fact hold that attorneys’ fees were an “an antitrust injury.” 812 F.3d at 1299.

### C. Causation

[8] Azurity also challenges Bionpharma’s allegation that the First Wave suits delayed the entry of Bionpharma’s generic enalapril liquid to market. Specifically, Bionpharma alleges that the automatic 30-month stay that applies in Hatch-Waxman litigation, and which remained in effect from the First Wave suits until April 30, 2021, delayed Bionpharma’s ability to market its enalapril liquid until August 17, 2021. (Counterclaims ¶¶ 193, 201.) Azurity responds that because there was a three-and-a-half-month gap between the expiration of the 30-month stay and Bionpharma’s market entry, it cannot be inferred

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that Bionpharma could have entered the market sooner but for the stay.

Bionpharma’s allegation that the 30-month stay delayed its entry must be accepted as true at the pleadings stage. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. It is also plausible under the Twombly standard that a legal prohibition on the FDA granting final approval would delay launch of the product. Azurity’s counterargument implicates a factual dispute that is not appropriate for resolution at this stage of the litigation.

Azurity also asserts that its lawsuits could not have harmed competition because it had an alternative way to keep Bionpharma’s generic enalapril liquid off the market. Namely, Azurity’s parent NovaQuest could have simply asked Azurity’s corporate sister CoreRx to stop manufacturing the product for Bionpharma. (See Azurity’s Brief at 18 (“[Bionpharma’s] but-for world is the same as the real world[.]”)) This is an unusual argument that appears to suggest that because Azurity could have suppressed competition some other way, it should not be held liable for the method it in fact chose. Unsurprisingly, Azurity cites no authority for this argument.

#### D. Noerr-Pennington Part 1: Objective Baselessness

[9] Azurity’s next argument for dismissal is that its lawsuits were protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. “The filing of a lawsuit carries significant constitutional protections, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and the right of access to courts.” Hoerber v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp & Waterproof Workers Ass’n, 939 F.2d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 1991). Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, such lawsuits “are generally immune from antitrust liability” unless certain exceptions are met.

FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 359-60 (3d Cir. 2020). To overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity, an antitrust plaintiff must show that: (1) “the lawsuit [was] objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could [have] realistically expect[ed] success on the merits”; and (2) “the baseless lawsuit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor through the use of the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.” Id. at 360.

[10] Azurity contends that certain events that occurred in the First Wave show that those lawsuits were not objectively baseless. According to Azurity, those events are: (1) Judge Stark denying leave to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings; (2) Judge Stark hearing five days of testimony and authoring a 70-page opinion; (3) Bionpharma not seeking leave to file a motion for summary judgment; and (4) the Federal Circuit granting oral argument in the appeal from the First Wave suits. Whether these events show that Azurity’s lawsuits were not objectively baseless is a factual question that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Azurity also takes issue with the substance of Bionpharma’s reasons for calling Azurity’s seven lawsuits objectively baseless. Bionpharma alleges that Azurity’s lawsuits were objectively baseless for numerous reasons, involving issues of infringement, validity, licensing, and jurisdiction. At this stage of the litigation, it is not necessary to analyze all of Bionpharma’s allegations that Azurity’s lawsuits were objectively baseless. Instead, because two of these allegations involve all seven lawsuits, for purposes of a motion to dismiss analysis it is sufficient to examine two of these allegations, which claim: (1) that the First and Second Wave suits were objectively baseless because Bionpharma’s

ANDA does not contain an equivalent to a citrate buffer; and (2) that the Third Wave and CoreRx suits were objectively baseless because the Third Wave patents' specification does not describe liquids without buffers.

Before analyzing the substance of these allegations, it is necessary to make two preliminary points. First, while Judge Stark entered judgment in Bionpharma's favor as to some of Bionpharma's allegations, the mere fact that Azurity lost on these grounds does not mean that its position was objectively baseless from the start. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (PRE), 508 U.S. 49, 60 n.5, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993). Indeed, Azurity contends that the positions it took in the First Wave were colorable even if Judge Stark did not ultimately agree with them.

