UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

FEDERAL TRADE COMIMISSION, . 4:23-CV-03560
PLAINTIFF, . HOUSTON, TEXAS
. APRIL 8, 2024 VS. . 10:00 A.M. U.S. ANESTHESIA PARTNERS, INC., ET AL,

DEFENDANTS.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE KENNETH M. HOYT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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## PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I have got to confess, somewhere between my house and the courthouse, I ran into a virus of some sort. It may be the pollen that we get down south, but it has gotten into my eyes and my sinus system. And if I need to take a short break because of medication, I think you will understand that. And I appreciate that indulgence if it does occur.

Beyond that, the Court has before it Cause Number 23-3560. This will be the Federal Trade Commission versus U.S. Anesthesia Partners, Incorporated, and the Welsh Carson entities, I believe, that are also included and being represented here today.

In a circumstance of this nature, I need to limit the number of speakers and make sure we are not repeating, and I know some of you -- I have seen some of you around, and I know you are going to handle this right. I suspect the government has done this more than one time, so we are not going to argue over the argument. We are going to simply present what we believe to be the appropriate issues and permit argument from both sides, or maybe three sides, in this matter. So let me see if I have an appreciation for how we go forward.

We will start with the government. You have indicated Grayson and Schwartz. Who is going to be representing or speaking on behalf of the government in this

MR. GRAYSON: Yes, Your Honor, this is --
THE COURT: Please stand.
MR. GRAYSON: My apologies.
THE COURT: You are going to have to stand. This is a big courtroom. I have done all the architectural stuff I can do for it to save our voices, but sometimes you will get lost, and you may be speaking and your voice hasn't reached me yet. I'm being facetious, but I want you to understand how difficult it is.

MR. GRAYSON: This is Timothy Grayson for the FTC.
Our plan is that I will be arguing on behalf of the government in response to U.S. Anesthesia Partners' motion, and my colleague, Mr. Schwartz, will be arguing some points that are unique to the motion that Welsh Carson -- the Welsh Carson entities have filed.

THE COURT: What's the difference between the arguments then? That's my point.

MR. GRAYSON: The defendants did file two separate motions. There are certainly overlapping issues, but I think the Welsh Carson entities are presenting arguments specific to why they should not be in the case.

THE COURT: Correct. I get that. And we would need to hear from you or -- who is going to speak to that? You or Mr. Schwartz?

MR. GRAYSON: Mr. Schwartz will speak to the Welsh Carson specific issues, Your Honor, and I will speak to the issues raised in U.S. Anesthesia Partners' argument.

THE COURT: I get it.
MR. GRAYSON: Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Yes?
MR. BECK: Your Honor, David Beck for the defendant, USAP, United States Anesthesia Partners, Inc. With the Court's permission, I will address the statutory interpretation issues, $13(\mathrm{~b})$, spending a few minutes on that, and my colleague, Mr. Geoff Klineberg, will deal with the antitrust issues raised by our motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you: As it relates to 13 (b) arguments that are going to be made, are these arguments that you are going to make -- are they silver bullets as far as your motion is concerned? Or are they just simply an argument that expands the scope of the presentations that I have? I have got, obviously, some lengthy briefs on these issues, but I'm concerned about the context that we are doing this argument. This is a motion to dismiss. There is no other relief that I'm taking up this morning or before me, so that's why I'm asking the question.

MR. BECK: Your Honor, I intend to make two basic points and tell you briefly the reasons why.

If the Court grants our position with respect to Section 13 (b) of the FTC Act, this case is over.

THE COURT: Okay. It makes sense.
Mr. Klineberg, is he going to be speaking to any matters? Or is this going to be Mr. Beck doing the -MR. KLINEBERG: As Mr. Beck explained, I will be addressing briefly some of the arguments with respect to the -what we call the antitrust issues in the case, the insufficiency of the complaint in our view on various antitrust claims.

THE COURT: All right. Then finally, I believe, Mr. Yetter? Is that right?

MR. YETTER: Yes, Your Honor. I will be the only speaker on behalf of the Welsh Carson defendants, Your Honor.

We have three grounds. I'm only going to spend time -- or primarily spend time on -- we have a $13(\mathrm{~b})$ argument. It's slightly narrower than the USAP, but it is a silver bullet, Your Honor. We think it is very strong.

We also have a separate issue, which is the corporate separateness. My clients are just investors, at best, in this company. And the complaint, we believe, fatally fails to address how they can be indirectly liable.

The third issue is a constitutional issue which we think the Court can avoid by deciding based on the first two issues.

So I will be very brief, but I'm going to spend most of my time on issue number one, the Section $13(\mathrm{~b})$ issue, because we think this case is far beyond where the Fifth Circuit has allowed these kind of cases to go.

THE COURT: All right. Very good. Thank you, sir.
MR. COSTA: Your Honor, if I may, Gregg Costa for the Amicus, American Investment Council, which you allowed to file a brief in this case.

And with the Court's indulgence, after Mr. Yetter goes, I would like to make just a few brief points.

THE COURT: I may or may not but I'll -- because I think that you're siding up, and my concern is going to be whether or not this is simply an argument that will precipitate another argument, so you can tell me that later.

MR. COSTA: Sounds good, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. How much time do you think you will need, Mr. Grayson, to make your opening -- or opening or complete arguments here?

Here is what I think, what I'm concerned about, whether or not I should proceed. Because of the nature and scope of this motion, it may be better for a foundation to be laid by the government, FTC, in order to have a basis upon which arguments are going to be made. And I'm saying it that way because I'm trying to make sure that I'm not putting words or something on you that you are not prepared to address, but
what I would like to do is to spend maybe 10 or 15 minutes laying the foundation, the groundwork, for what these arguments are about, so the record is complete, at least as complete as we need it.

Then I would like to see you go into your arguments, but I'm almost tempted to turn the floor over to the defense and permit them to argue their motion and then get your response. That might be the smart way to do it.

Let's assume that I let Mr. Beck to go forward after you lay a little foundation there.

Who is going to respond to Mr. Beck's arguments?
MR. GRAYSON: Your Honor, I would respond to Mr. Beck, and I think the FTC is absolutely fine proceeding in the way that you just outlined.

I'm happy to speak briefly about our complaint and then turn the floor over --

THE COURT: You are going to have to keep your voice up.

All the arguments are going to be need to be made from the podium, not from the table. So when we get started -I spent six years in a tank, so -- not military tank, so there is a deficit here sometimes, and this room doesn't accommodate that.

So, please, if my voice drops off, it is because I have got this thing going on inside. You let me know, and I
will speak up, and I'm certainly going to do the same for you. So let's do that. Let's go ahead and take a 10or 15 -minute statement from the government as it -- the FTC as it relates to what this case is about, without arguing any particular aspects of the case itself but simply the factual background.

We will proceed at this time.
Yeah. That's it.
MR. GRAYSON: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Timothy Grayson for the Federal Trade Commission.

Your Honor, in brief, this case is about the FTC attempting to protect American consumers, specifically Texans, both patients and employers, in this state from monopolistic and anticompetitive business practices.

Our complaint alleges in detail that USAP and Welsh Carson have together unlawfully amassed an anesthesia empire across the state. We have alleged that USAP acquired over 15 of its competitors. We have alleged that USAP conspired with competitors that it did not acquire. We allege that the result is that USAP has obtained market power. It's obtained negotiating leverage that it uses against health insurers in the state, and that as a consequence, patients and their employers pay tens of millions of dollars per year more for anesthesia services than they did before USAP entered the market.

