IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

OREGON ASSOCIATION OF HOSPITALS ) AND HEALTH SYSTEMS,

Plaintiff,

VS.

STATE OF OREGON, et al., Defendants.

3:22-cr-01486-SI

May 7, 2024
Portland, Oregon
(Motion Hearing)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL H. SIMON UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

COURT REPORTER: Dennis W. Apodaca, RDR, CSR United States District Courthouse 1000 SW Third Avenue, Room 301 Portland, OR 97204
(503) 326-8191

## APPEARANCES

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: Brad S. Daniels Stoel Rives LLP
760 SW Ninth Avenue, Suite 3000 Portland, Oregon 97205

FOR THE DEFENDANTS: Sara D. Van Loh
Oregon Department of Justice 100 SW Market Street Portland, Oregon 97201

(May 7, 2024)
PROCEED INGS
(Open court:)
THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. We are here in the case of Oregon Association of Hospitals and Health Systems versus State of Oregon, et al., Case No. 3:22-cv-1486. I invite counsel for the plaintiff, first, to enter and appearance.

MR. DANIELS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Brad Daniels for the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Daniels.
I will now invite counsel for defendants to enter an appearance.

MS. VAN LOH: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Sara Van Loh for defendants.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Van Loh.
All right. I take it you all have received the tentative opinion that we circulated last week?

MR. DANIELS: Yes.

MS. VAN LOH: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. We are here for cross-motions for summary judgment. As I said in my email last week, it is just a tentative opinion, but it does reflect the state of my thinking, and so I look forward to the arguments.

Mr. Daniels, it's probably appropriate to begin with
plaintiffs, unless the two of you would jointly prefer some other approach.

MR. DANIELS: Thank you, Your Honor, and thank you for the tentative opinion to focus the discussion on the issues today.

As the opinion reflects, and as we indicate in our briefs, we recognize that, on its face, so to speak, the federal claim is doctrinally challenging. But $I$ think it is important to keep two threshold points in mind, and then I'll touch on specific areas in the opinion where we might have a different perspective.

The first is that we are seeing a subtle, but $I$ think significant shift in vagueness law recently. We are now facing three court decisions in the last several years that $I$ think have struck down both criminal and civil laws on constitutional vagueness grounds. And as I'll touch on in a minute, I think those are significant because they've expressly tied the doctrine of vagueness to concerns about delegation as well as separation of powers.

The second threshold point, Your Honor, is that this really is a unique statute. We looked pretty extensively for a statute that was similar in language or structure, but we were unable to locate one. And I think it is striking that neither party really drew parallels between House Bill 2362 and another statute that maybe survived a similar vagueness challenge.

Now, that's obviously not fatal to the enterprise, but I think it's relevant because it demonstrates that what the legislature here was -- something that was created out of whole cloth. And in doing so, we think they crossed a constitutional line.

With those general points in mind, I would like to focus on what $I$ think are the three major areas of tension or maybe disagreement with the Court's tentative opinion.

Beginning with the contrast or the tension between non-delegation and vagueness, now the Court's opinion, I think, acknowledges that there is a fairly significant overlap between the concept of vagueness and non-delegation, and $I$ think the opinion leans on the fact that perhaps our real complaint with this statute is the fact that it grants, in our view, entirely to OHA the ability to define what the law will require, and that delegation should be, I think, perhaps in the Court's view, a matter of state constitutional law only.

We certainly contend that there is a significant non-delegation problem here. And while we understand the Court's reasoning, I think we disagree with the notion that there's such a clean divide between the rationale for invalidating a law on vagueness grounds and a separate non-delegation concern.

I think there are two reasons that animate our view
there. One is, $I$ think, the recent case law in Dimaya and Davis. Both Justices Kagan and Gorsuch, first in a concurrence
and then in his majority opinion, talk expressly --
THE COURT: Kagan's was a plurality, right?
MR. DANIELS: Yes.
THE COURT: Basically most of the Court, or at least five of the Court, joined in most of her opinion. There was that one section where Justice Gorsuch did not, but the rest of it was a plurality and not a concurrence.

MR. DANIELS: That's right, Your Honor.
What's significant to us about that is that both Justice Kagan in her opinion talked about the notion that vagueness has, as its underlying corollary, a separation of powers concern, and then Justice Gorsuch takes that up in his concurrence. Then in his majority opinion in Davis he talks about the twin constitutional pillars of vagueness.

The notion here is that the court is increasingly and expressly recognizing that the concern of vagueness is handing over to enforcing authorities the ability to define law without political accountability, and I think that really goes back to the seminal case of Grayned, which Your Honor cited, which also referred to delegation, and stated that a vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to enforcing authorities, allowing them to make decisions on an ad hoc basis.

So I think what those recent decisions made express and what some commentators have recognized and explained is
that due process and vagueness have a structural -- what I'll call a structural component in that that due process restriction ensures that the legislature is not handing over the keys wholesalely, conveying its law-making authority to an enforcing authority.

Now, we think that's not surprising, because one effect of an excessive delegation is what the Court has described as the most important animating purpose of the vagueness doctrine, which is the prevention of arbitrary or standardless enforcement, and it's because of an impermissible delegation to an enforcing agency would allow for such a standardless enforcement regime, that the Court has said that's the more important prong that gave us concern, and I think that's what these recent opinions talk about, and going back to Morales, I think, is the focus.

So I think the fact that non-delegation is a distinct concern, has its distinct rationale, distinct source in the vesting clauses, that doesn't mean that the two doctrines necessarily are so distinct or they can't operate concurrently, and I think that's what certainly our theory is with respect to House Bill 2362.

Now, if that's the case, and I recognize that's a contested proposition, then $I$ think it undermines the fundamental premise, $I$ think, of defendants' argument and to some extent the Court's opinion, which is that administrative
regulations can then serve to cure what would be an unconstitutional or impermissibly vague statute.

THE COURT: There are many cases from the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit that say that, aren't there?

MR. DANIELS: There are, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So what do I do with that? As I understand it -- and tell me and see if you disagree with this: As I understand it, the amount of vagueness that is acceptable from a statute depends upon context. Are we talking about classic criminal law? Are we talking about something that impinges on express constitutional rights, like free speech? Or are we talking about something that is economic regulation?

As I understand the case law -- and in a moment I'll invite you to tell me if I'm understanding it incorrectly -but as I understand the case law, in the context of economic activity, those are generally subject to a far less strict or a more lenient vagueness challenge, and those cases also say that there is less of a problem when they miss, because administrative regulations, even non-regulatory, or rather, sub-law guidance materials from the agency can both inform people who are subject to this regulation -- what they need to do to comply -- and can also redo arbitrary enforcement by saying, "This is how we enforce it."

That's my understanding of the state of the law, and
that's how I envision evaluating the vagueness challenge that plaintiff has brought here.

Am I looking at it incorrectly?
MR. DANIELS: I don't think so, Your Honor. And here is the distinction that we draw, and I think Your Honor has summarized, I think, a vast majority of the cases in this area. Let me talk about two separate parts of Your Honor's question.

One is we view that there is a distinction in law that sets a broad or comprehensible either objective fact or normative standard that then regulations then fill in and further describe.

What does it mean to carry a firearm? What does it mean to engage in a material misrepresentation? What does it mean to unreasonably do something? In each of those circumstances, and mostly in economic regulation, the legislature has done some work. It may be broad, but at least it's comprehensible, and it's a normative standard or an objective fact that then regulations serve to define or limit. And that's really what Hoffman was all about. The quintessential case of Hoffman of items designed or marketed for illegal drug use, that was a standard and then, of course, they relied on administrative guidelines.

What's missing here, in our view, and what we see an absence of, what is that initial normative standard?

THE COURT: I thought the initial normative standard
here -- again, tell me if I've got this wrong -- is that the legislature has perceived that the influx of private equity, of corporate management and/or ownership has caused a diminution in the quality of healthcare. It caused an increase in the prices paid by the caregivers and, frankly, maybe even a decrease in compensation to medical providers, and they wanted to make sure that if there was going to be a significant transaction -- a material transaction primarily involving a change of corporate ownership or management, an infusion of private equity, that that would not adversely affect either the quality of healthcare delivered or the price of healthcare charged, and they wanted some advance notice of that, much like the merger notifications before the FTC under the antitrust laws. They wanted some advance notice of that. Therefore, you have to file the statement of an intention to engage in this type of transaction.

If the Oregon Health Authority, which is charged with maximizing patient health care and reducing prices to a reasonable level, while also maintaining an adequate supply of healthcare providers and healthcare facilities, if they thought that this would somehow be a problem, then they could challenge it, but you're only really going to challenge these types of transactions if you know about them in advance.

Now, we're not at the stage in this lawsuit of the Oregon Health Authority challenging one of these transactions,
and the parties to the prospective transactions saying, "No, you can't challenge us. We fit within the law. We have a right to engage in this transaction." That will have to go before probably a contested case hearing; up to the courts of appeals. That's a different issue.

As I understand it, your client is making a facial challenge here primarily to the notification process of giving advance notification to the OHA before these actions are done. Whether or not they need to be disclosed, I thought it was relatively clear from the statute, certainly as expanded on by the regulations, and the purpose is, as I said, to maximize positive results from health care and to reduce the increases in health costs.

Am I looking at it incorrectly?
MR. DANIELS: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough.
MR. DANIELS: I think that when I say that, I would recharacterize or redescribe what our view of the statute is and what our challenge is.

I think that Your Honor is absolutely correct in terms of describing the legislative purpose of the statute. I think there is a lot of evidence for that, and I think Your Honor absolutely is correct to analogize it to other notice regimes.