Second, although it is sometimes possible to decide whether a lawsuit was objectively baseless "as a matter of law," PRE, 508 U.S. at 63, 113 S.Ct. 1920, not all of the facts underlying Bionpharma's anti-trust allegations are undisputed. For example, it is a factual question whether Azurity had a basis to believe that certain ingredients in Bionpharma's ANDA could act as a buffer. In addition, while legal issues underlying Bionpharma's allegations might be resolvable at the pleadings stage, Azurity's motion contains only a cursory analysis of those issues, which is inadequate for me to conclude, at this juncture, that Bionpharma's allegations necessarily fail as a matter of law.

With those points in mind, I consider whether two of Bionpharma's allegations plausibly give rise to an inference that the First Wave, Second Wave, Third Wave, and CoreRx suits were objectively baseless.

### 1. Lack of Claimed Buffer in Bionpharma's ANDA

The patents asserted in the First Wave suits claimed buffers made from citric acid and sodium citrate. As to some of those claims, the language was amended during the prosecution history to add sodium citrate. Bionpharma argued in the First Wave suits that the amendment triggered amendment-based prosecution history estoppel—such that Azurity could not claim solutions lacking sodium citrate. Bionpharma alleges that Azurity's position that it could overcome this defense was objectively baseless, such that Noerr-Pennington immunity does not apply.

In its present motion, Azurity asserts it "believed the amendment was made for clarification purposes and was not a narrowing amendment," but Azurity does not explain why the pleadings compel the conclusion that this belief was objectively colorable. It therefore remains a factual dispute whether Azurity had an objective basis for alleging that Bionpharma's ANDA infringed the First Wave patents, and I thus decline to dismiss Bionpharma's counterclaims as to this ground.

### 2. Lack of Written Description Supporting Liquids Without Buffers

The Third Wave patents differ from the First Wave patents in that the Third Wave patents claim formulations that lack buffers. Bionpharma alleges that the specification does not support formulations without buffers and that, therefore, the Third Wave patents are invalid for lack of written description. And Bionpharma asserts that it was objectively baseless for Azurity to claim that it could overcome this invalidity defense.

Azurity responds only that there is a presumption that an issued patent is valid and does not address the substance of Bionpharma's argument. I therefore cannot conclude, at this stage, that Azurity

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necessarily had an objective basis to assert the Third Wave patents against Bionpharma's ANDA.

For these reasons, Bionpharma has plausibly alleged the first prong of the exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity by alleging that Azurity's seven lawsuits were objectively baseless. Whether these lawsuits were in fact objectively baseless remains an issue for factual development.

**E. Noerr-Pennington Part 2: Subjective Motivation**

[11, 12] Azurity next contends that Bionpharma has not adequately pled the subjective component necessary to overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity "Under the subjective motivation prong, a plaintiff must show the defendant brought baseless claims in an attempt to thwart competition (i.e., in bad faith)." FTC v. AbbVie, 976 F.3d at 360 (quotation marks omitted).

Bionpharma alleges several facts that it argues raise a plausible inference that Azurity intended to thwart competition:

First, Bionpharma alleges that Azurity turned down an opportunity to view Bionpharma's ANDA before filing the First Wave suits, suggesting that Azurity was disinterested in learning whether those suits were viable. See FTC v. AbbVie, 976 F.3d at 360 (a relevant factor is "whether the defendant was indifferent to the outcome on the merits of the suit" (alterations and quotation marks omitted)).

Second, Bionpharma points to the number of lawsuits—seven across three courts—and reasons that Azurity's nine patents on enalapril liquids enabled it to file new lawsuits as patents were issued. Bionpharma notes that the FDA has raised concerns that "the practice of filing 'continuation' patent applications can allow companies to create 'patent thickets' by obtaining multiple patents on different aspects of the same product within a patent application," a practice which "increas-

es litigation burdens and potentially delays the approval of generics." See September 10, 2021 Letter from Acting Commissioner Woodcock to the USPTO at 3, <https://www.fda.gov/media/152086/download>.