And what our complaint alleges, what we charge, is that this conduct violates a host of laws enforced by the Federal Trade Commission.

We allege that USAP and Welsh Carson have unlawfully monopolized markets in Houston and Dallas. We allege that USAP's acquisitions in Houston, Dallas and Austin each violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which is a law designed to prevent mergers that may substantially lessen competition or may tend to create monopolies.

We also allege that USAP's conspiratorial agreements with its competitors violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade, and we allege that USAP and Welsh Carson's overall course of conduct across the state is unfair in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. That is an overall --

THE COURT: That's the nature and scope?
MR. GRAYSON: Yes. And I'm happy to cede the floor now to Mr. Beck, Your Honor, to give him the opportunity to present USAP's arguments on --

THE COURT: I said that, but I'm not sure.
Are you going to proceed first, Mr. Beck?
MR. BECK: Your Honor, I'm willing to proceed anytime the Court wants me to.

THE COURT: No. I want to know -- I don't want to jump past you if you are going to make the first argument.

MR. BECK: I am.
THE COURT: Okay. Very good.
MR. GRAYSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. BECK: May it please the Court, Your Honor, David Beck for the defendant USAP, Inc.

THE COURT: One second. Let's make sure we're connected.
(Pause)
MR. BECK: Your Honor, there is one housekeeping matter that I would like to call to attention of the Court.

The Court may be aware that there is a related antitrust case pending before Judge Bennett. We had a hearing -- a scheduling conference last Friday before Judge Bennett, and, by the way, he has a motion to dismiss pending before him, just as there is one pending before you. It has been fully briefed, as well. And basically, Judge Bennett took no action on Friday other than to schedule another scheduling conference for July 19, 2024, out of deference to Your Honor. In other words, he is aware of this hearing this morning. He is aware of the scheduling conference in your court next Monday .

THE COURT: That's not the kind of deference that I look forward to, but go ahead.

MR. BECK: In any event, we were asked to advise you of what he had done, so I'm so doing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
MR. BECK: Let me turn to our argument with respect to statutory interpretation.

Your Honor, it is our position that in
Section $13(\mathrm{~b})$ of the FTC Act, Congress gave the FTC limited statutory authority to sue for a permanent. The FTC's complaint in this lawsuit, we say, exceeds its statutory authority in two separate ways.

First way: Section 13 (b) empowers the FTC to seek an injunction in federal court only to support enforcement proceedings in its own administrative process, its own administrative process. And there are no pending administrative proceedings with respect to this matter before Your Honor.

The second basis is that 13 (b) authorizes injunctions only to halt ongoing or imminent anticompetitive conduct. But here, the FTC's complaint, by its very terms, refers to a string of acquisitions that are four years past due, and even longer.

Our position is that that is certainly not the type of conduct that the statutory standard requires.

Now, let me turn to the question of why. Why should the FTC not be permitted to seek a permanent injunction and bypass its administrative process?

Well, there are several reasons. The first
reason is the text of Section 13 (b) itself. And the Supreme Court of the United States, in the AMG Capital case, talked about how the proviso that added on in 1973 a permanent injunction, according to the Supreme Court, is directly related to the temporary injunction permitted by 13 (b). In other words, the permanent injunction in the proviso is linked to the temporary or preliminary injunction in 13 (b), as well.

Why is that important? It's important, Your Honor, because when you look at what Congress said with respect to the temporary injunction, the temporary injunction will be dissolved if the FTC doesn't file an administrative action within 20 days after a temporary injunction. In other words, Congress put a limit on it. They want to make sure that a temporary injunction is in support of, and not in lieu of, the administrative process.

Because the Supreme Court of the United States in AMG Capital linked the permanent injunction proviso to the temporary injunction language in 13 (b), we say that Congress intended to limit the FTC's ability to seek a permanent injunction and bypass its administrative process.

But there's another reason why. In AMG Capital, the Supreme Court of the United States dealt with an issue where the FTC was attempting to exceed its authority by going directly to court, bypass its administrative process, and seek some type of equitable monetary relief. And like here, the FTC
came in and said, But, wait a minute, we have got circuit court decisions that support our position. And indeed they did, just like they are claiming here. But the Supreme Court of the United States looked at all of those cases, rejected what the analysis and rationale of those cases were and held, FTC, No, you can't go directly to court. That's not what Section 13 (b) allows. That is the precise position we take here, Your Honor.

Even though there are certain circuits that they have relied upon, the Fifth Circuit has not ruled on this issue at all. So the Fifth Circuit -- you will be writing on a clean slate with respect to any circuit court decisions.

Then, finally, the reason why we say that 13 (b) supports our position is, look at the title. Sometimes the title can be informative. If you look at the title, you will see that it refers to injunctions. It refers to both injunctions in this case. So when you consider the title, you consider what Congress said, and you consider the text, we respectfully submit that under $13(\mathrm{~b})$, they cannot bypass their administrative proceedings to go directly to court to seek a permanent injunction.

And, in fact, what little legislative history we have, Your Honor -- and it's not very helpful, to be honest with you. One of the major concerns was that if that proviso was not added in 1973, there was a concern that if a court entered a temporary injunction with no ability to somehow set a
definitive date on a permanent injunction, that that could pose a real problem. So for all of those reasons, we say that 13 (b) does not support what the FTC is trying to do here.

Let me turn to the second reason. Again, this has to do with the statutory standard itself. So even if you conclude that, well, the FTC does have the authority to seek a permanent injunction and bypass its administrative proceedings, our position is they can only do so if the FTC has, quote, reason to believe, end of quote, that someone, quote, is violating or is about to violate the law. In other words, somebody must be doing it right now or there must be some imminent threat that they are going to do so.

If you look at the FTC's complaint in this case, the FTC alleges that my client has performed unlawful acquisitions from 1914 (sic) through 2020. So basically they want to go back more than four years and say that somehow that satisfies the statutory standard of, is violating or about to violate. And our position is, on its face, it does not support that contention by the FTC.

We also cite FTC versus Shire, which is a Third Circuit case from 2019 where the FTC came in and said, Yes, we can do this. We can take this kind of action here. And what the Third Circuit said in FTC versus Shire -- and I want to quote this because it is directly relevant to the issue before Your Honor. The Third Circuit said, quote: We reject the

FTC's contention that Section $13(\mathrm{~b})$ 's, quote, violating or about to violate the law can be satisfied by showing a violation in the distant past in a vague and generalized reference of recurring conduct.

Again, when you look at exactly what they have alleged in this case, Your Honor -- and I'm specifically referring to paragraph 333 of the FTC's complaint. They say that what they have alleged satisfies this violating or about to violate statutory standard. We say it does not.

An allegation that conduct is at least four years old, without any factual support in the complaint, is not ongoing conduct as the FTC has alleged in paragraph 333. An allegation without any factual support that, as the FTC alleges, that there is a, quote, reasonable likelihood that USAP will engage in similar or recurrent conduct, end of quote, does not satisfy Section $13(\mathrm{~b})$ either.