But what's critical about this statute and what the
core of our challenge is, whatever those purposes were, they didn't make their way into the statute as a standard, not only for when we would need to provide notice, but what we would need to do in order to structure this transaction to comply to get actual approval, and that's the second point and the key point of our challenge, which is it's not enough to say that you need to provide notice of a transaction that we think is material. You have to provide -- in our view, you have to provide a standard by which we know whether that transaction is going to comply with the law that's passed by the legislature.

THE COURT: Isn't one of the things built into the statute here -- and by the way, I apologize for interrupting you, but not too much. But you're welcome to interrupt me too as well.

MR. DANIELS: It's your prerogative.
THE COURT: I'm inviting this to be a discussion.
I thought if someone to a transaction wants to engage in a transaction, they go to the OHA, or they can go to the OHA and say that this is the transaction we're planning on doing and ask, not only is it subject to the disclosure obligations, but also are you likely to approve it? Are you likely to approve it with conditions? If you can approve it unconditionally, great. If you approve it with conditions, what are those conditions so that the parties to the transaction can decide do they want to go through with it or
challenge those conditions. And if the OHA says, "We are not going to approve it, even with any conditions," fine, then there's a way to challenge that. That's a correct understanding of the statutory framework, isn't it?

MR. DANIELS: I'm not sure -- I think that's in the regulations. And as I understand the pre-notice process, it's "Are we going to be a covered transaction? Are we going to have to go through this process?" I don't know if that process also goes and takes the further step of informing the parties of the agency's preliminary determination about whether approval or conditions or denial will occur.

THE COURT: I know there is preliminary review. What's that preliminary review of?

MR. DANIELS: That preliminary review is mandated by statute. You provide the notice and then you're in -- once you provide the notice, then you're in the process. The problem that we have is that whether that transaction is going to get that preliminary review is not governed by any statutory standard. The standard for preliminary approval and for comprehensive review and approval is entirely dependent on whether you satisfy the rule, and that's the fundamental problem we have with the statute, because it's not enough to say, "We think that material transactions need to be reviewed." The legislature needed, in our view, to go one step further and say, "In order for this material transaction to go forward, it
needs to satisfy this standard." Now, that standard does not need to be perfectly precise or factually specific, but it needs to be something. Once you get through the cross-references of this statute, what you're left with is this transaction will be approved if the agency approves it, and that's basically it.

Now, the agency has then promulgated a rule that says that we will approve this transaction and then set out a variety of different factors, one of which is, is it consistent with the law?

THE COURT: Well, I thought the criteria of supply is the agency should approve it if it will not unreasonably interfere or diminish the quality of healthcare or unreasonably raise the prices or unreasonably diminish the ability of healthcare.

Am I mistaken? Isn't that part of the law?

MR. DANIELS: That is part of the law, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Again, that's the criteria. So it's really not just that it will be approved if the agency in its ipsi dixit says so. It basically tells the agency: You are the experts of figuring out when the delivery of healthcare will be adversely affected, when the provision of healthcare -the pricing will be increased. This is the criteria we apply. Don't diminish the quality of healthcare. Don't unreasonably increase the costs. Don't unreasonably diminish the
availability of healthcare services. That's our criteria, says the legislature; now agency, you go and close the rules. Here's your advance notice requirements. And tell people who are covered, the healthcare entities, material change transactions, if you need to give people more detail about whether they're covered, do it. If they have a question about whether they're covered or about the process that helps them understand if they're covered, and for any covered transaction, those are the three substantive criteria you look to: Does it adversely affect healthcare costs, healthcare delivery, or quality or quantity of healthcare providers?

And so I don't view it as totally standardless. What am I looking at incorrectly?

MR. DANIELS: What we need to amend -- what I need to do to amend your description is that those criteria are not the only criteria. There's a critical "and"; "and" you have to satisfy whatever the agency has put in its rules. That's in (5), I believe of the preliminary approval.

THE COURT: And what was that intended to include?
MR. DANIELS: Anything that the agency decided to put in its rules.

THE COURT: You're asking for a facial challenge -you brought a facial challenge to the whole rule. You're not asking for some type of limiting construction that limits that "and," right?

MR. DANIELS: No.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DANIELS: And I don't think that the Court would be in a position to do that, because the way the statute is structured, the criteria for approval is that you will meet whatever the agency has put in its rule, and you will meet these other criteria.

THE COURT: Now, has the agency put in any other explanation of what's intended to go into that other criteria, the "and"? Has the agency explained that yet?

MR. DANIELS: They've promulgated a rule, and I think Your Honor quoted it in the tentative opinion. It's at (60) of the AORs, and it does repeat those statutory criteria. But in addition to that, in order for a transaction to be approved, it cannot be contrary to law or otherwise hazardous or prejudicial to consumers or the public. Now, those criteria are nowhere in the statute.

THE COURT: Hazardous to consumers or the public essentially is just another way of saying if it unreasonably diminishes the quality of healthcare or raises prices.

MR. DANIELS: I don't think -- we don't view that as the interpretation that the agency --

THE COURT: And that's my question then. Has the agency given that clause any further interpretation either by rule, regulation, guidance, or contested case decision that is
beyond anything other than what the statutory criteria are?
MR. DANIELS: One example is the "otherwise contrary to law" -- or the "contrary to law" provision. I think the agency has taken the position that that applies to any source of law, including Delaware corporate law.

So, for example, if the transaction, you know, is somehow violative of some principles of Delaware corporate law, then your transaction is contrary to law and will not be approved.

THE COURT: Have they said that in one of their guidance papers?

MR. DANIELS: They have not, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DANIELS: But the point is that if you have -the way I think of statutes, if you have specific circumstances A, B, and then C says something else, C is not repeating A and B. C has to be an independent source of authority.

THE COURT: Sure. And that may be right, and maybe other source of law -- well, maybe if we have a terrorist organization wanting to buy one of our health clinics, that would be prohibited under federal law. Okay, fine. Then that will not be approved. But we're getting into some very hypothetical, abstract scenarios for which you may be right in an as-applied challenge. But that's not what we have before us.

MR. DANIELS: I understand, Your Honor. And to pull the lens back on this discussion, I think when Your Honor originally described the importance of the administrative regulations, which we entirely agree with, and which are the vast majority of cases here, those cases don't deal with the unique situation we have here, which is, $I$ think, a situation which meets the standard that Your Honor outlined in page 21 of your opinion, which is do we have a comprehensible but imprecise normative standard, or do we have no standard of conduct specified at all in the statute?

Our view of the statute is, once you kind of get through the cross-reference from here and there and everywhere, ultimately no standard of conduct is specified in the statute, not because the legislature didn't go part of the way, but because they left fundamental, in our view, law-making functions to the agency. They said you have to satisfy $A, B$, and $C$, and $C$ is whatever the agency will decide.

THE COURT: By the way, you reminded me of almost a footnote issue, but $I$ want to get it out of the way. There was some discussion in your briefing that there's uncertainty about which healthcare entities are covered. It is unclear to me precisely what types of entities are members of the Oregon Association of Hospitals and Health Systems. By the way, approximately how many members are there?

MR. DANIELS: 61 hospitals, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. It struck me -- and I think I discussed this in the tentative -- that $I$ don't think that there is any serious argument that the members of the plaintiff association are healthcare entities, as defined in the statute. And so when you made the argument in your briefing that there is some ambiguity about who might be a healthcare entity, I did have a little bit of concern about standing. Now, maybe $I$ didn't express it clearly enough in my supplemental order about standing. You came back and told me of course you have an associational standing, and of course you do. And the defendants agree with that.

That's not what $I$ meant to ask. What $I$ meant to ask is: Does this plaintiff association have the standing to assert an argument that some unknown hypothetical entity may or may not know whether they're a covered healthcare entity, given that all of the members of this association clearly are?

MR. DANIELS: I appreciate the question, Your Honor. I think, in our view, we still have standing to make that challenge, the reason being that -- obviously we're assuming the burden of a facial challenge in this case. And if we were talking about an "as applied," then we would have to demonstrate that some of our members would be subject to that ambiguity. But a facial challenge, I think, imposes a greater burden on us but relaxes it with respect to pre-enforcement -THE COURT: That then leads me to this follow-up, and

I've already distracted you a little bit, so maybe if you'd go down this line a little bit further. I think I'm willing to accept your argument that Salerno, as boldly as defendant argues it, is not necessarily the current law.

So what is the standard that someone who challenges facially a statute must show?

MR. DANIELS: We think the standard that you put in your opinion on 21 and 22, the difference between an imprecise but comprehensible standard or no standard at all, or what we put in on page 22 of our supplemental brief, which was not imprecision about whether a fact may be proved, but what that fact is, which I think is from Justice Roberts' opinion. Those are not necessarily completely satisfying, but I think they are as close as we can get to what we think the standard should be on a facial challenge.

THE COURT: I'm trying to apply that, let's say to your argument -- you're not making it now so much, but you made it in your papers -- that it's ambiguous or vague, what are the healthcare entities? As I see it, every one of the plaintiff association members are clearly and unambiguously a healthcare entity.

Most of the healthcare entities that I can think of would be clearly and unambiguously healthcare entities, but I see your argument that there is a theoretical possibility that some person or organization may or may not know whether they're
a covered healthcare entity, and that strikes me as too speculative for a legitimate facial challenge.

Do you agree or disagree? And if you disagree, why? Then how do I define --

MR. DANIELS: I will take a run at it, Your Honor, and see if $I$ can persuade you, which is -- I think it is Judge Strand's opinion in United States v. Stupka, which we cited in our supplemental brief, actually did a fairly detailed and scholarly analysis of that precise question. The answer that he came to was that in the narrow category of a facial challenge, when you're not talking only about notice, but you're also talking about the threat or the invitation or the possible encouragement of arbitrary enforcement, that is going to be a situation where we're not going to impose on the challenger an obligation to demonstrate that they themselves -their conduct would be covered by the statute. But because there is a sufficient interest in hearing that facial challenge on the merits, we're not going to knock them out. So we would adopt that standard.