Third, Bionpharma alleges that because Azurity's lawsuits were baseless, an experienced litigant like Azurity would only bring them for a reason other than eventual success on the merits. See FTC v. AbbVie, 976 F.3d at 369 ("Evidence that a defendant knew its claims were meritless may help a plaintiff to show a defendant was indifferent to the outcome on the merits of the suit and decided to sue primarily for the benefit of collateral injuries inflicted through the use of legal process." (alterations and quotation marks omitted)).

Azurity responds to these allegations primarily by identifying contrary facts that it claims show a proper motivation for filing suit, such as that it spent time and resources litigating an appeal. Azurity also notes that the Hatch-Waxman Act gives a patentholder a short window to decide whether to file a lawsuit and states that it had a legitimate, unspecified reason to turn down Bionpharma's offer of confidential access. Whether these countervailing reasons will ultimately demonstrate that Azurity's lawsuits were brought in good faith is a factual question that cannot be resolved at this stage.

Azurity also objects to consideration of the number of lawsuits it filed, citing authority that an accusation of "serial petitioning" is inapplicable to Hatch-Waxman lawsuits because Congressional policy favors prompt resolution of property rights. See In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, 868 F.3d 132, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2017). But Azurity's cited authority is addressed to the situation where a brand manufacturer sues multiple different generic competitors, as Hatch-Waxman requires it to. See id.; Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v.

Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding repeated Hatch-Waxman lawsuits were not sham litigations because “the volume of [the patentee’s] suits was dependent on the number of generic companies attempting to enter the [redacted] marketplace, a matter over which [the patentee] had no control”). Here, Azurity filed seven lawsuits over the same generic product and has not pointed to anything in the Hatch-Waxman Act that endorses such a practice.

For these reasons, Bionpharma has plausibly alleged that Azurity filed its seven lawsuits to interfere with competition in enalapril liquids through means other than eventual success on the merits. Whether that was Azurity’s actual motivation remains an issue for factual development.

#### F. Intent to Monopolize

Lastly, and somewhat cursorily, Azurity asserts that Bionpharma “fails to sufficiently allege a specific intent to monopolize.” Azurity also states that Bionpharma’s “allegations amount to, at most, an intent to exclude infringing products, which is insufficient.”

Largely for the reasons set out in the previous section, Bionpharma’s allegations raise a plausible inference that Azurity “ha[d] the specific intent to monopolize the [enalapril liquid] Market.” (Counterclaims ¶ 257.) Whether Bionpharma’s product was infringing such that Azurity could legitimately exclude it is a subject of ongoing dispute that cannot be resolved at this time.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, Azurity’s motion to dismiss will be denied.

An appropriate order follows.



Eric SUBER et al., on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated

v.

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE GROUP et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-4750

United States District Court,  
E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed March 30, 2022

**Background:** Insured motorist brought putative class action against insurer, insurer’s parent company, holding company which owned parent company, and sister company of insurer, alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory judgment arising from denial of claims subject to an exclusion related to racing events. Defendants moved to dismiss, and insured moved to strike portions of insurer’s answer.

**Holdings:** The District Court, McHugh, J., held that:

- (1) fact that coverage-denial letter was signed by a claims resolution specialist who identified himself as an agent for both insurer and for sister company was not a contact of sister company with forum state that was sufficiently connected to claims at issue, as could allow exercise of specific jurisdiction over sister company;
- (2) fact that footer of coverage-denial letter sent to insured included a hyperlink to lines of insurance issued by sister company was not a contact of sister company with forum state that could support exercise of specific jurisdiction over sister company;
- (3) insurer’s use of brand and logo for holding company was not a contact of holding company with forum state that was connected to claims at issue, as