Again, paragraph 333. It does not pass the Twombly well-pled complaint test in this case. There are no allegations, I might add, that there is any conduct on the part of our client that is somehow about to begin. There is no allegation that any new acquisitions are on the table. There is no allegation that any new acquisition is about to take place. Their complaint is simply devoid of the factual support to support the claim that they are making in this case.

For those two principal reasons, Your Honor, we
respectfully submit that Section 13 (b) of the FTC Act does not entitle them to come directly to court, seek a permanent injunction and bypass its own administrative process.

THE COURT: Appreciate it.
MR. BECK: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I don't have any questions.
I do need a response from the government.
I would like to put these responses next to the argument so that it's an easier read and follow-through.

MR. GRAYSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Timothy Grayson for the FTC again.

Your Honor, contrary to what you just heard from Mr. Beck, Section $13(\mathrm{~b})$ of the FTC Act permits the FTC to proceed in federal court in two distinct circumstances.

First, the FTC can obtain or seek a preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. Section 13 (b) clearly ties this kind of preliminary relief to the pendency of an FTC administrative proceeding.

Second, however, Section 13 (b) of the FTC Act also permits the FTC to obtain a permanent injunction. Unlike the language about preliminary injunctions in Section $13(\mathrm{~b})$, the permanent injunction clause -- not at the end of the statute -- does not say anything about administrative proceedings. And that's why all of the courts to consider this issue, every single one, has ruled that the permanent
injunction language does not require a parallel administrative proceeding.

Now, according to Mr. Beck, AMG -- the Supreme Court's recent AMG Capital decision came out the opposite way, but, in fact, here's what the Supreme Court said in AMG.

Quote: The Commission may use Section 13 (b) to obtain injunctive relief while administrative proceedings are foreseen or are in progress or when it seeks only injunctive relief.

Now, USAP is attempting to write that whole second part of the Supreme Court statement out of the opinion. So we think AMG squarely supports us. The two Courts of Appeals that have considered this issue post-AMG agree with us, as does a case from -- I believe it's the Northern District of Texas, Your Honor, the Neora case that we cite in our papers. The judge in that case carefully considered this issue and concluded, consistent with the FTC's position today, that no parallel administrative proceedings are required.

One thing that USAP is glossing over a little bit here that I want to highlight for Your Honor is their interpretation of Section 13 (b) does not really make clear what purpose the permanent injunction language in Section 13 (b) plays. That language is obviously there, and I think the Supreme Court has been clear that, in interpreting the statute, we should give meaning to all the words in the statute.

USAP would essentially either read this permanent injunction clause out of the statute, or if a parallel administrative proceeding is required, USAP's construction would require or, at the very least, permit a situation in which the FTC is proceeding in Your Honor's court as well as in an administrative proceeding in Washington, D.C. That is wasteful and duplicative, and that is very unlikely to be what Congress intended.

So, for that reason, and all the other reasons we provided in our papers, Your Honor, we do think that Section 13 (b) allows us to proceed solely for a permanent injunction in this Court without a parallel administrative proceeding.

We also think that we satisfy Section 13 (b) 's requirement that USAP, quote, Is or, quote, is about to violate the law.

Now, everybody agrees -- I think we and USAP are aligned -- that ongoing conduct satisfies Section 13 (b)., and that's exactly what our complaint alleges. We allege that Welsh Carson built USAP to be a monopolist and that that's exactly what USAP is engaged in to this very day.

USAP holds practices that it acquired. It continues to conspire with certain of its competitors. It continues to exercise undue negotiating leverage. And to this day, it continues to charge patients and employers inflated
prices for anesthesia in this state. We are not aware of any case -- and I don't think USAP has cited one -- in which an ongoing scheme like that with ongoing harm to the public was dismissed under Section 13 (b).

But even if USAP's conduct were entirely in the past, Your Honor, the FTC's complaint would still be well pled under Section $13(\mathrm{~b})$. And that is because of the Fifth Circuit case called Southwest Sunsites.

Now, Mr. Beck pointed out that on the parallel proceeding argument, there is no Fifth Circuit authority. Here, the Fifth Circuit has spoken. And what the Fifth Circuit has said is that the, quote, about to violate language in Section 13 (b) is satisfied by facts that give reasonable inference to a likelihood that past violations will recur. And the Fifth Circuit is not alone on this issue.

We cite, actually in our Welsh Carson papers, cases from the Second, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits that all adopt the very same approach. This is by far the majority approach to Section 13 (b)., and that is what our complaint pleads here, Your Honor. We do plead a likelihood of recurrence. We plead that USAP engaged in extensive past violations. Those facts alone will warrant an inference that USAP's conduct would recur absent an injunction, but we also plead that USAP is well positioned to continue the kinds of conduct that we allege they engaged in in the complaint.

And to really drive that home, I think it's important to understand the differences between this case and the Shire case that Mr. Beck referenced that USAP relies on so heavily. Now, Shire is an outlier. The Third Circuit is the only case that applies the standard that Mr. Beck was describing.

In that case, the defendant had sold off the drug product that was at issue, and it was under new corporate control. All of the conduct, all of the effects of the conduct had ceased five years before the FTC filed its complaint. And so it's very clear that intervening events had made it quite unlikely, to say the least, that the conduct was going to recur.

Here, there has been no such change. USAP is easily able to pick up exactly where it left off, and we think for that reason, the Commission's complaint suffices under Section 13 (b), even if Your Honor were to disagree that we pleaded an ongoing violation.

Unless the Court has questions, I'm happy to take a seat.

THE COURT: Let me just ask -- I will permit Mr. Beck to respond to this. I think what you have indicated is that if this were a TRO or a preliminary injunction proceeding, you would be or may be constrained by the parallel proceedings section in that statute. Is that right?

MR. GRAYSON: That's right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And because you are not seeking a permanent injunction, you do not need that parallel proceeding?

MR. GRAYSON: That's right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.
MR. GRAYSON: Thank you.
THE COURT: I'm going to ask Mr. Beck to respond to that. Five minutes.

MR. BECK: First of all, they are seeking a permanent injunction in this case. It is the first paragraph of their pleading, so they are clearly seeking a permanent injunction in this case.

Our position is, among other things, that the proper case, which is referenced in the proviso, specifically refers, for example, to the FTC coming into court and getting a temporary injunction and then eventually converting it to a permanent injunction. But that does not allow the FTC to come into court, bypass its administrative process, seek a permanent injunction without honoring its administrative process. That's what the text of $13(\mathrm{~b})$ says.

The other point that I would make is that the Fifth Circuit case they mention, the Southwest Sunsites case, we don't have any quarrel with that case. If Your Honor looks at that case, it specifically shows that a temporary injunction was entered in this case because of a defendant's ongoing
fraudulent sales. So basically the statutory standard was satisfied in that matter, so we have no quarrel with that decision at all.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.
If you would state your name for the record again. I'm sure the court reporter has it, but just to identify it in the record itself.

MR. KLINEBERG: Of course, Your Honor. Good morning. My name is Geoffrey Klineberg, and I'm with the Kellogg Hansen firm in Washington, DC, and together with Mr. Beck, I am representing here the defendant, U.S. Anesthesia Partners.

It is our position, Your Honor, even if the FTC has authority to bring this standalone case in federal court, untethered to any administrative proceeding, its complaint should be dismissed for the simple reason that its allegations of antitrust violations are not plausible as the Supreme Court required them to be in United States versus Twombly.