THE COURT: I derailed you, but maybe you can go back on track.

MR. DANIELS: Let me touch on a couple of other points that Your Honor made, which is the idea that this is an economic regulation. Certainly we agree that those are the factors that the Court should look at. We don't agree that the
standard is as lenient maybe as the Court suggests, for a few different reasons. The reason why economic regulation is typically subject to a more lenient standard is, one, it deals with a narrow and technical area -- a mining statute, a statute that deals with specific securities professionals, things of that nature. And it uses technical language in its admonitions. I don't think that rationale applies to this law. It's extremely broad. The market it covers is extremely broad. The number of transactions it covers is vast potentially. So that rationale, we think, is decidedly weaker here.

The other rationale that $I$ think Your Honor alluded to was the fact that sophisticated entities typically are charged with more knowledge of the law. I think there's a disconnect with respect to this statute because we're not talking about a statute that really regulates the core competencies and knowledge of hospitals: Patient care, doctor staffing, nurse. We're talking really about the regulation of business transactions.

Think about the 61 members that we have. 37 of them are rural hospitals. We have frontier hospitals. That notion of this being within our core sophistication, 1 think there's daylight between what the statute is regulating and what we have.

THE COURT: That's a fair point. But also, anyone who is doing a business transaction in the millions of dollars
with private equity or out-of-state corporate capital, they have pretty darn sophisticated advisors.

MR. DANIELS: I take Your Honor's point. We're not dealing with the Papachristou quintessential -- that being said, those arguments can slightly prove too much in this case, particularly given that the revenue thresholds, while they may seem significant, are not -- I think sweep in an undecidedly large number of transactions.

The other point that Your Honor made was the availability of pre-enforcement administrative review, and we take that point. But in our view, again, it may prove too much in this case; one, because we think that pre-enforcement review is really whether you're a covered transaction, whether you have to get in the door, first and foremost, and it won't get into the substantive merits of the transaction in our view.

THE COURT: Maybe I need to go back and double-check this, and wherever you can point me to, I would appreciate. But I thought that the idea behind some of the preliminary reviews is not just are you a covered transaction, but are we likely to approve it or not.

MR. DANIELS: I will check this, Your Honor. I believe there is an opportunity for pre-preliminary review, and I have no reason to believe that the agency has closed its doors either informally or formally to parties who wish to contact the agency. But $I$ think that for us, relying on that
as a basis to kind of water down the leniency standard, when you go back to the core concern that we have, which deals with delegation and the scope of authority that's granted to the enforcing agency saying, "Well, you can talk to the policemen after the fact," so to speak, is somewhat of a weaker rationale, we believe. I may have one or two points, but I'm happy to answer any questions.

THE COURT: I'm not shy about interrupting with questions. If you need more time, or if you want to take a little recess, that's fine. We can even hear from Ms. Van Loh, and if you want to raise new points, as well as rebuttal points, I'll let you do that. That's fine. I'm just trying to get the right answer here.

MR. DANIELS: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Ms. Van Loh, speaking of trying to get the right answer, in addition to responding to anything that Mr. Daniels has said, in addition to making any other points you want to make, are there any errors -- factual or otherwise or legal -- that you want to correct in my tentative? Because if my tentative becomes the actual, and if plaintiff doesn't like it, they're going to appeal. Now is a good time for you to correct any errors I've made.

MS. VAN LOH: Your Honor, I think the only thing I might raise is on page 31 you sort of shift into an overbreadth challenge and conclude that they don't have standing to raise
an overbreadth challenge. My understanding of the case law is that overbreadth is actually a distinct claim.

THE COURT: Right.
MS. VAN LOH: Our position is that the association does not have standing to raise an as-applied challenge here under the vagueness doctrine.

THE COURT: So let's focus in on that and then get back to the other points.

Am I right in thinking that as long as every member of the plaintiff association is clearly and unambiguously a healthcare entity under the statute, then this plaintiff may not be heard to argue that "healthcare entity" is a vague or ambiguous term?

MS. VAN LOH: Yes.
THE COURT: And what's the legal authority for that conclusion?

MS. VAN LOH: I actually addressed that in the opposition to the reply on page 8. The case we cited was Gospel Missions of America v. City of Los Angeles. The quote is that "speculation about possible vagueness and hypothetical situations not before the Court" -- in brackets -- "will not support a facial attack on a statute when it is surely valid 'in the vast majority of its intended applications.'"

We also cite United States v. Johnson, which says, "Unless First Amendment freedoms are implicated, a vagueness
challenge may not rest on arguments that the law is vague in its hypothetical applications, but must show that the law is vague as applied to facts of the case at hand."

THE COURT: Now, that last point is sort of morphing from facial to as-applied challenge.

MS. VAN LOH: I think -- I understand Your Honor's concerns and possibly confusion about this. I have also struggled with how to interpret the cases, because the lines seem to vary by case, and I think really what we're talking about is there's sort of a spectrum of how we look at these things. And if you're talking about -- and this goes back to the Hoffman standard -- if you're talking about economic regulation and sophisticated parties, then the law tolerates more vagueness in the statute.

So when we say "in the vast majority of its intended application," I mean, that also sounds like an entirely different standard in some sense. But I think what I take from that is that you -- if you're in a situation where you have 61 members, all of whom are healthcare entities, then you really don't have the solid basis to challenge what the definition of healthcare entity might be.

THE COURT: Let's get to the other two issues that $I$ was talking to Mr. Daniels about, and then I'll let you say anything you want, I really will.

But it's unclear to me whether the preliminary
reviews are only whether or not the transaction is covered such that there must be notice given, or whether there's some opportunity for prospective business entities to get some guidance from OHA as to whether or not on the merits, on the review criteria, this is likely to be approved, approved with conditions, disapproved, things like that.

So what does the law provide in that area?
MS. VAN LOH: So I think that the pre-notice -- so there is a pre-notice conference, and I think you can also informally reach out to OHA, I believe. And as far as the -- I don't know that OHA would say informally "Oh, we will probably give you these conditions and then approve the transaction," just because there's so much more. This is not something that can be decided in an informal conversation. It depends on the submissions that the parties make to support the transaction.

But the preliminary review process is very fast actually. So I think the importance of the pre-filing conference is so that you can say whether or not the transaction that you're contemplating would even require notice.

THE COURT: I think that's probably the easier of the questions. I can imagine business parties saying, "Yeah, we probably do have to give notice. But what I want to know is, are we going to get approved or approved with conditions? That will affect whether we're even willing to provide the notice
and move further, or whether we will abandon this proposal and maybe go try it in some other state."

So how do they go about finding out in a relatively efficient way whether or not they're likely to get approval? MS. VAN LOH: So I think at that point they would look probably to the sub-regulatory guidance documents, which are very thorough and comprehensive and provide examples of the types of transactions and types of situations where a reduction in essential healthcare services might happen.

So if you're talking about, for example, putting a bunch of private equity into a particular hospital that is maybe struggling financially, and the intention of the merger or the influx of money is to completely revamp how the hospital system works and streamline and lay people off and close -- you know, reduce the services. I mean, it's pretty clear, under those circumstances, you're talking about something that will be implicating the concerns that are meant to be addressed in application of the law.

THE COURT: So you're saying that the parties to a prospective transaction can look at the law and have a pretty good sense themselves whether it's likely to be approved or not as opposed to going through any type of procedure with OHA to get advance indications?

MS. VAN LOH: I think that's generally true. On the margins, there might be some confusion, or it may be less clear
if you're not -- if you're sort of on the edge of how many -how do you exactly apply it. They also have the list of the eight factors to consider whether there has been a substantial reduction in essential services.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, I'm going to change topics a little bit. One of the points that Mr . Daniels makes is that the statute itself doesn't give any guidance to OHA on how to -- whether or not to approve the transaction. So assume it's covered, but they don't give enough guidance on whether to approve it. I thought that the statute says you approve it or disapprove it based upon whether it reduces the availability of healthcare services, unreasonably increases price, and a few other criteria.

No. 1, am I right on that, in the statute?
No. 2, Mr. Daniels says, well, even if that is right, there is this other criteria "or otherwise violative of the law" or "against what OHA wants to do," and that essentially gives them a blank check. I would like to hear defendants' response to that argument, please.

MS. VAN LOH: So I think your interpretation is correct, that the statute does require OHA to approve or disapprove a transaction based on the factors that you suggest. I think with respect to maybe the -- I don't know if this is one we were calling a residual cause or not -- but the statutory provision allowing OHA to promulgate additional
regulations, I don't think we have a basis to strike down the entire statute because the rules that OHA promulgated are -they're given an opportunity to provide additional criteria that would further the purposes of the legislature enacting the statute. You can see by looking at the rules that they then enacted that that is what they did, and that's what they do.

And the question here isn't whether or not the rules that they have -- and the specific elements that people need to be looking at when they're evaluating these transactions. The question of whether those are appropriate, whether they're too broad or too narrow, I mean, that's really not the question. The question is, the fact that OHA has the option of promulgating additional criteria and does so, does that make the statute facially invalid? And it doesn't. It does not.

THE COURT: Am I correct in understanding defendants' position that if OHA were to issue some criteria that might be inappropriate, that can be dealt with an as-applied challenge to that criteria but should not affect defendants' motion for summary judgment against the facial challenge that's brought here?

MS. VAN LOH: That's correct Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. VAN LOH: I don't have anything else I want to add. We are prepared to accept the tentative. If you have further questions for me at this point, I'm happy to answer
them.

THE COURT: Anything else you want me to correct in the tentative, if that's going to be the general direction $I$ go in?

MS. VAN LOH: Page 31 was my main one on the overbreadth.