For the reasons we have argued in our motion to dismiss, we believe the FTC has fallen short of this standard in at least three ways.

One, it has failed to allege the proper market for anesthesia services, and it has, therefore, misstated USAP's share of that market.

Two, it has failed to allege that USAP has raised its prices above a competitive level when its only allegations
with respect to pricing are that after acquiring various anesthesia practices, USAP started billing those practices out at USAP's existing rate, as it was entitled to do under its contracts with the insurance companies.

And, three, it has failed to allege that USAP has engaged in exclusionary conduct. Section 2 requires something more than the mere allegation that USAP acquired various practices. There has to be a claim that USAP engaged in anticompetitive conduct that caused actual harm to consumers. Simply acquiring practices and billing the rates they were contractually entitled to charge is not enough.

So I would like to briefly address each of those in turn.

Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the government has to allege that USAP possesses monopoly power in a relevant market. Your Honor, this is not a typical situation where a consumer and a producer meet to exchange a product at a certain price.

The patient in need of anesthesia services is not the one who negotiates the price for those services. Those prices are negotiated between the providers of the services and the insurance companies.

So when considering whether an appropriate antitrust market has been alleged, courts consider whether all interchangeable substitute products have been included, but the

FTC has failed to allege that when defining its so-called market for commercially insured, hospital-only anesthesia services.

There are anesthesiologists, Your Honor, who do not currently practice in hospitals, but who work, instead, in outpatient facilities and in so-called ambulatory surgery centers. The FTC has made no allegation that these anesthesiologists lack sufficient qualification or skill to provide anesthesiology services in hospitals.

When insurance companies negotiate with USAP over the rates their anesthesiologists may charge, the fact that these other anesthesiologists may be able and willing to provide the same services necessarily means that they are in the same market. The availability of non-hospital-based anesthesiologists restrains whatever USAP's ability is to raise prices above the competitive level. It is simply not plausible to allege otherwise.

As a result of this pleading failure, the FTC's allegations regarding the USAP's market share are implausible, and without a valid market definition, the complaint should be dismissed.

But that is not the only problem with the complaint. There is no allegation that USAP has profitably raised its own prices above a competitive level. What kind of monopolist, one might reasonably ask, increases its rates, as
it is contractually entitled to do, at no more than a level even with inflation? That's what the FTC itself alleges.

Instead of focusing on USAP's rates, the complaint dwells instead on the difference between the rates of an acquired practice that the acquired practice used to charge and the rates that these anesthesiologists charge now that they have become part of USAP.

Just as a law firm would start billing out newly acquired lawyers at the firm's existing rate, rather than at the rates they may have charged when they were practicing in a different firm, USAP billed its new doctors at USAP's existing rates.

I want to emphasize this point: The complaint alleges that USAP acquired various practices and then raised prices not to some kind of supercompetitive level, something that you might expect a monopolist to do, but rather to USAP's existing rates. And those existing contract rates were not the result of some kind of market power exercised by USAP when negotiating with powerless multibillion dollar insurance companies. But rather they were contractual rates that USAP's predecessor had negotiated before USAP even existed.

By the complaint's own terms, then, these so-called price increases are not plausibly the result of the exercise of monopoly power. And that's not all.

As we explained in our motion to dismiss, there
is another reason why it is entirely implausible that USAP could exercise monopoly power in this environment, and that is because of a law that went into effect in 2021 called the No Surprises Act. The FTC makes a vague reference to the law in a footnote of the complaint, but it is a watershed piece of legislation. It mandates arbitration for disputes between providers and insurers over the rates that providers can bill when they are out of the insurance companies' networks.

This law has thereby effectively eliminated the ability of any provider, including USAP, to exercise whatever leverage it might once have had in negotiations with insurers.

Again, the FTC's claims that USAP is able to exercise any monopoly power in this environment are simply not plausible.

And, finally, Your Honor, I just want to spend a moment on the fact that the complaint fails to allege that USAP has engaged in some kind of anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct.

Even assuming USAP is able to exercise some form of monopoly power, it will not be found unlawful unless it's accompanied by an element of anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct. The FTC's principal allegation of exclusionary conduct is that USAP acquired several smaller anesthesiology practices in Texas, consolidated them under USAP's umbrella and billed them out at USAP's existing contract rates.

The FTC is asking this Court to accept the position that acquisitions alone are presumptively anticompetitive, but that is not the law.

As we argued in our motion, courts have expressed the view that plaintiffs cannot rely on the fact of the acquisition alone and that the mere factor that a merger eliminates competition between the firms concerned has never been a sufficient basis for illegality.

The FTC has made no allegation that USAP's acquisitions have harmed the competitive process and thereby harmed consumers. There is no allegation, for example, that USAP acquired practices in order to shut them down or to deprive patients of appropriate care.

The FTC's complaint contains no plausible allegation that USAP's acquisitions caused harm to consumers in any measurable way. The only suggestion of harm is that USAP has extended its existing market rates, which were negotiated at arm's length, to the newly acquired practices. That is simply not a plausible basis to allege exclusionary conduct.

Your Honor, these are the points I wanted to stress to you this morning. There are, of course, other arguments that we make in our papers, but I won't dwell on those now.

Unless you have any questions, I will sit down. THE COURT: I don't have any questions. Thank you,
sir.
MR. KLINEBERG: Thank you very much.
THE COURT: Response?
MR. GRAYSON: Timothy Grayson for the FTC again.
Your Honor, our complaint is 105 pages long and includes over 300 paragraphs of detailed factual allegations, and most of what you heard from Mr. Klineberg just now, very respectfully, either ignores or even flatly contradicts the facts that we've alleged in our complaint.

Mr. Klineberg raised three arguments. There was market definition, monopoly power and exclusionary conduct.

On market definition, Mr. Klineberg's argument seems to be that we are excluding certain anesthesiologists from the market entirely. That is not the case, Your Honor. Our market is premised around the idea of what we refer to as hospital-only procedures. That is, procedures that must be performed in hospitals, and for those procedures, obviously, patients need to receive anesthesia at a hospital.

Now, Mr. Klineberg's argument seems to be that anesthesiologists that currently practice outside of hospitals, or that maybe predominantly practice outside of hospitals, would simply flood into the marketplace in response to USAP trying to raise its own prices. But, Your Honor, that is not at all what we have seen.

Our complaint alleges that USAP is a dominant
provider of these hospital-only anesthesia services and that no competition has swarmed in from outside to compete down their rates. And, Your Honor, we plead a lot of very specific facts as to why that is.

We plead that these other anesthesiologists lack the specialization that hospitals require. We plead that these other anesthesiologists may not want to work at the hospital because the shifts are long and often overnight. We plead that even if they wanted to work at the hospital and were qualified, they may not be able to. Many hospitals do not simply let any anesthesiologist come in off the street and start operating there. They work specifically with an exclusive group. And so, small, you know, one and two anesthesiologists, they are not going to be big enough to service an entire hospital exclusively. They can't come in and displace USAP. And even if all of these other anesthesiologists could band together and form a large group, we further allege that the exclusive contracts that contracts have with USAP or others are what we call sticky. It's hard for hospitals simply to replace an anesthesia group.

So those are just some of the facts in our complaint that show why these other anesthesiologists cannot, and have not, come in and started competing down USAP's prices.

Now, again, this is an intensely factual issue that is not appropriate for resolution at this stage. It is
rare that courts decide market definition cases on the pleadings, and particularly here, we think our complaint is well pled and that we have said more than enough about market definition.

But there is also another way to establish that USAP has monopoly power. So, one way, the more common way, is to define a relevant market and show that USAP has a very high share of the market.

The other way is to plead that you can directly observe the deleterious effects of USAP's monopoly, and this is an independently sufficient way. Even if Your Honor were to find -- if Your Honor were to find that our relevant market is plausibly pleaded, you don't need to reach this issue.

If you find that our relevant market is flawed, you do need to consider this issue. And here, if Your Honor does reach the issue, you will find that we had indeed pleaded direct evidence of anticompetitive effects, and that is in the form of supercompetitive pricing.

Now, Mr. Klineberg would have you believe that these are just preexisting market rates that USAP has been charging for years, but what we allege in our complaint is that USAP charges double the median rate in Texas and by far the highest rate in Houston and Dallas.

We allege that USAP's -- the groups that USAP acquired could not charge similar rates or, quite frankly,
rates even particularly close to these until USAP acquired them.

We allege that USAP's competitors have not been able to use competition to drive down USAP's prices, and we allege that USAP's customers are unable to negotiate these prices down.

Again, these are deeply factual issues, Your Honor, that are inapposite for resolution at this stage.

Now, finally, on exclusionary conduct or anticompetitive conduct, the third prong of Mr . Klineberg's attack, I want to take a step back and make clear what anticompetitive means in this connection.

Antitrust law is about protecting the competitive process. It is about making sure that the marketplace functions the way it should, make sure that different buyers and sellers of goods are competing, and the result is that people obtain high quality goods at low prices, that there is rapid innovation in markets.

You are not allowed to disrupt that process by buying or conspiring with your competitors. That is exactly USAP has done, and the harm to the competitive process that has resulted is that USAP is now a monopolist.

Under the antitrust laws, monopoly power can exist if parties get it by offering a superior product through superior business strategy or just by sheer dumb luck, but you
are not allowed to use the kind of tactics that USAP has used to gain monopoly power. The Supreme Court has been very clear about that issue for well over a century, and that monopoly that should not exist, that is in and of itself a harm to the competitive process.

That said, our complaint goes much further than that. We allege supercompetitive prices. We allege that particularly close competitors that were competing fiercely against one another have been eliminated by USAP's conduct. We have alleged that it is now harder for new entrants to enter the market and compete against USAP, and we have alleged that consumers have fewer choices. So, even though we don't need to allege those things, Your Honor, we have, and our complaint more than suffices to get past the 12 (b) (6) standard.

Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
MR. KLINEBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
Very briefly, with respect to market definition, the FTC's definition of commercially insured hospital-only anesthesia services is what they have defined as their market, but there is no allegation that the nature of the anesthesiology services provided in ambulatory surgical centers, for example, is different. There is no allegation that anesthesiologists licensed to practice in outpatient settings lack sufficient qualifications to provide
anesthesiology services in hospitals. Doctors of equal skill and training, who currently locate their practice in nonhospital settings, are apparently not competitors, even though they are fully capable of providing the same services. We don't think those are plausible in terms of how they have defined the relevant market here.

With respect to monopoly power, it is the power to raise prices over a competitive level, not just some mean that the FTC has devised as an average rate in the state. It is above a competitive level, which they have never tried to define, or to restrict output to the same effect or somehow to reduce the quality. That's what the exercise of monopoly power is. And the FTC's only claim here is that the prices of anesthesiology services have increased for certain practices that used to practice separate and apart from USAP. There is no allegation that those prices are above some competitive level.

And then finally, Your Honor, Mr. Grayson did not address the No Surprises Act, and I think that's for a good reason, because it does really present a very serious obstacle to the FTC's claim here. We urge the Court to take a look at that Act and to understand what limitations it places on the ability of any provider, and USAP in particular, to exercise any kind of market power in the current environment. Whatever may once have been true is no longer true, and that is a
serious problem for the FTC's case.
THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
MR. KLINEBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I think we are ready. Mr. Yetter?

MR. YETTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor, I have provided -- we have a very short slide deck that I provided to the government lawyers before the hearing started, and I would like to provide it to you and your clerk, if we could. It has some of the relevant language that I think might be helpful to the Court.

May it please the Court, Paul Yetter on behalf of the Welsh Carson defendants.

I would like to start, Your Honor, with what is not disputed. Welsh Carson defendants, even if you look at it as a single entity, is a minority investor in U.S. Anesthesia Partners. That's one of the remarkable things about this case is the FTC is suing a minority investor. It has been a minority investor for seven years, since 2017. Twelve years ago, its original investment helped USAP to expand access to critical medical care by hospitals here in Houston and beyond.

Your Honor, this involves medically-underserved areas, like Baytown, Sharpstown, Bayside, and hospitals like Ben Taub and St. Joseph's.

There have been real and lasting patient care
benefits to our city. None of this is seriously disputed by the FTC. Its focus is on an alleged loss of bargaining power by big insurance companies. The reason why the FTC knows what these facts are is because, Your Honor, it did a two-year investigation before filing this lawsuit. It secured every fact it wanted, including witness interviews and a small mountain of documents, well over a million pages of documents, all with the cooperation of all of these defendants. And this is important, Your Honor, because in light of the substantial investigation, the complaint still has as to -- and I am only speaking on behalf of my clients, the Welsh Carson clients -fatal silver bullet pleading gaps.

It fails to plead essential fact allegations about how an investor, a minority investor today, what the Welsh Carson defendants' actual role is in any alleged antitrust violations going on now or in the future, and it ignores a core pleading element, the 13 (b) element, Your Honor, necessary to give the FTC authority to file suit at all. And that is the likelihood of future violations and the need for prospective relief.

Your Honor, on slide 2, my clients, the Welsh Carson defendants, have three grounds: statutory, pleading and constitutional. I am going to focus on ground number one and talk -- as well, address ground number two pleading, but we believe the Court can avoid the constitutional issue by ruling
on the first two grounds.
If we go to slide 3, Your Honor, this is the language that all the counsel have been focused on.

THE COURT: Excuse me. Go ahead.
MR. YETTER: Certainly. Counsel for the government forthrightly said that their gating issue, the way they can come to federal court to seek any injunction, permanent injunction or preliminary injunction, is by showing -- is by satisfying Section 13 (b) .

This is the language, Your Honor. The title talks about TROs and preliminary injunctions. The language of the statute, this threshold pleading issue, says that the Commission, when it has reason to believe that a person, partnership or corporation is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of the law enforced by the FTC, they can then -- the government can then come to court to seek to enjoin them.

This is the -- from the perspective of the Welsh Carson defendants, Your Honor, this is the gating issue that the government has not satisfied. They haven't pleaded as against our clients -- the Court might have noticed, but you might not have, in the very able presentation by the FTC counsel, in the beginning, about what this case is about. He lumped everybody together: the defendants, USAP and the Welsh Carson defendants. And that's not appropriate under our
federal pleading rules, Your Honor, because one defendant is the operating company, U.S. Anesthesia Partners.