THE COURT: All right. Then let's hear further from Mr. Daniels, and he is not going to be limited to rebuttal.

Then I'll invite you to make any further comments, Ms. Van Loh, if you wish.

MR. DANIELS: Thank you, Your Honor.

With respect to the application and the pre-notice conference, I would cite Your Honor to 409-070-0042. That's an OAR cite.

THE COURT: 409-070- - -

MR. DANIELS: -- -0042. (1) of that regulation says that "a party may, but shall not be required to submit a written application to the authority requesting a determination whether such transaction is a covered transaction pursuant to these rules."

THE COURT: Okay. What do I learn from that, or what's the point of that?

MR. DANIELS: The point of that is that this is the rule that Your Honor was thinking about in the sense of what do you get to learn before you then get engaged in the notice?

And it's not substantive on approval criteria.
THE COURT: And it sounds like Ms. Van Loh is agreeing that there really isn't an opportunity, at least not one provided for under the law, including the regulations, to get some type of advanced hint as to whether or not the transaction, if applied for, will be approved.

MR. DANIELS: And that's really the rub, Your Honor, because I think Your Honor has identified criteria that are laid out in the statute. But again, that doesn't help a party if they look to the statute and say, "Great. We're going to improve access to care. Great. We are going to limit costs. Great. We are going to" -- and then fill in the blank of whatever the rule is.

If you look at (5) of the statute -- this is 415.501 and then (9) of the statute, those sections make, as a necessary requirement, you must satisfy whatever they put in the rule, in addition to the statute.

The final point that I'd make with respect to the list of eight factors, $I$ think what's interesting about that list is that it uses a numerical one-third reduction standard. But some of the factors are not subject to any kind of numerical test at all. They talk about improving access to consultations, and so those are not helpful limiting factors. They just enhance the ambiguity of the statute.

THE COURT: By the way, back to the (5) and (9),
isn't that something -- and if $I$ end up going in the direction of the tentative and send you on the delegation issue to the Oregon courts, ultimately it would end up before the Oregon Supreme Court, I'd suspect. If not, you'd at least have a right to get to the Oregon Court of Appeals, you can make the argument that there's insufficient standards provided by the state legislature on points (5) and (9), and if the Oregon appellate courts agree with you, one way to deal with that is to simply strike (5) and (9), right?

MR. DANIELS: I think that's right, Your Honor. I think they would be free, as maybe Your Honor is not free, to do a little more surgery in limiting construction. But that also is at the heart of statutory regime. It really is a fundamental -- notwithstanding a lot of the general language, it's fundamentally giving a grant of authority: OHA, you go figure this out.

THE COURT: But how can you say that, given that OHA, in their regulatory guidance so far, hasn't put any more requirements under (5) or (9). They haven't said no to anybody based on this additional requirement. They may never do that. So it may be the case that at some point with an as-applied challenge, if they try to do it, those may be struck down, and it's not an uncommon act, at least on the state Supreme Court side on the state law and the Supreme Court with federal law, to say that one particular piece of a statute on a as-applied
challenge should be eliminated to avoid constitutional problems -- the constitutional avoidance doctrine. But that's not where we are right now.

So since it hasn't been done, I don't see how you can say it's at the heart of what your client is really complaining about.

MR. DANIELS: So if $I$ can kind of reformulate the hypothetical. Let's say that we were to make a rule challenge to the rules and say, "Hey, look, you probably have these rules. We think the legislature said something different," that would fail in this case, because the legislature has said, "Whatever the standard is, it's whatever you put in your rules." What they put in their rules is not only the statutory requirements, but other things, which I cited earlier in my argument.

So we are kind of between a rock and a hard place here. If the legislature says you may not engage in an injurious transaction that is contrary to rule but doesn't give any standard, then we're stuck.

THE COURT: Well, you're not, because the Oregon appellate courts -- certainly the Oregon Supreme Court -- would have the ability to say under the Oregon non-delegation doctrine, if they agree with you, "You're right. We keep the rest of the statute, but we strike that particular piece." So you're not between a rock and a hard place. You've got an
avenue of relief. And I just think that supports -- because that's something that the state courts can do that I can't do -- but that supports why in your second claim I shouldn't rule for you or against you, but I should just decline jurisdiction and send that piece back to the state courts.

MR. DANIELS: And I agree with that as a remedy, and I agree with Your Honor's observations. Respectfully, we think that's not exclusive, for the reasons that I explained earlier.

THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough.
Ms. Van Loh, anything you would like to say further? Otherwise, I will take it under advisement.

MS. VAN LOH: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I do want to compliment both sides -- I was already going to compliment you for outstanding briefing on this. I will now compliment both sides for outstanding oral advocacy. I take the two cross-motions for summary judgment under advisement as of today. And given my own schedule, I will promise you a decision no later than a week from Friday, as I'm going to be gone for about four weeks. So I will get this out with a final decision no later than a week from Friday, probably sooner.

Thank you.
MR. DANIELS: Thank you, Your Honor.
MS. VAN LOH: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Court adjourned.)

I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature, conformed signature, or digitally signed signature is not certified.
/s/ Dennis W. Apodaca DENNIS W. APODACA, RDR, RMR, FCRR, CRR

May 21, 2024 DATE Official Court Reporter

|  | above-entitled [1] 37/7 <br> absence [1] 10/24 <br> absolutely [2] 12/20 12/23 <br> abstract [1] 18/23 <br> accept [2] 21/3 31/24 <br> acceptable [1] 9/9 <br> access [2] 33/11 33/22 <br> accountability [1] 7/18 <br> acknowledges [1] 6/10 <br> act [1] 34/23 <br> actions [1] 12/8 <br> activity [1] 9/17 <br> actual [2] 13/5 25/20 <br> actually [4] 22/8 26/2 26/17 28/17 <br> ad [1] 7/22 <br> add [1] 31/24 <br> addition [4] 17/14 25/16 25/17 33/17 <br> additional [4] 30/25 31/3 31/13 34/20 <br> addressed [2] 26/17 29/17 <br> adequate [1] 11/19 <br> adjourned [1] 36/25 <br> administrative [5] 8/25 9/20 10/22 19/3 24/10 <br> admonitions [1] 23/7 <br> adopt [1] 22/19 <br> advance [6] 11/12 11/14 11/23 12/8 16/3 29/23 <br> advanced [1] 33/5 <br> adversely [3] 11/10 15/22 16/10 <br> advisement [2] 36/11 36/17 <br> advisors [1] 24/2 <br> advocacy [1] 36/16 <br> affect [4] 11/10 16/10 28/25 31/18 <br> affected [1] 15/22 <br> after [1] 25/5 <br> afternoon [5] 4/4 4/9 4/11 4/14 4/16 <br> again [4] 11/1 15/18 24/11 33/9 <br> against [3] 30/17 31/19 36/4 <br> agency [21] 8/11 9/21 15/5 15/7 15/12 15/19 15/20 16/2 <br> 16/17 16/20 17/6 17/8 17/10 17/22 17/24 18/4 19/16 19/17 <br> 24/23 24/25 25/4 <br> agency's [1] 14/10 <br> agree [9] 19/4 20/11 22/3 22/24 22/25 34/8 35/23 36/6 36/7 <br> agreeing [1] 33/3 <br> al [2] $1 / 74 / 6$ <br> all [10] 4/17 4/17 4/21 10/19 19/10 20/16 21/9 27/19 32/7 33/22 <br> allow [1] 8/11 <br> allowing [2] 7/22 30/25 <br> alluded [1] 23/11 <br> almost [1] 19/18 <br> already [2] 21/1 36/14 <br> also [14] 7/19 9/18 9/23 11/19 13/21 14/9 22/12 23/24 <br> 26/24 27/7 27/16 28/9 30/2 34/13 <br> am [7] 10/3 12/14 15/16 16/13 26/9 30/14 31/15 <br> ambiguity [3] 20/6 20/23 33/24 <br> ambiguous [2] 21/18 26/13 <br> amend [2] 16/14 16/15 <br> Amendment [1] 26/25 <br> America [1] 26/19 <br> amount [1] 9/9 <br> analogize [1] 12/23 <br> analysis [1] 22/9 <br> and/or [1] 11/3 <br> Angeles [1] 26/19 <br> animate [1] 6/23 <br> animating [1] $8 / 8$ <br> another [2] 5/24 17/19 <br> answer [5] 22/9 25/7 25/13 25/16 31/25 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MR. DANIELS: [39] |  |  |
| MS. VAN LOH: [16] 4/13 4/19 25/22 26/3 26/13 26/16 |  |  |
| 27/5 28/7 29/4 29/23 30/19 31/20 31/22 32/4 36/11 36/23 |  |  |
| THE COURT: [53] |  |  |
| - |  |  |
| 'in [1] 26/23 |  |  |
| - |  |  |
| --000 [1] 37/3 |  |  |
| -0042 [1] 32/16 |  |  |
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| /s [1] 37/10 |  |  |
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| 1 |  |  |
| 100 [1] 2/5 |  |  |
| 1000 [1] 1/24 |  |  |
| 1486 [1] 4/6 |  |  |
| 2 |  |  |
| 2024 [3] 1/6 4/1 37/10 |  |  |
| 21 [3] 19/7 21/8 37/10 |  |  |
| $22[2] 21 / 821 / 10$ |  |  |
| 2362 [2] 5/24 8/21 |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |
| 3000 [1] 2/3 |  |  |
| 301 [1] 1/24 |  |  |
| 31 [2] 25/24 32/5 |  |  |
| 326-8191 [1] 1/25 |  |  |
| 37 [1] 23/19 |  |  |
| 3:22-cr-01486-SI [1] 1/5 |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |
| 409-070 [1] 32/15 |  |  |
| $409-070-0042$ [1] $32 / 13$ $415.501[1] 33 / 14$ |  |  |
| 5 |  |  |
| 503 [1] 1/25 |  |  |
| 6 |  |  |
| 60 [1] 17/12 |  |  |
| 61 [3] 19/25 23/19 27/18 |  |  |
| 7 |  |  |
| 760 [1] 2/3 |  |  |
| 8 |  |  |
| 8191 [1] 1/25 |  |  |
| 9 |  |  |
| 97201 [1] 2/6 |  |  |
| ${ }^{97204[1] ~ 1 / 24}$ |  |  |
| 97205 [1] 2/3 |  |  |
| A |  |  |
| ```a facial [1] 16/22 abandon [1] 29/1 ability [4] 6/14 7/17 15/14 35/22 about [42]``` |  |  |