The other seven defendants, my clients, are investors or are somehow related to an investor of the client. That's what is remarkable about this case, Your Honor, is because the government wants to just lump everybody together, such that investors, without any pleading of -- at least their current role would be liable under the FTC Act.

Section 13 (b) says that the FTC can enjoin someone that is violating, or is about to violate, the law enforced by the FTC. The only thing the FTC can get is injunctive relief.

If we go to slide 4, Your Honor, the difference between the FTC is very significant in its enforcement power. The DOJ, the Department of Justice, has the power to prosecute to enforce against past violations and to secure hindsight or relief for past violations. The FTC does not have that power, Your Honor.

Under the FTC Act, as this chart reflects, the only thing the FTC can seek relief against is prospective relief against current or future violations. And regardless of what the FTC alleges against USAP, the operating company in this case, we have to look separately to the Welsh Carson defendants to see what the government has alleged against them in terms of whether they are violating currently.

As you can see at the timeline at the bottom, Your Honor, the last alleged violation, the middle box on the bottom, in 2019 -- this is their complaint, paragraph 337. The last alleged violation by the Welsh Carson entities is in 2019, five years ago.

At that time, the Welsh Carson Fund XII owned 23 percent, no more than 23 percent, of USAP and did not have control of the board. So five years ago is the last violation against my clients, at least just one of them, and they were at the time, according to the complaint, a minority investor with no control. That's a fatal gap in the complaint. Because the gating issue for the FTC is that that defendant, every single defendant, is either violating today or is about to violate our federal law.

The reason why that is significant here, Your Honor, is the FTC didn't come to court, like many private plaintiffs, not knowing what the full facts are. The FTC did a full investigation. We know this because we participated in it. And, Your Honor, one of the most significant things, at least we suggest, is that having done a full investigation, the FTC came to this Court knowing they had to show you that there is either a violation going on or about to happen by the Welsh Carson defendants, and they sought no preliminary relief.

Your Honor, every other case -- and we will get to this in one second, but every other case you have had in
your Court by the FTC, the government has sought preliminary relief. Every other case.

And the reason why -- and we are not suggesting, Your Honor, that there are not circumstances that the FTC could come to court and not seek a preliminary injunction for some reason or another. For example, if the defendants, the target of the investigation, had voluntarily agreed to stop what it was doing, then the government wouldn't have to come in and get preliminary relief. But here, Your Honor, what is so significant is that after two years of investigation, more than a million pages of documents, knowing everything that these defendants -- most importantly, the Welsh Carson defendants -did and didn't do, the government decided in good faith it had no grounds to claim that there was an imminent harm or imminent violation. That's significant.

All they plead -- all the government pleads in this case are allegations against Welsh Carson defendants that happened yesterday. In fact, many yesterdays ago, like in 2012 or 2014 or 2019.

The government does not give, under Twombly, this Court specific factual allegations to plausibly conclude that there is an imminent violation by the Welsh Carson defendants about to happen. And about to happen is not something that is two years in the future. It means what it says.

When I tell my wife, I'm about to go to work,

Your Honor, it's means I'm about to go out the door. It doesn't mean I may go to work in two or three or four years. The government had to plead, just to come to court against my clients, the Welsh Carson defendants, that they, each one of these seven defendants, were about to violate the federal law.

If we go to slide 5, Your Honor, we looked, we checked your docket for every case that the FTC filed in your Court. There was one case where you enforced a subpoena. We didn't include that because they weren't seeking substantive relief, but there were four cases that the FTC filed, starting in 2001 and going through 2008. Every case, Your Honor, they came to court because there was an imminent or current violation of federal law. And in every one of those cases, the government asked for a preliminary injunction.

In the Garrett case, you granted it. In the Greenwell case, you granted it. We couldn't quite tell, because of certain sealed filings in the Webb Source and Red Sky Case, whether you granted it. But, Your Honor, in contrast, today, if we look at the complaint of the government, at the bottom, Your Honor, that box at the bottom, is one of the allegations by the FTC against the Welsh Carson defendants.

And I will read it. Quote: Nor does anything prevent Welsh Carson -- and they lump them altogether into one supposed entity -- quote: From re-upping its investment in

USAP, retaking formal control of the company and directing yet more anticompetitive acquisitions.

What is the problem with that allegation, Your Honor? That allegation is symptomatic and typical of the entire complaint the FTC has filed against my clients. They have no factual assertions that they make against an investor, a 23 percent investor of an operating company that says that the investors, or companies related to the investors, are currently or about to violate federal law.

Instead, what they say here is, Well, nothing stops them in the future at some unstated date from committing some undescribed federal violations.

There's no litigant that could come before this Court and seek a federal injunction, which is the standard the government must meet, that would get -- that would stay in court very long by simply telling you that nothing stops the defendant from committing a violation in the future.

And what this allegation also does, Your Honor, is it reflects -- this is their complaint, the government's complaint -- that the Welsh Carson defendants have no control today over U.S. Anesthesia Partners, the operating company.

My clients are not buying anesthesia practices. They are not giving patient care. They are investors, 23 percent, at the most, in one fund.

Now, Your Honor, if you go to slide 6, all the
cases across the circuits are consistent that this is a threshold requirement for the government. For the FTC to come to court to seek any injunctive relief, they have to show with plausible factual pleadings that a violation by each defendant is happening or is about to happen. And that is, starting, as the Court sees in these cases, on slide 6, under the AMG Capital case, every relief they can request must be prospective. It can't be retrospective. That's the difference between the DOJ enforcement power and the FTC.

So if we look at the second -- counsel for the government very correctly pointed out, well, there's the Southwest Sunsites case, that's the fourth bullet, Your Honor, and that case is exactly the kind of case in which the Federal Trade Commission can come in and seek an injunction.

The defendants were selling land in rural Texas, saying it was good for farming and ranching and everything and there was utilities and water, and it was all false. There was no water. There were no people. There was no value. It was a scheme to defraud out-of-state buyers, and so the government came in to seek a preliminary injunction, which was granted. That's not the situation that we have here.

The government seems to suggest that proving -alleging with plausible facts a reasonable expectation of current or imminent violations is somehow a low standard. Your Honor, that's exactly the standard that the government -- that

Section 13 (b) requires the government to meet.
Now, there is another Texas case that we suggest for the Court and your staff to consider reading. It's the AdvoCare case in 2020 out of the Eastern District. In that situation, the defendant -- the person that actually operated the scheme had shut down the company, and Judge Jordan in Plano looked to see whether the FTC could sue for injunctive relief when the deception and fraud had stopped. The company had dissolved. And he said you couldn't.

Now the FTC here is saying USAP is still operating, but what they are not -- what the government needs to explain to the Court is my clients, the Welsh Carson defendants, are only minority shareholders with no control. So, in essence, this case is exactly like the Third Circuit case in Shire where the defendant had sold the drug over which the dispute occurred, and the Third Circuit said there's no plausible grounds for an injunction and so the FTC cannot seek injunctive relief.

Here, Your Honor, the best the government can say is that at some point in the future, the Welsh Carson defendants might get -- retake control and might direct a future violation.

So, Your Honor, we believe that on the issue of 13 (b) -- and this is a -- we believe this is a seminal gating threshold issue -- for the FTC to sue the Welsh Carson
defendants, that their complaint fails to state under Twombly facts that give a plausible expectation that the Welsh Carson defendants today are violating or are about to imminently violate.