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A
antitrust [1] 11/13
any[17] 14/2 14/18 16/8 17/8 17/24 18/4 20/3 25/7 25/17
    25/18 25/22 29/22 30/7 32/9 33/21 34/18 35/19
anybody [1] 34/19
anyone [1] 23/24
anything [7] 16/20 18/1 25/16 27/24 31/23 32/2 36/10
AORs [1] 17/13
Apodaca [3] 1/23 37/10 37/11
apologize [1] 13/12
appeal [1] 25/21
appeals [2] 12/5 34/5
appearance [2] 4/8 4/13
APPEARANCES [1] 2/1
appellate [2] 34/8 35/21
application [4] 27/16 29/18 32/12 32/18
applications [1] 27/2
applications.' [1] 26/23
applied [9] 18/24 20/21 26/5 27/3 27/5 31/17 33/6 34/21
34/25
applies [2] 18/4 23/7
apply [3] 15/23 21/16 30/2
appreciate [2] 20/17 24/17
approach [1] 5/2
appropriate [2] 4/25 31/10
approval [8] 13/5 14/11 14/19 14/20 16/18 17/5 29/4 33/1
approve[13] 13/21 13/22 13/22 13/23 14/2 15/8 15/12
24/20 28/12 30/8 30/10 30/10 30/21
approved [11] 15/5 15/19 17/14 18/9 18/22 28/5 28/5
28/24 28/24 29/21 33/6
approves [1] 15/5
approximately [1] 19/24
arbitrary [3] 8/9 9/23 22/13
are [61]
area[3] 10/6 23/4 28/7
areas [2] 5/10 6/6
aren't [1] 9/4
argue [1] 26/12
argues [1] 21/4
argument [10] 8/24 20/3 20/5 20/14 21/3 21/17 21/24
30/19 34/6 35/15
arguments [3] 4/24 24/5 27/1
as [52]
as the [1] 28/10
as-applied [6] 18/24 26/5 27/5 31/17 34/21 34/25
ask [3] 13/20 20/12 20/12
asking [2] 16/22 16/24
assert [1] 20/14
association[9] 1/4 4/5 19/23 20/4 20/13 20/16 21/20 26/4
26/10
associational [1] 20/10
assume [1] 30/8
assuming [1] 20/19
attack [1] 26/22
authorities [2] 7/17 7/22
authority [9] 8/4 8/5 11/17 11/25 18/17 25/3 26/15 32/18
34/15
availability [3] 16/1 24/10 30/11
avenue [3] 1/24 2/3 36/1
avoid [1] 35/1
avoidance [1] 35/2
B
back[11] 7/18 8/14 19/2 20/9 22/20 24/16 25/2 26/8 27/11
33/25 36/5
based [3] 30/11 30/22 34/20
basic [1] 7/21
basically [3] 7/4 15/6 15/20
basis [4] 7/23 25/1 27/20 31/1
be [53]
because [20] 5/17 6/2 8/6 8/10 9/19 14/22 17/4 19/14
19/15 22/16 23/14 24/12 25/19 27/8 28/13 31/2 33/8 35/11
35/20 36/1
becomes [1] 25/20
been [2] 30/3 35/4
before [8] 1/13 11/13 12/4 12/8 18/24 26/21 32/25 34/3
begin [1] 4/25
Beginning [1] 6/8
behind [1] 24/18
being[3] 20/19 23/21 24/4
believe [5] 16/18 24/22 24/23 25/6 28/10
below [1] 37/5
between [8] 5/24 6/8 6/10 6/20 21/8 23/22 35/16 35/25
beyond [1] 18/1
Bill [2] 5/24 8/21
bit [4] 20/7 21/1 21/2 30/6
blank [2] 30/18 33/12
boldly [1] 21/3
both [6] 5/15 6/25 7/9 9/21 36/13 36/15
brackets [1] 26/21
Brad [2] 2/2 4/9
brief [2] 21/10 22/8
briefing [3] 19/20 20/5 36/14
briefs [1] 5/7
broad [5] 10/9 10/16 23/8 23/8 31/11
brought [3] 10/2 16/23 31/19
built [1] 13/11
bunch [1] 29/11
burden [2] 20/20 20/24
business[4] 23/18 23/25 28/3 28/22
buy [1] 18/20
C
call [1] 8/2
calling [1] 30/24
came [2] 20/9 22/10
can [26] 9/1 9/21 9/23 13/18 13/22 13/25 21/14 21/22 22/6
22/20 24/5 24/17 25/4 25/10 28/9 28/14 28/18 28/22 29/20
31/5 31/17 34/5 34/17 35/4 35/7 36/2
can't [3] 8/19 12/2 36/2
cannot [1] 17/15
capital [1] 24/1
care [4] 11/18 12/12 23/16 33/11
caregivers [1] 11/5
carry [1] 10/12
case [19] 4/5 4/6 6/24 7/19 8/22 9/14 9/16 10/20 12/4
17/25 20/20 24/5 24/12 26/1 26/18 27/3 27/9 34/21 35/11
cases[6] 9/3 9/18 10/6 19/5 19/5 27/8
category [1] 22/10
cause [2] 30/24 37/7
caused [2] 11/3 11/4
certainly [5] 6/17 8/20 12/10 22/24 35/21
certified [1] 37/9
certify [1] 37/5
challenge [33] 5/25 9/18 10/1 11/21 11/22 12/2 12/7 12/19
13/1 13/6 14/1 14/3 16/22 16/23 18/24 20/19 20/20 20/23
21/15 22/2 22/11 22/17 25/25 26/1 26/5 27/1 27/5 27/20
31/17 31/19 34/22 35/1 35/8
challenger [1] 22/15
challenges [1] 21/5
challenging [2] 5/8 11/25
change [3] 11/9 16/4 30/5
charged [3] 11/12 11/17 23/13
check [3] 24/16 24/21 30/18
```




| F | Gospel [1] 26/19 |
| :---: | :---: |
| factually [1] $15 / 2$ <br> fail [1] 35/11 <br> fair [3] $12 / 16 \quad 23 / 2436 / 9$ <br> fairly [2] $6 / 10 \quad 22 / 8$ <br> far [3] $9 / 17 \quad 28 / 1034 / 18$ <br> fast [1] $28 / 16$ <br> fatal [1] $6 / 1$ <br> FCRR [1] 37/11 <br> federal [3] $5 / 8 \quad 18 / 21 \quad 34 / 24$ <br> few [2] 23/1 30/12 <br> figure [1] 34/16 | ```governed [1] 14/18 grant [1] 34/15 granted [1] 25/3 grants [1] 6/13 Grayned [1] 7/19 great [4] 13/23 33/10 33/11 33/12 greater [1] 20/23 grounds [2] 5/16 6/21 guidance [8] 9/21 17/25 18/11 28/4 29/6 30/7 30/9 34/18 guidelines [1] 10/22``` |
| figuring [1] 15/21 | H |
| file [1] 11/15 | ```hand [1] 27/3 handing [2] 7/16 8/3 happen [1] 29/9 happy [2] 25/7 31/25 hard [2] 35/16 35/25 has [23] 7/11 8/7 8/12 8/17 10/2 10/5 10/16 11/2 11/3 15/7``` |
| filing [1] 28/17 |  |
| final [2] 33/18 36/20 |  |
| final [2] financially [1] $29 / 12$ |  |
| finding [1] 29 |  |
| fine [4] 14/2 18/21 25/10 25/12 |  |
| firearm [1] 10/12 first [5] 4/7 5/12 $6 / 25$ 2 | 31/12 33/8 35/11 |
| st [5] 4/7 5/12 6/25 24/14 26/25 [1] 12/2 | hasn't [2] 34/18 35/4 |
|  | have [53] |
| focus [4] 5/4 6/6 | haven't [1] 34/19 |
| follow [1] 20/25 | hazardous [2] 17/15 17/18 he [3] 7/13 22/10 32/8 |
| follow-up [1] 20/25 |  |
| foregoing [1] 37/5 | healthcare [31] 11/4 11/11 11/11 11/20 11/20 15/13 15/15 |
| foremost [1] 24/14 | 15/21 15/22 15/24 16/1 16/4 16/10 16/10 16/11 17/20 19/21 |
| formally [1] 24/24 | 20/4 20/6 20/15 21/19 21/20 21/22 21/23 22/1 26/11 26/12 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { ward [2] } 4 / 19 \\ & \text { ur [1] } 36 / 19 \end{aligned}$ | 27/19 27/21 29/9 30/12 |
| framework [1] 14/4 | hear [3] 25/10 30/18 32/7 |
| frankly [1] 11/5 | heard [1] 26/12 <br> hearing [4] 1/11 3/2 12/4 22/17 |
| free [3] 9/12 34/11 34/11 | heart [2] 34/13 35/5 |
| freedoms [1] 26/25 | help [1] 33/9 |
| Friday [2] 36/18 36/21 frontier [1] 23/20 | helpful [1] 33/23 |
| FTC [1] 11/13 | helps [1] 16/7 |
| functions [1] 19/16 | her [2] 7/5 7/10 <br> here [20] 4/4 4/21 6/3 6/18 7/15 10/2 10/4 10/23 11/1 $12 / 7$ |
| fundamental [4] 8/24 14/21 19/15 34/14 fundamentally [1] 34/15 | 13/12 19/5 19/6 19/12 23/10 25/13 26/5 31/7 31/20 35/17 |
| further [11] 10/11 14/9 14/24 17/24 21/2 29/1 31/4 31/25 | Here's [1] 16/3 |
| $32 / 732 / 936 / 10$ | Hey [1] 35/9 |
| G |  |
| gave [1] 8/13 hoc [1] 7/22 |  |
| general [3] 6/5 32/3 34/14 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Hoffman [3] 10/19 10/20 27/12 } \\ & \text { Honor [37] } 4 / 9 \text { 4/14 5/3 5/20 7/8 } 7 / 19 \text { 9/6 10/4 10/5 12/20 } \end{aligned}$ |
| generally [2] 9/17 29/24 |  |
| get [21] 13/5 14/17 15/3 19/11 19/19 21/14 24/14 24/14 25/13 25/15 26/7 27/22 28/3 28/24 29/4 29/23 32/25 32/25 | 22/23 23/11 24/9 24/21 25/14 25/23 31/21 32/11 32/13 <br> 32/24 33/7 33/8 34/10 34/11 36/12 36/23 36/24 |
| 33/5 34/5 36/19 | Honor's [4] 10/7 24/3 27/6 36/7 |
| getting [1] 18/22 give [6] 16/5 28/12 28/23 30/7 30/9 35/18 | HONORABLE [1] 1/13 |
| Given [7] 17/24 20/15 24/6 28/2 31/3 34/17 36/1 | hospital [2] 29/11 29/13 |
| gives [1] 30/18 | hospitals [7] $1 / 44 / 5$ 19/23 19/25 23/16 23/20 23/20 |
| giving [2] 12/7 34/15 | House [2] 5/24 |
| go [18] $12 / 3$ 13/18 13/18 13/25 14/8 14/24 14/25 16/2 17/9 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { how [13] 9/24 10/1 19/24 22/4 27/8 27/10 29/3 29/13 } 30 \\ & 30 / 2 \text { 30/7 34/17 35/4 } \end{aligned}$ |
| 19/14 [31/1 $7 / 18$ 14/9 27/11 goes [3] | hypothetical [5] 18/23 20/14 26/20 27/2 35/8 |
| going [23] 8/14 11/7 11/22 13/10 14/2 14/7 14/7 14/17 | I |
| 22/13 22/14 22/18 25/21 28/24 29/22 30/5 32/3 32/8 33/10 33/11 33/12 34/1 36/14 36/19 | I'd [2] 33/18 34/4 |
| gone [1] 36/19 <br> good [7] 4/4 4/9 4/11 4/14 4/16 25/21 29/21 <br> Gorsuch [3] 6/25 7/6 7/12 | I'II [7] 5/9 5/16 8/1 9/14 25/12 27/23 32/9 <br> I'm [11] 9/15 13/16 14/5 21/2 21/16 25/6 25/8 25/12 30/5 31/25 36/19 |


| I | itself [1] 30/7 |
| :---: | :---: |
| I've [3] 11/1 21/1 25/22 | J |
| idea [2] 22/23 24/18 | Johnson [1] 26/24 |
| identified [1] 33/8 | joined [1] 7/5 |
| illegal [1] 10/21 | jointly [1] 5/1 |
| imagine [1] 28/22 | JUDGE [2] 1/14 22/7 |
| impermissible [1] 8/10 | Judge Strand's [1] 22/7 |
| impermissibly [2] 7/21 9/2 | judgment [3] 4/22 31/19 36/16 |
| impinges [1] 9/12 | jurisdiction [1] 36/5 |
| implicated [1] 26/25 implicating [1] 29/17 | just [9] 4/23 15/19 17/19 24/19 25/12 28/13 33/24 36/1 |
| importance [2] 19/3 28/17 | 36/4 |
| important [3] 5/9 8/8 8/13 | Justices [1] 6/25 |
| impose [1] 22/14 <br> imposes [1] 20/23 | K |
| imprecise [2] 19/9 21/8 | Kagan [2] 6/25 7/10 |
| imprecision [1] 21/11 | Kagan's [1] 7/2 |
| improve [1] 33/11 | keep [2] 5/9 35/23 |
| improving [1] 33/22 | key [1] 13/5 |
| inappropriate [1] 31/17 | keys [1] 8/4 |
| include [1] 16/19 including [2] 18/5 33/4 | kind [5] 19/11 25/1 33/21 35/7 35/16 |
|  | knock [1] 22/18 |
| increase [2] 11/4 15/25 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { know [11] 11/23 13/9 14/8 14/12 18/6 20/15 21/25 28/ } \\ & \text { 28/23 29/15 30/23 } \end{aligned}$ |
| increased [1] 15/23 | knowledge [2] 23/13 23/16 |
| increasingly [1] 7/15 | L |
| independent [1] 18/17 | laid [1] 33/9 |
| INDEX [1] 3/1 | language [3] 5/22 23/6 34/14 |
| indicate [1] 5/6 | large [1] 24/8 |
| indications [1] 29/23 | last [4] 4/18 4/22 5/14 27/4 |
| influx [2] 11/2 29/13 | later [2] 36/18 36/20 |
| inform [1] 9/21 | law [43] |
| informal [1] 28/14 | law-making [2] 8/4 19/15 |
| informally [3] 24/24 28/10 28/11 | laws [2] 5/15 11/14 |
| informing [1] 14/9 | lawsuit [1] 11/24 |
| infusion [1] 11/9 | lay [1] 29/14 |
| initial [2] 10/24 10/25 | leads [1] 20/25 |
| injurious [1] 35/18 | leans [1] 6/12 |
| insufficient [1] 34/6 | learn [2] 32/21 32/25 |
| intended [4] 16/19 17/9 26/23 27/15 | least [5] 7/4 10/16 33/3 34/4 34/23 |
| intention [2] 11/15 29/12 | left [2] 15/4 19/15 |
| interest [1] 22/17 | legal [2] 25/19 26/15 |
| interesting [1] 33/19 | legislative [1] 12/21 |
| interfere [1] 15/13 | legislature [13] 6/2 8/3 10/16 11/2 13/10 14/24 16/2 19/14 |
| interpret [1] 27/8 | 31/4 34/7 35/10 35/11 35/17 |
| interpretation [3] 17/22 17/24 30/20 | legitimate [1] 22/2 |
| interrupt [1] 13/13 | leniency [1] 25/1 |
| interrupting [2] 13/12 25/8 | lenient [3] 9/18 23/1 23/3 |
| invalid [1] 31/14 | lens [1] 19/2 |
| invalidating [1] 6/21 | less [3] 9/17 9/19 29/25 |
| invitation [1] 22/12 | let [4] 10/7 22/22 25/12 27/23 |
| invite [4] 4/7 4/12 9/15 32/9 | let's [5] 21/16 26/7 27/22 32/7 35/8 |
| inviting [1] 13/16 | level [1] 11/19 |
| involving [1] 11/8 | like [9] 6/5 9/12 11/12 25/21 27/16 28/6 30/18 33/2 36/10 |
| ipsi [1] 15/20 | likely [6] 13/21 13/21 24/20 28/5 29/4 29/21 |
| is [148] | limit [2] 10/18 33/11 |
| isn't [6] 13/11 14/4 15/16 31/7 33/3 34/1 | limited [1] 32/8 |
| issue [4] 12/5 19/19 31/16 34/2 | limiting [3] 16/24 33/23 34/12 |
| issues [2] 5/4 27/22 | limits [1] 16/24 |
| it [86] <br> it's [22] <br> $4 / 25$ | line [2] 6/4 21/2 |
| it's [22] 4/25 6/2 8/10 10/17 10/17 13/6 13/15 14/6 14/22 | lines [1] 27/8 |
| $15 / 18$ $17 / 12$ <br> $34 / 23$ $21 / 18$ | list [3] 30/2 33/19 33/20 |
| 34/23 35/5 35/12 | little [6] 20/7 21/1 21/2 25/10 30/6 34/12 |
| items [1] 10/20 | LLP [1] $2 / 2$ |
| its [13] 5/7 7/11 8/4 8/17 15/19 16/17 16/21 17/6 23/6 24/23 26/23 27/2 27/15 | locate [1] 5/23 |