Your Honor, I have one other ground, but I want to know if you want me to pause and let the government respond at this point?

THE COURT: Is that the constitutional issue?
MR. YETTER: The other one is the corporate separateness issues, and they are just lumping everybody together. It is a separate issue, Your Honor, but I'm happy to deal with it or let the government respond.

THE COURT: I think the government should respond, and I'm not really sure I need argument on that, but we will wait and see.

MR. YETTER: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. DAVID B. SCHWARTZ: May it please the Court, Your Honor, I'm David Schwartz on behalf of the Federal Trade Commission.

I would like to begin by addressing my opposing counsel's point that Welsh Carson is just an investor. I would like to walk through, if I could, just some of the allegations in our complaint about Welsh Carson's independent participation in USAP's violations of the antitrust laws.

Welsh Carson came up with the original
anesthesiology consolidation strategy at issue, and it specifically created USAP by acquiring the Greater Houston Anesthesiology Group. Welsh Carson executed multiple letters of interest, letters of intent and confidentiality agreements for USAP's creation, USAP's acquisition and USAP's horizontal agreements, such as their market allocation agreement with Envision. In every one of those agreements, Your Honor, one person signs for USAP; one person signs for Welsh Carson. And we allege that at four different places in our complaint.

Welsh Carson hired multiple consultants to identify anesthesia practices for USAP to acquire. Welsh Carson reviewed and approved every single acquisition USAP made. Welsh Carson drafted the specific contractual language at issue, the tuck-in clauses that USAP uses to raise anesthesiology prices across Texas.

Welsh Carson selected USAP's management team, including USAP's initial chief executive officer, chief financial officer, chief operations officer and head of human resources. USAP's most recent CEO comes from Welsh Carson and still has a role at Welsh Carson today.

Welsh Carson provided over $\$ 175$ million of funding for the creation of USAP and USAP's serial acquisition, and Welsh Carson has always had, from USAP's founding until today, at least two board seats on USAP's board of directors.

Your Honor, USAP -- I'm sorry -- Welsh Carson is
not a passive investor. They are not an active investor. They are the creator of USAP, and they deserve to be held liable for their independent participation in USAP's unlawful scheme.

Now, let me turn to the 13 (b) issue that Welsh
Carson raised. To win on this argument, they have to prove as a matter of law both that their conduct is not ongoing and that they are not about to violate the law. They cannot win on either ground.

Let me address each in turn.
First, I want to talk about ongoing conduct.
Your Honor, the 13 (b) analysis is extremely straightforward and relies on three straightforward undisputed points.

The first is that the complaint alleges that Welsh Carson today holds about a quarter of USAP's stock and remains USAP's most influential board member.

Second, the Supreme Court has ruled since 1957, in the Dupont case cited in our papers, that the act of directly or indirectly holding assets of another company, the effect of which may be to substantially lessen competition, violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act and that, quote, the government may proceed at anytime, unquote, to challenge that holding of assets.

And, third, Section 7 is one of the laws the FTC enforces and it enforces here against Welsh Carson. That's it. That's the entire analysis. And Welsh Carson doesn't dispute
any of those points. It admits it's holding stock today in USAP. It never disputes the Dupont case or its successor, the ITT Continental Baking case we talk about in our papers. And there is no disagreement between the parties about the plain text of $13(\mathrm{~b})$, which is that the Commission can come into court and seek a permanent injunction when a company is violating the laws the FTC enforces.

Now, of course, we still have to prove that Welsh Carson's conduct substantially lessens competition, so I want to be very clear. This is not a strict liability standard, and we are not seeking to hold Welsh Carson liable merely because they have an ownership stake. We are saying that we are allowed to come into court and to seek a permanent injunction because Welsh Carson independently participated in the ongoing conduct that is happening today.

USAP is Welsh Carson's handcrafted vehicle, and it's in the market right now.

The FTC is not aware of any case -- and Welsh Carson cites none -- that holds that an entity's current holding of assets that substantially lessen competition is time barred as to a government enforcer. In fact, the only case that squarely addresses this issue is nowhere in this deck. That's the FTC versus Facebook case we cite in our papers. That Court followed the ITT Continental Baking and Dupont cases I just referenced to hold that the ongoing holding of a
previous acquisition still violates the antitrust laws for $13(b)$ today.

I would like to talk about their deck that they just handed out because I think it is missing a couple critical points.

First, I will just point to slide 3 and say that this is not the full text of $13(\mathrm{~b})$. It is missing the permanent injunction proviso that is the basis for our coming into court today, so I don't think this is a complete document.

I would also like to turn to slide 5 for just a moment. I know Your Honor said you didn't want to hear arguments on the corporate separateness. I will just say this slide is missing your FTC versus Kennedy decision from 2008, which we cite in our papers. That expressly describes why it is appropriate to hold all of the Welsh Carson entities liable here today.

I would like to talk for a few minutes about the other part of $13(\mathrm{~b})$, the likelihood of recurrence standard.

Your Honor, Welsh Carson is also about to violate the FTC statutes because there is a fair inference of a reasonable expectation of continued violations by Welsh Carson. That quote comes from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Southwest Sunsites, which controls here, and is the same as the permanent injunction standard this Court routinely applies.

Here, the FTC's complaint easily satisfies that
governing standard because there are multiple well-pleaded allegations of a large scale systematic scheme that is still intact. In fact, there are two of them. First, there is the entity that Welsh Carson masterminded, handcrafted and maintains to the present day, namely USAP.

USAP has engaged in over a dozen acquisitions since its founding, and who knows what else is on Welsh Carson's shopping list for USAP to pick up. And just to give an example about why it is reasonable for the Court to infer that there are future acquisitions in the offing, I point Your Honor to paragraph 325 of our complaint where we allege that USAP began to show interest in acquiring a practice called Guardian Anesthesia Services in 2014, but it didn't complete the acquisition until 2020.

You have also heard a lot from Welsh Carson about our two-year investigation. If you do the math, Your Honor, that means that our investigation, by their recounting, started in about 2021. That's almost exactly when they say the last conduct occurred. There's no credit they get for stopping their conduct once they realize the government is investigating, and there are actually numerous cases holding to that effect that is talked about in our papers.

Beyond USAP itself, there is also Welsh Carson, and we have well-pleaded allegations in our complaint saying they plan to run the same playbook with USAP in practices like
radiology and emergency medicine.
I want to point Your Honor to paragraph 339 of our complaint, which is quoting from contemporaneous business documents within Welsh Carson admitting that, quote: Given our success to date with USAP and in emergency medicine, we would like to deploy a similar strategy to consolidate the market, unquote. They are talking about radiology. That's exactly the find of factual well-pleaded allegation that courts like Shire held was missing in that case. That's not the case here.

And I would point Your Honor to the numerous cases throughout the Fifth Circuit that have held that when there is a large scale, intact scheme present at the filing of litigation, that satisfies Southwest Sunsites.

Look at FTC versus Educare, for example, where the Western District of Texas held there was a large scale fraudulent scheme with intact infrastructure at the initiation of litigation. Or FTC versus Neora, where the Court found that the channel of wrongdoing was still open. The channel of wrongdoing is still wide open today, Your Honor, for both Welsh Carson and USAP.