```
O
once [3] 14/15 15/3 19/11
one [23] 5/23 6/24 7/6 8/6 10/8 11/25 13/11 14/24 15/9
    18/2 18/10 18/20 21/19 23/3 24/12 25/6 30/6 30/24 32/5
    33/4 33/20 34/8 34/25
one-third [1] 33/20
only[9] 6/16 11/22 13/2 13/20 16/16 22/11 25/23 28/1
35/13
oOo [1] 37/3
Open [1] 4/3
operate [1] 8/19
opinion [18] 4/18 4/23 5/4 5/6 5/10 6/7 6/9 6/12 7/1 7/5
7/10 7/13 8/25 17/12 19/8 21/8 21/12 22/7
opinions [1] 8/14
opportunity [4] 24/22 28/3 31/3 33/3
opposed [1] 29/22
opposition [1] 26/18
option [1] 31/12
oral [1] 36/15
order [4] 13/4 14/25 17/14 20/8
OREGON [19] 1/2 1/4 1/7 1/7 2/3 2/5 2/6 4/5 4/6 11/17
    11/25 19/22 34/3 34/3 34/5 34/7 35/20 35/21 35/22
organization [2] 18/20 21/25
original [1] 37/7
originally [1] 19/3
other [17] 5/2 12/23 17/7 17/8 17/9 18/1 18/19 22/22 23/11
24/9 25/17 26/8 27/22 29/2 30/13 30/16 35/14
otherwise [5] 17/15 18/2 25/18 30/16 36/11
our [24] 5/6 6/12 6/13 6/23 8/20 10/23 12/18 12/19 13/1
    13/6 13/8 14/24 16/1 18/20 19/11 19/15 20/18 20/22 21/10
    22/8 23/21 24/11 24/15 26/4
out[11] 6/3 15/8 15/21 19/19 22/18 24/1 28/10 29/3 33/9
34/16 36/20
out-of-state [1] 24/1
outlined [1] 19/7
outstanding [2] 36/14 36/15
over [2] 7/17 8/3
overbreadth [4] 25/24 26/1 26/2 32/6
overlap [1] 6/10
own [1] 36/17
ownership [2] 11/3 11/9
P
page[5] 19/7 21/10 25/24 26/18 32/5
paid [1] 11/5
Papachristou [1] 24/4
papers [2] 18/11 21/18
parallels [1] 5/24
part [3] 15/16 15/17 19/14
particular [3] 29/11 34/25 35/24
particularly [1] 24/6
parties [8] 12/1 13/24 14/9 24/24 27/13 28/15 28/22 29/19
parts [1] 10/7
party [3] 5/24 32/17 33/9
passed [1] 13/10
patient [2] 11/18 23/16
people [5] 9/22 16/3 16/5 29/14 31/8
perceived [1] 11/2
perfectly [1] 15/2
perhaps [2] 6/12 6/15
person [1] 21/25
perspective [1] 5/11
persuade [1] 22/6
piece [3] 34/25 35/24 36/5
pillars [1] 7/14
place [2] 35/16 35/25
plaintiff[11] 1/5 2/2 4/7 4/10 10/2 20/3 20/13 21/19 25/20
```

26/10 26/11
plaintiffs [1] 5/1
planning [1] 13/19
please [1] 30/19
plurality [2] 7/2 7/7
point [16] 5/20 13/5 13/6 18/14 23/24 24/3 24/9 24/11
24/17 27/4 29/5 31/25 32/22 32/23 33/18 34/21
points [10] 5/9 6/5 22/23 25/6 25/11 25/12 25/17 26/8 30/6 34/7
policemen [1] 25/4
policy [1] 7/21
political [1] 7/18
Portland [4] 1/7 1/24 2/3 2/6
position [4] 17/4 18/4 26/4 31/16
positive [1] 12/12
possibility [1] 21/24
possible [2] 22/13 26/20
possibly [1] 27/7
potentially [1] 23/9
powers [2] 5/19 7/12
pre [9] 14/6 20/24 24/10 24/12 24/22 28/8 28/9 28/17 32/12
pre-enforcement [3] 20/24 24/10 24/12
pre-filing [1] 28/17
pre-notice [4] 14/6 28/8 28/9 32/12
pre-preliminary [1] 24/22
precise [2] 15/2 22/9
precisely [1] 19/22
prefer [1] 5/1
prejudicial [1] 17/15
preliminary [11] $14 / 10$ 14/12 14/13 14/14 14/18 14/19
16/18 24/18 24/22 27/25 28/16
premise [1] $8 / 24$
prepared [1] 31/24
prerogative [1] 13/15
pretty [4] 5/21 24/2 29/15 29/20
prevention [1] 8/9
price [2] 11/11 30/12
prices [4] 11/5 11/18 15/14 17/20
pricing [1] 15/23
primarily [2] 11/8 12/7
principles [1] 18/7
private [4] 11/2 11/10 24/1 29/11
probably [8] 4/25 12/4 28/11 28/21 28/23 29/6 35/9 36/21
problem [5] 6/18 9/19 11/21 14/16 14/22
problems [1] 35/2
procedure [1] 29/22
proceedings [2] 1/12 37/6
process [9] $8 / 1$ 8/2 $12 / 7$ 14/6 14/8 14/8 14/16 16/7 28/16
professionals [1] 23/5
prohibited [1] 18/21
promise [1] 36/18
promulgate [1] 30/25
promulgated [3] 15/7 17/11 31/2
promulgating [1] 31/13
prong [1] 8/13
proposal [1] 29/1
proposition [1] 8/23
prospective [3] 12/1 28/3 29/20
prove [2] 24/5 24/11
proved [1] 21/11
provide [10] $13 / 3$ 13/7 13/8 13/9 14/15 14/16 28/7 28/25 29/7 31/3
provided [2] 33/4 34/6
providers [3] 11/6 11/20 16/11
provision [3] 15/22 18/3 30/25
public [2] 17/16 17/18
pull [1] 19/1


| S | state [12] 1/7 4/6 4/23 6/16 9/25 24/1 29/2 34/7 34/23 |
| :---: | :---: |
| ```seeing [1] 5/12 seem [2] 24/7 27/9 seminal [1] \(7 / 19\) send [2] 34/2 36/5 sense [3] 27/17 29/21 32/24 separate [2] 6/21 10/7 separation [2] 5/19 7/11 serious [1] 20/3 serve [2] 9/1 10/18 services [5] 16/1 29/9 29/15 30/4 30/12 set [1] 15/8 sets [1] 10/9 several [1] 5/14 shall [1] 32/17 shift [2] \(5 / 13\) 25/24 should [7] 6/15 15/12 21/14 22/25 31/18 35/1 36/4 shouldn't [1] 36/3 show [2] 21/6 27/2 shy [1] 25/8 SI [1] \(1 / 5\) side [1] 34/24 sides [2] 36/13 36/15 signature [3] 37/8 37/8 37/8 signed [1] 37/8 significant [7] 5/13 5/17 6/10 6/17 7/9 11/7 24/7 signing [1] \(37 / 5\) similar [2] 5/22 5/25 SIMON [1] 1/13 simply [1] 34/9 since [1] 35/4 situation [4] 19/6 19/6 22/14 27/18 situations [2] 26/21 29/8 slightly [1] 24/5 so [43] solid [1] 27/20 some [24] 5/1 7/25 8/25 10/16 11/12 11/14 16/24 18/7 18/22 19/20 20/6 20/14 20/22 21/25 24/18 27/17 28/2 28/3 29/2 29/25 31/16 33/5 33/21 34/21 somehow [2] 11/21 18/7 someone [2] 13/17 21/5 something [11] 6/3 9/11 9/13 10/14 15/3 18/16 28/13 29/16 34/1 35/10 36/2 somewhat [1] 25/5 sooner [1] 36/21 sophisticated [3] 23/12 24/2 27/13 sophistication [1] 23/21 sort [4] 25/24 27/4 27/10 30/1 sounds [2] 27/16 33/2 source [4] 8/17 18/4 18/17 18/19 speak [2] 5/7 25/5 speaking [1] 25/15 specific [5] 5/10 15/2 18/15 23/5 31/8 specified [2] 19/10 19/13 spectrum [1] 27/10 speculation [1] 26/20 speculative [1] 22/2 speech [1] 9/12``` | 34/24 36/2 36/5 <br> stated [1] 7/20 <br> statement [1] 11/15 <br> STATES [5] 1/1 1/14 1/23 22/7 26/24 <br> statute [46] <br> statutes [1] 18/15 <br> statutory [7] 14/4 14/18 17/13 18/1 30/25 34/13 35/13 <br> step [2] 14/9 14/24 <br> still [1] 20/18 <br> Stoel [1] 2/2 <br> Strand's [1] 22/7 <br> streamline [1] 29/14 <br> Street [1] 2/5 <br> strict [1] 9/17 <br> strike [3] 31/1 34/9 35/24 <br> strikes [1] 22/1 <br> striking [1] 5/23 <br> struck [3] 5/15 20/1 34/22 <br> structural [2] 8/1 8/2 <br> structure [2] 5/22 13/4 <br> structured [1] 17/5 <br> struggled [1] 27/8 <br> struggling [1] 29/12 <br> stuck [1] 35/19 <br> Stupka [1] 22/7 <br> sub [2] 9/21 29/6 <br> sub-law [1] 9/21 <br> sub-regulatory [1] 29/6 <br> subject [6] 9/17 9/22 13/20 20/22 23/3 33/21 <br> submissions [1] 28/15 <br> submit [1] 32/17 <br> substantial [1] 30/3 <br> substantive [3] 16/9 24/15 33/1 <br> subtle [1] $5 / 12$ <br> such [4] 6/20 8/11 28/1 32/19 <br> sufficient [1] 22/17 <br> suggest [1] 30/22 <br> suggests [1] 23/1 <br> Suite [1] 2/3 <br> summarized [1] 10/6 <br> summary [3] 4/22 31/19 36/16 <br> supplemental [3] 20/8 21/10 22/8 <br> supply [2] 11/19 15/11 <br> support [2] 26/22 28/15 <br> supports [2] 36/1 36/3 <br> Supreme [5] 9/4 34/4 34/23 34/24 35/21 <br> Supreme Court [1] 9/4 <br> sure [3] 11/7 14/5 18/18 <br> surely [1] 26/22 <br> surgery [1] 34/12 <br> surprising [1] 8/6 <br> survived [1] 5/25 <br> suspect [1] 34/4 <br> SW [3] 1/24 2/3 2/5 <br> sweep [1] 24/7 <br> system [1] 29/14 <br> SYSTEMS [3] 1/4 4/5 19/23 |
| staffing [1] 23/17 | T |
| stage [1] 11/24 <br> standard [29] 10/10 10/17 10/21 10/24 10/25 13/2 13/9 <br> 14/19 14/19 15/1 15/1 19/7 19/9 19/9 19/13 21/5 21/7 21/9 <br> 21/9 21/14 22/19 23/1 23/3 25/1 27/12 27/17 33/20 35/12 35/19 <br> standardless [3] 8/10 8/12 16/12 <br> standards [1] 34/6 <br> standing [7] 20/7 20/9 20/10 20/13 20/18 25/25 26/5 |  |


| T | 29/20 30/8 30/22 32/19 32/19 33/6 35/18 |
| :---: | :---: |
| ```talks [1] 7/13 technical [2] 23/4 23/6 tell [4] 9/8 9/15 11/1 16/3 tells [1] 15/20 tension [2] 6/6 6/8 tentative [11] 4/18 4/23 5/4 6/7 17/12 20/2 25/19 25/20 31/24 32/3 34/2 term [1] 26/13 terms [1] 12/21 terrorist [1] 18/19 test [1] 33/22``` | ```transactions [10] 11/23 11/25 12/1 14/23 16/5 23/9 23/18 24/8 29/8 31/9 transcript [3] 1/12 37/6 37/7 true [1] 29/24 try [2] 29/2 34/22 trying [3] 21/16 25/12 25/15 twin [1] 7/14 two [8] 5/1 5/9 6/23 8/18 10/7 25/6 27/22 36/16 type [4] 11/16 16/24 29/22 33/5 types [4] 11/22 19/22 29/8 29/8 typically [2] 23/3 23/12``` |
| than [3] 18/1 36/18 36/20 | U |
| thank [7] 5/3 5/3 25/14 32/11 36/22 36/23 36/24 that [252] | ultimately [2] 19/13 34/3 unable [1] 5/23 |
| their [5] 13/2 18/10 22/16 34/18 35/13 | unambiguously [3] 21/20 21/23 26/10 uncertainty [1] 19/20 |
| them [7] 7/22 11/23 16/7 22/18 23/19 30/18 32/1 | unclear [2] 19/21 27/25 |
| themselves [2] 22/15 29/21 | uncommon [1] 34/23 |
| $\text { 10/21 } 11 / 21 \text { 14/2 14/15 14/16 15/7 15/8 17/23 18/8 18/16 }$ | unconditionally [1] 13/23 unconstitutional [1] 9/2 |
| 18/21 20/21 20/25 22/4 26/7 26/11 27/13 27/19 27/23 28/12 31/5 32/7 32/9 32/25 33/12 33/15 35/19 | undecidedly [1] 24/7 |
| then you're [1] 14/15 | under [10] 11/13 18/21 26/6 26/11 29/15 33/4 34/19 35/22 36/11 36/17 |
| theoretical [1] 21/24 | underlying [1] 7/11 |
|  | undermines [1] 8/23 |
| (11/7 12/22 14/12 19/12 19/19 19/24 20/3 20/5 21/24 22/17 |  |
| 24/22 25/18 28/2 28/9 29/25 30/3 30/16 33/3 | understanding [5] 9/15 9/25 14/4 26/1 31/15 |
| there's [10] $6 / 20$ 14/3 16/16 19/20 23/13 23/21 27/10 28/2 28/13 34/6 | unique [2] 5/21 19/6 |
|  | UNITED [5] 1/1 1/14 1/23 22/7 26/24 |
| lhese [10] 8/14 11/22 11/25 12/8 17/7 27/10 28/12 31/9 | United States [2] 22/7 26/24 |
| 32/20 35/9 | unknown [1] 20/14 unless [2] 5/1 26/25 |
| they [43] $10 / 610 / 7$ 10/8 20/15 21/25 25/21 29/4 31/3 |  |
|  | 17/19 30/12 |
| they've [2] 5/17 17/11 | up [5] 7/12 12/4 20/25 34/1 34/ |
| thing [1] 25/23 | upon [2] 9/10 30/11 |
| things [5] 13/11 23/5 27/11 28/6 35/14 | us [6] 7/9 8/13 12/2 18/25 20/24 24/25 |
| think [80] | uses [2] 23/6 33/20 |
| $\text { third [2] } 1 / 2433 / 20$ | V |
| this [53] |  |
| thorough [1] 29/7 | vagueness [19] 5/13 5/16 5/18 5/25 6/9 6/11 6/21 7/11 |
| those [22] 5/17 6/5 7/24 9/17 9/18 10/14 13/1 13/24 14/1 | 7/14 7/16 8/1 8/9 9/9 9/18 10/1 26/6 26/20 26/25 27/14 |
| 16/9 16/15 17/13 17/16 19/5 21/12 22/24 24/5 29/16 31/10 | valid [1] 26/22 |
| thought [7] 10/25 11/20 12/9 13/17 15/11 24/18 $30 / 10$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Van [8] 2/4 4/15 4/16 25/10 25/15 32/9 33/2 36/10 } \\ & \text { variety [1] 15/9 } \end{aligned}$ |
| threat [1] 22/12 | vary [1] 27/9 |
| three [3] 5/14 6/6 16/9 threshold [2] 5/9 5/20 | vast [5] 10/6 19/5 23/9 26/23 27/15 |
| threshold [2] | versus [1] 4/6 |
| through [5] 13/25 14/8 15/3 1 | very [3] 18/22 28/16 29/7 |
| tied [1] 5/17 |  |
| time [2] 25/9 25/21 | 16/12 17/21 19/11 19/15 20/18 24/11 24/15 |
| today [2] 5/5 36/17 | violative [2] 18/7 30/16 |
| tolerates [1] 27/13 | W |
| too [7] 13/13 13/13 22/1 24/5 24/11 31/10 31/11 | want [11] 13/25 19/19 25/9 25/11 25/18 25/19 27/24 28/23 |
| topics [1] 30/5 | 31/23 32/2 36/13 |
| totally [1] 16/12 | wanted [3] 11/6 11/12 11/14 |
| touch [3] 5/10 5/16 22/22 | wanting [1] 18/20 |
|  | wants [2] 13/17 30/17 |
| transaction [35] 11/8 11/8 11/16 12/3 13/4 13/7 13/9 13/17 13/18 13/19 13/25 14/7 14/17 14/25 15/5 15/8 16/8 17/14 18/6 18/8 23/25 24/13 24/15 24/19 28/1 28/12 28/15 28/19 | was [21] 5/22 6/3 6/3 7/2 7/5 7/7 10/19 10/21 11/7 12/9 16/19 19/19 21/10 22/10 23/12 24/9 26/18 27/23 32/5 32/24 |

```
W
was... [1] 36/14
water [1] 25/1
way[13] 13/2 13/12 14/3 17/4 17/19 18/15 19/14 19/18
19/19 19/23 29/4 33/25 34/8
we [85]
we're [13] 11/24 13/19 18/22 20/19 22/14 22/18 23/14
23/17 24/3 27/9 28/25 33/10 35/19
weaker [2] 23/10 25/5
week [4] 4/18 4/22 36/18 36/20
weeks [1] 36/19
welcome [1] 13/13
well [8] 5/18 13/14 15/11 18/19 25/4 25/11 30/15 35/20
were [6] 5/22 13/1 20/20 30/24 31/16 35/8
what [52]
what's [8] 7/9 10/23 12/25 14/13 17/9 26/15 32/22 33/19
whatever [8] 13/1 16/17 17/6 19/17 33/13 33/16 35/12
35/12
when [12] 9/19 12/17 13/3 15/21 15/22 19/2 20/5 22/11
25/1 26/22 27/15 31/9
where [6] 5/10 7/6 22/14 27/18 29/8 35/3
wherever [1] 24/17
whether [30] 12/9 13/9 14/10 14/17 14/21 16/6 16/7 20/15
21/11 21/25 24/13 24/13 27/25 28/1 28/2 28/4 28/18 28/25
29/1 29/4 29/21 30/3 30/8 30/9 30/11 31/7 31/10 31/10
32/19 33/5
which [24] 7/19 7/19 8/9 8/25 11/17 13/6 13/9 15/9 18/23
19/4 19/4 19/6 19/7 19/8 19/21 21/10 21/12 22/6 22/7 22/23
25/2 26/24 29/6 35/14
while [3] 6/18 11/19 24/6
who [6] 9/22 16/3 20/6 21/5 23/25 24/24
whole [2] 6/3 16/23
wholesalely [1] 8/4
whom [1] 27/19
why [3] 22/3 23/2 36/3
will [28] 4/12 6/14 12/3 14/11 15/5 15/8 15/12 15/19 15/22
15/23 17/5 17/6 18/8 18/22 19/17 22/5 24/21 26/21 27/24
28/11 28/25 29/1 29/16 33/6 36/11 36/15 36/18 36/19
willing [2] 21/2 28/25
wish [2] 24/24 32/10
within [2] 12/2 23/21
without [2] 7/17 37/7
won't [1] 24/14
work [1] 10/16
works [1] 29/14
would [28] 5/1 6/5 8/11 9/1 11/10 11/21 12/17 13/3 13/3
17/3 18/21 20/21 20/22 21/23 22/16 22/18 24/17 28/11
28/19 29/5 30/18 31/4 32/13 34/3 34/11 35/11 35/21 36/10
written [1] 32/18
wrong [1] 11/1
Y
Yeah [1] 28/22
years [1] 5/14
Yes [5] 4/19 4/20 7/3 12/15 26/14
yet [1] 17/10
you [102]
you'd [2] 21/1 34/4
you're [23] 11/22 13/13 14/15 14/16 15/4 16/22 16/23
21/17 22/11 22/12 24/13 27/11 27/12 27/18 28/19 29/10
29/16 29/19 30/1 30/1 35/20 35/23 35/25
You've [1] 35/25
your [58]
Your Honor [26] 5/20 7/8 7/19 9/6 10/4 10/5 12/20 12/23
15/17 18/12 19/1 19/2 19/7 19/25 20/17 22/23 23/11 24/9
24/21 25/14 25/23 31/21 32/13 32/24 34/10 34/11
Your Honor's [4] 10/7 24/3 27/6 36/7
```