Does Your Honor have any questions?
THE COURT: I have no questions.
MR. YETTER: Your Honor, with your permission, I have just a brief response.

THE COURT: Sure thing.

MR. YETTER: Your Honor, for this, the government agency timing matters. And so as well-spoken as counsel is, it is of no use to this Court to say that their complaint alleges a current or imminent violation when they don't give you any dates on all of the activities and events that they talked about.

What counsel actually was talking about when they say that Welsh Carson supposedly was the creator of USAP was something that happened in 2012, 11, 12 years ago. And if we look at the actual complaint that the government has filed against my clients, there is no date of an alleged wrongful act that somehow Welsh Carson participated in any sooner than 2019. The only date beyond 2019 is a date in 2020 when they say that Welsh Carson got dividends. Getting dividends is not illegal, and it's not an unlawful act or imminent violation.

So what the government has given to the Court, at least as to my client, as to the Welsh Carson defendants, is a complaint that alleges no supposed unlawful activity or participation beyond five years ago. That is not a complaint that gives this Court a basis to plausibly conclude that there is an imminent -- excuse me -- that there is a current or imminent violation.

Now, counsel said, Well, the company is still operating. And, yes, USAP is still operating. But their complaint alleges that the Welsh Carson defendants have no
control over it. Yes. They have two board seats out of 14. That's one seventh of the board. Their complaint does not allege that Welsh Carson has control today of the board.

The complaint alleges that the only owner, Welsh Carson Fund XII, has 23 percent of the stock. That's not a majority. It's not control.

And so what the government is trying very hard to do is maintain claims against a private equity firm, a group of companies that invested in an operating company, by somehow blurring everything together as if it were all the operating company. And that's not what Rule 12 (b) (6) or Section 13 (b) allows.

Lastly, counsel said, Well, this could happen somewhere else. The FTC is coming to court to defend its complaint against the Welsh Carson defendants by saying, Well, I know this case is all about anesthesia, but we can sue because it might happen in radiology or some other health care area. Your Honor, that's not what the pleading requirements, Twombly and Rule 12 (b) (6), allow the government to do. They have to give you, to get through that initial gate, factual allegations, not speculation, not possibilities, not maybes, but something could happen in the future, not ifs, piled on ifs, factual allegations that give you an ability to plausibly conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of an imminent or actual violation.

So, Your Honor, in conclusion, what counsel gave back to the Court in response to this issue was nothing of substance that the Court can rely on. There is not a case that they can cite that the government has ever shown that a minority, noncontrolling investor can somehow be held liable because the operating company may or may not have made some acquisitions that are being challenged. That's where we are at today in this case.

Your Honor, with that, if you would like me to move to the corporate separateness point, I'm happy to do that briefly.

THE COURT: I believe that is sufficiently pled -- I mean, sufficiently written on.

Is there something unique about it that I need to be aware of?

MR. YETTER: Your Honor, I have touched a little bit on it already.

THE COURT: I have heard it. Yeah.
MR. YETTER: Yes, you have. I think -- let me just check my notes.

The one last thing, Your Honor, slide 7, which is -- which deals with the corporate separateness, that is the -- so the Court can see in a schematic what the seven defendants are. And the only defendant is the yellow circle -oval box to the right at the bottom that today owns any part of

USAP, and it's 23 percent or less. It does not have control, and it is entitled to appoint only two directors out of fourteen on the USAP board. All the rest do not have ownership or any board -- rights to appoint to the board.

THE COURT: Got it.
MR. YETTER: Thank you, Your Honor, for your time.
MR. DAVID B. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, may I briefly be heard on the corporate separateness issue for just a moment? THE COURT: What are you going to say now? On the what?

MR. DAVID B. SCHWARTZ: On the corporate separateness. THE COURT: One minute maybe.

MR. DAVID B. SCHWARTZ: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I have got the briefs and all on it. Go ahead.

MR. DAVID B. SCHWARTZ: I would just point Your Honor to paragraphs 31 and 32 of the complaint which allege that all seven of the Welsh Carson entities are commonly located, commonly branded, commonly staffed and commonly controlled.

We specifically allege that Mr. D. Scott Mackesy is a director of numerous of these entities across both the Fund XI and Fund XII defendants. They are part of, as Your Honor put it in the Kennedy decision, the same unholy alliance, and you explained there why it's appropriate to hold all the entities, even though the misconduct is only occurring through
one of them today.
On the control issue, very briefly, I point Your Honor to the Reading International case. It's in our papers. It says that there is no numeric threshold for antitrust purposes when it comes to control. And there are numerous cases that Welsh Carson themselves cite, such as Post X and Top Rank, that hold that control can be found when there is a minority investor.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Gentlemen, I guess I have got to find out what this other case is about. So let me ask. I have not looked at the cases pending, and I wouldn't ordinarily do that anyway, in Judge -- did you say Bennett's court?

MR. BECK: Yes, Your Honor. Judge Bennett.
THE COURT: Let's see what I have got here. So this is an individual plaintiff as opposed to to the FTC?

MR. BECK: That is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Versus the --
MR. YETTER: It's a punitive action of insurance companies against the same defendants.

THE COURT: I was looking for that. It does include WC, Welsh Carson, as a defendant in the matter. All parties are the same save and except the FTC is involved in this case. I say all the parties, meaning all of the defendants in the case.

MR. BECK: Welsh Carson and USAP.
MR. YETTER: Yes, Your Honor. Same defendants.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Is there anything else I need to hear? And the operative term is "need to hear."

MR. YETTER: Your Honor, I hope you feel better and the allergies go away, and we appreciate your time and patience, as always.

THE COURT: They will go away and they will come back.
MR. YETTER: Like clockwork every year.
THE COURT: Yeah. I look forward to it.
Were you saying something?
MR. DAVID B. SCHWARTZ: Nothing from the government.
THE COURT: Very good.
MR. BECK: I have two great points, but I don't think the Court is going to entertain them so...

THE COURT: All right. Wait. I'm not going to entertain them?

MR. BECK: I assume you were not going to entertain them. If you will, I will quickly make them.

THE COURT: No, no, no. I think I have at least a threshold command of what has been thrust upon me. And to the extent that I need some additional argument or some refinement, it may be that I will do it telephonically on a specific point, whatever, if I get there. Otherwise, I will be looking not
only at the documents here, but I think you have also filed another document having to do with scheduling, assuming that, I gather, that the case is not dismissed; that there is some work that you all are doing together in terms of attempting to figure out what direction -- how far this is going to go, where it should go, but I will be looking at this over the next 15 to 20 days. It will take me that long to get through the paperwork.

MR. BECK: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. YETTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And you were about to say?
MR. HENNES: Thank you for having us. I'm standing out of respect for the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Have a good evening.

Oh, there was a question. I don't believe there is anything that the parties seek to protect in this record at this proceeding, so if the public seeks the documents or the record of argument, are there going to be any objections from the government in that respect?

MR. GRAYSON: No, Your Honor. I don't think we heard anything today that we would --

MR. BECK: None from USAP.
MR. YETTER: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: They may not want it, but the point is, if
they ask, at least I know what your positions are.
MR. YETTER: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Court adjourned at 11:30 AM)

*     *         *             * 

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause.

Date: April 9, 2024

## /s/ Mayra Malone

Mayra Malone, CSR, RMR, CRR
Official Court Reporter

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